SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
Drake v PKF (Gold Coast) Pty Ltd & Anor [2021] QCA 83
PARTIES:
PETER CHARLES DRAKE
(appellant)
v
PKF (GOLD COAST) PTY LTD
ACN 137 531 250
(first respondent)
SCOTT JAMES McMURTRIE
(second respondent)FILE NO/S:
Appeal No 10289 of 2020
SC No 2822 of 2019DIVISION:
Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING:
General Civil Appeal
ORIGINATING COURT:
Supreme Court at Brisbane – Unreported, 26 August 2020 (Dalton J)
DELIVERED ON:
30 April 2021
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
17 March 2021
JUDGES:
Fraser and Morrison and McMurdo JJA
ORDERS:
1. Appeal allowed.
2. Set aside the orders made on 26 August 2020.
CATCHWORDS:
PROCEDURE – CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS – COURT SUPERVISION – WANT OF PROSECUTION OR LACK OF PROGRESS – where the appellant seeks to challenge orders made refusing leave to file an amended statement of claim and dismissing proceedings – where the original statement of claim was struck out and the party was given six months to re-plead – where the amended pleadings contained the same defects as the earlier pleadings – where the primary judge dismissed proceedings without relief of that kind being sought and without consideration being given to matters relevant to such an application
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld), r 280, r 293, r 374, r 376
Tyler v Custom Credit Corporation Ltd[2000] QCA 178, applied
COUNSEL:
The appellant appeared on his own behalf
M Jones for the respondentsSOLICITORS:
The appellant appeared on his own behalf
Hall & Wilcox for the respondents
THE COURT: The appellant, Mr Drake, seeks to challenge orders made on 26 August 2020, refusing leave to file an amended statement of claim, and dismissing proceedings instituted by him on 14 March 2019.
The proceedings concerned a claim by Mr Drake in relation to the appointment of administrators to a company with which he was involved, LM Investment Management Limited (LMIM). In essence he claimed that his accountants (the respondents to this appeal) were negligent by not advising him how to respond to a proposal by the other directors to appoint administrators to LMIM, and that such an appointment would have a detrimental effect on his personal income. Further, part of the case claimed that the respondents “chose to remain silent” about various aspects of the proposal to appoint administrators and the options available to Mr Drake. It was claimed that had the respondents given appropriate advice, Mr Drake would have been able to prevent the appointment of the administrators by exercising the LMIM shareholders’ powers in general meeting, and taking over LMIM’s affairs by himself and continuing to trade.
For the reasons which follow, whilst Mr Drake had been unsuccessfully attempting to properly plead his case for some years, the proceedings should not have been dismissed, and the orders made by the learned primary judge must be set aside.
Progress of the proceedings
The material shows that the relevant steps and other aspects of the proceedings below have…
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- Case
- [2021] QCA 83
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues the court was required to decide included whether the primary judge had the jurisdiction to dismiss the proceedings for want of prosecution and lack of progress, and whether the dismissal was justified. The court held that the orders were made in the absence of an application by the respondents seeking relief of the kind ordered and without consideration being given to matters that are relevant to such an application. The court also held that the primary judge had not considered whether there was a realistic prospect of Mr Drake being able to plead a coherent case.
The court's reasoning was that there were considerable difficulties that confronted the orders made on 26 August 2020. Firstly, there was no application by the respondents seeking relief of the kind ordered. Secondly, the only extant application at that time was that under UCPR r 376(4), by Mr Drake seeking leave to amend. However, the primary judge made it plain on 11 February 2020 that she was not embarking on that application, and it is evident that she did not do so on 26 August 2020. Thirdly, in so far as it might be thought that her Honour was exercising the power to dismiss for want of prosecution it could only have been pursuant to the inherent jurisdiction of the court to control its own processes, as the respondents submitted before this Court. However, the reasons do not reveal that any consideration was given to the matters that are relevant to such an application.
The outcome of the appeal was that the orders made on 26 August 2020 were set aside. The court held that the appeal was allowed, and the orders made by the primary judge were set aside.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Appeal allowed.
2. Set aside the orders made on 26 August 2020.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Then her Honour turned to an assessment of whether Mr Drake had a realistic prospect of ever being able to plead a coherent case, and whether there was any justification in allowing the proceedings to continue:[32]“So the first thing Mr Drake would need to do is find a lawyer. Then he would need to somehow get hold of the documents he says he needs to plead, and after all of that had happened, he could make another attempt, or his lawyer could make another attempt to plead what would be, as I say, a very complicated cause of action. I just cannot see that there is a realistic chance of that happening, and I think that, given the history of this matter, and the warnings that Mr Drake has had in relation to what would be required today, there is no justification for this proceeding continuing.”[32]AB 6 lines 11-17.Consideration In our view, there are considerable difficulties that confront the orders made on 26 August 2020, in terms of the legal framework under which they were made. First, there was no application brought by the respondents seeking relief of the kind ordered, that is, dismissal of the proceedings. True it is that counsel agreed that they sought costs of the proceedings “because you want them dismissed”, but no application was made to that effect. Therefore, her Honour was not called upon for the exercise of powers under rules such as UCPR r 280 (noncompliance with the rules or an order) or r 293 (summary judgment by a defendant). Secondly, the only extant application at that time was that under UCPR r 376(4), by Mr Drake seeking leave to amend. But her Honour made it plain on 11 February 2020 that she was not embarking on that application, and it is evident that she did not do so on 26 August 2020. There is nothing in the reasons to suggest that her Honour was addressing matters such as whether there was a new cause of action that was being added, and whether it was based on the same or substantially the same facts as the currently pleaded cause of action. Thirdly, in so far as it might be thought that her Honour was exercising the power to dismiss for want of prosecution it could only have been pursuant to the inherent jurisdiction of the court to control its own processes, as the respondents submitted before this Court. However, the reasons do not reveal that any consideration was given to the matters that are relevant to such an application, as identified in Tyler v Custom Credit Corporation Ltd.[33] Those factors include: (i) how long ago the events alleged in the statement of claim occurred; (ii) how long ago the litigation was commenced or causes of action were added; (iii) the prospects the plaintiff has of success in the action; (iv) whether or not the impecuniosity of the plaintiff has been responsible for the pace of the litigation; (v) any delay before the litigation was commenced; (vi) how far the litigation has progressed; and (vii) whether there is a satisfactory explanation for the delay.[33][2000] QCA 178 at [2]; Mathieson v Lawson & Ors [2019] QCA 35 at [38]-[40].