Duma v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Limited (No 4)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Duma v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Limited (No 4) [2023] FCA 159

File number: NSD 420 of 2020
Judgment of: KATZMANN J
Date of judgment: 3 March 2023
Catchwords:

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – where previous judgment erroneously stated that respondents had not pressed a particular part of their defence – where judge consequently failed to consider submissions on the point supposedly not pressed – whether in such circumstances orders previously made can be varied under r 39.05(h) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth)

DEFAMATION – where separate defamation proceedings initiated in respect of two different sets of publications – where applicant held entitled to damages in one proceeding and the other proceeding settled for a confidential sum – whether the different sets of publications had the “same meaning or effect” for the purposes of ss 38(1)(d) and 38(1)(e) of the Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) – whether amount of damages awarded ought to be reduced on account of the confidential settlement sum

Legislation:

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 39.05(h))

Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) ss 38(1)(d), 38(1)(e)

Defamation Act 1952 (UK) s 12 

Cases cited:

Autodesk Inc v Dyason (No 2) (1993) 176 CLR 300

Carson v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd (1993) 178 CLR 44

Cassell & Co Ltd v Broome [1972] AC 1027

Chau v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (No 3) [2021] FCA 44; 386 ALR 36

Chau v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd [2019] FCA 185

Dingle v Associated Newspapers Ltd [1961] 2 QB 162

Duma v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd (No 3) [2023] FCA 47

Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd v Gayle (2019) 100 NSWLR 155

Flint v Richard Busuttil & Company Pty Ltd (2013) 216 FCR 375

Gayle v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd (No 2) [2018] NSWSC 1838

Hayson v The Age Company Pty Ltd (No 2) [2020] FCA 361

Lewis v Daily Telegraph Ltd [1964] AC 234

Patel v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (No 4) (2012) 208 FCR 128

Storey & Keers Pty Ltd v Johnstone (1987) 9 NSWLR 446

Tabbaa v Nine Network Australia Pty Ltd [2019] NSWCA 69

Theo v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [1998] FCA 862; 4 ATR 404

Division: General Division
Registry: New South Wales
National Practice Area: Other Federal Jurisdiction
Number of paragraphs: 70
Date of hearing: 28 February 2023
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr N Olson
Solicitor for the Applicant: Mark O’Brien Legal
Counsel for the Respondents: Mr D R Sibtain with Mr M Lewis
Solicitor for the Respondents: Banki Haddock Fiora

ORDERS

NSD 420 of 2020
BETWEEN:

WILLIAM MARRA DUMA

Applicant

AND:

FAIRFAX MEDIA PUBLICATIONS PTY LTD

First Respondent

ANGUS GRIGG

Second Respondent

JEMIMA WHYTE

Third Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

KATZMANN J

DATE OF ORDER:

3 MARCH 2023

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.Order 2 of the orders made on 7 February 2023 be varied by substituting “$465,000” for “$545,000”.

2.Pursuant to r 36.03(b) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), any notice of appeal be filed by 17 March…

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Details
Case
[2023] FCA 159
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Duma v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Limited (No 4) involved the plaintiff, Duma, seeking damages for defamation against the respondents. The dispute centred on two separate defamation proceedings related to different sets of publications. In one proceeding, Duma was awarded damages, while the other settled confidentially. The key issues before the court were whether the publications had the "same meaning or effect" and whether the damages awarded should be reduced due to the confidential settlement. The court was also asked to consider whether an error in the principal judgment could lead to a variation of the orders under r 39.05(h) of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

The court identified an error in the principal judgment, where it was mistakenly stated that a particular defence was not pressed, leading to a failure to consider relevant submissions. This misapprehension was due to the court's oversight and not the neglect of the respondents. The court examined the purpose of the slip rule, which allows for the variation of orders to avoid injustice caused by accidental slips or omissions. The court had to determine if the error could be corrected under this rule. The respondents argued for a reduction in the damages awarded to Duma, citing the confidential settlement as a factor.

After reviewing the authorities and the submissions, the court found that the publications did not have the same meaning or effect. The court also concluded that the damages awarded should be reduced, taking into account the confidential settlement sum. The court exercised its discretion under the slip rule to vary the order and reduce the damages from $545,000 to $465,000. Additionally, the court ordered that any notice of appeal must be filed by a specific date and that the respondents pay Duma's costs on a party and party basis until a certain date and on an indemnity basis thereafter.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Order 2 of the orders made on 7 February 2023 be varied by substituting “$465,000” for “$545,000”.

2. Pursuant to r 36.03(b) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), any notice of appeal be filed by 17 March 2023.

