FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| DOR17 v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR | [2018] FCCA 3933 |
| Catchwords: MIGRATION – Protection visa application – review of decision of Immigration Assessment Authority – did the Authority have power to make second decision in light of s.473EA(3) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – whether the Authority erred by failing to properly consider claim – whether the Authority misconstrued a claim concerning a relative – failed asylum seeker – Authority had power to make second decision – jurisdictional error – writs issued. |
| Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.473EA, pt.7AA |
| Applicant: | DOR17 |
| First Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION |
| Second Respondent: | IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY |
| File Number: | SYG 2510 of 2017 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Smith |
| Hearing date: | 13 December 2018 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 13 December 2018 |
| Delivered at: | Sydney |
| Delivered on: | 13 December 2018 |
REPRESENTATION
| The applicant appeared in person. |
| Counsel for the First Respondent: | Mr G Johnson |
| Solicitors for the Respondents: | HWL Ebsworth Lawyers |
ORDERS
A writ of certiorari issue quashing the decision of the second respondent dated 7 July 2017.
The first respondent pay the applicant’s costs fixed in the amount of $615 in respect of disbursements.
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
SYG 2510 of 2017
| DOR17 |
Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION |
First Respondent
| IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY |
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(Delivered Extempore and Revised)
There are two applications for judicial review before the Court. Each concerns a decision made by the Immigration Assessment Authority, both purporting to have been made in respect of the applicant before the Court.
The first decision made on 17 July 2017 (the July decision) did not however, address any of the applicant’s circumstances and none of his claims. It appears that what occurred is that the reasons for decision in another matter were accidentally uploaded into the Authority’s system by reference to the applicant’s IAA reference number.
When this mistake was realised, according to a note in evidence before the Court, that decision record was removed and the second decision was made by the Authority on 21 August 2017 (the August decision). That decision, on its face, did address the applicant’s claims and his circumstances.
The question arises as to whether, in light of s.473EA(3) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), the Authority had any power to make the August decision: that is, regardless of whether the first decision was, as clearly was the case, affected by jurisdictional error.
In CLV16 v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2017] FCCA 1200, Judge Street found that the Authority in similar circumstances had no power to make a second decision. However, on appeal…
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- Case
- [2018] FCCA 3933
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the court was whether section 473EA of the *Migration Act 1958* (Cth) precluded the IAA from making a second decision when its first decision was vitiated by jurisdictional error. This involved considering the effect of subsections (2) and (3) of section 473EA, which deal with when a decision is taken to be made and the IAA's power to vary or revoke a decision. The court also had to determine whether a decision made without properly undertaking the statutory review process, as required by section 473CC, could be considered a "decision" for the purposes of section 473EA.
The court reasoned that a decision affected by jurisdictional error is, in law, "no decision at all," a principle established in *Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Bhardwaj*. Applying this principle, the court found that section 473EA(2) and (3) did not operate to deem a decision made in excess of jurisdiction as a valid decision for the purposes of preventing a subsequent review. The court held that the phrase "taken to have been made" in section 473EA(2) merely provided precision regarding the timing and form of a decision, rather than conferring power to reopen or validate a decision that fundamentally failed to discharge the statutory review obligations. Therefore, the IAA retained the power to make a second decision in circumstances where the initial decision was a nullity due to jurisdictional error.
