DECISION AND REASONS FOR DECISION [2003] AATA 50
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL Nº N2001/744
VETERANS' APPEALS DIVISION
Re: DANIEL PATRICK DONOGHUE
Applicant
And: REPATRIATION COMMISSION
Respondent
DECISION
Tribunal: P.J. Lindsay, Senior Member
Date: 17 January 2003
Place: Sydney
Decision:Decision under review set aside. In substitution the Tribunal decides that Mr Donoghue's lumbar spondylosis is a war-caused disease with effect from 24 February 1999. The matter is remitted to the Commission for assessment.
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Senior Member
© Commonwealth of Australia (2003)CATCHWORDS
Veterans Affairs – entitlement - lumbar spondylosis – whether a war-caused disease – necessity for Applicant to have suffered a 'trauma' in accordance with relevant Statement of Principles – decision set aside.
Veterans' Entitlements Act 1986, ss.120, 120A
Repatriation Medical Authority Statement of Principles, Instrument No. 46 of 2002 concerning Lumbar Spondylosis as amended by Instrument No. 77 of 2002.
Repatriation Commission v Deledio (1998) 49 ALD 193
Repatriation Commission v Gorton (2001) 110 FCR 321
Connors v Repatriation Commission (2000) 59 ALD 61
East v Repatriation Commission (1987) 16 FCR 517
Harris v Repatriation Commission (2000) 31 AAR 270
REASONS FOR DECISION
P.J. Lindsay, Senior Member
This is an application under the Veterans' Entitlements Act 1986 (the Act) for review of a decision by the Repatriation Commission (the Commission) which refused Mr Donoghue's claim for acceptance of lumbar spondylosis as a war-caused disease under the Act. The decision was affirmed by the Veterans' Review Board.
Mr B. Winship, solicitor, appeared for Mr Donoghue. The Commission was represented by Mr J. Marsh from the Department of Veterans' Affairs. The only witness to give evidence at the hearing was Mr Donoghue. The Tribunal had before it the documents lodged under s.37 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (the T documents) and also the exhibits tendered during the hearing.
backgroundThe parties do not dispute that Mr Donoghue served in the Australian Army from 27 October 1941 to 26 February 1945 and that this was a period of eligible war service and operational service. Mr Donoghue's service records in the T documents note that on enlistment he was assessed as fit. During service he was treated for a number of disabilities including a right inguinal hernia, upper respiratory tract infection, pleurisy, infective jaundice, pharyngitis, painful feet and painful shoulders. He was medically examined for reclassification purposes in July 1944 but there was no record of any complaint regarding his back (T10). On discharge in February 1945 he complained of rheumatic pains in both shoulders and pains in his feet and in the back of his legs after standing and marching. The examining doctor recorded that he had a full range of movement in all joints with slight crepitus in both knees and shoulders (T6). The medical board considered each complaint to be constitutional in origin (T3). Notably, there was no mention of an injury to his back. When,…
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CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue the court had to address was whether Mr Donoghue's lumbar spondylosis is a war-caused disease under the Veterans' Entitlements Act 1986. Specifically, the court needed to decide if the lumbar spondylosis was connected to a trauma during his service, as defined by the Repatriation Medical Authority's Statement of Principles. The court also had to assess whether Mr Donoghue's account of the injury met the criteria for a 'trauma' as outlined in the applicable Statement of Principles.
The court examined Mr Donoghue's service records and medical evidence, including his recollection of an incident where he injured his back while serving. The court noted that Mr Donoghue's service records did not mention any back injury, but the medical evidence indicated that he suffered from lumbar spondylosis. The court considered the definition of 'trauma' in the relevant Statement of Principles and whether Mr Donoghue's account of the injury met this definition. The court concluded that the injury Mr Donoghue described did not constitute a 'trauma' within the meaning of the Statement of Principles. Consequently, the court found that the hypothesis connecting the lumbar spondylosis with Mr Donoghue's service did not fit the template set by the Statement of Principles.
The court set aside the Commission's decision, finding that Mr Donoghue's lumbar spondylosis was not war-caused because it did not meet the criteria for a war-related injury as defined by the applicable Statement of Principles. The court directed the Commission to reconsider the claim in light of its decision.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In cross-examination, Mr Donoghue said the drum did not fall onto his back or hit him on the back. He took the weight of the drum on his arms. He was unable to say definitely that he visited the RAP, but he said that he was given painkillers that were supplied by the RAP. He agreed that he was probably able to tie his boot laces by the time he rejoined his work party, which was a couple of days after the incident. Mr Donoghue added that while he went out to work with his colleagues he did not do any work. Although he worked on his family's sheep farm after discharge, he did no shearing or crutching. Mr Donoghue said he has not since suffered another injury to his back, whether while working on the farm or in other circumstances. consideration As Mr Donoghue rendered operational service, s.120(1) of the Act applies and the disease of lumbar spondylosis will be determined to be war-caused unless the Tribunal is satisfied, beyond reasonable doubt, that there is no sufficient ground for making that determination. The Tribunal will be so satisfied if it is of the view that the material before it does not raise a reasonable hypothesis connecting the disease with the circumstances of Mr Donoghue's service: s.120(3). As his claim for pension was lodged after 1 June 1994, s.120A of the Act applies and the Tribunal is to assess the reasonableness of the hypothesis in accordance with any Statement of Principles (SoP) issued by the Repatriation Medical Authority (RMA). The Commission accepts Mr Donoghue's account of the injury and that he did injure himself in the manner he described. Mr Marsh submitted that the issue for the Tribunal is whether Mr Donoghue's injury meets the definition of 'trauma to the lumbar spine' in the SoP. In reviewing the decision in question, the Tribunal must follow the approach that the Full Court of the Federal Court laid down in Repatriation Commission v Deledio (1998) 49 ALD 193, at 206:1. The Tribunal must consider all the material which is before it and determine whether that material points to a hypothesis connecting the injury, disease or death with the circumstances of the particular service rendered by the person. No question of fact finding arises at this stage. If no such hypothesis arises, the application must fail. 2. If the material does raise such a hypothesis, the Tribunal must then ascertain whether there is in force an SoP determined by the Authority under s 196B(2) or (11). ... 3. If an SoP is in force, the Tribunal must then form the opinion whether the hypothesis raised is a reasonable one. It will do so if the hypothesis fits, that is to say, is consistent with the "template" to be found in the SoP. The hypothesis raised before it must thus contain one or more of the factors which the Authority has determined to be the minimum which must exist, and be related to the person's service (as required by ss 196B(2)(d) and (e)). If the hypothesis does contain these factors, it could neither be said to be contrary to proved or known scientific facts, nor otherwise fanciful. If the hypothesis fails to fit within the template, it will be deemed not to be "reasonable" and the claim will fail. 4. The Tribunal must then proceed to consider under s 120(1) whether it is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the death was not war-caused, or in the case of a claim for incapacity, that the incapacity did not arise from a war-caused injury. If not so satisfied, the claim must succeed. If the Tribunal is so satisfied, the claim must fail. It is only at this stage of the process that the Tribunal will be required to find facts from the material before it. In so doing, no question of onus of proof or the application of any presumption will be involved.