DMU16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

DMU16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1334

Appeal from: DMU16 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 276
File number: NSD 327 of 2018
Judge: THAWLEY J
Date of judgment: 3 September 2018
Catchwords:

MIGRATION – appeal from Federal Circuit Court of Australia – where Federal Circuit Court dismissed an application for review of a decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority – whether Authority was required to engage in “more specific reasoning” in relation to threats purportedly made to the appellant – whether Authority failed to engage in an “active intellectual process” in relation to each integer of the appellant’s claims

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for leave to rely on grounds not raised below – whether in the interests of justice to grant leave – where grounds had no real merit – leave refused

Cases cited:

ADF15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1099

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZIAI (2009) 83 ALJR 1123

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259

MZAGE v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 630

NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 144 FCR 1

NAJT v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 147 FCR 51

SZVLE v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 90

VUAX v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 238 FCR 588

Date of hearing: 7 August 2018
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 40
Counsel for the Appellant: The Appellant appeared in person
Counsel for the Respondents: Ms R Francois
Solicitor for the Respondents: Australian Government Solicitor

ORDERS

NSD 327 of 2018
BETWEEN:

DMU16

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

THAWLEY J

DATE OF ORDER:

3 SEPTEMBER 2018

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs as agreed or assessed.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

THAWLEY J:

  1. This is an appeal from orders of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia made on 21 February 2018, dismissing an application for judicial review of a decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority made on 26 October 2016, affirming a decision of the delegate of the first respondent (Minister) made on 30 August 2016 not to grant the appellant a protection visa, being a Safe Haven Enterprise (Class XE) (subclass 790) visa (SHEV).

    ADJOURNMENT APPLICATION

  2. At the hearing of the appeal, the appellant applied for an adjournment.  The relevant factual background was:

    (1)The appellant was represented by counsel before the Federal Circuit Court, which delivered judgment on 21 February 2018. 

    (2)The appellant electronically lodged his notice of appeal on 8 March 2018.  He was provided assistance in…

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Details
Case
[2018] FCA 1334
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appellant, a Sri Lankan national, sought judicial review of a decision of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection. The Minister had decided not to grant the appellant a protection visa. The appellant argued that the Immigration Assessment Authority had failed to properly assess his claims of past persecution and fear of future persecution. The appeal was heard by the Federal Circuit Court of Australia, which dismissed the appeal. The appellant then appealed to the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia. The appellant argued that the Authority had not properly considered the threats made to him by the Criminal Investigations Department (CID) and had not engaged in an active intellectual process in relation to his claims. The appellant also sought leave to rely on new grounds of appeal. The court considered whether it was in the interests of justice to grant leave to raise new grounds. The court found that the new grounds had no real merit and that there was no real prejudice to the Minister if leave were granted. The court found that the Authority had adequately considered the appellant's claims and that the Federal Circuit Court had not erred in its assessment of the Authority's decision. The appeal was dismissed with costs. The appellant was ordered to pay the Minister's costs as agreed or assessed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs as agreed or assessed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The application for an adjournment was refused for the following reasons:(1)The appellant engaged the appellate jurisdiction of this Court in March 2018 and was informed in April 2018 that his appeal was likely to be heard in August 2018. It is in this context that the email sent on 13 July 2018 identifying the exact date and time of the appeal must be seen. (2)The appellant did not take sufficient steps to secure legal representation at the appropriate time, namely after the filing of the notice of appeal and by August 2018. (3)The appellant did not provide information sufficient for a conclusion to be drawn that he was likely to be able to obtain or afford representation if a three month adjournment were granted.(4)The grounds advanced in the notice of appeal indicate that the drafter had some knowledge of migration matters and could have been a lawyer and, to that extent, the appellant has had the benefit of some assistance. (5)It did not appear from a review of the decisions of the Authority and the Federal Circuit Court, and the grounds of appeal set out in the notice of appeal to this Court, that the appellant would be unfairly disadvantaged by the lack of legal representation. The grounds of appeal appeared weak, but it did not appear that they could be improved. (6)The appellant has experienced difficult circumstances and was unrepresented and not legally trained. This Court is cognisant of those difficulties and approaches the hearing of appeals in these circumstances in a way conducive to ensuring appellants are properly heard and that they are not unfairly disadvantaged by their difficult situation – see: MZAGE v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 630 at [32] (Mortimer J).BACKGROUND The appellant, a Sri Lankan national, arrived at the Cocos (Keeling) Islands by boat on 25 September 2012. He participated in an “entry interview” on 11 January 2013. By his agent, he applied for a protection (Class XA) visa on 7 September 2013. The appellant was informed by letter dated 10 October 2014 that his application was invalid because of a statutory bar. On 30 November 2015, the Department wrote to the appellant informing him that the statutory bar had been lifted and inviting him to apply for a temporary protection visa or a Safe Haven Enterprise Visa (SHEV). The appellant applied for the SHEV on 19 February 2016. The appellant provided additional material in respect of his application on 8 April 2016 and was interviewed on 8 June 2016 and 14 July 2016. The appellant’s statutory declaration which outlined his claims included the following:10.It was only about 15 days later, also during September 2011, that at about 10:00pm at night, I received a telephone call from an individual who did not identify themselves but I assumed was a [member of the Criminal Investigations Department (CID) of the Sri Lanka Police]. The individual again accused me of providing vegetables to the [Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)] in support of the LTTE. The individual said words to the effect of “You helped the LTTE in this way so you must have assisted them in other ways. How could you have not joined the LTTE, given you were from an LTTE area?” I responded that due to my speech impediment the LTTE did not force me to join. I also responded similarly to the previous occasion – namely, I made clear to this man that our area had been predominantly an LTTE area in the past and so if we had sold vegetables or crops to individuals who belonged to the LTTE, it was only because there were so many LTTE individuals in our area, not an act in support of the LTTE. I also made clear to this man on the telephone that the LTTE individuals paid for these goods, albeit at a lower price than others (due to their threats of violence if we did not listen). We had never voluntarily assisted the LTTE nor assisted them without a fee. The CID member also demanded that I provide him with money but I told him I had no money.11. For about the next three months, I would persistently received telephone calls of intimidation and false accusations such as this one. I became increasingly fearful of what may eventuate.12.In about March 2012, while I was at my [Town B] address and my mother was at [Town A], two armed individuals arrived at our [Town A] address on a motorbike. My mother went outside to see what they needed. The individuals enquired of my whereabouts but my mother did not give them any information apart that I had gone out. The very next day, I was at our [Town A] home and at this point my mother told me about her encounter with these men. These men were in civilian dress but we knew they were members of the CID. They had told my mother words to the effect of “We have called your son many times. He does not answer our calls. Tell him to answer the phone or else we will shoot him.” When I learnt of this information, I knew it was unsafe to remain at this residence so I returned to [Town B] but I stayed with my aunty [Y]. I would also stay at my aunty [X’s] house when I was in [Town A], in order to evade danger. Sometimes I would return to our family homes. I did this until the time I fled Sri Lanka in September that year.13.In about August 2012, I was at my aunty [Y’s] home in [Town B] one day when two CID members (who I believe must be the same two I had previously encountered in September 2011) arrived at my home in [Town A] and demanded my mother tell them my whereabouts. My mother lied and told them I was out watching a movie with my friends. They did not believe her and demanded to search the house. They entered our home and searched the premises thoroughly for me. They eventually left with words to the effect of “We already told you he has not been answering our calls. Next time he does not answer - we will shoot him!”

