Drysdale and Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (Citizenship)

Case

[2021] AATA 4808

23 December 2021


Drysdale and Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (Citizenship) [2021] AATA 4808 (23 December 2021)

Division:GENERAL DIVISION

File Number:          2021/0087

Re:Yvonne Drysdale

APPLICANT

AndMinister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs

RESPONDENT

DECISION

Tribunal:Deputy President J Sosso

Date:23 December 2021

Place:Brisbane

The decision is under review is set aside and the matter is remitted to the Respondent with the direction that the Applicant satisfies s 21(2)(h) of the Australian Citizenship Act 2007.

.............SGD.....................

Deputy President J Sosso

CATCHWORDS

CITIZENSHIP – review of a decision to refuse the applicant’s application for grant of Australian citizenship, by conferral, under s 24 of the Australian Citizenship Act 2007 (Cth) - whether applicant is a person of good charter -decision under review set aside, and remitted to the Respondent with a direction that the Applicant satisfies s 21(2)(h)

LEGISLATION

Australian Citizenship Act 2007 (Cth)

Drugs Misuse Act 1986 (Qld)

CASES

Ahori and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] AATA 601

BOY19 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 574

Chaang and Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] AATA 72.

Irving v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1996) 68 FCR 422

Minister for Home Affairs v G and Another (2019) 266 FCR 569

Nepi v Northern Territory [1997] NTSC 153

Prasad and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1994] AATA 326

Re Drake and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (No 2) (1979) 2 ALD 634 at 645

R v MacKenny (1983) 76 Cr App R 271

R v McKinnon [2002] QCA 185

Safar and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] AATA 503

SECONDARY MATERIALS

Australian Citizenship Policy Statement

Citizenship Procedural Instructions

REASONS FOR DECISION

Deputy President J Sosso

23 December 2021

INTRODUCTION

  1. Ms Yvonne Drysdale (the Applicant) seeks a review of a decision of a delegate of the Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (the Respondent) to refuse the grant of Australian citizenship, by conferral, pursuant to s 24 of the Australian Citizenship Act 2007 (Cth) (the Act).

  2. The delegate was not satisfied that the Applicant was a person of good character for the purposes of s 21(2)(h).

  3. The Applicant was born in Scotland in July 1963 and arrived in Australia in April 1968 with her parents and siblings– Exhibit 1 T4 p. 36. On arrival, the Applicant was granted a Transitional (Class BF) visa – Exhibit 2 para 3.

  4. The evidence before the Tribunal discloses that the Applicant left school after Year 10 and in the years up to the birth of her first child worked in the florist industry – Exhibit 3 p. 11.

  5. The Applicant has four adult children, with the eldest three more than 30 years of age and the youngest who is 21 years of age – Exhibit 3 p. 10, Exhibit 6. In addition, the Applicant has four grandchildren – Transcript (Tr.) 11.10.2021 pp. 13 - 14. All of the Applicant’s children and grandchildren are Australian citizens.

  6. On 13 December 2019 the Applicant’s application for Australian citizenship by conferral was received by the Department of Home Affairs – Exhibit 1 T4 pp. 1 – 38. At Question 39 of the Application for Citizenship Form the Applicant answered in the affirmative to the following Questions – Exhibit 1 T4 p. 25:

    “(a) Have you been convicted of, or found guilty of, ANY offences overseas or in Australia (include all traffic offences which went to court, including offences declared in your permanent residence application and any ‘spent’ convictions)?

    (b) Have you been confined in prison or in a psychiatric institution by order of a court made in connection with criminal proceedings overseas or in Australia?”

  7. The Application for Citizenship Form asks an applicant who has answered in the affirmative to any of the Questions posed to provide all relevant details, and, in particular, if the matter relates to a criminal conviction to outline the nature of the offence, full details of sentence imposed and dates of any period of imprisonment or detention. The Applicant provided the following information – Exhibit 1 T4 p. 25:

    “I WAS CONVICTED & SENTENCED TO 8 MONTHS IMPRISONMENT FOR DRUG RELATED OFFENCES IN 2013.”

  8. On 27 October 2020 the Applicant was invited by the Department of Home Affairs to comment on adverse information relating to her citizenship application. The adverse information related to the Applicant’s criminal history as contained in a Checks Results Report collated by the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission – Exhibit 1 T11 pp. 59 – 68.

  9. The Checks Results Report disclosed that the Applicant had the following criminal convictions – Exhibit 1 T4 pp. 67 – 68:

    (a)on 12 October 2001 at the Beenleigh Magistrates Court, convicted of breach of a Domestic Violence Order, with no conviction recorded and a recognizance of $200 and to be on good behaviour for 22 months; and

    (b)on 10 September 2013 at the Brisbane Supreme Court, convicted of the following drug offences:

    (i)one count of trafficking dangerous drugs (Schedule 1) between 31 December 2011 and 21 September 2012, with a sentence of 3 years imprisonment (concurrent);

    (ii)three counts of supplying Schedule 1 drugs between 31 August 2012 and 21 September 2012 and sentenced to 6 months imprisonment, to be served concurrently, with a fixed parole date of 9 May 2014;

    (iii)one count of possessing a dangerous drug specified in Schedule 1 on 20 September 2012, with a sentence of 6 months imprisonment to be served concurrently, and with a fixed parole date of 9 May 2014; and

    (iv)one count of possessing anything used in the commission of crimes defined in Part 2, for which the Applicant was not further punished.

  10. In response to the invitation, the Applicant submitted a Statutory Declaration dated 27 October 2020 in which she provided the following information – Exhibit 1 T12 p. 72:

    “In this Statutory Declaration I wish to clarify a part of my criminal history I neglected to put into my application, not as a result of an attempt to deceive but as a genuine lapse of memory. The offence occurred in 2001, I was charged with a domestic violence breach, and as no conviction was recorded I did not think it applied on my application.  I read the question as to mean convictions were to be stated. I did state my convictions on the application relating to my drug offences and imprisonment.

    On your correspondence to me the items listed pertain to only 1 period of imprisonment for the three charges dated 10/9/2013 as stated on my original application.

    Between 2001 – 2013 I was a model citizen, not even as much as a traffic infringement to my knowledge.

    As of May 2014 after my release, I have again remained a model citizen.

    I am a full time personal carer, I do a Narcotics anonymous program in Wacol Correctional Centre every second Friday which I find extremely rewarding as I educate women for a better life narcotics free…”

  11. On 7 January 2021 a delegate of the Respondent refused the Applicant’s application for citizenship on the basis that she did not meet the good character requirement in s 21(2)(h) of the Act – Exhibit 1 T13 pp. 73 – 83.

  12. The following reasons were given by delegate for refusing the Applicant’s citizenship application – Exhibit 1 T13 pp. 80 – 81:

    “I consider you being found guilty of offences relating to ‘Trafficking in dangerous drugs’ with an imposed penalty of 3 years imprisonment to be serious.  Actions that involve the trafficking of drugs that incur penalties of imprisonment indicate your actions were considered serious enough to warrant such deterrents. You were prompted to provide further information about the offence in the invitation to comment on adverse information on 27 October 2020.

    On the 3 November 2020, you provided a personal statement which confirmed that you were convicted of the offences listed on your NCCHC report.  However, you have provided little information regarding the circumstances surrounding the offences.

