Director of Public Prosecutions v Longmore
[2024] ACTSC 278
•9 September 2024
SUPREME COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY
Case Title: | DPP v Longmore |
Citation: | [2024] ACTSC 278 |
Hearing Date: | 2 September 2024 |
Decision Date: | 9 September 2024 |
Before: | Christensen AJ |
Decision: | See [127] |
Catchwords: | CRIMINAL LAW – DRUG AND ALCOHOL SENTENCING LIST – Judgment and Punishment – Sentence – assault – aggravated robbery – arson – driving offences – boundaries of Bugmy principles – early substance use – moral culpability – injuries sustained during offence – extra-curial punishment – consideration of totality and s 12A of the Crimes (Sentence) Act 2005 (ACT) – rehabilitation efforts while in custody – connection to culture – art – significant prospects of rehabilitation – drug and alcohol treatment order imposed |
Legislation Cited: | Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) s 24 |
Cases Cited: | Barrett v The Queen [2016] ACTCA 38 |
Texts Cited: | Explanatory Statement, Drugs of Dependence (Personal Use) Amendment Bill 2021 (ACT) |
Parties: | Director of Public Prosecutions (Crown) Mathew Longmore (Offender) |
Representation: | Counsel M Fieldus (Crown) S Lynch (Offender) |
| Solicitors ACT Director of Public Prosecutions Aboriginal Legal Service (Offender) | |
File Numbers: | SCC 118, 119 of 2024 |
CHRISTENSEN AJ:
Introduction
1․Mathew Longmore is to be sentenced for 12 offences committed in four series, and it is to be considered whether the drug and alcohol treatment order (treatment order) he seeks be imposed. A particular issue arising are the sentencing purposes of the promotion of rehabilitation of an offender and community protection, in circumstances where a motivation and intention to rehabilitate is demonstrated, and a treatment order is sought.
Offending
2․The offending occurred on four separate occasions.
Series 1: 9 January 2024
3․The first offending occurred on 9 January 2023, with an offence of assault occasioning actual bodily harm by joint commission contrary to s 24 of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT). This offence carries a maximum penalty of 5 years imprisonment.
4․Mr Longmore and his co-offender, Jacob Daniels, were at PJ O’Reilly’s in Tuggeranong, from about 8:30pm. They were socialising and drinking with a number of people, including the victim of the assault. The victim and Mr Longmore were known to each other, and the victim told Mr Longmore that he did not like him because of an apparent incident involving a friend of the victim some years previous. The associates continued to socialise and drink throughout the night.
5․At about 10pm, they all left the premises at closing time and went to their cars. A female associate of the victim came to be in the car of Mr Longmore, his co-offender, and a female associate from Mr Longmore’s group. The victim approached the car and sought to force his associate from it. Mr Longmore and his co-offender approached the victim and his associate. At this stage, the victim, and his associate, who were both heavily intoxicated, had fallen onto the ground.
6․The victim came to be standing up again, and Mr Longmore approached the victim from the rear. He restrained him by the neck with both of his hands. The co-offender punched the victim twice in the face with a closed fist and said, “you just fucking man-handled a fucking woman bro”, before the co-offender pushed the victim to the ground and held him down with his bodyweight.
7․While the co-offender held down the victim, Mr Longmore produced a sharp implement and stabbed the victim in the left buttocks area about four times. The victim felt an immediate sharp pain. Mr Longmore and the co-offender immediately left the area.
8․This was a serious example of this form of offence. It involved an assault committed by two people on the victim, who came to be in a vulnerable position on the ground and being restrained. An implement was used by Mr Longmore to stab the victim multiple times. The victim was subjected to multiple forms of assault by both offenders. As the prosecution submitted, there was a sustained application of force by Mr Longmore, involving restraint of the victim and then stabbing the victim.
9․The circumstances in which the offending occurred warrant a deterrent sentence, being a reminder that a resort to violence, no matter the circumstances, is not tolerated.
10․The physical injuries sustained by the victim involved three puncture wounds to the left buttocks with mild oozing, one puncture being 1.5 cm in length, bruising around the right eye, lacerations to the left hand, and lacerations to the right elbow and forearms. While a serious form of bodily harm, it is fortunate that more serious injuries were not caused. There would have been ongoing physical discomfort, as well as emotional distress, experienced by the victim.
Parity
11․The co-offender was sentenced in the Magistrates Court on 29 August 2024. The information provided to the Court is that the co-offender has a limited criminal history with prior convictions for common assault, possess knife and possess/use prohibited firearm. The co-offender was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 12 months, reduced to 11 months on account of a plea of guilty. The term was ordered to be served by way of an intensive correction order, with 90 hours of community service.
12․In considering the application of the parity principle, it is relevant to observe that the subjective circumstances and the role of the offenders are distinguishable. While they both had a role in restraining the victim during the assault, Mr Longmore was involved in the most serious conduct during the assault with the use of an implement to stab the victim. Mr Longmore has a lengthier and more serious criminal history, although he does not have previous convictions for assault. It is also relevant to observe that the necessity to reflect Mr Longmore’s serious conduct is such that a period of fulltime imprisonment is appropriate. That period will be moderated having regard to the community based, albeit onerous, nature of the co-offender’s sentence.
Series 2: 6 to 10 June 2023
13․The next offending occurred some five months later. Three offences were committed:
(a)Aggravated robbery by joint commission, contrary to s 310(1) of the Criminal Code 2002 (ACT) (Criminal Code) carrying a maximum penalty of 25 years imprisonment, 2500 penalty units, or both;
(b)property damage contrary to s 403(1) of the Criminal Code, carrying a maximum penalty of 10 years imprisonment, 1000 penalty units, or both; and
(c)aggravated dangerous driving, as a repeat offender, contrary to s 7(1) of the Road Transport (Safety and Traffic Management) Act 1999 (ACT) (Road Transport (Safety and Management) Act), carrying a maximum penalty of 5 years imprisonment, 500 penalty units or both. An automatic disqualification period of 12 months applies.
14․The offending involves Mr Longmore and co-offender Saleh Majeed, stealing with threatened force a red Volkswagen Golf GTI from the backyard of a residence in Florey. The owner of the vehicle was storing it at the residence, behind a fence and gate. The location where the vehicle was being stored was known only to the owner of the vehicle, the owner of the residence, her daughter, and Natalia Landon. Ms Landon is alleged to be a co-offender and was a friend of the vehicle’s owner. She was staying with the vehicle’s owner at the time of the offending. Mr Longmore was known to both Ms Landon and the vehicle’s owner.
15․In the days leading up to the offending, Mr Longmore and Ms Landon had message exchanges that included Mr Longmore asking Ms Landon to “grab them [key][s]” if she got a chance and “got petrol or am I getting a hottie”. During this time, Mr Landon was also communicating with the owner of the residence where the vehicle was stored about her concerns as to interpersonal relationships involving the victim. Further, during this time, the owner of the vehicle retrieved the battery from his car and put it on charge at his own home.
16․From about 10am on 6 June, message exchanges between Mr Longmore and Ms Landon led to them meeting together, along with Mr Majeed, at an address in O’Connor. Ms Landon provided them with the keys to the victim’s car.
17․The owner of the vehicle woke up at around 11am and found that his keys, along with a laptop, were missing. The facts provide that these were taken by Ms Landon.
18․Shortly before 12:30pm, the owner of the residence looked out her window and saw the vehicle being reversed out of her yard onto the driveway. It was being driven in an aggressive manner and she realised the driver was not the owner.
19․The owner of the residence, being a victim of the aggravated robbery, ran out of her house and came to stand in front of the vehicle at the end of the cul-de-sac. The vehicle then stalled. The victim was able to make observations of the appearance of the driver that established him to be Mr Longmore.
20․The co-offender, Mr Majeed, then approached the victim where she was standing in front of the vehicle. Mr Majeed reached into a satchel he was carrying and produced a knife about 20 cm in length. He began swinging it back and forth as he approached, and is described as swinging it in an erratic and panicked manner. The victim was concerned she would be wounded if she did not move, and began backing away. Mr Majeed followed her halfway back to her driveway before he ran back to the vehicle and got into the passenger seat. The vehicle left, and the victim contacted the owner of the vehicle.
21․At about 12:53pm, the vehicle was driven by Mr Longmore past a stationary unmarked police vehicle located on Coppins Crossing Road, Whitlam. The vehicle was driving at an excessive speed and police began to follow it, with their lights and sirens activated. Mr Longmore did not stop the vehicle and continued driving in excess of the speed limit. He passed through an intersection against a red light and narrowly avoided a collision with a truck turning through the intersection.
22․The facts provided that between 12:52pm and 1:02pm, phone numbers associated with Mr Longmore and Mr Majeed were connecting to cell towers in the suburbs of Stromlo, Coombs, Curtin, Duffy, and Lyons.
23․In the days following the offending, there were message exchanges between Mr Longmore and associates that included “I’m going to mine to get golf key almost lost another full night could have hit 4 shops by now”, and messages in which Mr Longmore impliedly admitted involvement but said that “I didn’t pull a fuckin’ knife”. Ms Landon spoke to an associate in which she said that she had organised for people to steal the Volkswagen from a location in Florey and to hold a machete up to “a lady named [victim’s first name] throat”. Ms Landon said that she had stolen items from the owner of the vehicle “to spite him”.
24․The facts further provide that the vehicle was recovered by police on 10 June 2023 in a carpark in Coombs. It had been spray painted white, though the original red colour was still visible in places. The rear driver side window was broken and covered with sticky tape. At around the time the vehicle was recovered, Mr Longmore’s telecommunication service was connecting with cell towers in an adjacent suburb.
25․Subsequent forensic examinations linked Mr Longmore to the vehicle, by fingerprints and DNA, including to the steering wheel. In addition, items inside the vehicle were linked to Mr Longmore.
26․Plainly, any offence of aggravated robbery is serious. Particularly serious aspects of the offending here are that it was committed at the victim’s own home, with the property involved a valuable item, and it was a planned offence in terms of arrangements made between the offenders, and securing the keys and a battery for the vehicle. It was also brazen, committed in the middle of the day at a residential address when occupants were likely to become aware of the offending.
27․There were two offenders, establishing the aggravated form of the offence. A particular of the threat involved in the charge is that one of offenders was armed. This is a serious aspect of this offence. The co-offender, and not Mr Longmore, was responsible for the brandishing of the knife. I accept the submission made on behalf of Mr Longmore that there was not necessarily an intention to use a weapon to steal the vehicle, and that this was an act done by the co-offender toward the end of the incident. It was an implicit threat not accompanied by verbal threat, but there was swinging of a relatively large knife during a persistent approach by the co-offender.
28․Nonetheless, this part of the offending was, unsurprisingly, clearly frightening for the victim, who ran back inside her home. The entire circumstance of the aggravated robbery would have been frightening, particularly so given that the victim was made to feel unsafe and vulnerable at her own home. The impacts from the offending are likely to be long-standing.
29․The owner of the vehicle has also experienced the inconvenience, frustration, and distress that would have arisen from the damage caused to the vehicle. The financial implication involved is not provided, but sufficient information is available to conclude that not insignificant damage was caused to the vehicle. The damage was seemingly done to conceal the vehicle in order to reduce the prospects of detection for the robbery offence.
30․As to the driving offence, it involved excessive speed, as a particular of the offence, and a failure to stop for police which establishes it as an aggravated offence with an increased maximum penalty. In addition, the driving involved conduct of going against a red light, putting other road users and the police at risk. It is not clear whether there was a passenger in the vehicle at the time. The distance and duration of the driving is also not clear, but on the facts provided as to the period of driving observed, it appears to be of a relatively short duration. Nonetheless, a deterrent sentence, particularly in circumstances of it being a repeat offence, is warranted.
31․The need for a deterrent sentence with respect to the aggravated robbery offence is also borne out with reference to comparative authorities relied upon by the prosecution: R v Marshall (No 2) [2022] ACTS 102 (Marshall); Barrett v The Queen [2016] ACTCA 38; R v Serena [2019] ACTSC 231; DPP v XK [2023] ACTSC 141. While acknowledging the limitations that such authorities provide, the authority of Marshall, in which a sentence of 3 years was imposed for an aggravated robbery of a vehicle, provides the most factually comparative authority, but the threat inflicted on the victim was more serious.
32․At the time of sentencing Mr Longmore, the co-offenders in relation to this series have not yet been sentenced.
Series 3: 18, 19 June 2023
33․Less than a fortnight later, Mr Longmore engaged in the third series of offending. This involved an offence of arson contrary to s 404(1) of the Criminal Code, carrying a maximum penalty of 15 years imprisonment, 1500 penalty units, or both, and an offence of taking a motor vehicle without consent contrary to s 318 of the Criminal Code, with a maximum penalty of 5 years imprisonment, 500 penalty units, or both.
34․On 18 June 2023, the victim’s blue ST172 Toyota Celica was stolen from the driveway of his residence in Macgregor. At about 5am on 19 June 2023, Mr Longmore drove the Celica down an alleyway next to the Midnight Hotel in Braddon. Shortly after, he entered a commercial premises in Eloura Street, a tattoo parlour operating as Ethereal Tattoo Parlour.
35․Mr Longmore took a 13.5 kg Supagas bottle and a red plastic fuel container into the business and started a fire inside the premises. The gas bottle was left on the floor in proximity to the plastic container of fuel. He then left in the Celica.
36․The fire inside the premises caused an alarm to activate, which included activation of ceiling-mounted fire sprinklers. ACT Fire and Rescue members attended and were told by a member of the public that she had seen flames coming from a ground floor business.
37․The fire caused damage to the business’ floor, front counter, and an Apple Mac desktop, stencil machine, and HP printer located on the counter. A glass panel beside the front door was smashed, but remained intact. Photographs tendered show that it was not inconsequential damage.
38․Police located a blue Samsung mobile that was found near the door of the premises. It was found to be registered to Mr Longmore, and that the last Google search done on the phone was for “Midnight Hotel Canberra”.
39․On 20 June at about 10:32am, the Celica was recovered from an address in Braddon. There were jerry cans inside the vehicle and a black screw driver on the floor of the driver’s seat. The driver’s side door lock was smashed with tool marks under the door lock, the sunroof gasket had been torn out, and the ignition barrel appeared to have been chiselled through. Mr Longmore’s DNA was found on the black screwdriver.
40․In August 2023, Mr Longmore engaged in a conversation with an associate during which it was said to him that his phone had been recovered at an arson. Mr Longmore said that “it was stolen … I lost my phone I fucking lose phones all the time, I’m a crackhead shit gets stolen”. Mr Longmore then went on to say that he dropped the phone as he was getting out of the car and he didn’t know because it was on grass. Further, Mr Longmore said in a conversation to another associate that “the only thing that taskforce has on me is that I dropped my phone when I fucking lit up the tattoo shop and I said it’s a moveable object so…”.
41․As to the offence of arson, there are serious features to this offending. While it was committed in the early hours of the morning when there was unlikely to be occupants on the business premises, the premises adjoined a number of high occupancy buildings. The potential risk of injury to other people, and fire officers, was high. The damage caused was not significant in the circumstances, although will have caused financial implications for the business, including the impact on the business for the purposes of repair and cleaning.
42․It was fortunate that not more damage, or harm, was caused, but this is only because of the alarm activation and not as a result of anything done by Mr Longmore. Rather, Mr Longmore used an accelerant to start the fire, and left a gas bottle proximate to it which had the potential to cause significant harm and damage. The offence was plainly highly planned.
43․The nature of the premises, and the circumstances of the offence, suggest a deliberate and targeted offence, for a reason unexplained on the information provided. Whatever the reason, engaging in an act of apparently targeted arson is serious and such an offence requires a deterrent sentence: R v Wrigley [2015] ACTSC 114 (Wrigley) at [34].
44․Comparative authorities provided by the prosecution (R v Johns [2021] ACTSC 288; R v Hartley [2020] ACTSC 210), again, to the extent they can be of assistance, suggest that sentences in the range of 12 months have been imposed for less sophisticated, although still with the potential for risk to life and property, examples of this offence. As observed in Wrigley, the crime of arson is one that is committed in a wide variety of circumstances, with there being no “tariff” for the offence.
45․The precise circumstance of the taking of the vehicle is not known, but it is apparent that it involved causing damage to the exterior and ignition of the vehicle. The victim will have experienced financial implications as a result, as well as the inconvenience and distress from the vehicle having been taken. The victim was without the vehicle for a period of days. The taking of the vehicle was for the purposes of facilitating the commission of a crime, the arson, which aggravates the offending: R v Rosewarne [2021] ACTSC 217 at [123].
Series 4: 30 June 2023
46․Again, less than a fortnight later, Mr Longmore engaged in further offending. The offending on this occasion involved, again, failing to stop a motor vehicle. This conduct is the subject of a charge of failing to stop motor vehicle for police as a repeat offender, contrary to s 5C of the Road Transport (Safety and Management) Act, carrying a maximum penalty of 3 years imprisonment, 300 penalty units, or both. An automatic disqualification period of 12 months applies. In addition, there is an offence of driving a motor vehicle without consent, contrary to s 318(2) of the Criminal Code, with a maximum penalty of 5 years imprisonment, 500 penalty units, or both.
47․Further, Mr Longmore has pleaded guilty to five summary charges related to this series:
(a)driver to have proper control of vehicle, contrary to s 297(1) of the Road Transport (Road Rules) Regulation 2017 (ACT), with a maximum penalty of 20 penalty units;
(b)prescribed drug in blood, a repeat offender, contrary to s 20(1) of the Road Transport (Alcohol and Drugs) Act 1977 (ACT), with a maximum penalty of 6 months imprisonment, 50 penalty units, or both. An automatic licence disqualification of 12 months applies, with a minimum period of 6 months;
(c)driving while never having held a licence, as a repeat offender, contrary to s 31(2) of the Road Transport (Driver Licensing) Act 1999 (ACT), with a maximum penalty of 6 months imprisonment, 50 penalty units, or both. An automatic licence disqualification period of 3 years applies;
(d)driving an unregistered vehicle, contrary to s 18(1) of the Road Transport (Vehicle Registration) Act 1999 (ACT), with a maximum penalty of 20 penalty units; and
(e)possessing a drug of dependence, contrary to s 169(1) of the Drugs of Dependence Act 1989 (ACT), with a maximum penalty of 1 penalty unit.
48․The facts provided that sometime before 30 June 2023, a white Ford Courier utility was taken without the owner’s permission. At about 4:48am on that day, Mr Longmore drove this Ford through a roundabout in Chisholm.
49․Police conducting a mobile patrol travelled behind the Ford and signalled for it to stop. Rather than stopping, Mr Longmore moved into the left hand lane in front of the police and accelerated away.
50․Shortly before 5:15am on the same day, Mr Longmore, still driving the Ford, was involved in a single vehicle collision. This collision forms the particulars for the summary offence relating to the failure to have proper control of the vehicle. The parties agreed that this collision occurred in the context of Mr Longmore having been under the influence of substances at the relevant time.
51․Mr Longmore got out of the vehicle and collapsed on the ground approximately 10 metres away. Police attended and arrested him, before transporting him to the hospital.
52․Police searched the Ford and located a number of clip seal bags that were subsequently analysed and found to contain a combined weight of 0.424 grams of methylamphetamine.
53․At the time of the driving, Mr Longmore was unlicensed, not having ever held a licence in any state or territory, and he had methylamphetamine in his blood. Further, the vehicle was unregistered, the registration having expired on 25 March 2023. These circumstances of the driving are aggravating, although they are the subject of distinct charges, with it necessary to reflect this in the penalties to be imposed.
54․Any driving involving a failure to stop for police is serious. This is particularly so here where it is repeat offending, accounting for the increased applicable maximum penalty. The circumstances of the driving and failing to stop for police involved a level of risk to the safety of the police. The risk that such conduct puts drivers, and other road users in, is demonstrated by the collision that Mr Longmore experienced shortly after he failed to stop for the police. It does not appear, though, that it was the manner of Mr Longmore’s driving that led to the request to stop the vehicle.
55․The vehicle that Mr Longmore was driving was being driven without the owner’s consent. There was seemingly significant damage caused from Mr Longmore’s driving given the collision that occurred, with the owner likely having been impacted financially, and by inconvenience and distress.
56․The assessment of the charge of the possession of the methylamphetamine must pay close attention to the limited maximum penalty that now applies. This reflects a legislated harm minimisation approach that prioritises a health-focused response to illicit drug personal possession: Explanatory Statement, Drugs of Dependence (Personal Use) Amendment Bill 2021 (ACT). The amount possessed here by Mr Longmore was almost one third of the prescribed small quantity of methylamphetamine, being 1.5 grams: reg 6 of the Drugs of Dependence Regulation 2009 (ACT).
Subjective circumstances
57․Mr Longmore is now aged 29 years and he was 27 years of age at the time of the offending.
58․He is a First Nations man from Bungala Country, and was born and raised on Ngunnawal Country. He is the youngest of five children. Mr Longmore is described as having meaningful connections to his culture and community. This is particularly through his artwork, which the Court has had the privilege of seeing examples of. The Court was impressed by the high quality of his work, which, deservedly, has featured in NAIDOC exhibitions and is utilised in ACT government documentation. He has opportunities to exhibit his artwork in the future. If, as Jackson Pollock said, “[e]very good artist paints what he is”, then Mr Longmore’s paintings tell a story of a man with many strengths and positive qualities.
59․Mr Longmore describes a mostly positive and stable upbringing. He maintains close relationships with his parents, but has minimal contact with his siblings. He is currently single, but maintains contact with his former partner with whom he shares a 19 month old son. Mr Longmore also reports having a close relationship to his former partner’s child, having been a stepparent to him since birth.
60․Mr Longmore left mainstream schooling during his grade 9 level of education. Since then, he has held various roles within the construction and hospitality industries when in the community. While in custody, he has been employed in various roles and he is described as having an “appropriate work ethic, positive attitude, and punctuality”.
61․He experienced a childhood trauma in 2009, the details of which are unnecessary to set out. Suffice to say, Mr Longmore attributes this experience, being an unaddressed trauma, to his history of illicit substance use. Mr Longmore has recently been assessed by a psychologist who reports the presence of symptoms consistent with Post Traumatic Stress Disorder and Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder.
62․This history of substance use is described in the reports as being “significant” and one that includes the use of cannabis, methamphetamine, MDMA, heroin, cocaine, and alcohol. Mr Longmore commenced the use of substances from when he was aged 13, with cannabis, and from 14 years of age was regularly using substances. At age 23, Mr Longmore used heroin, with the use of it when it was available to him.
63․More recently, prior to his return to custody, Mr Longmore was using methamphetamine and cocaine daily, and heroin approximately weekly. This relapse arose following a separation from his partner, triggering an “unhealthy coping strategy”. Mr Longmore claims not to have used substances since the last offence committed, one that involved a collision and serious injuries (see below at [78] and [83]).
64․In custody, Mr Longmore utilises opioid maintenance therapy, but reports an intention to cease this form of treatment while in the community. While in custody he has also received support including counselling sessions, cultural art sessions, and participation in Yeddung Mura Yarning Circle.
Bugmy principles
65․It was submitted on behalf of Mr Longmore that the principles from Bugmy v The Queen [2013] HCA 37; 249 CLR 571 (Bugmy) are enlivened. This submission was made with reference to the traumatic event of Mr Longmore’s childhood in 2009, when he was aged 13 or 14 years, and that thereafter he engaged heavily in substance abuse, experienced homelessness, [redacted].
66․In considering this submission it is necessary to consider closely the information provided in the drug and alcohol sentencing assessment reports as to Mr Longmore’s childhood circumstances. This provides that Mr Longmore described his upbringing as “good and healthy” and that he had a mostly positive and stable upbringing. He recalls experiencing bullying due to matters including his family’s financial circumstances. This ceased after grade five when he began fighting back, but he was frequently in trouble and suspended from school commencing in grade four. He reported “dropping out” of school after completing grade eight, and commencing drug use.
67․His parents separated when he was approximately 12 years of age and he initially moved between their houses. From age 13 he stayed fulltime with his mother, but from 14 years moved to live with a local drug dealer for a period of three years. Mr Longmore also describes that he was “couch surfing with mates, bouncing around between them and mum’s house as [he] wanted to stay away as much as possible because of the drugs”.
68․It was submitted that the Court consider what was said in DPP v Monaghan [2024] ACTSC 183 at [35] (Monaghan) and find that the childhood circumstances observed for the offender there were of a similar nature to Mr Longmore’s, and that, as in Monaghan, it be found that the Bugmy principles are enlivened. Having reviewed the subjective circumstances explained in Monaghan, I do not accept this submission. While a common experience of [redacted] and disrupted education exists, in contrast, the offender’s background circumstances in Monaghan “demonstrate disadvantage such that she was deprived of a stable and secure environment within which to develop”: Monaghan at [35].
69․In any event, a determination as to whether the Bugmy principles are enlivened is not an exercise in comparison of the subjective circumstances of offenders. It involves an exercise of a question of fact, with reference to the information available as to an offender’s experience in their formative years. This is not to say that for the principles to be enlivened it is necessary to characterise an offender’s childhood as one of “profound deprivation”, nor that there be a strict causal connection between the background and the offending: see, for example, Hoskins v R [2021] NSWCCA 169 at [57].
70․It is to say that the “the boundaries of Bugmy have not been clearly or definitively delimited”: Nasrallah v R [2021] NSWCCA 207; 105 NSWLR 451 (Nasrallah) at [11] per Bell P. It is not certain whether the principle is enlivened with reference to the impact of traumatic events external to, and not apparently associated with, an offender’s upbringing and immediate or extended family environment, or with the occurrence of an isolated traumatic event: Nasrallah at [21] (Bell P); and see Simpson AJA in R v Irwin [2019] NSWCCA 133 at [2] as to the principles being concerned with a history of disadvantage and deprivation.
71․Nonetheless, wherever it is that the boundaries of Bugmy are, on a consideration of the information here as to Mr Longmore’s childhood experiences, I am not satisfied that it falls within circumstances that would readily enliven the principles.
72․Recently, Ierace J in Lupton v R [2024] NSWCCA 29 at [145] has explained:
The essence of the Bugmy principles is a recognition that an offender’s physical and moral environment in their formative years may profoundly impair their moral compass and judgment, so that they may not be as morally culpable for subsequent criminal behaviour as an offender who has not been so afflicted. In order to determine whether a reduction in moral culpability is warranted on this basis, it is logically necessary to consider the evidence as to how those childhood experiences have affected the offender. If the offender’s moral culpability is reduced by that impact, consideration is then given to whether countervailing factors, such as the need to protect the community, reduce or eliminate its mitigatory effect.
73․The circumstances of Mr Longmore’s trauma, and of his adolescence, are certainly informative, and still to be given full weight, in the process of instinctive synthesis. Whether they, as submitted, reduce his moral culpability in the sense submitted is not as clear. This is particularly so in circumstances where the offending, at least for series 2 and 3, evidences planning and lacks spontaneity, which is not necessarily reflective of his experiences in his formative years.
74․Mr Longmore’s childhood experiences explain his descent into entrenched substance dependency, and his early involvement in substance use, before he was capable of making an informed choice as to such use, explains how he now, as an adult, continues to experience substance dependency. To this extent, I accept that while typically drug addiction is not a mitigating factor, in circumstances of early addiction, it can reduce moral culpability: Douglas v The Queen (1995) 56 FCR 465, 470; R v Henry (1991) 46 NSWLR 346 [273] (Henry); and see, for example, MF v R [2024] NSWCCA 42.
75․It is ultimately in this matter unhelpful to attempt to categorise whether the so called Bugmy principles apply, or whether the so called Henry principle as to early addiction applies. It is sufficient to observe that Mr Longmore’s background is significantly informative in determining the appropriate sentence to be imposed on him as an individual. In the process of instinctive synthesis, inclusive of assessing moral culpability, the weight which would ordinarily be given to punishment, denunciation, and general deterrence is appropriately moderated in favour of other sentencing purposes such as promotion of rehabilitation.
76․In doing so, this also involves a consideration as to the extent to which those earlier experiences, and the ongoing substance abuse issue that has resulted, inform the need for community protection. To that end, it is relevant to observe that “[r]ehabilitation, if it can be achieved, is likely to be the most durable guarantor of community protection and is clearly in the public interest”: Hogan v Hinch [2011] HCA 4; 243 CLR 506 at [32].
Rehabilitation
77․As to Mr Longmore’s rehabilitation, there is a basis upon which to conclude there is considerable prospects of this been achieved. Mr Longmore gave evidence of what are plainly two significant motivating factors for his rehabilitation.
78․The first is the impact of the collision that occurred during the last offence, in which he was involved in a single vehicle accident. Mr Longmore sustained various physical injuries as a result. He was hospitalised, required ongoing medical treatment, and he continues to experience nerve related pain for which he receives ongoing assistance.
79․Mr Longmore explained that this was a “near death” experience and one that was “enough to wake you up”. Mr Longmore described being told by the ambulance officers that he was fortunate he didn’t snap his neck, and that the experience showed him what he had been giving up and pushing away, being his family. Mr Longmore said that the collision was his “learning point” and that he hasn’t used substances since then. It made him think about his whole life and all the bad decisions he has made.
80․The second is that he is now a father to a young son who is 19 months of age. Mr Longmore said that from the day of the collision, he “made a promise to my son that I’d turn my life around”.
81․It was not long after the collision that Mr Longmore checked himself into the Canberra Recovery Service residential rehabilitation program. While he was there, he was arrested and then remanded in custody.
82․Mr Longmore gave evidence that he has been abstinent from drugs for 16 to 17 months, and that this is the longest period he has gone without using drugs. He is, rightly, proud of himself and has a lot more respect for himself. A confirmation as to his abstinence is available by way of a negative result for substances from urinalysis testing conducted on 14 August 2024.
Extra-curial punishment
83․As observed above at [78], Mr Longmore sustained physical injuries as a result of the collision that occurred in the series four offending. The information provided includes that he received eight screws in his ankle, five screws in his shin, and two plates in his face. It was submitted that this amounts to extra-curial punishment: R v Daetz [2003] NSWCCA 216 at [62]. I did not understand the prosecution to submit against this.
84․I accept that the serious, and ongoing, physical injuries sustained by Mr Longmore amount to extra-curial punishment that is appropriately taken into account. The weight to be given to it, and how it is to be taken into account, was recently considered in El-Hassan v The King [2023] VSCA 307 in which Priest and Beach JJA observed at [31]:
Although the authorities do not speak with one voice, the better view appears to be that a condition resulting from injuries sustained in the commission of a crime, or at the time of arrest, which occasions extra hardship to an offender will be relevant in at least two ways: first, it will be relevant to the choice of the sanction (and whether imprisonment is ordered at all); and, secondly, it may well dictate the length of any term of imprisonment.
85․Here, it is appropriate that the extra-curial punishment informs the severity of the term of imprisonment that must be imposed. The hardship to the offender is particularly relevant, and warrants weight being applied to it in the sentence, given the extent to which it has informed Mr Longmore’s intentions as to rehabilitation (see above at [79]).
Criminal history
86․Mr Longmore has an extensive criminal history [redacted] in both the Australian Capital Territory and New South Wales. He has served multiple terms of imprisonment, and been subject to numerous community based orders. His overall response to community supervision is described as being poor, with this including a previous parole order that was cancelled.
87․Notably, his criminal history includes a previous conviction for arson and for aggravated robbery. As accepted on his behalf, this criminal history effects the leniency that would otherwise be afforded to him. I accept, however, the submission made that Mr Longmore’s criminal history reflects his subjective experiences and his entrenched substance dependency.
Plea of guilty and remorse
Plea of guilty
88․In relation to all charges, a plea of guilty was entered in the Magistrates Court. In the first series, a plea of guilty was entered on the day of the hearing to a charge that had not been available earlier. In the second series, a plea of guilty was entered after an initial plea of not guilty, the provision of a brief of evidence, and following representations which were accepted. A plea of guilty was entered in relation to the third series after an initial plea of not guilty and after the provision of the brief of evidence. The pleas of guilty for the fourth series were entered at a mention stage before there was provision of a brief of evidence.
89․The stage at which the pleas of guilty were entered in the Magistrates Court differs. I am satisfied that a reduction in the order of 20 to 25 per cent is appropriate.
[Redacted]
90․It was submitted on behalf of Mr Longmore that s [redacted] of the Crimes(Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) (Sentencing Act) applies. That is, that there ought be a reduction in the sentence [redacted]. There was no submission made by the prosecution with respect to the application of this section.
91․The information available as to this is set out in the submissions on behalf of Mr Longmore. [Redacted].
92․An application of s [redacted] of the Sentencing Act requires mandatory consideration of the matters set out in s [redacted]. The limited information available to the Court does not enable most of those matters to be considered. The decision of whether to impose a lesser penalty is discretionary: s [redacted]. I am not persuaded that there is sufficient basis upon which the Court could exercise the discretion to impose any lesser penalty [redacted].
93․[Redacted]. This will be taken into account when assessing his remorse and prospects of rehabilitation.
Remorse
94․In terms of his remorse, Mr Longmore has given evidence in Court from a letter he prepared, as well as having spoken to the assessment report writers about his remorse. It is apparent that his remorse is not solely directed towards the situation that he finds himself in, but that it extends to a genuine depth of remorse and insight as to the harm he has caused to his victims and the community from his offending. Mr Longmore expresses:
I am remorseful, angry and upset with myself. I’ve let my mum and dad down; I’ve let friends down and I’ve let the community down. This is a wake-up call and I feel remorse for everyone my crimes have affected.
95․In the assessment reports, Mr Longmore is described as accepting full responsibility for his actions. He expresses that his behaviour reflects his substance use and poor decision making. With respect to the assault, Mr Longmore is described as appearing to express a level of empathy towards the victim, and as having recognised that he should not have gotten involved and should have left. With respect to the arson offence, Mr Longmore said that he “put peoples lives and businesses at risk”.
Conditional liberty
96․At the time of each of the offences for which Mr Longmore is to be sentenced, he was subject to conditional liberty in the form of parole. This is a relevant aggravating factor in determining the appropriate penalty.
Consideration
97․Mr Longmore has engaged in what can be described as a crime spree, particularly with the June 2023 offending. He has committed various forms of offending, suggestive of him being someone with a flagrant disregard for the law and community members. That observation though is to be tempered having regard to the matters considered above as to Mr Longmore’s subjective circumstances.
98․Nonetheless, I am readily satisfied that with respect to all offences where imprisonment is an available maximum penalty that, having considered possible alternatives, no penalty other than imprisonment is appropriate.
99․The prosecution submission was that rehabilitation clearly has a role to play in Mr Longmore’s sentencing exercise. I am satisfied that the promotion of rehabilitation is a significant sentencing purpose warranting promotion in the sentencing exercise. In circumstances where an offender is strongly and genuinely motivated to address entrenched substance abuse, promoting rehabilitation also meets the sentencing purpose of protecting the community from the offender.
Totality
100․The sentencing exercise here requires close consideration as to the application of the totality principle. There is no dispute that the offending within the series warrants at least a degree of concurrency. However, while it might typically be that the distinct series of offending, involving differing forms and occasions of offending, appropriately involve cumulation of the series, there are reasons why the application of the totality principle dictates otherwise here.
101․First is the overall period of time that Mr Longmore has been in custody, that is, since 25 August 2023. Due to cancellation of a previous parole order, little of this period is applicable in terms of s 63 of the Sentencing Act, but it is relevant in considering the duration that Mr Longmore has now spent in the custodial environment: Mill v The Queen (1998) 166 CLR 59 (Mill) at [66].
102․Second is that totality requires that the overall sentence hold out a proper measure of hope for, and encouragement to, rehabilitation and reform: Postiglione v The Queen (1997) 189 CLR 295 at 341. This is particularly relevant when Mr Longmore’s subjective circumstances are such that promotion of rehabilitation is of significance in the sentence to be imposed.
103․Mr Longmore seeks a treatment order. The prosecution submitted that having regard to all sentencing considerations, the Court may consider that the appropriate length of sentence would exceed the four year threshold for a treatment order. It was submitted on behalf of Mr Longmore that the Court consider an approach to sentencing that enables Mr Longmore to be supported with his genuine motivation for rehabilitation.
104․Such an order is plainly the sentencing order that will best promote his rehabilitation, and best protect the community upon his release from custody: s 80O of the Sentencing Act. Section 12A(1)(b)(ii) of the Sentencing Act provides that where there is a conviction of more than one offence eligible for a treatment order, the total period of imprisonment imposed is to be of at least one year but not more than four years.
105․Section 12A(5) then provides that the “court must not impose a lesser sentence of imprisonment on the offender than the circumstances of the offence would ordinarily require only to allow the court to make a treatment order”. The sentences that are to be imposed for each offence are in accordance with this requirement.
106․That subsection does not though preclude an application of the totality principle which otherwise enables a total period of imprisonment that meets the requirements of
s 12A(1)(b)(ii), and one that gives effect to the objects of such an order per s 80O. Indeed, the express reference of “the offence” in s 12A(5), in contrast to the “total period” in s 12A(1)(b)(ii) tends towards a conclusion of legislative intent of differing considerations at each of these stages of the sentencing exercise. As observed by McCallum CJ in DPP v Djerke(No 2) [2023] ACTSC 341 at [36], “the cap of four years was not intended to preclude people … from having the benefit of a [treatment order], but is rather a reflection of a policy that any longer period would be unmanageable and more difficult in terms of the administration of the list”.107․The Court must not impose a lesser sentence of imprisonment for an individual offence than the circumstances of the offence would ordinarily require only to allow the court to make a treatment order: s 12A(5) of the Sentencing Act. But the sentencing exercise, where there are multiple eligible offences to be considered, still involves an application of the totality principle. When the promotion of rehabilitation and protection of the community is of significance in the sentencing decision, orders as to when the sentences are to be served such that eligibility for a treatment order pursuant to s 12A of the Sentencing Act remains, are likely appropriate.
108․The application of the totality principle here results in such an outcome, one that is “just and appropriate”: Mill at [63]. It is then necessary to consider the other legislative considerations before such an order is imposed.
Drug and alcohol treatment orders
109․In addition to the matters to be considered pursuant to s 12A of the Sentencing Act, considered above at [104]-[107], it is necessary to consider the matters in s 12A(2).
110․I am satisfied that Mr Longmore is dependent on alcohol or a controlled drug and that his dependency substantially contributed to the commission of the offences. Both parties submitted that the Court would be satisfied of this. There may be some hesitation in concluding this given the nature of some of the offences and the planning involved in them. I do accept however the submission made on behalf of Mr Longmore that it is Mr Longmore’s illicit substance dependency that is at the core of what he terms his “poor decision making” that leads to his offending. Mr Longmore described in his evidence as this being that he “let the drugs control my life”.
111․It is clear that all of the offences in June 2023 were committed during a period of particularly heavy substance abuse, and that the earlier assault was committed in circumstances of substance use leading to the poor decision making that Mr Longmore exhibits while under the influence of substances. I am satisfied on the balance of probabilities of the matters in sub-ss 12A(2)(a)(i), (ii).
112․I am further satisfied that Mr Longmore will be in the ACT for the term of the sentence except as directed by the Court. He has available to him residence at his mother’s location, which has been found suitable by Corrective Services.
113․As to ss 12A(2)(b)(ii) and 12A(2)(c) of the Sentencing Act, there was no information given to the Court relating to the concerns of a victim about their safety or welfare, and Mr Longmore has given the requisite informed consent.
114․As to the whether the Court considers the order appropriate taking into account the relevant sentencing considerations applying to Mr Longmore (s 12A(b)(i) Sentencing Act) and the objects of a treatment order (ss 12A(2)(b)(iii), 80O), I observe that both reports assess Mr Longmore as suitable for a treatment order for a period of up to 18 months.
115․Mr Longmore demonstrates insight into his use of illicit substances, informing the assessors that his use of illicit substances arises as a way to manage life stressors. He reports a direct correlation between his use and his unaddressed childhood trauma. He reports being ready to begin addressing his childhood trauma, and has hopes of creating a more positive and pro-social life. Mr Longmore has a desire to engage in employment after he has focused on his rehabilitation. He describes that when employed “he does good and is around good people”.
116․It must though be recognised that there are two factors that have warranted careful consideration in determining whether the Court is satisfied that the order is appropriate.
117․Firstly, the prosecution did caution the Court to have some scepticism as to Mr Longmore’s ability to comply with the stringent requirements of a treatment order given his previous non-compliance with community based orders.
118․Mr Longmore’s history of non-compliance with community based orders is of concern. I am persuaded however that a sentence by way of a treatment order that sees Mr Longmore essentially serve his term of imprisonment while under the onerous demands of a community based treatment order is appropriate. It is abundantly clear on the information available to the Court that Mr Longmore demonstrates an inherent strength and motivation to rehabilitate, and that he has available to him protective factors to support that rehabilitation. This includes that there are reports of positive behaviour while he has been in custody that details polite and respectful engagement towards officers and satisfactory participation in cultural related programs.
119․The assessment reports further provide that Mr Longmore has demonstrated motivation to comply with the requirements of a treatment order and has engaged in positive steps towards rehabilitation whilst in custody. In particular, the Corrective Services report dated 22 August 2024 provides that “given Mr Longmore has previously been subject to all types of community-based orders with [Community Corrections], a DATO may provide the adequate structure and intensive support required to benefit Mr Longmore in abstaining from anti-social behaviours and subsequent re-offending”. This assessment, while noting concerns as to the previous non-compliance with community based orders and the non-deterrent effect from such orders, assesses Mr Longmore as suitable for a treatment order.
120․Secondly, I have had a hesitation as to the appropriateness of a treatment order as being the best mechanism to assist Mr Longmore. A treatment order is capable of being of significant assistance for someone who is ready to rehabilitate from their substance use, which Mr Longmore is. It is not though necessarily the best mechanism to address the underlying traumas that Mr Longmore needs to address if he is to not readily resort to illicit substances in the future. The recent psychological assessment recommended that Mr Longmore receive further assessment.
121․Relevant supports and programs can be made available, but it will be important for the Drug and Alcohol Sentencing List treatment team to identify and support Mr Longmore to access culturally appropriate programs during the term of the treatment order. The Corrective Services report acknowledges this, describing that with the structure of a treatment order and the support of the Indigenous Case Management Program (ICAN), it is hopeful that Mr Longmore will “begin to develop appropriate strategies and resources to manage life’s stressors without resorting to substance abuse and offending behaviours”.
122․Mr Longmore himself has already taken steps to access relevant programs upon his return to the community. This includes with the Karralika Matrix Program, the Ngunnawal Bush Healing Farm, and ICAN. The later of these will involve Mr Longmore being assigned an Aboriginal Controlled Community Organisation Intensive Case Manager. There is no reason that such a Case Manager cannot collaborate with the treatment team to ensure optimal support for Mr Longmore.
123․In all the circumstances, I am satisfied that a treatment order is suitable for Mr Longmore, that it is appropriate for him to serve a sentence suspended in accordance with a treatment order, and that appropriate arrangements for the administration of a treatment order are practicable: ss 80S, 80T of the Sentencing Act.
Pre-sentence custody
124․In relation to the charges the subject of sentence, Mr Longmore has had three periods in custody solely in relation to these charges, from 8 March 2023 to 9 March 2023, from 25 August 2023 to 23 October 2023, and from 22 August 2024 to 9 September 2024. A total of 2 months and 19 days is to be taken into account: s 63 of the Sentencing Act.
Licence disqualification
125․In relation to a number of the offences, a legislated licence disqualification period, some of which may be reduced to a minimum period, applies. The parties submitted that it was open to the Court to order complete or partial concurrency: DPP v Holder (No 2) [2023] ACTSC 167 at [83]-[95].
126․Having regard to the primacy of rehabilitation in the sentencing exercise, it is appropriate that the minimum necessary disqualification periods are served concurrently. The ability to be lawfully licensed provides a mechanism by which rehabilitation can be supported. The Drug and Alcohol Sentencing List often sees participants who achieve rehabilitation from drug dependency, but are frustrated in their inability to secure appropriate employment due to the licence disqualification periods that have been applied. The period that Mr Longmore should be subject to the loss of the privilege that a licence affords should be the minimum period permitted given his prospects of rehabilitation.
Orders
127․For those reasons, the orders of the Court are as follows:
(1)Mathew James Longmore be convicted of joint commission assault occasioning actual bodily harm (CAN 5915/2023) and he be sentenced to 9 months imprisonment, reduced from 12 months imprisonment on account of his plea of guilty, commencing from 22 June 2024 and ending on 21 March 2025.
(2)Mathew James Longmore be convicted of aggravated robbery (CAN 8778/2023) and he be sentenced to 18 months imprisonment, reduced from 2 years imprisonment on account of his plea of guilty, commencing from 22 March 2025 and ending on 21 September 2026.
(3)Mathew James Longmore be convicted of damage property (CAN 8780/2023) and he be sentenced to 3 months imprisonment, reduced from 4 months imprisonment on account of his plea of guilty, commencing from 22 July 2026 and ending on 21 October 2026.
(4)Mathew James Longmore be convicted of aggravated dangerous driving (CAN 8784/2023) and he be sentenced to 6 months imprisonment, reduced from 8 months imprisonment on account of his plea of guilty, commencing from 22 July 2026 and ending on 21 January 2027. The automatic disqualification period of 12 months be noted.
(5)Mathew James Longmore be convicted of take motor vehicle without authority (CAN 8361/2023) and he be sentenced to 4 months imprisonment, reduced from 5 months imprisonment on account of his plea of guilty, commencing from 22 July 2026 and ending on 21 October 2026.
(6)Mathew James Longmore be convicted of arson (CAN 8360/2023) and he be sentenced to 14 months imprisonment, reduced from 18 months imprisonment on account of his plea of guilty, commencing from 22 January 2027 and ending on 21 March 2028.
(7)Mathew James Longmore be convicted of driver drive vehicle without proper control (CAN 11053/2023) and no penalty be imposed.
(8)Mathew James Longmore be convicted of fail to stop motor vehicle for police (CAN 11054/2023) and he be sentenced to 3 months imprisonment, reduced from 4 months imprisonment on account of his plea of guilty, commencing from 22 November 2027 and ending on 21 February 2028. Mathew James Longmore be disqualified from holding or obtaining a drivers licence for 12 months from today.
(9)Mathew James Longmore be convicted of ride/drive motor vehicle without consent (CAN 11055/2023) and he be sentenced to 6 months imprisonment, reduced from 8 months imprisonment on account of his plea of guilty, commencing from 22 December 2027 and ending on 21 June 2028.
(10)Mathew James Longmore be convicted of driver with prescribed drug in oral fluid (CAN 11058/2023) and he be sentenced to 1 month imprisonment, reduced from 40 days imprisonment on account of his plea of guilty, commencing from 22 December 2027 and ending on 21 January 2028. Mathew James Longmore be disqualified from holding or obtaining a drivers licence for 6 months from today.
(11)Mathew James Longmore be convicted of use unregistered vehicle (CAN 11056/2023) and no penalty be imposed.
(12)Mathew James Longmore be convicted of unlicenced – licence never held (CAN 11057/2023) and he be sentenced to 1 month imprisonment, reduced from 40 days imprisonment on account of his plea of guilty, commencing from 22 December 2027 and ending on 21 January 2028. Mathew James Longmore be disqualified from holding or obtaining a drivers licence for 3 years from today.
(13)Mathew James Longmore be convicted of possess drug of dependence not more than small quantity (CAN 11059/2023) and no penalty be imposed.
Drug and Alcohol treatment order
(14)A Drug and Alcohol Treatment Order under s 12A of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) be made for Mathew James Longmore in respect of the eligible offences set out in Orders 1-13, of which Mathew James Longmore has been convicted and for which he has been sentenced for a total term of 4 years imprisonment.
(15)It be noted that convictions and sentences imposed for the eligible offences have been recorded and are hereby incorporated into the Drug and Alcohol Treatment Order in the Custodial Part of the Order.
(16)The Drug and Alcohol Treatment Order be for 3 years 9 months 13 days from today, 9 September 2024, to 21 June 2028.
(17)The Treatment and Supervision Part of the Drug and Alcohol Treatment Order be for 18 months from today, 9 September 2024, to 8 March 2026.
(18)The Custodial Part of the Drug and Alcohol Treatment Order for the eligible offence here be suspended under s 80W of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) from today, 9 September 2024, until 21 June 2028.
(19)Under s 80ZA of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT), Mathew James Longmore be required to sign an undertaking to comply with the offender’s Good Behaviour obligations under s 85 of the Crimes (Sentence Administration) Act 2005 (ACT) from the day after the end of the Treatment and Supervision Part of the Drug and Alcohol Treatment Order, 9 March 2026, until the end of the total sentence, 21 June 2028, with a probation condition that he accept supervision by the Commissioner of ACT Corrective Services or his delegate for the period of the undertaking or such lesser period as the person supervising him considers appropriate and obey all reasonable directions of the person supervising him.
(20)For the Treatment and Supervision Part of the Drug and Alcohol Treatment Order:
(a)The core conditions of the Order set out in s 80Y of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) be hereby imposed;
(b)Mathew James Longmore undertake any program, treatment or counselling, alcohol and drug testing or case management that may be required by any member of the Treatment and Supervision Team and obey all reasonable directions of any member of that Team about where he resides, with whom he associates and his attendance from time to time;
(c)Mathew James Longmore not return a positive test sample under alcohol and drug testing;
(d)Mathew James Longmore not consume or use alcohol, cannabis, illicit drugs and prescription drugs not prescribed to him; and
(e)Mathew James Longmore comply with any directions of the Court from time to time about attendance at Court in person or by electronic means.
(21)Mathew James Longmore be directed to sign a sealed copy of this Order and an undertaking to comply with the Order and any obligations under the Crimes (Sentence Administration) Act 2005 (ACT) for the period that this Order is in force before he leaves the Court precincts.
(22)Mathew James Longmore be directed to appear in person or via electronic means in Court on Tuesday 17 September 2024 at 11:30am.
| I certify that the preceding one hundred and twenty-seven [127] numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Sentence of her Honour Acting Justice Christensen Associate: Date: 21 January 2025 |
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