Director of Public Prosecutions v Yeaman

[2025] ACTSC 338

SUPREME COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY

Case Title:	DPP v Yeaman
Citation:	[2025] ACTSC 338
Hearing Date:	23 July 2025
Decision Date:	1 August 2025
Before:	McWilliam J
Decision:	The application for bail is dismissed.
Catchwords:	CRIMINAL LAW – BAIL – repeat application – whether there has been a change of circumstances – where accused is remanded
in respect of a serious offence and is alleged to have committed the offence while a charge for another serious offence is pending
– whether special or exceptional circumstances exist favouring
grant of bail under s 9D of the Bail Act 1992 (ACT) – where prisoner wishes to transition from male to female gender – where prison environment less suitable – where matters raised on previous bail application – no change of circumstances – no
special and exceptional circumstances
Legislation Cited:	Bail Act 1992 (ACT) ss 9D, 20C, 22 Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT)
Cases Cited:	Bail by Massey [2008] ACTSC 145 Director of Public Prosecutions v Waverly (a pseudonym) [2022] ACTSC 329 DPP v Alexander (a pseudonym) [2024] ACTSC 161 DPP v Hiscox [2025] ACTSC 17 R v Ezekiel [2022] ACTSC 98 R v Rubino [2012] ACTSC 157 Sherd v The Queen [2011] ACTCA 17; 5 ACTLR 290
Parties:	Julian Leslie Yeaman (Accused)
Director of Public Prosecutions
Representation:	Counsel
Self-represented (Accused) S Janackovic (DPP)
Solicitors
Self-represented (Accused) ACT Director of Public Prosecutions
File Numbers:	SCC 30 of 2023 SCC 220 of 2023
SCC 175 of 2024 SCC 96 of 2025
McWILLIAM J:
1․	Julian Leslie Yeaman has made an application for bail following being remanded in
custody since 2 August 2022, almost three years. That is a long time to be held in
custody on remand. It calls for some explanation.
2․	There are four proceedings travelling through the court and two in the Magistrates Court.
They deal with a number of outstanding charges, including two charges of an act of
indecency, one of assault occasioning actual bodily harm, one of breach of a family
violence order, two charges of aggravated threat to kill, two charges of arson and one
charge of assaulting a frontline community service provider.
3․	Two of those proceedings were heard by Taylor J in 2024 in a judge alone trial. They
concern whether the court should make a finding of not guilty by reason of mental
impairment. It is not disputed that the accused has schizophrenia. Judgment has not
yet been delivered because it is awaiting a further two matters that are listed for hearing
before Taylor J in September 2025 with the same issue under consideration in relation
to different offences. The accused has pleaded not guilty in respect of those matters
and the parties do not appear to have sought expedition in relation to that hearing date,
notwithstanding the lengthy time this accused has spent in custody on remand.

Previous applications for bail in the Supreme Court

4․	There are two previous applications for bail in the Supreme Court, each of which was
unsuccessful. The first was heard by Loukas-Karlsson J on 24 March 2023. The second
was heard more recently by Elkaim AJ on 30 June 2025.
5․	The present application is affected by those previous applications because of s 20C of
the Bail Act 1992 (ACT) (Bail Act). The relevant part of that provision is s 20C(2), which
applies where an application for bail has previously been made in the Supreme Court:

(2)

The court may only consider a further application for bail (other than a bail review application) by the person in the proceeding if the court is satisfied:

(a)	that since the last application for bail there has been a change in circumstances relevant to the granting of bail; or
(b)	that there is fresh evidence or information of relevance to the granting of bail that was unavailable at the last application for bail.

6․ As stated by McCallum CJ in R v Ezekiel [2022] ACTSC 98 (Ezekiel) at [3]:

… The test established by s 20C poses a relatively low bar. The fresh evidence or change

of circumstances does not have to be such as to warrant a grant of bail, but only “relevant to

the granting of bail” or “of relevance to the granting of bail”.

