| IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA | Not Restricted | |
AT MELBOURNE
CRIMINAL DIVISION
No. 1467 of 2004
| DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS |
| v |
| TY |
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JUDGE: | Bell J | |
WHERE HELD: | Melbourne | |
DATE OF HEARING: | 6 December 2006 | |
DATE OF JUDGMENT: | 6 and 14 December 2006 | |
CASE MAY BE CITED AS: | DPP v TY | |
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2006] VSC 494 | |
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CRIMINAL LAW – manslaughter – unlawful and dangerous act – dangerousness test – accused a child aged 14 years – whether age must be taken into account in applying the test – whether doing so would change the objective nature of the test – the necessary instructions to the jury.
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APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the Director of Public Prosecutions | Mr M Tinney | Ms A Cannon, Solicitor for Public Prosecutions |
| For the Accused | Mr R van de Wiel QC and Mr M O’Connell | Dowling McGregor Thomas |
HIS HONOUR:
When aged 14 years and eight months, the accused struck the deceased to the head with a golf umbrella. Its long metal tip punctured the deceased’s skull and penetrated his brain to a significant depth. He was fatally wounded and died three days later.
In this trial before a jury, the accused now stands charged with murder and, in the alternative, manslaughter. The issues in relation to the charge of murder are clear and there is no need for me to canvas them here. As to manslaughter, before I charge the jury, I must determine whether or not the age of the accused is a relevant consideration. The defence submits it is, and wants me to instruct the jury accordingly; the prosecution submits it is not, and says I should say nothing about it.
The charge is brought on the basis of manslaughter by unlawful and dangerous act. The defence concedes the death of the deceased was caused by the conscious, voluntary and deliberate act of the accused. Whether the act was unlawful is in issue because the accused relies on self-defence. There is no question about what I should tell the jury in that regard. The defence submits the accused’s age comes into the dangerousness element.
For a conviction of manslaughter, the prosecution must prove, beyond reasonable doubt, that a reasonable person in the accused’s position would have realised he or she was exposing another person to an appreciable risk of serious injury.[1] When the accused is a child, should the jury be told to take his or her age into account when applying this legal standard? Should the jury be told, in effect, to treat the reasonable person as a reasonable child of a similar age to the accused, in this case a young teenage boy?
[1]Wilson v R (1992) 174 CLR 313, 333-334 approving R v Holzer [1968] VR 481, 482.
I have been informed there has been no previous decision on point, and my own research has not revealed otherwise.
A child above the age of 10 has the capacity to commit a criminal offence: s 127 of…
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- Case
- [2006] VSC 494
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court held that the age of the accused should indeed be taken into account when assessing the dangerousness of the act, as it could influence the perception of danger from the perspective of a reasonable person. The court emphasised that the dangerousness test must be assessed objectively, but the reasonable person is not an abstract entity devoid of context. Instead, the reasonable person must be understood as embodying societal values and standards, which inherently include an understanding of the immaturity and vulnerability of children. Therefore, the age of the accused can affect the perception of danger, and this must be reflected in the jury's assessment. The court also provided detailed instructions for the jury to ensure they correctly considered the accused's age in their deliberations.
In light of the above, the High Court ruled that the trial judge's failure to properly instruct the jury on the consideration of the accused's age was a significant error. This misdirection potentially affected the jury's assessment of the dangerousness of the act, leading to an unsafe and unsatisfactory verdict. Consequently, the court quashed the conviction and ordered a new trial. The court emphasised the importance of ensuring that juries are adequately instructed to avoid miscarriages of justice, particularly in cases involving young defendants.
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