    In regards to positive changes made since the offences occurred, you stated that you are working as a full time personal carer, do a narcotics anonymous program in Wacol Correctional Centre regularly, and that you have not committed any offences since. While you have stated you have made positive changes since the offences occurred, you have not provided any evidence to substantiate these claims of the positive changes you have made since the listed offences which would provide the community with confidence that a matter like this would not re-occur were you conferred Australian citizenship.

    Furthermore, you have not provided any character references to support your application.

    Without further information regarding the circumstances of the offences, lack of evidence to support claims you have made, and in consideration of the penalties imposed by the court against you, I find that these factors cast significant doubt towards a finding that you are of good character…

    Based on the evidence before me, I find that your disregard for the law in the past, the severity of these offences, the limited information you have provided in relation to the circumstances of the offences, the limited evidence you provided to support claims you made in regards to positive changes in your life, and in consideration of the penalties imposed by the court against you do not satisfy me that you are of good character at the time of decision on your application. You therefore do not satisfy paragraph 21(2)(h) of the Act.”

  13. On the same day the Applicant lodged an Application for Review of Decision with this Tribunal – Exhibit 1 T2 pp. 4 – 9.

    ISSUE FOR DETERMINATION

  14. The only issue for determination by the Tribunal is whether the Applicant is a person of good character for the purposes of s 21(2)(h) of the Act.

    LEGAL OVERVIEW

  15. Pursuant to s 21(1) a person may make application to the Respondent to become an Australian citizen. Subsections 21(2) – (8) prescribe the various eligibility criteria. General eligibility criteria are dealt with in s 21(2) and in the reviewable decision the only eligibility criteria the Applicant was found not to have met was s 21(2)(h) namely:

    “is of good character, at the time of the Minister’s decision on the application.”

  16. The term “good character” is not defined in the Act. It has been observed that the absence of a definition indicates that Parliament intended that the term be used in a broad way and allows a decision-maker to consider a range of events and conduct connected with an applicant – per O’Bryan J in BOY19 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (BOY19) [2019] FCA 574 at [46].

  17. There have been a number of Federal Court decisions on the meaning of this term and the proper application of the good character test. Reference can be made to the following observations of Lee J in Irving v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (Irving) (1996) 68 FCR 422 at 431 – 432:

    “the words ‘good character’ should be taken to be used in their ordinary sense, namely, a reference to the enduring moral qualities of a person, and not to the good standing, fame or repute of that person in the community. The former is an objective assessment apt to be proved as a fact whilst the latter is a review of subjective public opinion…A person who has been convicted of a serious crime and thereafter held in contempt in the community , nonetheless may show that he or she has reformed and is of good character…Conversely, a person of good repute may be shown by objective assessment to be a person of bad character.”

  18. An assessment of good character, then, is an objective exercise governed by a review of the evidence presented as distinct from a popularity contest weighed by emotion and only a partial understanding of a person’s character and behaviour.

  19. Such an assessment is by no means an easy task and a decision-maker must reach the requisite state of satisfaction. The Tribunal made these observations in Prasad and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1994] AATA 326 at [7]:

    “a decision about whether a person is of good character requires the consideration of an aggregate of qualities. It is true to say, however, that, despite the many good qualities possessed by a person, those qualities can be outweighed by a single adverse incident if it is of sufficient weight and seriousness.”

  20. Subparagraph 21(2)(h) requires a decision-maker to be “satisfied” that an applicant is of good character. Guidance on what degree of satisfaction is required can be found in the judgment of O’Bryan J in BOY19 (at [54] – [55]):

    “54. Section 21(2)(h) requires the Minister to form a judgment as to whether he or she is satisfied that the applicant for citizenship is of good character. The word ‘satisfied’ in that context is not amenable to the application of an evidentiary burden of proof, such as balance of probabilities. That is for at least two reasons. First, the decision is an administrative decision to which the rules of evidence are inapplicable and the evidentiary burden of proof inapposite…Second, the matter of which the Minister must be satisfied, the applicant’s good character, is not a fact to be proved but an opinion requiring an evaluative judgment. A standard of proof, such as balance of probabilities, is incapable of application to such an opinion….

    55. The absence of an evidentiary burden of proof does not mean that there is an absence of a legal standard of satisfaction. In the context of s 21(2)(h) of the Act, satisfaction requires that the decision-maker reach an affirmative belief that the applicant is a person of good character. It is not sufficient for the decision-maker to believe that there is a chance that the applicant is a person of good character; equally it is not necessary for the decision-maker to have a high degree of confidence that the applicant is a person of good character. Further, where a power is conferred by statute, Parliament is taken to intend that that power will be exercised reasonably…However, the requirement of reasonableness is not a vehicle for challenging a decision on the basis that the decision-maker has given insufficient or excessive consideration to some matters or has made an evaluative judgment with which the Court disagrees….”

  21. Although the Act does not define “good character” guidance is provided to decision-makers by the Australian Citizenship Policy Statement (ACPS) and the Citizenship Procedural Instructions (CPI).

  22. It needs to be noted that neither the ACPS or the CPI are made pursuant to a specific provision in the Act. In Minister for Home Affairs v G and Another (2019) 266 FCR 569 the Full Court (Murphy, Moshinsky and O’Callaghan JJ) made the following observations ([18]/574):

    “There is no power conferred by the Australian Citizenship Act to make the Instructions. Despite appearing in a form that resembles a legislative instrument or that has a statutory source, the Instructions are made in an exercise of executive power.”

  23. Their Honours also made the following observations ([58]/586):

    “It is established that an executive policy relating to the exercise of a statutory discretion must be consistent with the relevant statute in the sense that: it must allow the decision-maker to take into account relevant considerations; it must not require the decision-maker to take into account irrelevant considerations; and it must not serve a purpose foreign to the purpose for which the discretionary power was created…”

  24. The Tribunal will generally apply the ACPS and CPI unless there is a cogent reason not to do so – Re Drake and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (No 2) (1979) 2 ALD 634 at 645 per Brennan J.

  25. However, although the ACPS and CPI provide sound general guidance to a decision-maker, where a level of satisfaction is reached for the purposes of s 21 of the Act, then any further requirements or steps as set out in the ACPS and CPI need not be addressed – Chaang and Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] AATA 72.

  26. Reference can also be made to the non-exhaustive list of characteristics expected of a person of good character set out in Cl. 4.4 of the CPI (Exhibit 1 T15 p. 99). The relevant characteristics as set out in the CI as relevant to this matter are:

    “An applicant who is a person of good character would generally be expected to exhibit the following characteristics. Application of these principles should be considered in light of the facts of the particular case.

    As a general proposition, a person who is of good character would:

    ·      respect and abide by the law in Australia and other countries

    ·     be honest and financially responsible (for example, pay tax, not be in dishonest receipt of public funds pay debts to the Commonwealth)

    ·     not practise deception or fraud in dealings with the Australian Government, or other organisations, for example:

    ointentionally providing false personal information (such as fraudulent work experience or qualification documents) or

    oother material deception during visa and citizenship applications;…

    oconcealing criminal convictions…

    ·not be violent, involved in illegal drugs or unlawful sexual activity, and not cause harm to others through their conduct…”

  27. It is also important to set out the following guidance in Cl 4.4 which informs a decision-maker on how to sensibly apply these principles in particular circumstances – Exhibit 1 T15 p. 99:

    “Application of these principles should be considered in the light of the particular case and should not be applied rigidly or inflexibly. The above examples are intended only to provide broad guidance to decision-makers about the types of behaviours which might support an adverse conclusion about a person’s character.  Ultimately a decision-maker must exercise any statutory discretion bearing in mind the facts of any particular case.

