DPP v Lipp & Anor

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA Not Restricted

AT MELBOURNE

CRIMINAL DIVISION

No. 1609 of  2007

THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS Respondent
v
GEORGE ERNEST LIPP (Principal)
RICHARD DAVENTRY MANN THOMPSON (Surety)
Applicant

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JUDGE:

CURTAIN J

WHERE HELD:

Melbourne

DATE OF HEARING:

29 May 2008

DATE OF JUDGMENT:

12 June 2008

CASE MAY BE CITED AS:

DPP v Lipp & Anor

MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION:

[2008] VSC 203

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CRIMINAL LAW – FORFEITURE OF BAIL: Application for order rescinding or varying an order for forfeiture of bail - Section 6(4) of the Crown Proceedings Act 1958 – Principles governing exercise of discretion – Failure of surety to take all reasonable steps to ensure attendance of the principal at trial – Notwithstanding failure, whether unjust not to vary or rescind order – Hardship established - Amount of surety varied.

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APPEARANCES:

Counsel Solicitors
For the Respondent Mr P Rose SC Office of Public Prosecutions
For the Applicant  Mr D Beach SC
Mr J Saunders
Valos Black & Associates

HER HONOUR:

  1. Richard Thompson applies pursuant to s 6(4) of the Crown Proceedings Act 1958 for an order rescinding or varying an order for forfeiture of bail made by Whelan J on 27 November 2007. The applicant has provided a surety of $300,000 undertaken at the Southport Magistrates’ Court on 15 March 2006 to enable George Lipp to be released on bail. George Lipp is Mr Thompson’s de facto wife’s brother. He has been charged with trafficking a commercial quantity of a drug of dependence and conspiracy to traffick a commercial quantity of a drug of dependence.

  1. Mr Lipp answered his bail on 31 October 2007, being the first day of the trial and, on the morning of the second day of the trial, at his home at 2 Bigola Street, Ringwood, dressed in a suit he kissed his wife goodbye at 7.15am and has not been seen since.  Subsequently, a Bench warrant for his apprehension issued and remains outstanding.

  1. Section 6(4) of the Crown Proceedings Act 1958[1] provides an order may be varied or rescinded if it would be unjust to require the surety to pay the amount undertaken to be paid having regard to all the circumstances of the case.

    [1]Section 6(4) of the Crown Proceedings Act 1958 provides “Where bail is declared to be forfeited under subsection (1) any surety may at any time within 28 days after the making of the order or, if the order was made in the absence of the surety, within 28 days after the order first comes to his notice apply to the Court that made the order to vary or rescind the order on the ground that it would be unjust to require him to pay the amount undertaken to be paid having regard to all the circumstances of the case and the court may vary or rescind the order and cancel any warrant issued in the case under the provisions of this section before the warrant so issued is executed.”

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Details
Case
[2008] VSC 203
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of the Director of Public Prosecutions v Lipp & Anor involved an application by the respondents for an order rescinding or varying an order for the forfeiture of bail. The application was made under section 6(4) of the Crown Proceedings Act 1958. The respondents argued that it would be unjust to allow the forfeiture of their bail to proceed given the circumstances of the case. The legal issues before the court included determining the principles governing the exercise of discretion in such cases and whether the failure of the surety to take all reasonable steps to ensure the attendance of the principal at trial, coupled with the established hardship, warranted a variation or rescission of the forfeiture order.

The court considered the principles that guide the exercise of discretion in these circumstances. It acknowledged the importance of the surety's responsibility to ensure the principal's attendance at trial. However, the court also recognised the hardship experienced by the respondents and the potential for unfairness in allowing the forfeiture of bail despite their efforts. The court found that while the respondents had not taken all reasonable steps to ensure the principal's attendance, the significant hardship they faced could not be ignored. As such, the court exercised its discretion to vary the amount of surety required, rather than allowing the forfeiture to proceed.

The court's decision reflected a balanced approach, weighing the responsibilities of the surety against the hardship faced by the respondents. By varying the amount of surety, the court provided a solution that mitigated the risk to the public while also considering the respondents' circumstances. This approach ensured that justice was served in a manner that took into account the complexities of the case.

The final orders of the court included a variation of the amount of surety required, rather than a complete rescission of the forfeiture order. This decision provided a pragmatic outcome that balanced the interests of all parties involved.

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