DNG17 v Minister for Immigration & Anor

The applicant, a citizen of Fiji, sought judicial review of a decision by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal) which affirmed a delegate's refusal to grant her a protection visa. The applicant had arrived in Australia in 2006 and subsequently applied for a protection visa in 2012 and 2013. Her application was refused by a delegate in March 2013, and the Tribunal affirmed this decision in November 2013. The matter was later referred for Ministerial Intervention, and in July 2017, the applicant was notified that the Minister would not intervene. The applicant then sought an extension of time to file an application for judicial review of the Tribunal's decision.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether to grant the applicant an extension of time to file her application for judicial review. This required the court to consider whether the applicant's explanation for the delay was satisfactory and whether her application had sufficient prospects of success to warrant an extension in the interests of justice. The court also had to balance the prejudice to the applicant against the public interest in the finality of administrative decisions.

Emmett J refused the application for an extension of time. His Honour referred to the principles outlined in *Re Commonwealth of Australia; Ex Parte Marks*, emphasising that an extension of time can only be granted if it is necessary to do justice between the parties, considering the history of the matter, the conduct of the parties, the nature of the litigation, and the consequences of the grant or refusal. Crucially, the court also considered the public interest in the finality of administrative decisions. His Honour noted that a significant delay, such as the 17 months that had elapsed in this case, would generally only be excused if the delay was caused by the respondent's conduct. The court found that the applicant's inability to obtain favourable legal advice was not a sufficient ground for extending time, and that in all but exceptional cases, such inability indicated a lack of an arguable case. Consequently, the court concluded that the applicant did not have an arguable case for relief.