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ground 6 asserts a failure to deal with “pre-trial detention” if the appellant were returned to Sri Lanka. However, no claim had been made in this respect and it was not a claim which, although unarticulated, clearly emerged from the material – cf: NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 144 FCR 1 at [55], [58]-[61], [68] (Black CJ, French and Selway JJ). Accordingly, this ground is not made out.CONCLUSION The appeal must be dismissed with costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

There were six grounds of appeal, only the first two of which may be seen as having been advanced before the Federal Circuit Court:(1)First, it was said that the Federal Circuit Court erred in not holding that the Authority was “required to engage in more specific reasoning” in relation to threats which had been made to the appellant by the CID when it attended the appellant’s home.(2)Secondly, it was said that the Authority was required, but failed, to engage in an “active intellectual process” in relation to each integer of the appellant’s claims.(3)Thirdly, it was said that the Authority “should have done more to explore the issue of the applicant’s claim of extortion attempts in the context of complementary protection” and the Federal Circuit Court should have so held.(4)Fourthly, it was said that the Federal Circuit Court erred in holding that the Authority’s decision dealt adequately with the appellant’s asserted fear of harm because of past links to the LTTE and that the Authority did not apply the real chance test as explained in Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259.(5)Fifthly, it was said that there was jurisdictional error in failing to hold that the harm the appellant would face if he were returned to Sri Lanka was due to his actual or imputed political opinion as a supporter of LTTE and was “motivated and deliberate conduct of his persecutors and it amounts to systematic discriminative conduct”.(6)Sixthly, it was claimed that the Authority did not properly address and deal with the likelihood of pre-trial detention if the appellant were to return to Sri Lanka in considering the appellant’s claim for a protection visa on the complementary protection ground.CONSIDERATIONLeave to raise new grounds Leave to raise new arguments on appeal may be granted where it is in the interests of justice to do so: VUAX v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 238 FCR 588 at 598 to 599. Considerations relevant to the exercise of the discretion were identified by Madgwick J in NAJT v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 147 FCR 51 at [166] as including:1)Do the new legal arguments have a reasonable prospect of success?2)Is there an acceptable explanation of why they were not raised below?3)How much dislocation to the court and efficient use of judicial sitting time is really involved?4)What is at stake in the case for the appellant?5)Will the resolution of the issues raised have any importance beyond the case at hand?6)Is there any actual prejudice, not viewing the notion of prejudice narrowly, to the respondent?7)If so, can it be justly and practicably cured?8)If not, where, in all the circumstances, do the interests of justice lie? That is not an exhaustive statement of matters which are potentially relevant. The consequences to the appellant of not being granted a protection visa are serious. There is no real prejudice to the Minister. Those matters weigh in favour of granting leave.