    It is also necessary to consider any other information that is relevant to a person’s character such as information provided by an applicant about his/her family life; for example, raising children, being in a stable home environment, being responsibly employed, paying taxes, any community work undertaken, and any other matter that is relevant to an assessment of character in the circumstances of a particular case.  This would include expressions of genuine remorse for past wrong-doing and the time that has elapsed since the wrong-doing. Ultimately a decision-maker should weigh up all the factors relevant to an assessment of an applicant’s character, which might include a number of factors some of which support reaching an adverse conclusion about a person’s character and some of which support reaching a positive conclusion about a person’s character.”

  28. The CPI makes it clear that when considering an applicant’s criminal history, regard should be had to whether an applicant has committed a “serious offence”. Amongst the crimes listed in Cl 4.7 of the CPI as “serious” are “domestic violence”, “drug trafficking (including importation and supply)” and “offences incurring prison sentences of 12 months or more” – Exhibit 1 T15 p. 105.

  29. The CPI also gives guidance on the weighing of information, and when a decision-maker is assessing whether an applicant is of good character, the following general propositions are to be taken into account – Exhibit 1 T15 p. 110:

    ·   characterise the nature of any offence or behaviour:

    ois the offence serious or minor?

    odid the offence harm other people?

    owho were victims?

    ois there a pattern of behaviour?

    owas it a one off incident?

    owere there extenuating circumstances?...

    ·   consider any mitigating circumstances:

    olength of time since the offence was committed

    oage at time of offence

    obehaviour since completing prison sentence or obligations to court

    oremorse regarding their offending behaviour

    ocommunity support (reference reports etc)

    ochanges in the life of the applicant. For example, relocation away from people who had a negative influence, marriage or de facto relationship, children, treatment for addiction or mental illness.

    ·   weigh up all relevant factors to decide whether the applicant is of good character. The decision-maker must look holistically at applicant’s behaviour over time and reach a conclusion about the person’s enduring moral qualities.”

    HEARING

  1. A Hearing was convened in Brisbane on 11 October 2021. The parties appeared remotely via Microsoft Teams.

  2. The Applicant, gave evidence and was cross-examined.  No other witnesses were called to give evidence.

  3. The Applicant was self-represented and the Respondent was represented by Ms C Allen of Sparke Helmore Lawyers.

    CONSIDERATION

    Introduction

  4. The Respondent contends that the primary factor weighing against a finding that the Applicant is a person of good character is her criminal history – Exhibit 2 para 18. In that regard, the Respondent, quite properly, draws to the Tribunal’s attention the domestic violence conviction as well as the Applicant’s convictions for trafficking, supply and possession of methylamphetamine and drug utensils – Exhibit 2 para 22.

  5. In the Respondent’s Closing Submissions (RCS) it is submitted (at para 9):

    “Given the inconsistencies in the applicant’s evidence as discussed throughout these submissions, the Minister submits the Tribunal ought not to accept the applicant’s recent self-serving oral claims as reliable where not supported by any independent evidence.”

  6. When discussing the Applicant’s various accounts about her drug history, the Respondent made these submissions – RCS para 27:

    “The Minister contends that the applicant has tailored her narrative to each specific audience for self-serving purposes. The Minister contends that this further weighs against the applicant being of good character.”

  7. In this matter the Tribunal had the benefit of listening to, and observing, the Applicant give evidence. It is important, having regard to the conclusion that the Tribunal has reached, to put on record the Tribunal’s assessment of the Applicant’s testimony.

  8. It was patently clear when the Applicant gave evidence that, despite her nervousness, she spoke with clarity and conviction. At no time when she was cross-examined by Ms Allen, did she prevaricate, attempt to minimise the seriousness of her criminal conduct or to evade responsibility for her actions. The Applicant appeared to the Tribunal to be an honest and plain speaking woman who has clearly made some terrible mistakes and committed crimes for which she is deeply ashamed. In the opinion of the Tribunal she was genuinely contrite and remorseful for the crimes she committed, the harm and hurt she caused to her family and friends as well as the damage dealing with drugs causes to the social fabric of our society.

  9. In an email to the Tribunal dated 12 October 2021, the Applicant stated:

    “I would like the Tribunal to know that any inconsistencies in my statements are not to deceive anybody but are Most [sic] likely as a result of the numerous years of drug abuse. My drug abuse has caused serious memory loss And [sic] lack of concentration.”

  10. The Tribunal agrees with the Respondent that there are various inconsistencies in the Applicant’s account of events in her life. It is open for the Respondent to submit that those inconsistencies are deliberate and designed to achieve a particular result.

  11. Having listened to the Applicant give evidence the Tribunal formed the view that she was not deliberately attempting to mislead the Tribunal or the Respondent, but does suffer from cognitive impairment. If the Applicant was intending to mislead the Tribunal then the attempt was a clumsy one. Instead, the Tribunal observed that the Applicant was apparently having difficulty remembering events, names and persons and, at times, articulating her thoughts.

  12. In short the Tribunal formed a favourable view of the Applicant’s testimony and concluded that she was both genuine and honest when she testified about her past, her remorse and her desire to continue to be a law-abiding and productive member of the Australian community.

  13. It is also important to recognise that when reaching a view as to whether an applicant for citizenship is of good character, a decision-maker is required to make an assessment on an applicant’s current character. It is the case that an applicant may have committed such a serious crime or engaged in such conduct in the past that it has irremediably soiled their character. The CPI explicitly recognises (Cl 4.13 – Exhibit 1 T15 p. 111) that in some rare instances the commission of an extremely serious crime or crimes may result in a person being found a person not of good character for the rest of their life.

  14. However, in most instances a decision-maker has to look objectively at how a person currently presents themselves, and, in that regard, questions of remorse, good deeds, community engagement, abiding by the law, employment history and other positive behaviour and actions are critically important.

  15. A tribunal of fact in such circumstances is in a unique position to make a holistic decision when it is presented not only with documentary evidence, but can observe an applicant testify and, especially, when an applicant is subject to vigorous and focused cross-examination. In this matter Ms Allen very competently and appropriately cross-examined the Applicant. The Tribunal places on record its appreciation for the professional and helpful manner in which Ms Allen advanced the Respondent’s position. If the Applicant was not being forthcoming, then it would have been exposed by the manner in which Ms Allen cross-examined her.

  16. The Tribunal formed the view that the Applicant was a witness of credit.

    Domestic violence offence

  17. On 30 July 2001 a Temporary Domestic Violence Order was made at the Beenleigh Magistrates Court naming the Applicant as the respondent spouse. The Temporary Domestic Violence Order had four standard conditions, including one which prohibited the Applicant from going to, or approaching, her ex-partner’s premises or workplace. 0On 22 August 2001, in breach of the Order, the Applicant approached her ex-partner’s workplace and was “yelling and pointing” at him. Police were called and the Applicant was charged with breaching the Order. She was subsequently convicted and placed on a good behaviour bond – Exhibit 4.

  18. The Respondent refers to CPI 15 and correctly highlights that crimes of violence, including family violence, are serious offences – Exhibit 2 para 21.

