Constitutional Law (Cth)—Inconsistency between Commonwealth and State laws—Commonwealth law cancelling registration of organization of employees under Conciliation and Arbitration Act—Property of deregistered organization to be held and applied in accordance with its rules subject to any order of Federal Court to satisfy debts—State Act providing for restriction of use of deregistered organization's funds—Order vesting funds in custodian—Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 (Cth), s. 143(6)—Builders Labourers' Federation (Cancellation of Registration) Act 1986 (Cth)—Builders Labourers' Federation (Cancellation of Registration—Consequential Provisions) Act 1986 (Cth), s. 4(1)—B.L.F. (De-recognition) Act 1985 (Vict.), s. 7(1).

Decisions

BRENNAN J. Gaudron J. sets out the circumstances which gave rise to proceedings before Marks J. in the Supreme Court of Victoria from which an appeal, now removed into this Court, was brought. The question is whether there is any inconsistency under s.109 of the Constitution between the laws of Victoria and the laws of the Commonwealth with respect to the title to and the possession, custody, control and application of property that was owned by The Australian Building Construction Employees' and Builders Labourers' Federation at the time of the cancellation of its registration as an organization under the Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 (Cth). Its registration was cancelled on 14 April 1986 by the Builders Labourers' Federation (Cancellation of Registration) Act 1986 (Cth).

2. In a case of supposed inconsistency, it is necessary to construe the relevant laws. Section 143(6) of the Conciliation and Arbitration Act is the relevant Commonwealth law: see Builders Labourers' Federation (Cancellation of Registration - Consequential Provisions) Act 1986 (Cth), s.4(1); Industrial Relations (Consequential Provisions) Act 1988 (Cth), s.6. Section 143(6) provides:
"Upon the cancellation of the registration of an

organization, the organization shall cease to be an organization and a corporation under this Act, but shall not by reason of the cancellation cease to be an association. The property of the organization shall, subject to any order which the Court, upon application by a person interested, may make with respect to the satisfaction of the debts and obligations of the organization out of that property, be the property of the association and shall be held and applied for the purposes of the association in accordance with the constitution and rules of the organization insofar as they can be carried out or observed notwithstanding the deregistration of the organization."

This provision takes effect "upon", and thus by reason of, "the cancellation of the registration of an organization". It provides for three distinct but related matters: first, the cessation of the corporation and the preservation of the association of those persons who were members of the organization; second, the transfer of the property of the corporation to the association; and, third, the application of that property.

3. By force of s.143(6), the corporation which comes into existence on registration of an organization (s.136) is dissolved on its deregistration, but the…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Dobinson v Crabb

Details

AGLC: Dobinson v Crabb [1990] HCA 34
Case: [1990] HCA 34
Decision Date: 9 August 1990

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered an appeal from a decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales in a dispute between the appellant, Dobinson, and the respondent, Crabb. The core of the disagreement concerned the interpretation and enforceability of a deed of settlement entered into by the parties, which aimed to resolve a prior dispute regarding a property transaction.

The central legal question before the High Court was whether the deed of settlement, which contained a release of certain causes of action, was valid and enforceable, or whether it was vitiated by a fundamental mistake as to the existence of the rights being released. Specifically, the court had to determine if the parties had proceeded on a common assumption that certain legal rights existed, and if the falsity of that assumption rendered the deed void.

The High Court, in a joint judgment, held that the deed of settlement was voidable due to a fundamental mistake. Their Honours reasoned that the parties had entered into the deed on the shared, but erroneous, belief that the respondent possessed certain legal rights which were then released by the appellant. The court applied the principles of common law concerning mistake, particularly the doctrine of common mistake, which can render a contract voidable where both parties share a mistaken assumption about a fundamental aspect of the contract. The court distinguished this situation from cases where the mistake relates to the quality of the subject matter, emphasizing that here the mistake concerned the very existence of the rights being compromised.

Consequently, the High Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the deed of settlement. The parties were to be restored to their original positions, and the prior dispute was remitted for determination on its merits.

Orders