BY CONSENT, THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

3. The respondents pay the applicant’s costs of the proceeding:

a. on a party and party basis until 23 February 2021; and

b. on an indemnity basis from 24 February 2021.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Later that day, after the dispute was resolved, I made orders by consent giving effect to the terms of the settlement. Those orders relevantly provided for judgment to be entered in Mr Duma’s favour and for the respondents to pay him “compensation” in an amount which the parties agreed to keep confidential, as well as costs in an agreed sum. Error in the principal judgment In the principal judgment (at [441]) I stated that para 26(f) of the defence was not pressed. Shortly after the publication of the principal judgment, the respondents emailed my chambers to inform me that para 26(f) of the defence had been pressed and that the implications of the settlement in the second proceeding for the assessment of damages fixed in the principal judgment had been addressed in both written and oral submissions. At the time of writing I checked the orders that I had made in the second proceeding, noted the reference to the amount of damages being confidential, and did not recall seeing the figure, which was included in the offer of compromise annexed to Mr Svilans’ affidavit. While the orders went on to indicate that there were references to the amount in Mr Svilans’ affidavit, I did not notice that particular order at the time and did not read the offer of compromise in which the sum appeared. Consequently, I proceeded on the mistaken belief that I had not been informed of the figure. That misconception was the basis of my statement at [441] of the principal judgment. I erroneously assumed that the point in para 26(f) of the defence was not pressed because I had not been informed of the figure. A review of the parties’ written submissions and the transcript confirms that the point was not abandoned.Can order 2 be varied under the slip rule? I was invited by the respondents to vary order 2 by reducing the amount of the damages awarded to Mr Duma under r 39.05(h) of the Rules, which permits the Court to “vary or set aside a judgment or order after it has been entered if … there is an error arising in a judgment or order from an accidental slip or omission” (the slip rule). The first question, then, is whether order 2 can be varied under the slip rule in the present circumstances. In Flint v Richard Busuttil & Company Pty Ltd (2013) 216 FCR 375 at [26] the Full Court described the purpose of the slip rule in the following way:The purpose of the slip rule is to avoid injustice to litigants (Gould v Vaggelas (1985) 157 CLR 215 at 274-275) by ensuring that the Court’s judgment or order reflects its intention at the time the order was made or the judgment was published, or reflects the intention that the Court would have had but for the failure that caused the accidental slip or omission: Symes v Commonwealth (1987) 89 FLR 356 at 357 … In Autodesk Inc v Dyason (No 2) (1993) 176 CLR 300 at 303 Mason CJ explained that the jurisdiction is not to be exercised for the purpose of enabling arguments already considered by the Court to be re-agitated or because the party seeking the variation has failed to present an argument “in all its aspects or as well as it might have been put”. Rather, his Honour said:What must emerge, in order to enliven the exercise of the jurisdiction, is that the Court has apparently proceeded according to some misapprehension of the facts or the relevant law and that this misapprehension cannot be attributed solely to the neglect or default of the party seeking the rehearing.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Accordingly, Mr Duma submitted that the damages awarded in the second proceeding “should be no more than a very modest one”.Consideration The sting of the April articles was that the proceeds of the bribe Mr Duma was alleged to have received as a result of his allegedly corrupt dealings with Horizon were channelled into the purchase of a house in Queensland — in other words, he not only conspired with Mr Ketan to receive a bribe but he was also involved in a money-laundering scheme to conceal his wrongdoing and he rewarded Mr Seeto for his role in the scheme. They repeated some, but not all, of the defamatory imputations conveyed by the February articles and added new ones. It is fair to say that, save in relation to the last two of the imputations, they were to the same effect. No evidence was adduced concerning the amount Mr Duma received or agreed to receive. Presumably this was a deliberate decision on the respondents’ part because they did not want the amount to be disclosed and did not consider that there was any basis upon which the Court could make a suppression or non-publication order. Mr Svilans’ affidavit was forwarded to my chambers by email on 21 September 2021 but it was never filed or read and the respondents did not tender the offer of compromise or call evidence that it had been accepted. Nevertheless, Mr Duma accepted that the amount was an agreed fact and, in the circumstances, should properly be taken into account, although he maintained that that it should have only a modest effect on the award. The parties referred me to four authorities: Gayle v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd (No 2) [2018] NSWSC 1838 (McCallum J) (Gayle); Chau v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd [2019] FCA 185 (Wigney J) (Chau 2019); Chau v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (No 3) [2021] FCA 44; 386 ALR 36 (Rares J) (Chau 2021); and Hayson v The Age Company Pty Ltd (No 2) [2020] FCA 361 at [195] (Bromwich J) (Hayson). In Gayle at [44]–[45] McCallum J assessed damages for the same defamation brought against three companies. Her Honour indicated “for transparency” that, had individual claims been brought against each of the newspapers, she would have assessed damages against the first company of $250,000, against the second for $200,000 and against the third for $100,000. But she went on to say that:[I]t is necessary to stand back from the sum of those amounts so as to avoid double or triple compensation, while also bearing in mind that the syndicated publication of the articles by each defendant did increase the scope of publication and cause some separate hurt and harm to Mr Gayle. Taking the holistic approach contended for by the defendants, I consider the appropriate total award to be an amount of $300,000. The Court of Appeal declined to interfere with the assessment, noting that the grounds of appeal sought to challenge “an essentially impressionistic evaluation of damages compensating for the defamatory publication”: Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd v Gayle (2019) 100 NSWLR 155 at [161]–[162].