  19. There are many Tribunal decisions that have held that domestic violence is an extremely serious matter that cannot be trivialised or downplayed and which can have long term deleterious consequences for family members, friends and the broader community – see Ahori and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] AATA 601 at [53].

  20. It is important, however, when evaluating the seriousness of a crime, to put in context having regard to the evidence presented. In this matter the Applicant gave the following testimony – Tr. 11.10.2021 pp. 12 – 13:

    “DEPUTY PRESIDENT: Okay. Now, would you like to tell me about the domestic violence offence and the background to that.

    WITNESS: The background to that was in 2000 my son was born. I was in a happy relationship at the time.  A week – one week after he was born I come home with him from the hospital, and to find that my partner at the time was watching my daughter through the bathroom window having a shower. So I packed my son up and we left.  We left that night.  A week later, that man shot at me….He put seven bullets through my house. A week after that, he set it on fire…He was imprisoned for eight months for those offences. When he was released from prison, he threw a brick through my kitchen window, which, you know, nearly hit me. I was at the kitchen sink at the time. So my son and I – my son was 15 – my oldest son at the time. He was angry, and I was angry, and we went down to his work to confront him and tell him, you know, what he did was dangerous. He could have hit me or the baby or – anyway, it got out of hand, and my son got hurt in an argument. But, anyway, I breached – I breached the domestic violence order by going to his work.

    DEPUTY PRESIDENT: Why did you have a domestic violence order taken out against you if he had been imprisoned for basically arson and shooting your house?

    WITNESS: Exactly. To be honest, I really don’t know, and I still don’t know to this day why I had a domestic violence order put against me originally. I honestly can’t answer that, because I don’t know. I did nothing wrong, to my knowledge.

    DEPUTY PRESIDENT: Okay. Was that the last time you had any dealings with that person?

    WITNESS: Yes.”

  21. The Respondent made the following submission with respect to the Applicant’s version of events – RCS para 9:

    These claims were not raised before the delegate, notwithstanding that, the applicant was invited to comment on her criminal history on 27 October 2020 (T11) and provided a response to that invitation (T12/72). Nor were these matters raised at any time prior to the hearing on 11 October 2021. Further, there is no independent evidence of these events.”

  22. Whilst the Applicant may not have raised these matters prior to the Hearing, it is not the case that the Applicant has not outlined her version of events previously, and the Respondent would have been put on notice of her version of the events leading up to the domestic violence breach.

  23. When the Applicant appeared in the Supreme Court to be sentenced for drug offences a report by Tracey Clarke, Psychologist, was produced. In that undated report, Ms Clarke made the following observations – Exhibit 3 p. 10:

    “She reported a history of unsatisfactory and/or violent relationships. Yvonne has had considerable difficulties in coming to terms with the domestic violence and abuse that she suffered after separating from her youngest son’s Father. She stated that he shot at her, burnt her house and possessions, has continued to be emotionally abusive over the past 10 years since their separation and has traumatised her son to the point where he now refuses to visit his Father.  She has lived in constant fear of him.”

  24. Insofar as the Ms Clarke’s report forms part of the Tender Bundle of documents produced under summons by (inter alia) the Queensland Director of Public Prosecutions in Exhibit 3, the Respondent should have known that the Applicant had claimed that she was the victim of a campaign of violence by her ex-partner. 

  25. In these circumstances the Tribunal does not accept the Respondent’s submission not to accept the Applicant’s claims as reliable.

  26. There is no evidence before the Tribunal that the Applicant committed any acts of violence against her ex-partner. Clearly the relationship between the Applicant and her ex-partner was an unhappy one, and, on the testimony given, it would appear that the Applicant was the victim of a campaign of retribution after she left him. While in no way downplaying the inappropriateness and seriousness of the Applicant’s breach of the Order, it is tolerably clear that she was the primary victim in a failed domestic relationship. Based on her testimony it is likely that the acts of violence and terror perpetrated on her and her family by her ex-partner resulted in the Applicant striking back and acting in a manner which was most probably out of character. Looked at from this perspective, the Applicant’s breach of the Temporary Domestic Violence Order was an aberration and was the culmination of a very unfortunate period in her life.

    Drug offences

  27. As previously noted, the Applicant was convicted on 10 September 2013 of a number of serious drug offences.

  28. The Tribunal has been provided with a schedule of facts prepared by the Queensland Director of Public Prosecutions. Relevant extracts from that document is set out below – Exhibit 3 p. 19:

    “At approximately 1.45 pm on 20 September 2012, police executed a search warrant…The defendant was the only person present at the address…The defendant declared that she had some amphetamines in her freezer in the kitchen.  Police located 8 clip seal plastic bags on the top shelf of the freezer each containing a quantity of Methylamphetamine (1.003 grams overall weight, 0.436 grams overall pure weight).

    Police also located a set of digital scales on the kitchen bench, which the defendant stated that she used to weigh her amphetamines in the process of apportioning the drugs into smaller quantities for sale.  Police also located a quantity of empty clip seal bags on the bed in the defendant’s bedroom and a container of MSM (Methylsulfonylmethane), which is regularly used as a cutting agent, in the defendant’s cupboard.”

  29. The Applicant told Police that she had three regular customers who came to her home once a week, but, in addition, she did have occasional additional customers. She knew all of her customers and the sales were always at her home – Exhibit 3 p. 19.

  30. The Applicant purchased half an eight ball of amphetamines every 1 – 2 months on 3 – 4 occasions for about $800 – Exhibit 3 pp. 19 – 20.

  31. The drugs were cut down into point quantities for sale, with each clip seal bag containing $100 worth of drugs – Exhibit 3 p. 20.

  32. The Applicant informed Police that she only made $100 a week profit from the sale of the drugs which assisted her to pay bills – Exhibit 3 p. 20.

  33. The Applicant was sentenced to three years imprisonment for the drug trafficking charge and six months imprisonment (to be served concurrently) for the each of the three supply charges and the possession charge.

  34. The Tribunal accepts the Respondent’s contention that drug trafficking offences incurring prison sentences of 12 months or more should be considered as particularly serious – Exhibit 2 para 25. The Tribunal also accepts that the seriousness of the Applicant’s offense is evidenced by the maximum penalties prescribed in the Drugs Misuse Act 1986 (Qld). In particular, supplying dangerous drugs has a maximum penalty of life imprisonment whilst possession and trafficking dangerous drugs carry maximum penalties of 25 years imprisonment – Exhibit 2 para 26.

  35. The Respondent contends that whilst the Applicant’s drug offences occurred more than eight years ago, nonetheless the seriousness of the offences and the potential consequences of the Applicant’s actions are such that the Tribunal could not be satisfied that she is now a person of good character - Exhibit 2 para 28.

  36. Subsequently the Respondent made the following submissions - RCS paras 17 – 21:

    “17. The Minister contends that the applicant’s offending in this regard is serious and that, by her actions, the applicant has put the Australian community at risk.

    18. Proportionally, Australia uses more methamphetamine than almost any other country, and the number of users continues to grow.

    19. The seriousness of methylamphetamine use and the impact it has on the Australian community is evident from the fact that the Australian government established a National Ice Taskforce to advise on the impacts of ice in Australia and drive the development of a National Ice Action Strategy.

