DPV17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs
[2022] FedCFamC2G 555
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
DPV17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FedCFamC2G 555
File number(s): SYG 2545 of 2017 Judgment of: JUDGE LAING Date of judgment: 13 July 2022 Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for judicial review of a decision by the Immigration Assessment Authority affirming decision not to grant a Safe Haven Enterprise (Class XE) (Subclass 790) visa – whether the IAA made an unsupported assumption that the applicant would be granted bail – whether the IAA’s non-compliance with the approach required in AUS17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2020] HCA 37; 269 CLR 494 was material – whether the IAA failed to consider the applicant’s claim that he would face harm because he lacked identity documents – application dismissed. Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 36(2A), 473DD(b)(ii) Cases cited: AUS17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2020] HCA 37; 269 CLR 494
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZMTA; CQZ15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection; BEG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] HCA 3; 264 CLR 421
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16; 240 CLR 611
SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection & Anor; SZTGM v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection & Anor [2016] HCATrans 276
Division: Division 2 General Federal Law Number of paragraphs: 48 Date of hearing: 21 June 2022 Place: Sydney Solicitor for the Applicant Mr S. Hodges (Hodges Legal) appeared in person Solicitor for the First Respondent Mr G. Johnson (Mills Oakley) appeared in person ORDERS
SYG 2545 of 2017 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: DPV17
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
First Respondent
IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE LAING
DATE OF ORDER:
13 JULY 2022
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application be dismissed.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
JUDGE LAING
Before the Court is an application for judicial review of a decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA). The IAA affirmed a decision of a delegate (Delegate) of the first respondent (Minister) refusing to grant the applicant a Safe Haven Enterprise (Class XE) (Subclass 790) visa (protection visa).
BACKGROUND
The applicant is a citizen of Sri Lanka of Tamil ethnicity, who lived in Jaffna in the Northern Province of Sri Lanka before fleeing to India in 1990 at the age of 6 where he lived in refugee camps for 22 years.
The applicant arrived in Australia on 5 November 2012 as an irregular maritime arrival. He applied for the protection visa on 27 September 2016.
On 3 April 2017, the Delegate refused the application.
The Delegate’s decision was referred to the IAA for review on 6 April 2017. Mr Sudarshan Tambimuttu (who disclaimed representing the applicant in an “official capacity”) provided two submissions on behalf of the applicant, on 27 April 2017 and 6 May 2017. Mr Tambimuttu also provided the IAA with material containing country information. The applicant requested that the two submissions and country information be considered by the IAA in its review.
On 14 July 2017, the IAA affirmed the Delegate’s decision.
THE IAA’S DECISION
The IAA observed that submissions had been put forward on the applicant’s behalf on 27 April 2017 (at [5]-[9]). It noted claims made in those submissions which it considered had not been made to the Delegate. These were considered in two categories:
(a)that “the applicant should he be returned to Sri Lanka would need a National Identity Card (NIC). As the applicant has no known familial or other links in Sri Lanka, the applicant would face difficulty in being issued [a] NIC by the authorities”. The applicant's birth certificate was “obtained through unofficial channels”; and
(b)that “the applicant faces a real chance of Convention related persecutory treatment as in the past the applicant has been imputed with LTTE involvement/support, it must also be noted that the applicant's father was killed by the army”.
In relation to the first category of new information, the IAA reasoned as follows (at [6]):
6. The submission contends that “the applicant should he be returned to Sri Lanka would need a National Identity Card (NIC). As the applicant has no known familial or other links in Sri Lanka, the applicant would face difficulty in being issued and NIC by the authorities” and that the applicant’s birth certificate was “obtained through unofficial channels”. These claims were not made to the delegate and I consider them to be new information. These claims substantially change and add to the basis on which the applicant’s claims were initially made before the delegate. The claims have not been previously made by the applicant. The applicant was represented before the Department and was given the opportunity to present his claims. Having regard to all the circumstances, I am not satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances to justify the consideration of this new information.