7․	However, it is important that the threshold to assuming jurisdiction is not so low as to
amount effectively to ignoring the statutory restriction but nor so high that the requirement
to construe the legislation consistently with the Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT) cannot be
met: R v Rubino [2012] ACTSC 157 (Rubino) at [17]-[24]. In Rubino, Refshauge J
discussed the approach, stating at [20]-[21]:

20․ It is clear, of course, that the change of circumstances has to be a relevant change in relevant circumstances as so described by Roberts-Smith J in Pinkstone (2000) 119 A Crim R 462 at 464; [15]. In Edwards (1988) 35 A Crim R 465, McPherson J had to consider a similar provision and what was required, and said (at 471):

A persuasive and satisfying case is ... required, and not one in which the differences disclosed by the additional material go only to matters of mere detail, or to considerations which, although not previously raised, would not have been likely to alter the balance to one favouring the grant of bail.

21․ That approach was followed by White AUJ in Musarri v The Queen [2001] WASC

200 at [12], where his Honour said:

Accordingly, I hold that the matters raised [in the equivalent to section 20C of the Bail Act] in order to enliven the jurisdiction ... be matters that would have been likely, if known to the judge who previously refused bail, to alter the balance in favour of bail.

8․	The accused relied on both limbs of s 20C and their arguments are considered below.
9․	The Director of Public Prosecutions (Director) submitted that nothing that had been
raised by the accused was properly characterised as constituting a change in
circumstances relevant to the granting of bail, or fresh evidence relevant to the grant of
bail that was unavailable at the last application for bail in June 2025. To the extent that
there was any additional information that might be categorised as fresh evidence or
information, such matters were not of relevance to the granting of bail.
10․	This application was heard on a duty basis, with the accused self-represented on this
occasion. It transpired that there was no transcript of the previous bail applications
before the court. I indicated to the accused that the court would reserve judgment so as
to obtain the transcript of at least the most recent bail application, in order to properly
consider the accused’s argument and see whether any part of the application overcame
the threshold stipulated in s 20C.

Serious offence charged while charge for another serious offence is pending

11․	In the event that the accused’s circumstances met the threshold in s 20C, there is a
further hurdle for the accused, arising from the fact that they have been charged with
further offences while in custody.
12․	Section 9D of the Bail Act applies where a person is accused of a serious offence and is
alleged to have committed that offence while a charge against the person for another
serious offence is pending or outstanding: s 9D(1). A “serious offence” is defined:

serious offence means an offence punishable by imprisonment for 5 years or

longer (other than an offence in relation to which an election for summary

disposal has been made under the Crimes Act 1900 …)

13․	In the present case, the accused is accused of, among other things, an aggravated threat
to kill which is an offence punishable by imprisonment of up to 25 years, and while in
custody, further charges have been laid involving arson, which is an offence punishable
by imprisonment for up to 15 years.
14․	It is thus not controversial that this additional hurdle must be overcome. What constitutes
“special or exceptional circumstances” has been considered in cases such as Bail by
Massey [2008] ACTSC 145 at [7]-[8] and R v Cockburn [2015] ACTSC 297 at [23].
15․	The court generally considers whether the circumstances are in some way unusual or
uncommon, either by themselves or in combination. They do not need to be unique or
rare, and they can include having regard to the circumstances in which an accused is
detained, as DPP v Alexander (a pseudonym) [2024] ACTSC 161 at [74] demonstrates.
16․	Ordinarily, family hardship will rarely amount to special or exceptional circumstances:
Sherd v The Queen [2011] ACTCA 17; 5 ACTLR 290 (Sherd) at [67]. In Director of
Public Prosecutions v Waverly (a pseudonym) [2022] ACTSC 329 at [17], Kennett J
made the point that an inability to support one’s family (I interpolate, whether that be
financial or otherwise) is an almost inevitable consequence of being remanded in
custody, which the legislature must have had in contemplation when enacting the Bail
Act. His Honour went on to state that illness of a relative is also a far from uncommon
experience although the desire of an accused to support their family was
understandable.
17․	It may well be that family or personal hardship could tip the balance and justify bail if
other considerations are finely balanced: Sherd at [68].
18․	The court looks to the circumstances that exist at the time the court is considering the
application for bail: DPP v Hiscox [2025] ACTSC 17 at [11].
19․	Here, the accused submitted that their stepfather was very unwell and living in an aged
care home in Canberra. They were close to their stepfather and did not know how much
time their stepfather had left. They wanted to spend time with their stepfather doing
things they know their stepfather likes to do.
20․	In addition, they stated that their own father was very unwell and had just had a transient
ischemic attack (TIA). Their father was caring for their stepmother, who was wheelchair
bound. They feel that they need to help out with their family. The accused explained
that they were not aware of their father having a TIA and that this had only happened in
the past couple of days. Accordingly, this represented a change of circumstances.
21․	They alleged other conduct that has occurred to them in prison, which they did report but
did not ultimately pursue. It is unnecessary for the purposes of this judgment to go into
the detail of those matters.