    21. Users of methylamphetamine often suffer from psychosis and become aggressive.  Frontline workers risk being assaulted or contracting transmittable diseases in the course of undertaking their duties. From a medical perspective, managing users of methylamphetamine is resource intensive and often diverts resources away from other people who need them.”

    (footnotes omitted)

  37. The Tribunal agrees that Australia suffers from a serious “Ice” problem, and those persons who engage in the trafficking and supply of this dangerous drug place their customers and the broader community at risk. Unfortunately, there is often a correlation between persons engaging in this type of criminal behaviour and their own addiction to “Ice” and other illegal drugs. It is for this reason that it is usually very helpful for a tribunal of fact to peruse the sentencing remarks of the trial Judge who sentences a person found guilty of these offences. This is the case as a range of relevant factors influence the sentence given and the culpability of the offender.

  38. Unfortunately, the Tender Bundle of documents marked as Exhibit 3 does not contain the sentencing remarks of A Lyons J. The Tribunal is not in a position, then, to ascertain how her Honour viewed the criminal conduct of the Applicant.

  39. However, insofar as her Honour imposed custodial sentences at very much the lower end of the scale it is open for the Tribunal to conclude that she did not view the Applicant’s criminal enterprise at the upper end of the scale of drug offences.

  40. The Tribunal views the Applicant’s drug convictions in a very serious light, but the fact that a person has been convicted of such offences does not automatically result in forming a view that they are not of good character for the rest of their lives. In determining whether the Applicant is “now” of good character, the Tribunal takes into account a range of factors which are set out below.

  41. It is sufficient for present purposes to note that the Applicant’s drug convictions appear to be out of character, and neither prior to those convictions or after she served her custodial sentence has she been convicted of any offences, let alone serious offences.

    Traffic offences

  42. The Applicant has an extensive history of traffic offences – Exhibit 3 pp. 15 – 18.

  43. First, the Applicant was convicted of speeding offences on the following dates: 19 June 1991, 8 July 1993, 11 February 2004, 22 November 2004, 27 January 2005, 11 July 2008, 4 December 2008, 15 December 2008, 19 March 2009, 23 July 2009, 12 July 2010, 3 November 2011, and 11 November 2011.

  44. Second, the Applicant has been twice convicted of driving whilst exceeding the prescribed concentration of alcohol: 13 November 1991 (0.090 BAC) and 17 August 1999 (0.067 BAC).

  45. Third, the Applicant has been convicted of unlicensed driving: 29 September 1993, 22 November 2004 and 31 January 2005.

  46. Finally, the Applicant has been twice convicted of driving whilst a relevant drug is present: both on 8 August 2013.

  47. In her Statutory Declaration of 27 October 2020, the Applicant claimed that between “2001– 2013 I was a model citizen, not even as much as a traffic infringement to my knowledge” – Exhibit 1 T12 p. 72.

  48. This claim is patently incorrect, as in the 2001 – 2013 period the Applicant committed approximately 17 driving offences. Far from being a model citizen, the Applicant had an extremely poor traffic history. It is, however, noteworthy that the Applicant has not been convicted of drink driving since 1999 and the Tribunal has been presented with no evidence of the Applicant committing any traffic offences since serving her custodial sentence. The last eight years are noteworthy in that the Applicant has, apparently, not come adversely to the attention of Queensland Transport.

  49. The Respondent contends that the Applicant demonstrated a blatant disregard for traffic laws which go to the essential safety of the community – Exhibit 2 para 37. Further, the Respondent contends that by her actions the Respondent has placed other road users at risk of harm and this behaviour is not consistent with Australian community values – Exhibit 2 para 37.

  50. The Tribunal’s attention was drawn to remarks made by Member Webb in Safar and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] AATA 503 at [28] – Exhibit 2 para 39. Without quoting the passage, the Tribunal is in agreement with Member Webb that drink driving and speeding, particularly when there is a pattern of persistent offending, are serious issues. Blatant and persistent breaches of traffic laws often demonstrates the disregard the offender has not only for the laws of Australia but also for the safety of fellow citizens. Insofar as a person demonstrates a callous disregard for the safety and well-being of other road users, and the community generally, it is sometimes a sound indicator of lack of good character.

  51. If the Tribunal had been presented with the traffic history of the Applicant in 2013, it would be likely that a Member would then have formed a pessimistic view about the chances of the Applicant reforming herself and becoming a law-abiding person and one who would strictly obey the traffic laws of Queensland. In this matter, however, the evidence presented to the Tribunal suggests that the Applicant has gone through a personal transformation over the past eight years and her recent unblemished traffic record is to her credit - see Tr. 11.10.2021 p. 15.

    Failure to disclose offences

  1. The Respondent contends that the Applicant provided an incomplete and inaccurate declaration of the offences she committed in her citizenship application form – Exhibit 2 para 40. Reference is made to Question 39(a) and the Applicant’s answer which is set out above.

  2. It is contended by the Respondent that the Applicant sought to downplay her offending history and made an inaccurate declaration. In that regard, it is contended by stating that she had been convicted of “drug-related offences” she did not declare her convictions for drug trafficking and supply – Exhibit 2 para 44. Further, the Applicant stated that she had been sentenced to eight months imprisonment, when in fact she had been sentenced to three years imprisonment but only served eight months imprisonment.

  3. Further, the Applicant did not disclose her domestic violence offence or her numerous traffic offences – Exhibit 2 para 45.

  4. Reference has been made to the Applicant’s Statutory Declaration of 27 October 2020. In that document she declared that she did not attempt to deceive but was rather “a genuine lapse of memory” . The Applicant referred to her domestic violence offence and stated “as no conviction was recorded I did not think it applied on my application. I read the question as to mean convictions were to be stated.” – Exhibit 1 T12 p. 72.

  5. The Respondent draws the Tribunal’s attention to the unambiguous wording of Question 39(a) which refers to an applicant being convicted of, or found guilty of, any offences – Exhibit 2 para 46.

  6. Likewise, the Respondent draws the Tribunal’s attention to the fact that the Applicant did not disclose those traffic offences which went to Court – Exhibit 2 para 47.

  7. During cross-examination the following exchange occurred between Ms Allen and the Applicant – Tr. 11.10.2021 p. 19:

    “Thank you. You declared in your application for citizenship that you were sentenced to eight months’ imprisonment, but that’s not true is it? You were, in fact, sentenced to three years’ imprisonment?---Yes, Yes. I wasn’t purposefully deceiving anyone there. I just obviously misunderstood the question.

    Okay. And when you were asked to provide the details of your convictions,  you declared that you had been convicted of drug-related offences? Do you accept that this downplays the seriousness of your offences?---No, because they were drug-related….

    And you declared that you were convicted and sentenced to eight months’ imprisonment for drug-related offences in 2013. Do you accept that you didn’t refer to your driving offences?---Well, that’s drug-related isn’t it?”

  8. It would appear that the Applicant’s answer to the traffic conviction question posed by Ms Allen relates to her convictions for driving whilst a relevant drug was present in her blood or saliva. The Applicant was convicted of two offences of driving whilst having a relevant drug in her blood or saliva. The facts surrounding these charges are set out below – Exhibit 3 p. 39:

    “At about 10.40 am on Friday 26 April 2013 police stopped the Defendant driving a sedan on Errol Street, Loganlea.