In relation to the second, the IAA considered that the new claims made were inconsistent with, and “appear[ed] to have no relationship to the case presented to the Department”. The new claims were that the applicant had previously been imputed with LTTE involvement or support and that his father had been killed by the army. This suggestion by Mr Tambimuttu was at odds with the applicant’s claims that he left Sri Lanka when he was 6 years old and that his father was alive and living in Tamil Nadu, India. The IAA considered that the applicant was represented before the Department and had been given the opportunity to present his claims. Having regard to “all of the circumstances”, the IAA was not satisfied that exceptional circumstances justified consideration of the new information (at [7]).
The IAA then addressed the submissions provided on 6 May 2017 (at [10]). Those submissions were a response to the IAA’s correspondence to the applicant on 2 May 2017. In that correspondence, the IAA requested the applicant provide the IAA with copies of material referred to in the submissions if he wished the IAA to consider it, in accordance with the Practice Direction. Mr Tambimuttu’s submissions on 6 May 2017 contended that the earlier submissions complied with the Practice Direction and raised issues with parts of that direction. The submissions indicated that hardcopies of the relevant documents would nonetheless be sent to the IAA by post.
The IAA observed that copies had been subsequently provided of various country information reports. That information pre-dated the Delegate’s decision, was not before the Delegate and was new information. The IAA was not satisfied that the information could not have been provided to the Delegate, nor that it was credible personal information that if previously known may have affected consideration of the applicant’s claims. Nor did the IAA find that exceptional circumstances justified consideration of the new information (at [11]-[12]). The IAA observed that it had additionally been provided with the transcript for SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection & Anor; SZTGM v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection & Anor [2016] HCATrans 276 (at [13]).
The IAA:
(a)accepted the applicant's identity as being a then 32-year-old Tamil male from the Northern Province of Sri Lanka, and a Sri Lankan national (at [23]);
(b)accepted that the applicant and his family travelled illegally by boat to Tamil Nadu, India in 1990 to escape the civil conflict, and that prior to the family's departure the applicant's father was physically assaulted by the SLA (at [20]);
(c)accepted that the applicant's residence in India was an ad hoc arrangement which permitted him to remain in Tamil Nadu temporarily, but did not give the applicant a right to enter and reside in India. (at [21]);
(d)accepted the applicant’s claim that if he returned to Sri Lanka, he would be returning to an environment where he does not have any family or friends. However, the IAA was not satisfied that this gave rise to a real chance of the relevant harm (at [24] and [56]);
(e)accepted that the applicant may face some level of societal discrimination related to his ethnicity, but did not accept that this would constitute serious or significant harm (at [28] and [55]);
(f)considered that, as a 6-year-old Tamil male, the applicant was not of adverse interest to the Sri Lankan authorities or any other groups when he departed Sri Lanka in 1990 (at [20]);
(g)found the applicant would not be imputed with any relevantly adverse association with Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), having regard to his background and relevant country information (at [31]-[32]); and
(h)did not accept that the applicant would face a real chance of the relevant harm as a 32-year old Tamil from the Northern province who left Sri Lanka illegally and resided in India as a refugee for a considerable period (at [32]).
The IAA considered the applicant’s claim that he would be harmed on return to Sri Lanka because he will be returning without Sri Lankan identity documents, as a failed asylum seeker from Australia who left illegally by boat to India in 1990. In addressing this claim, the IAA:
(a)did not accept that the applicant would be harmed on return due to his lack of Sri Lankan identity documents. The IAA observed that the applicant possessed a Sri Lankan birth certificate. It considered that there was no suggestion that his residence in Sri Lanka had not been previously recorded (at [35];
(b)accepted that the applicant may be detained en masse with other returnees for processing. Country information indicated that returnees would be treated according to standard airport procedures, regardless of ethnicity or religion, and would not be subject to mistreatment during processing (at [37]);
(c)rejected, based on available country information, that the applicant would be imputed with a relevantly adverse profile on return (at [38]); and
(d)accepted that the applicant may be charged under the Immigration and Emigration Act 1988 (I&E Act) for his unlawful departure. This may involve a brief period of detention that may occur in a Sri Lankan prison. Whilst conditions there were poor, the IAA was satisfied that this was “due to economic and resourcing conditions and old infrastructure, not a result of any systematic or intentional conduct” by the authorities (at [40]-[43]).