The court concluded that the IAA had the power to make a second decision and that its failure to properly consider the applicant's claims constituted jurisdictional error. Writs were issued accordingly.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The first question then, is whether in spite of the clear jurisdictional error in the first decision, the Authority had the power to make another decision as it did on 21 August. Section 473EA provides:Immigration Assessment Authority's decision and written statementWritten statement of decision(1) If the Immigration Assessment Authority makes a decision on a review under this Part, the Authority must make a written statement that:(a) sets out the decision of the Authority on the review; and(b) sets out the reasons for the decision; and(c) records the day and time the statement is made.How and when written decisions are taken to be made(2) A decision on a review is taken to have been made:(a) by the making of the written statement; and(b) on the day, and at the time, the written statement is made.(3) The Immigration Assessment Authority has no power to vary or revoke a decision to which subsection (2) applies after the day and time the written statement is made.Return of documents etc.(4) After the Immigration Assessment Authority makes the written statement, the Authority must:(a) return to the Secretary any document that the Secretary has provided in relation to the review; and(b) give the Secretary a copy of any other document that contains evidence or material on which the findings of fact were based. The application of s.473EA to circumstances where an initial decision is clearly affected by jurisdictional error was considered by the Full Court, as I have noted, in CLV16. At [61] of that decision, the Full Court explained the general principle:... that a decision ostensibly made pursuant to statutory authority but which is made either in excess of the authority conferred or as not constituting an exercise of that authority may be regarded in law as a decision vitiated by jurisdictional error and as “no decision at all” ...(Emphasis in original, citation omitted) This was the principle explained by the High Court in Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Bhardwaj (2002) 209 CLR 597. Later in its reasons, the Full Court then considered whether that general principle was affected by the operation of s.473EA. It noted the contention before it that in circumstances that there was jurisdictional error that provision meant that the Authority had no power to reopen that decision and that the second decision itself was beyond power. Those contentions were both rejected. The reasons for that rejection were set out in [68] to [71]:[68] Section 473EA(2) does not operate such that a deliberation of the Authority which is set forth in a “written statement” that meets the requirements of s 473EA(1) is taken to be, or is “deemed” to be, a “decision” for the purposes of s 473EA. There is nothing in the terms of s 473EA(2) which displaces the normal position as established in Bhardwaj. A provision such as s 473EA(2) may well serve no “higher purpose” than simply “giving precision to what is to be the date of the decision”: cf. Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZQOY [2012] FCAFC 131 at [44], (2012) 206 FCR 25 at 34 per Logan J (Barker J agreeing). The phrase employed in s 473EA(2), “taken to have been made”, says nothing with respect to whether such a decision is one susceptible of being “re-opened”. The phrase does nothing other than give content to how a decision is to be made (as a matter of form) and when it has been made.[69] Nor does s 473EA(3) dictate any contrary conclusion. Section 473EA(3) simply provides that a “decision” once made cannot be varied or revoked by the Authority. Left unanswered by that sub-section is that which constitutes such a “decision” upon which s 473EA(3) operates. Again, there is nothing in s 473EA(3) which can be relied upon as supporting the proposition that a “decision” made in excess of jurisdiction – or a “decision” made without the Authority having discharged the statutory responsibility entrusted to it by s 473CC to conduct a “review” – is taken to be a “decision” within the meaning and for the purposes of s 473EA(3). And, notwithstanding the difference of views expressed in BMB16 as to the nature of the “review” to be undertaken for the purposes of the “limited form of review” provided for in Pt 7AA, none of the views there expressed provide any support for a proposition that any exercise of the power conferred by s 473CC could give rise to a “decision on a review” (s 473EA(2)) without undertaking such a “review”. Such a “review” includes entertaining a submission which has been made, including a submission that the Authority should consider “new information” pursuant to s 473DD. A purported “decision”, which fell short of considering such a submission, would not constitute a “decision on a review”.[70] Section 473EA(2) and (3), it may be noted, are expressed in substantially the same terms as s 430(2) and (2A). But the comparison takes the analysis of the term “decision” no further.[71] If any Parliamentary intent is to be discerned that a “decision” made by a statutory decision-maker without having discharged the statutory tasks required to be undertaken is to be a “decision” notwithstanding such a fundamental jurisdictional error, much clearer words are required than can be found within s 473EA(2) and/or (3). To clothe a “decision” with the character of one that cannot be revisited in circumstances where it becomes manifestly apparent that the statutory responsibility of conducting a “review” has not been undertaken, much clearer statutory language is called for. The uncertain process of statutory construction advanced on behalf of Applicant AHT17 which initially assumed the conclusion he sought to advance, and thereafter contended that the assumption was correct, only has to be stated to be rejected.(Without alteration)