    The Deft was submitted to a roadside drug test and when questioned about the consuming illicit drugs he [sic] stated she had a lick of a spoon earlier…

    On the 1/5/2013 the Defendant’s specimen of saliva was forwarded to the Forensic Toxicology Laboratory. On 14/5/2013 the State Analyst issued CERTIFICATE OF ANALYSIS stating Methylamphetamine was detected in the Defendant’s saliva.”

  9. The Tribunal does not accept the Respondent’s submission that the Applicant provided a misleading answer to her drug convictions, or tried to downplay those convictions. The Applicant correctly stated that she had been convicted in 2013 of drug-related offences and was imprisoned for eight months. The fact that the Applicant referred to her being sentenced to eight months imprisonment, is explicable as A Lyons J ordered that she be released on parole fixed at 9 May 2014, which was eight months from the day she was sentenced, namely 10 September 2013 – Exhibit 3 p. 3. To a layperson, the fact that the head sentence was three years imprisonment, would perhaps not be as significant as the Order that she only serve eight months’ imprisonment.

  10. With respect to the breach of the Temporary Domestic Violence Order, the Court document provided to the Tribunal discloses that Magistrate Ehrich did not record a conviction against the Applicant and placed her on a good behaviour bond – Exhibit 4. It is understandable, therefore, that she did not disclose this matter, as she formed the view that the wording of Question 39(a) did not cover this incident.

  11. Finally, the Applicant’s failure to disclose her traffic history is unfortunate as Question 39(a) specifically requires a person to include all traffic offences which went to Court. As previously noted, the Tribunal formed a positive view about the credibility of the Applicant, and accepts her statement in the Statutory Declaration of 27 October 2020 that she did not intentionally attempt to deceive the Respondent.

    Weighing the evidence

    Seriousness of criminal history

  12. It is not disputed that the Applicant’s drug convictions are serious offences and weigh against a finding of good character. An applicant who has been convicted of possessing, supplying and trafficking a dangerous drug under the Drugs Misuse Act 1986 (Qld) quite clearly is a person who is not of good character, at least at the time of the conviction and whilst in custody. The Tribunal in no way downplays or minimises the seriousness of the Applicant’s drug convictions.

  13. The Tribunal does not regard the Applicant’s domestic violence breach in the same light. The evidence presented suggests that she was the victim of a prolonged campaign of harassment involving the commission of criminal acts by her ex-partner. Whilst no excuses can be made for her breaching the Temporary Domestic Violence Order, nonetheless that breach has to be viewed in the broader perspective of a person who was under severe pressure and a victim herself of domestic violence.

  14. The Applicant’s traffic history up until 2013 was substandard and exhibited a pattern of persistent breaches of the law. In most circumstances such a history would weigh heavily against an applicant. However, as previously noted, the Applicant has, apparently, been fully compliant with the traffic laws of Queensland since her release from custody. 

    Is there a pattern of behaviour, or was it a one-off incident?

  15. The Applicant does not have a pattern of persistently breaching the drug or domestic violence laws of Queensland.

  16. In the case of her drug convictions, all the charges were laid at the same time and resulted from a Police raid on her home which has been outlined above.

  17. Likewise, the breach of the Temporary Domestic Violence Order was a one-off incident, and there is no pattern of the Applicant breaching domestic violence orders. In fact, as previously noted, the Applicant was the victim of repeated criminal actions by her ex-partner. It is somewhat curious in these circumstances that the Applicant was the respondent of a Temporary Domestic Violence Order. Unfortunately, the Tribunal has not been presented with the full history of the interactions between the Applicant and her abusive ex-partner and, accordingly, is not in a position to reach any settled conclusions on the context in which the Temporary Domestic Violence Order was made.

  18. As previously noted, there was a pattern of the Applicant repeatedly breaching the traffic laws of Queensland between 1991 and 2013.

    Extenuating circumstances

  19. With respect to the domestic violence breach, the evidence suggests that the Applicant and her family were the victims of a campaign of violence waged by her ex-partner, and the breach was the culmination of a circle of violence perpetrated mostly by her ex-partner.

  20. At the Hearing the Applicant testified that she began using drugs after a close friend was murdered – Tr. 11.10.2021 pp. 9 – 10:

    “DEPUTY PRESIDENT: Perhaps you might like to tell me about your criminal history and put it in context from your point of view.

    WITNESS: Yes. My drug history started 15 years ago when a very close friend of mine was murdered by another very close friend of mine. That’s when my journey began with drugs. And it absolutely out of control when I started to sell – to sell methamphetamine. I don’t know what to say other than that, you know, I’m grateful that I was arrested and put in prison for my offences. It was honestly the best thing that ever happened to me. I was out of control. I had a lot of deaths in my family at that time and wasn’t able to control it. And then…

    DEPUTY PRESIDENT: Had you been taking drugs before that time? Or it had started…

    WITNESS: No. No, that was the start of it. I was 40, so it was – yes. That was the start of it. I never took drugs. I did – I did drink, but on a social, not as a drinker – a heavy drinker. It was just a social thing, growing up as a child – you know, a young adult. But, yes, the drug thing didn’t happen till later in life.”

  21. The murder that the Applicant referred to was the subject of a decision of the Queensland Court of Appeal – R v McKinnon [2002] QCA 185.

  22. The judgment of Atkinson J discloses that Paul McKinnon was convicted on 4 July 2001 of murdering his former de-facto partner, Ms Jane Horsbourgh. McKinnnon killed Ms Horsbourgh by strangling her in the early hours of the morning of 29 March 2000. The murder was witnessed in part by the deceased’s six year old daughter. 

  23. In an email dated 12 October 2021, the Applicant informed the Tribunal that both McKinnon and the deceased worked at the Kuraby Hotel. The deceased worked at the bar and McKinnon was “a yard man.”

  24. The Applicant gave the following testimony about the impact this murder had on her life – Tr. 11.10.2021 p. 20:

    “If you could just let us know.  But what actually occurred? What was the nature of the offence?---He strangled her to death in front of her three year old daughter.  They were – she worked at the Kuraby Hotel. He was her partner at the time. He was just a horrible alcoholic. He did beat her up quite a few times before the final ---

    And how did you know her? Was she a close friend of yours?---We were close friends, yes. We were all friends. I was friends with him as well. Because I used to go to the Kuraby Hotel.

    And she…worked at the Kuraby Hotel as a bar maid? Yes…

    And how long after that crime did you start taking drugs, approximately?---Pretty much straightaway, but it was very few and far between. I didn’t really start getting heavy into drug tills the last five years of my drug use. It became a weekly – a daily episode.”

  25. In a separate email, also of 12 October 2021, the Applicant made the following claims:

    “I would like to add to my defence that I was Diagnosed [sic] with post traumatic stress disorder after the murder of my friend then After I was shot at and my house was set on fire by my sons father 21 years ago.

    I would like the tribunal to know that any inconsistencies in my statements are not to deceive anybody but are Most [sic] likely a result of the numerous years of drug abuse. My drug abuse has caused serious memory loss And [sic] lack of concentration.”

  26. In response the Respondent correctly notes that the Applicant did not raise the murder of her friend with the delegate and nor was it was raised at any time before the Hearing on 11 October 2021 – RCS para 12.