At [45]-[46] of its decision, the IAA stated:
45. Country information indicates if the applicant pleads guilty to departing illegally, will be required to pay a fine (which he can do by instalment) and will subsequently be released. In most cases if a person pleads not guilty, they will be granted bail on their own personal surety immediately by the magistrate, or may be required to have a family member act as guarantor and wait for their family member to collect them.
46. The applicant has claimed that he has no family or friends in Sri Lanka and will not have the required family member to act as guarantor if he pleads not guilty on return. I accept that the applicant may not have the requisite family member to act as a guarantor however the information before me indicates that bail is also granted on the basis of personal surety. There is no evidence in the referred materials or submissions to indicate why he would not be granted bail on his own personal surety or if bond was ordered he would not have the monetary assets to cover the bond amount. An accused will only need to return to court when the case against them is being heard, or if summonsed as a witness in a case against the organiser/facilitator of a boat venture. There is no general requirement to report to police or police stations between hearings.
A footnoted reference was provided at the end of [46] to the following report: DFAT, “DFAT Country Information Report: Sri Lanka”, 24 January 2017, CISEDB50AD105.
The IAA was not satisfied that a short period in detention, or the fine indicated on the country information, would result in serious or significant harm (at [47] and [54]).
The IAA further considered (at [48]):
48. On a separate basis, I consider that the information before me does not indicate that I&E Act is discriminatory on its terms, that it is applied in a discriminatory manner or that it is selectively enforced. I am also satisfied there is a legitimate object to these laws, that being to regulate the movement of Sri Lankan and other nationals in and outside the country. Accordingly, I am satisfied that any investigation, prosecution and punishment of the applicant under the I&E Act would be the result of a law of general application and would not amount to persecution for the purpose of ss.5H(1) and 5J(1) of the Act.
The IAA did not accept that the applicant faced a real chance of the relevant harm on return as a failed asylum seeker from Australia who left Sri Lanka illegally or for any of the other reasons that he had claimed. Accordingly, the IAA affirmed the Delegate’s decision (at [49]-[58]).
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THIS COURT
The pleading grounds
The applicant applied for judicial review on 11 August 2017, relying on the following grounds:
1.The IAA committed jurisdictional error by making a finding that was based on an assumption.
PARTICULARS
a. At [14], the applicant claimed that, in 1990, he and his family left Sri Lanka and travelled by boat to Tamil Nadu in India.
b. The applicant resided in Tamil Nadu for 22 years (between 1990 and [2012]) and has not returned to Sri Lanka since he left.
c. At [24], IAA noted that the applicant claimed that he “doesn't have anyone” in Sri Lanka.
d. At [40], the IAA accepted that the applicant left Sri Lanka illegally by boat in 1990 and that, upon return, he may be charged under the Immigration and Emigration Act 1988 (I&E Act).
e. In it noted, at [44], that the penalties for people who depart illegally can include imprisonment of up to five years and a fine up to 200,000 LKR.
f. At [45], the IAA stated the following:
i.“Country information indicates if the applicant pleads guilty to departing illegally, [he] will be required to pay a fine ... and will subsequently be released. In most cases if a person pleads not guilty, they will be granted bail on their own personal surety ... or may be required to have a family member act as guarantor and wait for their family member to collect them.”
g. In relation to (f), the IAA made the following finding, at [46]:
i. “The applicant... will not have the required family member to act as guarantor if he pleads not guilty on return. I accept that the applicant may not have the requisite family member to act as guarantor however the information before me indicates that bail is also granted on the basis of personal surety.”
h. This finding was not supported by evidence but was rather based on the assumption that the applicant would automatically be granted bail on the basis of personal surety because he does not have any family members in Sri Lanka.