22․ The accused explained that they accept that they have a mental illness, being

schizophrenia, but felt that they were in positive mental health at the moment.

23․	An equally important reason why the accused was seeking bail was because they are in
the process of transitioning while in custody from identifying as a male to identifying as
a female. They were about to commence hormone replacement therapy and will be
pursuing medical transition further. They had received a recommendation that the
process of transitioning occur not in prison, as those circumstances can adversely affect
the outcome of the transition’s success. Understandably, they wanted a full opportunity
to transition with the best care they could receive. This latest medical advice was also
said to constitute a change in circumstances.
24․	They also mentioned that they are currently enrolled in a double degree in business and
IT and cannot complete this while in custody due to operational factors outside their
control.
25․	Further material was available in the event that the statutory thresholds discussed above
were overcome and the accused did make other submissions about where they would
live and other matters associated with the s 22 considerations of the Bail Act. However,
I indicated to the accused that I would take the bail application in two stages, and that
further material would be accepted if the court reached a stage where consideration of
the matters identified in s 22 of the Bail Act became appropriate.
26․	As indicated above, the Director’s position was that all of these matters were raised
before the court in June 2025. Elkaim AJ did not consider there to be special or
exceptional circumstances under s 9D.
27․	Having read the transcript of the hearing that occurred before Elkaim AJ, I am satisfied
that the majority of the matters upon which the present application was based were properly before the court and were thus not changed circumstances, as opposed to being
additional detail in relation to an issue that was previously raised.
28․	I accept that the evidence of a down-turn in the health of the accused’s father may be a
change of circumstances, in terms of evidence that was not before the court on the last
occasion. However, from the information provided and applying the principles above in
relation to health matters of family members, this is not a case where the additional
information is a matter that is relevant to the grant of bail in the sense of being likely to
alter the balance. But even if the ill health of family members combined with the updated
medical position on the accused’s decision to transition were considered under the lower
threshold articulated in Ezekiel so as to constitute a change in circumstances, these
matters do not, either individually or cumulatively, amount to special or exceptional
circumstances. Even accepting that the desire to transition while in custody is an
uncommon occurrence, it is not the case that the option is unavailable in custody. It is
more that the preference would be for the process to occur in the community. The
disparity between medical services available and likely better outcomes in the community
versus those available in a custodial setting is, regrettably, a common experience.
29․	In relation to the accused’s family members, this is not a case where the accused is the
only support person for their father or stepfather, nor did the evidence establish that this
was a case where there was any suggestion that the accused’s father or stepfather was
in fact close to death. Rather, they are generally in poor health. The material and
submissions before the court did not establish a particular need for this accused to be
involved, and even having regard to the other circumstances already mentioned, I am
not persuaded that the personal hardship or family hardship falls into the category where
I could fairly say that the circumstances of the accused were special or exceptional,
either individually or cumulatively.
30․	Accordingly, as the statutory thresholds have not been overcome, there is no discretion
available to the court and I must not consider the application.

Conclusion

31․	For the above reasons, the order of the Court is as follows:
(1) The application for bail is dismissed.

I certify that the preceding thirty-one [31] numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of her Honour Justice McWilliam

Associate:

Date: