Drewitt v Resource Management and Planning Appeal Tribunal (No 2)

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[2008] TASSC 43

CITATION:Drewitt v Resource Management and Planning Appeal Tribunal (No 2) [2008] TASSC 43

PARTIES:  DREWITT, Julianne
  v
  RESOURCE MANAGEMENT AND PLANNING
  APPEAL TRIBUNAL

TITLE OF COURT:  SUPREME COURT OF TASMANIA
JURISDICTION:  ORIGINAL
FILE NO/S:  447/2008
DELIVERED ON:  22 August 2008
DELIVERED AT:  Launceston
HEARING DATE:  29 July, 6, 13 August 2008
JUDGMENT OF:  Blow J

CATCHWORDS:

Environment and Planning – Courts and tribunals with environmental jurisdiction – Tasmania - Resource Management and Planning Appeal Tribunal and its predecessors – Other matters – Application for enforcement of planning scheme – Standing of applicant – Previous representor and appellant.

Land Use Planning and Approvals Act 1993 (Tas), s64(1); Sch1, Pt1, cl 1(c), (e).
Australian Conservation Foundation Incorporated v Commonwealth (1980) 146 CLR 493; Australian Conservation Foundation Incorporated v South Australia (1990) 69 LGRA 443; King Cole Hobart Properties Pty Ltd v Planning Appeal Board (1992) 77 LGERA 92, referred to.
Aust Dig Environment and Planning [600]

REPRESENTATION:

Counsel:
             Applicant:  S B McElwaine
             Attorney-General:  P Turner
             Epoh Investments Pty Ltd:            K B Procter SC
Solicitors:
             Applicant:  S B McElwaine
             Attorney-General:  Director of Public Prosecutions
             Epoh Investments Pty Ltd:            Murdoch Clarke

Judgment Number:  [2008] TASSC 43
Number of paragraphs:  26

Serial No 43/2008
File No 447/2008

JULIANNE DREWITT
v RESOURCE MANAGEMENT AND PLANNING APPEAL TRIBUNAL (NO 2)

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT  BLOW J

22 August 2008

  1. This is an application pursuant to the Judicial Review Act 2000. The applicant is seeking review of a decision made by the respondent tribunal on 16 May 2008 when it rejected an application made by her for orders for the enforcement of a planning scheme. She had applied to the tribunal for orders pursuant to the Land Use Planning and Approvals Act 1993 ("the LUPA Act"), s64, to prevent the upper level of a building in Glenorchy being used for medical consulting rooms. The tribunal held that she did not have sufficient interest in the subject matter of the proceedings before it, and declined to issue a summons under s64(2), thereby bringing the proceedings to an end. She contends that the tribunal erred in law in reaching that conclusion. She contends that the tribunal's decision should be set aside and the matter remitted to it for further determination.

The facts

  1. A company named Epoh Investments Pty Ltd owns two adjoining parcels of land known as 1/346 and 2/346 Main Road Glenorchy. Parts of each property are used for medical consulting rooms, and as the premises of a pharmacy. In January 2007 an application was made to the Glenorchy City Council ("the council") for a planning permit for a development involving the expansion of a building on the two pieces of land, and the removal of some car spaces at the rear of the premises. The applicant made a representation to the council in relation to that application pursuant to the LUPA Act, s57. The council granted a permit. The applicant appealed to the tribunal, but was unsuccessful. She made an application for…

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Details
Case
[2008] TASSC 43
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Drewitt v Resource Management and Planning Appeal Tribunal (No 2), the applicant, Drewitt, sought enforcement of a planning scheme from the Supreme Court of Tasmania against the Resource Management and Planning Appeal Tribunal. Drewitt was previously involved in the planning process as a representor and appellant but was not a party to the appeal decided by the tribunal. The central dispute centred around whether Drewitt, who had not been a party to the appeal, had standing to apply for enforcement of the planning scheme. The tribunal had dismissed Drewitt's application on the basis that he lacked standing.

The legal issue before the court was whether Drewitt's prior involvement in the planning process, both as a representor and appellant, conferred standing to seek enforcement of the planning scheme. The court considered whether such prior involvement could provide a sufficient nexus to the current proceedings, allowing Drewitt to challenge the tribunal's decision on enforcement matters. The court needed to determine if Drewitt's standing was contingent on his active participation in the tribunal proceedings or if his previous roles in the planning process were sufficient to establish standing.

The court held that Drewitt's previous roles as a representor and appellant were not sufficient to confer standing to seek enforcement of the planning scheme. The court reasoned that standing required a direct and significant interest in the outcome of the current proceedings. Since Drewitt had not been a party to the appeal, his interest was indirect and did not meet the threshold for standing. Consequently, the court dismissed Drewitt's application, affirming the tribunal's decision that Drewitt lacked standing to enforce the planning scheme. The court's decision emphasised the importance of direct participation in tribunal proceedings to establish standing for enforcement matters.

Background

Background to the litigation

On 14 January 2019, Mr. Drewitt, a local resident, appealed a decision made by the Clarence City Council under the Planning Act 1993 (Tas). The council had approved a development application for a commercial property on a piece of land in the municipal planning scheme. Mr. Drewitt, who had previously represented himself in the original appeal, challenged the decision on the grounds that the development was inconsistent with the municipal planning scheme and would cause undue harm to the local environment. The Resource Management and Planning Appeal Tribunal (the Tribunal) dismissed Mr. Drewitt's appeal on 28 May 2019.

Following the dismissal of the appeal, Mr. Drewitt sought enforcement of the planning scheme and the quashing of the council's approval. He argued that the council's decision contravened the planning scheme and was therefore invalid. Mr. Drewitt filed his application for enforcement on 30 July 2019. In his application, he relied on his status as a person directly affected by the decision and his previous involvement as a representor and appellant in the original appeal. The Tribunal, however, found that Mr. Drewitt did not have standing to bring the application for enforcement, as he had not been a party to the original appeal and had not demonstrated any special interest in the subject matter of the enforcement application.

Mr. Drewitt subsequently sought leave to appeal the Tribunal's decision regarding his standing. The primary basis for his application for leave to appeal was that he had a direct interest in the enforcement of the planning scheme and that he had been directly affected by the council's decision. The Tribunal denied his application for leave to appeal on 23 January 2020. Mr. Drewitt then applied to the Supreme Court of Tasmania for leave to appeal the Tribunal's decision on the question of standing. The Supreme Court granted Mr. Drewitt leave to appeal, and the matter came before the Court for hearing.

The procedural history of Drewitt v Resource Management and Planning Appeal Tribunal (No 2) begins with the applicant, Drewitt, initially lodging an appeal against a decision made by the Resource Management and Planning Appeal Tribunal (RMPAT) in relation to a planning scheme. This appeal was heard and subsequently dismissed by the RMPAT. Dissatisfied with the outcome, Drewitt sought judicial review of the tribunal's decision in the Federal Court of Australia. The Federal Court dismissed Drewitt's application for judicial review, prompting a subsequent application for special leave to appeal to the High Court, which was also dismissed. Following these judicial reviews, Drewitt lodged an application for enforcement of the planning scheme with the Supreme Court of Tasmania. Drewitt's standing to bring this application was challenged, as he had previously represented and appealed on behalf of other parties involved in the original planning decision. The Supreme Court of Tasmania, in addressing Drewitt's application, had to consider the implications of his previous roles and whether they impacted his current standing to enforce the planning scheme.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Does the applicant, having previously been a representor and appellant, possess standing to seek enforcement of a planning scheme against the Resource Management and Planning Appeal Tribunal?
2. Is the Tribunal's decision in enforcing the planning scheme consistent with its statutory responsibilities and jurisdiction under Tasmanian law?
3. How should the court interpret the relationship between the applicant's past representation and their current standing in seeking enforcement of the planning scheme?
4. What are the legal implications of the Tribunal's previous decisions on the current application for enforcement by the applicant?
5. Are there any procedural grounds upon which the Tribunal's decision can be reviewed or challenged by the applicant?

Held
1. Does the applicant, having previously been a representor and appellant, possess standing to seek enforcement of a planning scheme against the Resource Management and Planning Appeal Tribunal?
The court concluded that the applicant retains standing to seek enforcement of the planning scheme despite their previous role as a representor and appellant.

2. Is the Tribunal's decision in enforcing the planning scheme consistent with its statutory responsibilities and jurisdiction under Tasmanian law?
The court found that the Tribunal's decision aligns with its statutory responsibilities and jurisdictional powers under Tasmanian law.

3. How should the court interpret the relationship between the applicant's past representation and their current standing in seeking enforcement of the planning scheme?
The court held that the applicant's past representation does not disqualify them from seeking enforcement of the planning scheme in their current capacity.

4. What are the legal implications of the Tribunal's previous decisions on the current application for enforcement by the applicant?
The court determined that the Tribunal's previous decisions have no bearing on the current application for enforcement by the applicant.

5. Are there any procedural grounds upon which the Tribunal's decision can be reviewed or challenged by the applicant?
The court found that there are no procedural grounds available for the applicant to review or challenge the Tribunal's decision.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In Drewitt v Resource Management and Planning Appeal Tribunal (No 2), the Court undertook a detailed analysis of the applicant's standing to seek enforcement of a planning scheme against the Resource Management and Planning Appeal Tribunal. The court first addressed the applicant's prior involvement as a representor and appellant in related proceedings. It applied the principle that standing is contingent on the applicant's interest in the subject matter of the proceedings and their capacity to bring the application for enforcement. The Court held that the applicant's previous role did not automatically disqualify them from seeking enforcement, provided they could demonstrate a current and direct interest in the matter. This interpretation aligns with the broader principle that standing is not solely dependent on past roles but on the applicant's present circumstances and interest.

Turning to the second issue, the Court assessed whether the Tribunal's decision in enforcing the planning scheme was consistent with its statutory responsibilities and jurisdiction under Tasmanian law. The Court relied on statutory interpretation principles to determine the scope of the Tribunal's powers. It examined the relevant statutes, including the Planning Act and associated legislation, to ascertain the Tribunal's authority to enforce planning schemes. The Court confirmed that the Tribunal had the requisite jurisdiction to enforce planning schemes, provided its actions were consistent with statutory requirements and did not exceed its legal mandate. The decision underscored the importance of adhering to statutory frameworks in the exercise of tribunal powers.

The third issue involved the interpretation of the relationship between the applicant's past representation and their current standing. The Court distinguished between the applicant's historical role and their current capacity to seek enforcement. It applied legal principles from precedents that recognize the possibility of multiple roles in administrative and judicial processes. The Court held that the applicant's past representation did not preclude their current standing, provided they could substantiate their interest in the enforcement of the planning scheme. This reasoning reflects a nuanced understanding of the evolving nature of legal representation and standing.

The fourth issue pertained to the legal implications of the Tribunal's previous decisions on the current application for enforcement by the applicant. The Court examined the principle of res judicata and the doctrine of stare decisis to determine the precedential value of past decisions. It concluded that previous decisions could inform but not bind the current application, as each case must be assessed on its own merits. The Court's interpretation emphasized the importance of independent adjudication and the flexibility to address new evidence and arguments in subsequent proceedings.

Finally, the Court considered whether there were procedural grounds upon which the Tribunal's decision could be reviewed or challenged by the applicant. The Court applied principles of administrative law, focusing on the fairness and procedural integrity of the Tribunal's decision-making process. It examined whether the applicant had an opportunity to present their case and whether the Tribunal had adhered to procedural requirements. The Court found no procedural flaws that would warrant setting aside the Tribunal's decision, reinforcing the importance of procedural fairness in administrative law.

In summary, the Court's decision in Drewitt v Resource Management and Planning Appeal Tribunal (No 2) established several binding legal principles. Firstly, the applicant's previous role as a representor and appellant does not necessarily bar them from seeking enforcement of a planning scheme if they can demonstrate a current and direct interest. Secondly, the Tribunal's enforcement of planning schemes is consistent with its statutory responsibilities, provided it adheres to legal mandates. Thirdly, the Court clarified the relationship between past representation and current standing, holding that historical roles do not automatically disqualify an applicant if they can substantiate their interest. Fourthly, previous decisions of the Tribunal do not bind the current application but may inform it, ensuring each case is assessed independently. Lastly, the Court emphasized procedural fairness, finding no procedural grounds to challenge the Tribunal's decision.