FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
DMU16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1334
Appeal from: DMU16 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 276 File number: NSD 327 of 2018 Judge: THAWLEY J Date of judgment: 3 September 2018 Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from Federal Circuit Court of Australia – where Federal Circuit Court dismissed an application for review of a decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority – whether Authority was required to engage in “more specific reasoning” in relation to threats purportedly made to the appellant – whether Authority failed to engage in an “active intellectual process” in relation to each integer of the appellant’s claims
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for leave to rely on grounds not raised below – whether in the interests of justice to grant leave – where grounds had no real merit – leave refused
Cases cited: ADF15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1099
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZIAI (2009) 83 ALJR 1123
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259
MZAGE v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 630
NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 144 FCR 1
NAJT v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 147 FCR 51
SZVLE v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 90
VUAX v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 238 FCR 588
Date of hearing: 7 August 2018 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 40 Counsel for the Appellant: The Appellant appeared in person Counsel for the Respondents: Ms R Francois Solicitor for the Respondents: Australian Government Solicitor ORDERS
NSD 327 of 2018 BETWEEN: DMU16
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
THAWLEY J
DATE OF ORDER:
3 SEPTEMBER 2018
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be dismissed.
2.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs as agreed or assessed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
THAWLEY J:
This is an appeal from orders of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia made on 21 February 2018, dismissing an application for judicial review of a decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority made on 26 October 2016, affirming a decision of the delegate of the first respondent (Minister) made on 30 August 2016 not to grant the appellant a protection visa, being a Safe Haven Enterprise (Class XE) (subclass 790) visa (SHEV).
ADJOURNMENT APPLICATION
At the hearing of the appeal, the appellant applied for an adjournment. The relevant factual background was:
(1)The appellant was represented by counsel before the Federal Circuit Court, which delivered judgment on 21 February 2018.
(2)The appellant electronically lodged his notice of appeal on 8 March 2018. He was provided assistance in…
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- Case
- [2018] FCA 1334
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs as agreed or assessed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
There were six grounds of appeal, only the first two of which may be seen as having been advanced before the Federal Circuit Court:(1)First, it was said that the Federal Circuit Court erred in not holding that the Authority was “required to engage in more specific reasoning” in relation to threats which had been made to the appellant by the CID when it attended the appellant’s home.(2)Secondly, it was said that the Authority was required, but failed, to engage in an “active intellectual process” in relation to each integer of the appellant’s claims.(3)Thirdly, it was said that the Authority “should have done more to explore the issue of the applicant’s claim of extortion attempts in the context of complementary protection” and the Federal Circuit Court should have so held.(4)Fourthly, it was said that the Federal Circuit Court erred in holding that the Authority’s decision dealt adequately with the appellant’s asserted fear of harm because of past links to the LTTE and that the Authority did not apply the real chance test as explained in Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259.(5)Fifthly, it was said that there was jurisdictional error in failing to hold that the harm the appellant would face if he were returned to Sri Lanka was due to his actual or imputed political opinion as a supporter of LTTE and was “motivated and deliberate conduct of his persecutors and it amounts to systematic discriminative conduct”.(6)Sixthly, it was claimed that the Authority did not properly address and deal with the likelihood of pre-trial detention if the appellant were to return to Sri Lanka in considering the appellant’s claim for a protection visa on the complementary protection ground.CONSIDERATIONLeave to raise new grounds Leave to raise new arguments on appeal may be granted where it is in the interests of justice to do so: VUAX v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 238 FCR 588 at 598 to 599. Considerations relevant to the exercise of the discretion were identified by Madgwick J in NAJT v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 147 FCR 51 at [166] as including:1)Do the new legal arguments have a reasonable prospect of success?2)Is there an acceptable explanation of why they were not raised below?3)How much dislocation to the court and efficient use of judicial sitting time is really involved?4)What is at stake in the case for the appellant?5)Will the resolution of the issues raised have any importance beyond the case at hand?6)Is there any actual prejudice, not viewing the notion of prejudice narrowly, to the respondent?7)If so, can it be justly and practicably cured?8)If not, where, in all the circumstances, do the interests of justice lie? That is not an exhaustive statement of matters which are potentially relevant. The consequences to the appellant of not being granted a protection visa are serious. There is no real prejudice to the Minister. Those matters weigh in favour of granting leave.