2.The IAA committed jurisdictional error by failing to give reasons for its decision.
PARTICULARS
a. See Particulars for Ground 1.
b. The IAA gave the following reason for its decision at [46]:
i.“There is no evidence in the referred materials or submissions to indicate why he would not be granted bail on his own personal surety.”
c.The reasoning provided by the IAA was inadequate as it was based on an assumption in the absence of evidence.
At the hearing of this matter, the applicant sought leave to rely upon the following additional ground, which was raised in response to a query from the Court that is considered further below:
3.The IAA was in error in failing to consider a claim made by the Applicant
PARTICULARS
a.At CB 59 paragraph 6 the Applicant states that he will be at risk on return. He claimed that he did not have a National Identity Card. The Applicant claimed je would be arrested and held in gaol. He would not be granted bail as he did not have family remaining if Sri Lanka who could act as guarantor and could be held in gaol for up to 18 months. The applicant claimed that as a young Tamil male he could be tortured in gaol.
b.At CB 402 paragraph 6, the IAA notes the submissions from the Applicant's representative to the effect of the claims in paragraph (a) above says that "these claims substantially change and add to the basis on which the applicant's claims were initially made before the delegate"
c.And "I am not satisfies that there are exceptional circumstances to justify consideration of this new information.
d. The inference from the IAA statement in paragraph 5 is that it did not read the applicant's statement at CB 6.
e.The IAA did not consider the risk to the applicant of returning to Sri Lanka without a National Identity Card.
f. In particular the IAA did not consider the relevance of the applicant's lack of a National Identity Card in consideration of the bail issue
The applicant also relied upon the following additional particular under ground 1:
i.The IAA did not consider the impact on a bail determination the fact that the Applicant did not have a National Identity Card.
Leave was granted for the applicant to rely upon the additional ground and particular, which were recorded in an amended application filed on 22 June 2022.
Grounds 1 and 2
There is considerable overlap between these two grounds, which were dealt with collectively in the applicant’s submissions. Both grounds contend that the IAA made an assumption without adequate foundation that the applicant would be granted bail on the basis of personal surety because he lacked family members to stand as guarantors. Ground two contends that inadequate reasons were given for this finding, as it was based upon an unsupported assumption.
In written submissions, the applicant relied upon various authorities in support of his contention that the making of an unfounded assumption may result in relevant error where it has no basis in the evidentiary material. The Minister accepted that in some cases, the making of an unwarranted assumption may point to the absence of a logical connection between the evidence and the reasons of the relevant decision maker: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16; 240 CLR 611.
However, I accept the Minister’s submission that the IAA’s reasons do not establish that such an unsupported “assumption” was made in the present case.
The IAA’s reasoning at [46] is set out in full above. Essentially, the IAA’s reasoning articulated that it was not satisfied bail would be refused in circumstances where:
(a)the IAA accepted that the applicant would not have family in Sri Lanka to stand as guarantor;
(b)country information indicated that bail may alternatively be granted on the basis of personal surety; and
(c)no evidence had been given in the written materials to indicate why the applicant would not be granted bail on this basis or, if a bond was ordered, that he would not have the monetary assets to cover the bond amount.
The source country information relied upon by the IAA in coming to this conclusion is not before the Court. This creates some evidentiary difficulty for the applicant in establishing that the IAA’s interpretation of it was not open or available.
The country information referred to in the IAA’s decision was not expressed as being contingent upon whether or not the applicant possessed a National Identity Card. For reasons given below in relation to ground 3, I do not accept that the IAA failed to consider the applicant’s claims regarding his lack of documentation. Nor do I accept the applicant’s contention that the IAA erred by failing to consider that this meant that the applicant may not be granted bail.
I consider that it was open for the IAA not to be satisfied that the applicant would face harm due to withholding of bail for the reasons that it gave. The applicant has not demonstrated that the IAA was mistaken about the effect of the country information that it considered, nor about the deficiencies it identified in his evidence. In the absence of satisfactory evidence indicating that bail on the basis of personal surety would be refused to a person in the applicant’s circumstances, the IAA was not obliged to find that there was a real chance of it being refused.
Further, I accept the Minister’s submission that the applicant has not demonstrated materiality of the asserted errors in this case. As set out above, the IAA identified as an additional basis of its decision that:
(a)“any investigation, prosecution and punishment of the applicant under the I&E Act would be the result of a law of general application and would not amount to persecution for the purpose of ss.5H(1) and 5J(1) of the Act” (at [48]); and
(b)conditions of detention would not constitute the arbitrary deprivation of life, carrying out of the death penalty, or any form of “intentional conduct” within the contemplation of s 36(2A) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act) (at [43] and [54]) (see SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] HCA 34; 262 CLR 362 at [26]-[27]).
Whilst the refusal of bail may result in a longer period of detention, the IAA found that the applicant’s detention would be pursuant to a non-discriminatory law of general application that would not result in his intentional mistreatment within the contemplation of s 36(2A) of the Act. Given this reasoning, the applicant has not demonstrated that there was a realistic possibility of a different outcome, even if his contended grounds were able to be established (see Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZMTA; CQZ15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection; BEG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] HCA 3; 264 CLR 421).
In these circumstances, I am not persuaded that jurisdictional error has been demonstrated under either of the grounds relied upon by the applicant.
Paragraph [6] of the IAA’s reasons
Prior to the hearing of this matter, my Associate wrote to the parties inviting them to consider:
(a)whether the IAA’s consideration at [6] of the claim that the applicant may face difficulty being issued a National Identity Card was consistent with AUS17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2020] HCA 37; 269 CLR 494 (AUS17); and, if not;
(b)whether any error in this regard was material to the IAA’s decision.
The applicant did not embrace the point, instead seeking leave to file an amended application relying upon an additional ground which I consider below. However, as the Minister accepted that the IAA did not follow the approach required in AUS17, and I find that it did not, I consider it appropriate to deal with the issues raised in this regard.
In AUS17, it was stated at [10]-[12] (per Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Keane and Gordon JJ) (footnotes omitted):
10. Section 473DD would be at war with itself, and the purpose of s 473DD(b)(ii) would be thwarted, if the circumstance that there was new information from a referred applicant meeting the description in either s 473DD(b)(i) or s 473DD(b)(ii) were able to be ignored by the Authority in assessing the existence of exceptional circumstances justifying consideration of that new information in order to meet the criterion specified in s 473DD(a).
11. Logic and policy therefore demand that the Authority assess such new information as it might obtain from the referred applicant first against the criteria specified in both s 473DD(b)(i) and s 473DD(b)(ii) and only then against the criterion specified in s 473DD(a). If neither of the criteria specified in s 473DD(b)(i) and s 473DD(b)(ii) is met, the Authority is prohibited from taking the new information into account in making its decision on the review. Further assessment of the new information against the criterion specified in s 473DD(a) is redundant. If either the criterion specified in s 473DD(b)(i) or the criterion specified in s 473DD(b)(ii) is met, that is a circumstance which must be factored into the subsequent assessment of whether the new information meets the criterion specified in s 473DD(a). If both the criterion specified in s 473DD(b)(i) and the criterion specified in s 473DD(b)(ii) are met, that too is a circumstance which must be factored into the subsequent assessment of whether the new information meets the criterion specified in s 473DD(a) and which must heighten the prospect of that criterion being met.
12. The result, as has been recognised by the Federal Court in numerous other cases[16], is that the Authority does not perform the procedural duty imposed on it by s 473DD in its conduct of a review if it determines in the purported application of the criterion in s 473DD(a) that exceptional circumstances justifying consideration of new information obtained from the referred applicant do not exist without first assessing that information against the criteria specified in both s 473DD(b)(i) and s 473DD(b)(ii) and then taking the outcome of that assessment into account in its assessment against the criterion specified in s 473DD(a). The nature of the non-performance of the procedural duty in such a case is not inaccurately characterised as a failure to take account of a mandatory relevant consideration in the purported application of the criterion in s 473DD(a)[17].