  27. The Tribunal was also concerned at the Hearing about the Applicant raising such a serious matter without notice. For that reason, the Tribunal conducted its own research and was able to confirm the truthfulness of the Applicant’s claims when it located the decision of the Queensland Court of Appeal. This decision was then provided to both the Applicant and Respondent. If it had not been for the fact that the Tribunal was able to confirm that this murder actually occurred, then little or no weight could have been placed on this aspect of the Applicant’s testimony.

  28. The Respondent points out that the Applicant referred to the deceased during the Hearing as “Jane Carmody” not as “Jane Horsbourgh”, and noted that the Applicant should have been able to recall her friends name with ease – RCS para 13. There are two possible responses to this suggestion. The first is that “Jane Horsbourgh” may also have been known as “Jane Carmody”. The second is, as the Applicant stated, she suffers from cognitive problems as a result of years of drug abuse.

  29. The Respondent challenges the Applicant’s claim that she suffers from PTSD and contends she has not provided any medical evidence to support this claim – RCS para 14.

  30. Whilst it is true that the Applicant has not provided any evidence to support this claim, there is material before the Tribunal which offers some support for the contention that the Applicant suffers, or at least at some time in the past suffered, from PTSD.

  31. Reference can be made to the report of Tracey Clarke who, as previously pointed out, assessed the Applicant in her capacity as a Psychologist.

  32. In that part of her report headed “Clinical Assessment” Ms Clarke made this assessment – Exhibit 3 p. 11:

    “Yvonne has suffered from severe depression, anxiety and post traumatic stress disorder for the past 10 years.”

  33. With respect to PTSD, Ms Clarke opined as follows – Exhibit 3 p. 12:

    “Yvonne disclosed symptoms congruent with the DSM IV TR diagnosis for Post Traumatic Stress Disorder. These symptoms included: Recurrent and intrusive recollections and dreams of the shooting and fire; Acting or feeling as if the trauma is recurring; intense psychological distress and physiological reactivity upon exposure to cues that resembled the traumatic event; efforts to avoid anything associated with the trauma; Markedly diminished interest in and participation in significant activities; and Hypervigilance.”

  34. As Ms Clarke was not called to give evidence, not as much weight can be placed on her report as otherwise would be the case. Further, it became clear during cross-examination that the Applicant had not told Ms Clarke the truth about her substance abuse, with Ms Clarke proceeding on the incorrect factual assumption that up until two years prior to her Supreme Court appearance she had no history of substance abuse – Exhibit 3 p. 11.

  35. It is not necessary for the Tribunal to weigh into the troubled and conflicting jurisprudence as to whether a Psychologist can make an authoritative diagnosis of a person’s mental illness – compare, for example, R v MacKenny (1983) 76 Cr App R 271 with Nepi v Northern Territory [1997] NTSC 153.

  36. It is sufficient for the disposition of this matter, to note that the Applicant’s claim that she was “diagnosed” with PTSD is in fact correct, and that “diagnosis” by Ms Clarke was prepared for the Applicant’s sentencing in the Brisbane Supreme Court. It is not to the point whether in fact the Applicant did, or still does, suffer from PTSD as defined in DSM IV TR; it is sufficient to find that she was diagnosed with such a condition by a Psychologist, and the report of Ms Clarke supports the proposition that the Applicant was traumatised by a series of events approximately a decade before her drug convictions.

  37. The Tribunal, then, takes into account the Applicant’s fragile mental state in the period leading up to her drug convictions.

  38. The Tribunal notes that the Applicant also informed Ms Clarke that she was supplying amphetamines to one of her ex-partners (the father of her second youngest child) for two months in the form of palliative care. The ex-partner was dying of cancer and “the lesions growing out of his neck and face were horrific and he only seemed to find relief from self administered amphetamines.” – Exhibit 3 p. 12.

  39. The Applicant also informed Ms Clarke that after her ex-partner’s death, she sold remaining amphetamines for $200 and gave the money to the ex-partner’s mother so she could pay the remainder owing on the ex-partner’s tombstone – Exhibit 3 p. 12.

  40. During the Hearing the following exchange occurred between Ms Allen and the Applicant – Tr. 11.10.2021 p. 19:

    “Okay. Thank you. So you accept your statement to Ms Clarke that you did not abuse drugs and that you were against the use of drugs was not correct?---Yes.

    Thank you. And would you accept also that that was an attempt to attain sympathy from a sentencing judge?---Probably, yes.”

  41. It is more likely than not that the Applicant’s account of her ex-partner’s death and the selling of drugs to help purchase his tombstone was also an attempt to gain sympathy from the sentencing judge. The Tribunal has, accordingly, given no weight to this version of events.

    Length of time since the offence(s) was (were) committed

  42. The breach of the Temporary Domestic Violence Order was on 22 August 2001, some 20 years ago. As previously noted, there have been no further convictions of domestic violence orders since that time.

  43. The Applicant was sentenced in the Brisbane Supreme Court for the drug offences on 10 September 2013, and the offences were committed between 31 December 2011 and September 2012.  In short, 8 years has elapsed since the Applicant’s convictions, and she has not been charged with any further drug offences since that time.

  44. The evidence before the Tribunal suggests that the Applicant’s last traffic infringement was on 26 April 2013 and convictions recorded on 8 August 2013.

  45. Again, since the Applicant’s release from custody it would appear she has not been the subject of any further breaches of Queensland’s traffic laws.

  46. In summary, then, the Applicant has had a clean record for more than eight years and the uncontested evidence suggests that since her release from custody she has lived a law-abiding life.

    Behaviour since completing prison sentence/remorse

  47. As noted above, the evidence before the Tribunal suggests that since her release from prison she has not been charged or convicted of any criminal or traffic offences.

  48. At the Hearing, the Applicant testified that since her release from prison she has been actively involved in Narcotics Anonymous – Tr. 11.10.2021 pp. 10 – 11:

    “WITNESS: Narcotics Anonymous is amazing. It’s an amazing program. It teaches you first and foremost how, you know, we have no control over our disease and we’re powerless over our addiction, and to do this 12 steps is something that just keeps us in line, on track and reminds us every day of, you know, there’s three choices if we go back down that road, and that’s institution, jail or death.  And, you know, we don’t want any of those. So we stay on track and – well, I do. I stay on track with the Narcotics Anonymous program.

    I actually do the program now at the Brisbane Women’s Correctional Centre.  I go in there with other women and we just give hope to the inmates and, you know, I’m eight years clean as of last month, and, you know, it gives them hope. And that’s all I can, you know, wish for, that I can help somebody else that may be going down the road and the path that I went down, and, yes I just – I’m remorseful for what happened and – but I’m grateful in the same – same hand. I’m grateful that, you know, I was arrested and went to jail, and I’ve been given a second chance. And my family have forgiven me. I have a very close relationship with my children and my grandchildren and my mum….

    DEPUTY PRESIDENT: And you – from also what you’re saying, do you voluntarily give up of your time to assist…persons who are incarcerated by participating in a Narcotics Anonymous program?

    WITNESS: Yes. Yes

    DEPUTY PRESIDENT: What does that entail? What do you actually do?

    WITNESS: So on Fridays- every Friday or every other Friday, lately, because of the lockdowns, I go into the Brisbane Women’s Correctional Centre at Wacol. And I go there with another woman, another lady, and we do the 12-step program for – we’re there from 1 o’clock in the afternoon till 3 o’clock. The program is so successful. We started off with five women. Now we’ve got 25 women coming in to the meetings.  And that’s what we do. We just go through the program with them and give them hope.”

  49. The Tribunal was also provided with a letter dated 9 January 2021 from Ms Meredith Connor, who is the Narcotics Anonymous Hospitals and Institutions Chair for Northern Australia – Exhibit 11.

  1. Ms Connor provided the following information about the Applicant’s involvement in Narcotics Anonymous:

    “Within the fellowship of NA, members are encouraged to ‘give back’ through voluntary hospital and institution service which includes visiting correctional facilities. I first met Yvonne when she attended the NA Prison Meeting Forum in August 2019 to discuss how NA members could better share the message of recovery with incarcerated addicts.

    From the outset Yvonne’s strength of character was evident through her insightful contributions to the Forum which benefited from her own personal experience and her willingness to ‘give back’ by volunteering to facilitate NA meetings with female prisoners.

    The administrative process to gain clearance, especially for female members who have been served prison sentences, is rigorous, lengthy and often frustrating. Yvonne navigated this process with dignity and patience and was rewarded with a positive outcome. For the past 12 months Yvonne has been an active participant on the Brisbane Women’s Correctional Centre NA roster.

    Women, such as Yvonne, who have a lived experience of incarceration and manage to maintain ongoing recovery, achieve a level of connection with the women inside which eludes most of us.  These acts of service see Yvonne sharing her experience, strength and hope, demonstrating both personal insight about her past experiences and how NA has supported her recovery to turn her life around. Yvonne’s determination to lead a different lifestyle is also evidenced by her residing in the same house for 18 years, as well as being a full time carer.

    Alongside her volunteer prison work, Yvonne also regularly attends NA service delivery meetings and discussion groups which have oversight of the operational aspects of this service work.  Her capacity and willingness to give of herself is respected by her peers and, as the Hospitals and Institutions Chair, I value Yvonne’s guidance and wisdom.

    It has been a privilege to have Yvonne’s support and I have every confidence that she will go on to take a leadership role within NA’s service structure.

    Survivors of addiction like Yvonne aren’t just important to NA, they’re important to every member of society, because they have the capacity to support others take a positive place in our communities.”

  2. The Tribunal has no reason to doubt the veracity of Ms Connor’s statement.

  3. It was clear from the Applicant’s testimony that she is very remorseful for the pain and harm she caused to her family and friends as a result of her drug addiction and criminal activity.

  4. The extent of her insight and remorse was clear from the following cross-examination by Ms Allen – Tr. 11.10.2021 pp. 16 – 17:

    “MS ALLEN: Thank you, Deputy President. Ms Drysdale, would you agree that a person of good character would not be involved in drugs?---Absolutely.

    And you would agree, wouldn’t you, that a person of good character would not cause harm to others?---Absolutely.

    Your criminal history in the material before the tribunal, you accept that that’s an accurate reflection of your criminal history in Australia?---Yes

    Thank you. And you accept that methylamphetamine is a dangerous drug?---Absolutely.

    And you would be aware of the potential consequences of methylamphetamine use, wouldn’t you?---Yes.

    Can you please tell the tribunal what you understand those to be?---Death, institution or jail is pretty much the bottom line of using methamphetamines.

    But what about the harm to others – non-users?---Mental abuse. Physical abuse and – a lot of mental abuse….my parents worried whether or not I was, you know, alive the next day or, you know, they had to lock up their house in case I come along and – a lot of mental abuse.”

  5. The Applicant expressed her appreciation for the manner in which her incarceration led to her rehabilitation and her actions since that time speak volumes about the change in her behaviour as well as her insight about her previous bad behaviour and her desire to lead a drug-free and law-abiding lifestyle.

  6. The Tribunal has also been presented with character reference statements from the Applicant’s family and friends. The Respondent points out that none of the statements are in the form of Statutory Declarations and should be given little weight – RCS para 28.

  7. The Tribunal generally agrees with the Respondent about the reliance that can be placed on character references which are not in the form of Statutory Declarations and, further, when the persons are not called to give evidence and be subject to cross-examination.

  8. In this instance the Tribunal has reached its decision on the Applicant’s character without needing to take into account the character references.

    Conclusion

  9. In reaching a conclusion as to whether the Applicant is of good character for the purposes of s 21(2)(h), the Tribunal has had regard to the following matters:

    (a)the Applicant has resided in Australia since 1968 from the age of five;

    (b)she has four children and four grandchildren, all of whom are Australian citizens;

    (c)the one-off domestic violence offence occurred two decades ago and followed a campaign of violence waged against the Applicant and her family by her ex-partner;

    (d)the domestic violence offence did not involve any physical violence but, rather, coming within a zone of exclusion;

    (e)the Applicant’s drug offences were serious and weigh against her;

    (f)the Applicant’s repeated traffic offences were also serious, and the nature and number of such offences disclose a disregard for the traffic laws of Queensland;

    (g)if the Tribunal had to assess the Applicant’s character at the time she was convicted of the drug offences, it is unlikely that a decision-maker would, or could, have found that she was of good character;

    (h)the Tribunal accepts that the murder of her friend Jane Horsbourgh by another friend, Paul McKinnon, had deleterious impacts on her mental state and may have started her downwards spiral into taking and supplying drugs;

    (i)since her release from prison the Applicant has not been convicted of any criminal or traffic offences;

    (j)the evidence before the Tribunal suggests that the Applicant has reformed herself and has lived a law-abiding life since her release from prison;

    (k)the Applicant demonstrated clear insight into her past and was remorseful, not just of her offending behaviour, but the harm and pain she caused to her family and broader society;

    (l)the Applicant has been an active member of Narcotics Anonymous and performed volunteer work involving, inter alia, going to Brisbane Women’s Correctional Centre and helping female inmates. In addition, she regularly attends Narcotics Anonymous service delivery meetings and discussion groups;

    (m)her involvement with Narcotics Anonymous was confirmed by Ms Meredith Cooper;

    (n)the Tribunal found the Applicant to be a witness of credit;

    (o)the Applicant’s testimony was straightforward and she did not attempt to evade responsibility or downplay any aspect of her criminal past; and

    (p)the Applicant presented as a woman who is attempting to redeem herself, contribute to society and ensure that the trust reposed in her by her family and friends is not misplaced.

  10. As pointed out previously, a decision-maker, when evaluating whether an applicant is a person of good character, has to consider an aggregate of qualities. Further, the assessment of good character, while necessarily considering an applicant’s criminal history and past behaviour, is primarily a contemporaneous exercise. The question to be determined is whether an applicant is now a person of good character. While in some instances an applicant’s past behaviour may be so serious and vile that it indelibly stains their character, this is not one of those cases.

  11. Having carefully considered all of the evidence presented, the Tribunal is satisfied that the Applicant is now a person of good character for the purposes of s 21(1)(h) of the Act.

    DECISION

  12. The decision is under review is set aside and the matter is remitted to the Respondent with the direction that the Applicant satisfies s 21(2)(h) of the Australian Citizenship Act 2007.

I certify that the preceding 141 (one hundred and forty-one) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of Deputy President J Sosso

...............[SGD]...................................

Associate

Dated: 23 December 2021

Date of hearing: 11 October 2021
Date final submissions received: 18 October 2021
Applicant: Microsoft Teams
Solicitors for the Respondent:

Ms Cody Allen

Sparke Helmore

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