Director of Public Prosecutions v Winters
[2024] ACTSC 293
•28 October 2024
SUPREME COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY
Case Title: | DPP v Winters |
Citation: | [2024] ACTSC 293 |
Hearing Date: | 12 September 2024 |
Decision Date: | 23 September and 28 October 2024 |
Before: | Christensen AJ |
Decision: | See [65] and [66] |
Catchwords: | CRIMINAL LAW – DRUG AND ALCOHOL SENTENCING LIST – Judgment and Punishment – Sentence – knowingly concerned in burglary by joint commission – aggravated burglary – theft by joint commission – damage property by joint commission – offences committed while on drug and alcohol treatment order – treatment order cancelled on earlier occasion – whether to resentence or impose sentence – offending occurred within one month of imposition of treatment order – prospects of rehabilitation – substantial non-compliance with treatment order – imposition of balance of the term of imprisonment – Bugmy principles – early substance use – connection to culture – strong motivation to rehabilitate – period of imprisonment imposed with respect to new offending – rehabilitation through parole |
Legislation Cited: | Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) pt 4, ss 63, 80O, 80W, 80ZE |
Cases Cited: | Bugmy v The Queen [2013] HCA 37; 249 CLR 571 |
Parties: | Director of Public Prosecutions ( Crown) Sara Winters ( Offender) |
Representation: | Counsel E Wren ( Crown) S Robinson ( Offender) |
| Solicitors ACT Director of Public Prosecutions Fortify Legal ( Offender) | |
File Number: | SCC 327 of 2022, SCC 60 of 2023, SCC 303 of 2023 |
CHRISTENSEN AJ:
Introduction
1․Sara Winters is to be sentenced for six offences committed on 12 June 2023, along with two other offences committed at that time that are to be taken into account on sentence. The offending occurred while Ms Winters was the subject of a drug and alcohol treatment order (treatment order).
2․The treatment order was previously cancelled, and a decision is to be made as to whether to impose that sentence or to re-sentence Ms Winters with respect to that offending. It is convenient to commence with consideration of this aspect.
Treatment order
3․On 22 May 2023, Ms Winters was sentenced as follows:
Offence
Sentence
Aggravated robbery, by joint commission
CAN 7437/2022
2 years, 4 months imprisonment
Intentionally making a threat to inflict grievous bodily harm
CAN 8245/2022
9 months imprisonment
Taking a motor vehicle without consent
CAN 7608/2022
10 months imprisonment
Taking a motor vehicle without consent, by joint commission
CAN 7609/2022
9 months imprisonment
Driving a motor vehicle without consent
CAN 8740/2022
7 months imprisonment
Obtaining property by deception
CAN 8741/2022
4 months imprisonment
Driving a motor vehicle without consent
CAN 235/2022
9 months imprisonment
Obtaining property by deception
CAN 237/2022
2 months imprisonment
4․The offending the subject of that sentence proceeding occurred in July and November 2022. The most serious of the offending, that involving violence, was committed by Ms Winters along with three other people. They viciously assaulted a woman in her home because the victim owed money to one of the participants in the assault. The victim’s phone and keys were taken. Ms Winters was involved in the physical assault, and also verbally threatened the victim while holding a knife.
5․The other offending involved Ms Winters entering the premises of a gym franchise of which she was a member, and taking keys and credit cards from bags belonging to other members. The keys were used to take vehicles, as well as using the credit cards to make purchases.
6․The reason why a treatment order was imposed is comprehensively set out in the sentence decision: DPP v Winters (Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory, Refshauge AJ, 22 May 2023) (Unreported Decision, 22 May 2023).
7․The total sentence imposed at that time, relating to the offences the subject of the treatment order and other offences, was one of 4 years and 3 months imprisonment. As to the offences the subject of the treatment order, a total sentence of 4 years imprisonment was imposed. The treatment and supervision part of the order was to be for a period of two years.
Cancellation
8․On 21 November 2023 the prosecution applied for cancellation of Ms Winters’ treatment order. On 9 January 2024, the treatment order was cancelled: DPP v Winters (Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory, Refshauge AJ, 9 January 2024) (Unreported Decision, 9 January 2024).
9․The order was cancelled pursuant to s 80ZE of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) (Sentencing Act), that is, on a basis that there were unsatisfactory circumstances. The Court found that “the compliance of Ms Winters was not satisfactory in a number of respects”. There was non-compliance with a condition to reside at Toora Women’s Incorporated, non-attendance at a drug rehabilitation program, failures to make contact with Treatment Team case managers and to attend for urinalysis, and use of substances.
10․On 20 June 2023, Ms Winters failed to appear as directed for a treatment order court review. A warrant was issued for her arrest. On 22 June 2023, Ms Winters was arrested on the warrant, as well as charged with offences committed on 12 and 19 June 2023 that are now the subject of sentence.
11․At the time of cancellation in January 2024, Ms Winters had not been convicted of the offences that are now the subject of sentence and accordingly the further offending was not a basis for cancellation. The Court did though find that Ms Winters was at risk of committing further offences.
12․The Court found that each ground relied upon for cancellation was established, and found, inter alia, that the treatment order would not achieve the objects of the
order: s 80O Sentencing Act. The Court considered it appropriate to delay the finalisation of the review to enable steps to be taken towards rehabilitation before the decision was made as to imposition or re-sentence: Unreported Decision, 9 January 2024.
Re-sentence or imposition?
13․Ms Winters has been in custody since the time of arrest on 22 June 2023. Her prospects of rehabilitation, and the circumstances that inform the decision as to whether to impose or re-sentence, are accordingly drawn primarily from her conduct while in custody.
14․This can be described in positive terms. Ms Winters has engaged in employment with the bakery where she is described as having “displayed great work ethic at all times” and very good attendance. She is “very polite” and “has responded very well to direction”, and “has a very positive attitude, she is very hardworking, courteous, shows a willingness to learn and enjoys her work”.
15․Ms Winters has engaged in counselling while she has been in custody, and has reached out and engaged with services that she had not previously taken the opportunity to engage with. Ms Winters has also completed a number of courses and programs to address her offending behaviour, her substance dependency, and to develop employment skills.
16․It was observed in R v Cook (No 2) [2024] ACTSC 27 at [10] as to a cancellation pursuant to s 80ZE of the Sentencing Act:
[A] preliminary consideration is the extent to which there was compliance with the treatment and supervision part of the order. Having considered that, the court then turns to consider if it is appropriate in the circumstances to resentence. If it is not, the suspended portion is imposed.
17․It follows that it is not only the prospects of rehabilitation, but also the extent of compliance that is informative as to the decision whether to impose or re-sentence. This is outlined above at [9] and [10]. While Ms Winters was able to demonstrate insight in her evidence at the review hearing as to the circumstances that led to this extent of
non-compliance, it remains that there was essentially none.18․As to whether it is appropriate in the circumstances to resentence, the further offending, while not determinative in the cancellation decision that occurred, is informative at this stage. It is relevant when considering the prospects of rehabilitation, which is a relevant circumstance that may tend towards resentence. Here, that there was offending, within one month of the imposition of the treatment order, does not weigh favourably towards a circumstance warranting a re-sentence exercise.
19․In addition, some of the original offending the subject of the initial sentence decision occurred while on bail. Ms Winters does not present a compelling case for a capability to not further offend while subject to terms of imprisonment that are in a form that enables them to be served in the community.
20․Having considered the non-compliance with the treatment order, and otherwise all relevant circumstances, I conclude that it is not appropriate to resentence and that the suspended term is to be imposed. I have carefully considered the submission made on behalf of Ms Winters to the effect that, even in circumstances where the opportunity for a treatment order was squandered, imposition is not inevitable, but I cannot agree. The legislated considerations for the decision require the Court to not only consider progress with rehabilitation, but also the extent of compliance with the treatment order. Imposition is inevitable in circumstances where there was such a substantial level of non-compliance with the treatment order, and no significantly compelling circumstances arise that warrant resentence.
21․The circumstances that otherwise arise with respect to Ms Winters are instead informative as to the determination of when Ms Winters is to be eligible for parole. This determination involves firstly the consideration of the offences that are the subject of sentence.
Sentence offences
22․The offences committed during the treatment order, with the applicable maximum penalties, are as follows:
Offence
Maximum penalty
Knowingly concerned in burglary
SCCAN 10/2024
s 311 Criminal Code 2002 (ACT)
14 years imprisonment, 1400 penalty units, or both
Take motor vehicle without consent, by joint commission
CAN 9666/2023
s 318 Criminal Code 2002 (ACT)
5 years imprisonment, 500 penalty units, or both
Take motor vehicle without consent, by joint commission
CAN 9667/2023
s 318 Criminal Code 2002 (ACT)
5 years imprisonment, 500 penalty units, or both
Aggravated burglary
CAN 6407/2023
s 312 Criminal Code 2002 (ACT)
20 years imprisonment, 2000 penalty units, or both
Theft, by joint commission
CAN 6988/2023
s 308 Criminal Code 2002 (ACT)
10 years imprisonment, 1000 penalty units, or both
Damage property, by joint commission
CAN 9741/2023
s 403(1) Criminal Code 2002 (ACT)
10 years imprisonment, 1000 penalty units, or both
23․In addition, Ms Winters seeks that two charges of theft, contrary to s 308 of the Criminal Code 2002 (ACT), are taken into account on sentence: pt 4.4 Sentencing Act. These will be taken into account in accordance with R v Campbell [2010] ACTCA 20 at [50].
The offending
24․All of the offending the subject of sentence was done in circumstances of Ms Winters engaging in the conduct with associates. Some of these associates have been identified, but none have yet been sentenced.
12 June 2023 offences – burglary, take motor vehicle without consent, theft (x 2)
25․On 12 June 2023, the two unrelated victims attended their gym franchise in Condor. They both parked their vehicles, both being Toyota Corollas, in the gym member carpark.
26․At around 4:30pm, the first victim placed her belongings, including her car keys, on some cubed storage shelves at the end of a corridor. About twenty minutes later, the second victim placed his keys, also including car keys, on the same storage shelves.
27․At around 5:27pm, Ms Winters and a female associate entered the gym. They entered by following another member inside, although Ms Winters did hold a membership. Their entry and conduct inside of the gym was captured on closed circuit television (CCTV) footage.
28․The CCTV footage shows that Ms Winters and her female associate went into the corridor and into a nearby bathroom. They spent some time near the shelves and in this area, and at some point, one of them took the car keys belonging to the victims.
29․They left after some six minutes, and went to the carpark. They were met by an associate and the vehicles were taken from the carpark. Ms Winters drove one of the vehicles. At about 5:45pm, the owners of the vehicles realised their car keys were missing.
30․There is a concerning brazenness to the offending, particularly given this form of offending was the subject of a sentence proceeding for the offender shortly before. Ms Winters showed a complete disregard for other community members, in particular fellow members of the gym, and has abused their trust in the intention of entering the premises, the taking of the keys, and then her involvement in the taking of the vehicles. A level of planning must have been involved, but the offending was not particularly sophisticated, nor was there any damage caused to effect entry.
31․The victims will have experienced distress and significant inconvenience from the offending behaviour. It is not known on the information provided what happened to one of the vehicles after it was taken, but the other was involved in the subsequent offending and was found burnt out (see below at [37]). There will have been financial implications for both victims, in particular for the victim whose vehicle was burnt.
32․Ms Winters had a role as a driver with respect to the vehicle that she took. The taking of any vehicle must be met with a stern sentence to reflect the implications for the victim, and to deter other offenders from such conduct. Similarly, the circumstances of the burglary require that deterrence be reflected in the sentence to be imposed.
19 June 2023 offences – aggravated burglary, theft, damage property
33․On 19 June 2023 at about 3:15am, one of the Toyota Corollas was observed on CCTV footage to be at the Garran shops. There was another vehicle, a blue Toyota Celica, present. The vehicles stopped with the driver side windows next to each other for approximately 90 seconds, before the driver of the Toyota got out, went to the boot, and returned to the driver’s seat shortly afterwards. Both vehicles then left.
34․At about 3:42am, Ms Winters and an unknown person were seen walking through the carpark of the Garran shops, each carrying a large bag. Ms Winter’s clothing included gloves, a cap and a facemask.
35․They approached the Friendly Grocer store. Approximately forty seconds later, the blue Toyota Celica, driven by a male co-offender, reversed into the door of the store several times over a period of approximately 30 seconds. The door was sufficiently damaged to allow entry into the store and all persons involved entered.
36․While inside, Ms Winters and her associates filled large bags with goods, including 480 packets of cigarettes and 17 bottles of spirits. A total of $19,326.39 worth of items was taken, and significant damage caused to the front of the store, costing approximately
$10,000 to fix.37․Police investigations established that immediately after the offending, Ms Winters was in contact with the male co-offender, and that she returned to her sister’s residence early in the morning. Both Toyotas involved were located burnt out, one nearby to Ms Winters’ sister’s residence. A search warrant was executed at the residence where Ms Winters was staying, and police located items used and taken in the burglary, including 81 packs of cigarettes and seven vapes.
38․The financial implications for the store, from both the aggravated burglary and the property damage were plainly not insignificant, and may have led to broader financial implications from increased insurance costs, and costs to the community from price increases to recoup costs. In addition, the owners and employees of the store will have experienced the inconvenience in necessary cleaning and repairs. It was inevitably a frustrating and distressing experience for them.
39․There was again a brazenness to the offending, with the method of entry involved being serious and one that was determined. Fortunately, it occurred at a time when employees were unlikely to be present. There was an aspect of planning, a form of sophistication, and a complete disregard for other community members.
40․The aggravation is established by the multiple people involved, which provides for the increased maximum penalty. This, as well as the high level of damage caused to effect entry, which is separately charged, is to be borne in mind when considering the totality principle on sentence.
41․The involvement in offending of this type, following offending some days prior, while subject to a treatment order, is indicative of Ms Winters conducting herself with a concerning level of impunity. That all offences were committed while subject to a treatment order is an aggravating factor on sentence.
Subjective circumstances
42․The subjective circumstances of Ms Winters are set out in detail in Unreported Decision, 22 May 2023 and Unreported Decision, 9 January 2024. It is unnecessary to repeat the detail provided there. I do though observe that Ms Winters is now 33 years of age. She is an Aboriginal woman from the Wiradjuri and Dakinjung nations and is connected to her cultural heritage.
43․The subjective circumstances previously considered set out the basis upon which it is established that the principles of Bugmy v The Queen [2013] HCA 37; 249 CLR 571 are to be applied. The prosecution did not submit against this. It is plain that Ms Winters’ moral culpability is reduced having regard to her tragic and traumatic childhood circumstances.
44․In addition, Ms Winters’ subjective circumstances include that she began the use of substances at eight years of age. This increased, and it seems was an entrenched dependency from the age of 12 years, primarily with the use of methamphetamine. Her background of trauma, and incidents of trauma as an adult, have been a catalyst for substance use.
45․I was helpfully reminded by counsel on behalf of Ms Winters of what was said by Simpson J in R v Henry [1999] NSWCCA 111; 46 NSWLR 346 (R v Henry) as to the relationship between moral culpability and drug addiction. What was said by Simpson J at 410-411 [336]-[338] in R v Henry warrants recalling in full:
It is a mistake, in my opinion, to regard drug addiction as a starting point. It is an end point, or a point on the way to the end, of a process. Where the process begins may vary in individual cases but it does not necessarily begin when a person decides to use a prohibited substance. It probably has its origins well before the date of the first use of drugs. In the worst, or least forgivable, cases it may have its origins in arrogance, in an antipathetical attitude to the laws of society, or in weakness of character. In other cases, I have no doubt, it has its origins in social disadvantage, poverty, emotional, financial, or social deprivation, poor educational achievement, unemployment, and the despair and loss of self-worth that can result from these circumstances or any combination of them. In this Court one sometimes sees cases in which drug taking stems from sexual assault or exploitation, sometimes committed when the person who turns to drugs, and who comes before the court, is very young, and sometimes the precipitating events have occurred many years before. Drug addiction is not always the disease; it is, as often as not, a symptom of social disease.
Drug addicts do not come to their addiction from a social or environmental vacuum. This Court should not close its eyes to the multifarious circumstances of disadvantage and deprivation that frequently precede and precipitate a descent into illegal drug use. I do not suggest for a moment that all drug users fall into this category. It is because some do and some do not that I believe rigid rules about the impact on sentencing of drug dependency cannot be laid down.
I cannot accept that the blameworthiness of one drug taker is (even excepting that small number of individuals who begin drug taking with medically prescribed drugs) always to be treated as being at the same level as the blameworthiness of the next. Nor can I accept that the exercise of free choice in the use of drugs is always of equal dimensions. It is not every decision to use drugs that can properly or fairly be characterised as a decision made in the exercise of free choice. The will of an individual can be overborne or undermined, not only by acts of another person, but also by the pressure of circumstances. I do not accept that most drug offenders are truly exercising free will when they choose the degradation, despair, criminality and cycle of imprisonment that can follow the initial use of illegal drugs. The circumstances that propel the offender to the use of drugs are often, if not usually, beyond his or her control. They may or may not be combined with a vulnerable personality or even a weakness of character. Many drug offenders have not had the life experiences or the normal developmental path that permit a conclusion that the decision to take drugs was a decision made in the exercise of a free choice in the sense in which that phrase is ordinarily understood.
46․Ms Winters’ apparent conduct of impunity, one plainly motivated by her entrenched substance dependency, must be considered in this context. I accept that her moral culpability is also reduced with reference to a circumstance of early addiction: DPP v Longmore [2024] ACTSC 278 at [74]; Douglas v The Queen (1995) 56 FCR 465; R v Henry; MF v The King [2024] NSWCCA 42.
47․More recently, the information available to the Court as to Ms Winters’ subjective circumstances includes that she has strengthened her relationship with her father. He is a strong support who has himself achieved sobriety and he works with the Ngunnawal Bush Healing Farm. She is also connected with and has the support of other family members, with this including family members who are employed at Winnunga Nimmityjah Aboriginal and Community Health Services.
48․Further, Ms Winters has the strong support of members of the community who have provided references on her behalf. These speak of her strengths, and her determination to change her life for the better, and that Ms Winters is at heart a good person who has made poor choices in vulnerable times of her life. They speak of the challenges for her children without the guidance, love, and support of their mother.
49․Ms Winters is motivated to achieve rehabilitation in order to be a good mother to her five children. She has intentions to avoid personal relationships that have in the past resulted in trauma and substance use, and to focus on her recovery. In order to support her rehabilitation, Ms Winters has intentions to attend at The Glen Residential Rehabilitation Program, where she has been accepted for admission. The success that this program has in providing culturally appropriate rehabilitation services is known to this Court: DPP v Welsh (No 3) [2024] ACTSC 179.
50․Upon return to the ACT, Ms Winters has intentions to engage with other ACT based rehabilitation programs. To this end, Ms Winters has completed assessment for a number of programs, and the information as to these were provided to the Court. In addition, Ms Winters has begun to focus on her health and fitness, and participated in an indoor rowing competition.
51․Ms Winters has diagnosed mental health conditions. She describes that her mental health is much improved from where it was at the time of the imposition of the treatment order. This contributes to her having confidence as to her ability to engage with support services and to succeed in her rehabilitation. The stability of her mental health is confirmed in a letter from a doctor with Winnunga Nimmityjah. I accept the submission on her behalf that her mental health is informative in the sentencing exercise.
Criminal history
52․Having regard to her subjective circumstances, Ms Winters has a surprisingly limited criminal history. In the ACT it involves offences of minor theft in 2009 and 2021, drug offending in 2016, and driving offences in 2010 and 2016, for which she was fined and placed on good behaviour orders. These good behaviour orders were successfully completed. In NSW, there were convictions for driving offences in 2015 and 2016, and in 2022, driving and drug offending. Fines were imposed.
53․This criminal history, or relative lack of it, does suggest that Ms Winters is capable of not engaging in serious offending behaviour, and to manage her substance dependency without causing harm to community members.
54․This observation is consistent with the information provided to the Court which includes that there are periods of time when Ms Winters has been abstinent from substances, the longest period being for five years. When abstinent, Ms Winters has engaged in employment in retail settings. She has an interest to return to such employment, and to pursue a career in the beauty industry. She also has an interest to obtain qualifications in alcohol and drug rehabilitation and work at the Ngunnawal Bush Healing Farm.
Pleas of guilty and remorse
55․The pleas of guilty were entered in the Supreme Court. This was after an initial plea of not guilty, and the listing of a pre-trial application, but before the listing of a trial date. The utilitarian value is such that a reduction in the order of 20 per cent is appropriate.
56․As to her remorse, Ms Winters is described as having realised her actions have impacted people’s livelihood and wellbeing. She accepts responsibility to such an extent that she reports willingness to engage with the restorative justice process. This remorse and insight into her offending behaviour is also demonstrated in a letter Ms Winters prepared for the Court in which she expresses her shame and guilt for her offending.
Presentence custody
57․As already observed, Ms Winters has been in custody since the date of arrest for the sentence offence on 22 June 2023, a period of 459 days. During that period, she has also been in custody on a provisional suspension of her treatment order, and then remanded following cancellation. This entire period in pre sentence custody is appropriate to be taken into account in determining when the totality of the sentence is to commence: ss 63 and 80W(4) Sentencing Act.
Consideration
58․I am satisfied with respect to all of the further offending that no penalty other than imprisonment is warranted. The real determination in this matter becomes the time at which Ms Winters should become eligible for parole. In the circumstances here, the prospects of Ms Winters’ rehabilitation are of significance to that determination: Robertson v DPP [2024] ACTCA 26; R v Toumo’ua [2017] ACTCA 9; 12 ACTLR 103.
59․The prosecution’s submission is that Ms Winters may be someone who has a motivation to rehabilitate, but that she demonstrates that she may be incapable of doing so. This Court is loath to conclude that there is anyone beyond rehabilitation. But the prosecution’s submission is not without merit, particularly having regard to the events of 2023. Ms Winters plainly has a strong motivation and intent to rehabilitate, but demonstrates significant challenges in doing so when in the community. As the prosecution submitted, Ms Winters had available to her with the treatment order the same supports that she now seeks to rely upon.
60․Nonetheless, Ms Winters has demonstrated in the past an ability to be abstinent from substance use, to be employed, and to be a good mother to her children. There is no reason to conclude that this cannot be achieved again, provided Ms Winters embraces the opportunity to engage with rehabilitation and address the underlying causes that lead her to substance use, and offending.
61․Community Corrections provide that “Ms Winters appears to have a stable plan in place to address her criminogenic risk factors when in the community through residential rehabilitation programs and counselling to address her mental health and trauma concerns”. The submissions on behalf of Ms Winters, and the evidence from Ms Winters herself, emphasises that she has now reached a stage of such motivation, and insight, that there is a high likelihood of engagement with future rehabilitation opportunities.
62․A difficult balancing exercise arises between the need to protect the community, and promote rehabilitation, which is also a purpose of sentence. I am satisfied that Ms Winters’ intentions to engage with rehabilitation are genuine, and that she does have a capability to do so. Her limited criminal history, beyond the matters currently before the Court, and her previous positive periods in the community, have been informative as to this conclusion. As have the apparent insights and determination that Ms Winters now demonstrates, a shift in Ms Winters that has been observed by the people that support her.
63․The sentencing exercise for Ms Winters, as to both the terms of imprisonment to be imposed and the setting of the nonparole period, is also informed by the reduction in moral culpability that is to be applied, as well as the need to ensure that there is not a ‘crushing’ sentence, and one that risks institutionalisation.
64․It is also relevant to observe that a lengthy period of supervision by the Sentence Administration Board will support community protection with an ability to enforce engagement in rehabilitation, and deter re-offending. In those circumstances, it is appropriate that a recommendation as to the nature of the parole conditions is made. A parole eligibility, with a recommendation, set at a smaller than usual proportion of the head sentence will reflect the minimum period of fulltime imprisonment necessary to fulfill the purposes of sentencing.
Orders
65․For those reasons, the following orders are made:
(1)The sentence proceedings are reopened pursuant to s 61(3) of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT).
(2)Pursuant to s 61(3) of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT), the orders made on 23 September 2024 are vacated and in lieu thereof the following orders are made:
(a)The cancellation of the Drug and Alcohol Treatment Order be confirmed.
(b)Under s 80ZE(2) of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT), the sentence of imprisonment suspended under the custodial part of the Drug and Alcohol Treatment Order be imposed.
(c)The conviction of Sara Naomi Winters of aggravated robbery by joint commission (CAN 7437/2022) be confirmed and the sentence of 2 years and 4 months imprisonment to commence on 22 June 2023 and end of 21 October 2025 be imposed.
(d)The conviction of Sara Naomi Winters of intentionally threatening to inflict grievous bodily harm (CAN 8245/2022) be confirmed and the sentence of 9 months imprisonment to commence on 22 July 2025 and end on 21 April 2026 be imposed.
(e)The conviction of Sara Naomi Winters of taking a motor vehicle without consent (CAN 7608/2022) be confirmed and the sentence of 10 months imprisonment to commence on 22 November 2025 and end on 21 September 2026 be imposed.
(f)The conviction of Sara Naomi Winters of taking a motor vehicle without consent by joint commission (CAN 7609/2022) be confirmed and the sentence of 9 months imprisonment to commence on 22 March 2026 and end on 21 December 2026 be imposed.
(g)The conviction of Sara Naomi Winters of riding in a motor vehicle without consent (CAN 8740/2022) be confirmed and the sentence of 7 months imprisonment to commence on 22 July 2026 and end on 21 February 2027 be imposed.
(h)The conviction of Sara Naomi Winters of obtaining property by deception (CAN 8741/2022) be confirmed and the sentence of 4 months imprisonment to commence on 22 November 2026 and end on 21 March 2027 be imposed.
(i)The conviction of Sara Naomi Winters of riding in a motor vehicle without consent (CAN 235/2022) be confirmed and the sentence of 9 months imprisonment to commence on 22 August 2026 and end on 21 May 2027 be imposed.
(j)The conviction of Sara Naomi Winters of obtaining property by deception (CAN 237/2022) be confirmed and the sentence of 2 months imprisonment to commence on 22 April 2027 and end on 21 June 2027 be imposed.
(k)Sara Naomi Winters be convicted of being knowingly concerned in burglary (SCCAN 10/2024) and be sentenced to 19 months imprisonment, reduced from 2 years on the account of the plea of guilty, to commence on 22 June 2026 and end on 21 January 2028.
(l)Sara Naomi Winters be convicted of taking a motor vehicle without consent by joint commission (CAN 9666/2023) and be sentenced to 6 months imprisonment, reduced from 9 months on the account of the plea of guilty, to commence on 22 August 2027 and end on 21 February 2028.
(m)Sara Naomi Winters be convicted of taking a motor vehicle without consent by joint commission (CAN 9667/2023) and be sentenced to 9 months imprisonment, reduced from 12 months on the account of the plea of guilty, to commence on 22 September 2027 and end on 21 June 2028.
(n)Sara Naomi Winters be convicted of aggravated burglary (CAN 6407/2023) and be sentenced to 2 years and 5 months imprisonment, reduced from 3 years on the account of the plea of guilty, to commence on 22 January 2027 and end on 21 June 2029.
(o)Sara Naomi Winters be convicted of theft by joint commission (CAN 6988/2023) and be sentenced to 9 months imprisonment, reduced from 12 months on the account of the plea of guilty, to commence on 22 September 2028 and end on 21 June 2029.
(p)Sara Naomi Winters be convicted of damaging property by joint commission (CAN 9741/2023) and be sentenced to 9 months imprisonment, reduced from 12 months on the account of the plea of guilty, to commence on 22 September 2028 and end on 21 June 2029.
(q)The total sentence imposed be 6 years imprisonment, commencing from 22 June 2023 and ending on 21 June 2029.
(r)A nonparole period be imposed to commence from 22 June 2023 and end on 29 October 2024.
(s)It is recommended to the Sentence Administration Board under s 120(1)(a) of the Crimes (Sentence Administration) Act 2005 (ACT) that:
When released on parole, Sara Naomi Winters be required as a condition of the parole to undertake a substantial period of supervised or mandated drug rehabilitation, preferably in a residential drug rehabilitation facility, if a program is available to her.
66․It is noted that the additional offences of theft (CAN 2023/7149) and (CAN 2023/7150) were taken into account in making the sentence order in relation to the offence of burglary (SCCAN 2024/10) and the list of additional offences is scheduled to these orders.
Corrigendum
67․Following the delivery of reasons and the making of sentencing orders in this matter, it was drawn to the Court’s attention by the prosecution that the individual start and end dates in relation to the nonparole period were not consistent with the agreed presentence period in custody that applied. On 28 October 2024, the matter was listed for submissions and clarification of the sentence orders per s 61(3) of the Sentencing Act.
68․As notified to the parties, the orders of 23 September 2024 were in error in terms of the start date expressed, but the intended effect of the orders remained. That is, the nonparole period concluded on 29 October 2024.
69․The orders as set out above at [65] and [66] reflect the orders as clarified on 28 October 2024, and the warrants of imprisonment as issued.
| I certify that the preceding sixty-nine [69] numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Sentence of her Honour Acting Justice Christensen. Associate: Date: 1 May 2025 |
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