In the present case, the IAA’s reasoning at [6] is extracted in full above. Whilst the IAA considered that the information substantially changed and added to the applicant’s earlier claims, it did not assess the information against s 473DD(b)(ii). I therefore find that the IAA’s reasoning did not comply with the approach required in AUS17.
However, the IAA did consider and dispose of the applicant’s broader claim that he may face harm in Sri Lanka due to not possessing identity documents at [35] of its decision:
35. I do not accept the applicant’s claims that he will be harmed on return because he will be returning without any Sri Lankan identity documents. The applicant provided a Sri Lankan Register of Birth Certificate in support of his application and identity and there is no suggestion on the information before me that the applicant’s residence in Sri Lanka has not been previously recorded.
To similar effect, at [57] the IAA stated that it did not accept that the applicant faced a real chance of harm for reasons including his lack of Sri Lankan identity documents.
On the basis of this additional reasoning by the IAA, I am not persuaded that there was a realistic possibility of a different outcome if the new information was taken into account. This is because the claim that the applicant may face difficulties on return due to a lack of Sri Lankan identity documentation was of sufficient breadth to include difficulties regarding the particular identity document in question. In disposing of the issue more generally, the IAA’s reasoning was dispositive of the more specific claim.
Contrary to the IAA’s summary in [6], Mr Tambimuttu did not submit that the applicant’s birth certificate was “obtained through unofficial channels”. Rather, he raised that this “may” have occurred as a possible construction of the evidence that was already before the IAA. This was said to have been a line of inquiry that might have been pursued “if the applicant had informed the delegate that the document was obtained through his mother”. However, the IAA observed elsewhere in its decision that the applicant had informed the Delegate that the document had been obtained as a result of contact with “someone” in Sri Lanka that was made by his mother (at [22]). Its acceptance of this did not change its rejection of the applicant’s claim to face harm due to a lack of Sri Lankan identity documentation. In rejecting this claim, the IAA did not rely upon any finding that the applicant’s birth certificate had been obtained through official channels.
For the above reasons, whilst I accept that the IAA did not follow the approach required in AUS17, I do not accept that such error was material to its decision.
Ground 3
As noted above, the applicant did not rely upon the IAA’s non-compliance with the approach required in AUS17. Instead, the applicant relied upon an additional ground 3 by which he contended that the IAA failed to consider his claim that he would face harm because he lacked identity documents including a National Identity Card.
The applicant relied upon the claim he made at page 59 [6] of the Court Book that he would “be detained at the airport as [he] left without permission and [did] not have any Sri Lankan Identity papers”. The applicant contended that the IAA’s characterisation of his claim not to have a National Identity Card as new information, and its consideration that the claim substantially added to his claims before the Delegate, indicated that the IAA overlooked the applicant’s earlier claim regarding his lack of Sri Lankan identity documents (including a National Identity Card).
I agree with the Minister’s submission that this cannot be sustained when considered against [35] of the IAA’s decision. There, the IAA specifically considered and rejected the applicant’s claim to face harm because he would be returning without identity documents. Whilst the IAA appears to have considered the additional, specific reference to a National Identity Card to fall within the definition of ‘new information’, this did not prevent it from considering the applicant’s more general claim to face harm on account of his lack of documentation.
I was not directed to evidence before the IAA establishing that the applicant’s lack of a National Identity Card specifically and at the time of its decision would have been expected to result in bail being refused to the applicant if he returned to Sri Lanka. As I have found above, the country information referred to by the IAA in finding that the applicant would not face a real chance of harm due to bail refusal was not expressed as being contingent upon whether or not the applicant possessed a National Identity Card. In the absence of such evidence, the IAA was not obliged to consider that bail may be refused due to his lack of this specific document.
It follows that I do not accept that ground 3 is able to succeed.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, the application must be dismissed.
I will hear from the parties in relation to costs.
49 I certify that the preceding forty-eight (48) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Laing.
Associate:
Dated: 13 July 2022
0
4
0