Director of Public Prosecutions v PM

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District Court


New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation: DPP v PM [2011] NSWDC 220
Hearing dates:30/11/2011
Decision date: 30 November 2011
Before: Judge S Norrish QC
Decision:

Evidence not admitted.

Catchwords: Admissions, unfairness discretion, probative value, unfair prejudice, "pretext" telephone calls.
Legislation Cited: Evidence Act 1995 - ss 84, 85, 88, 90 137
Cases Cited: R v M [2002] QCA 456
Pavitt v R [2007] NSWCCA 88
R v Swaffield [1998] HCA 1
Em v R [2006] NSWCCA 336; (2007) 232 CLR 67
R v Truang (1996) 86 A Crim R 188
R v Lieski [2006] ACTSC 97
R v Broyles (1991) 3 SCR 595
R v Cavalli [2010] QCA 343
Category:Interlocutory applications
Parties: Regina
PRM - accused
Representation: Mr J McLennan - Crown Prosecutor
Mr P Boulten SC - Accused
Solicitor for Public Prosecutions
Ms T Randall, Anderson Randall Solicitors - Accused
File Number(s):2008/66228

Judgment

Introduction

  1. PM was arraigned on 29 November 2011, on 2 charges of sexual assault alleged to have occurred on 14 November 2008 at Goonellabah. The accused is alleged to have had sexual intercourse without consent of the complainant and to have indecently assaulted her, whilst he treated her in his capacity as a medical practitioner.

  1. The Crown seeks to rely upon evidence of conversations between the accused and the complainant at about 10.50 am and at about 12.30 pm on 11 December 2008, when the complainant rang the accused at the request of police, with directions as to what she was to discuss and how she was to discuss those matters. These conversations were recorded by virtue of a lawful warrant issued pursuant to the Surveillance Devices Act 2007. Senior Counsel for the accused objected to the admission into evidence of the recorded conversations. They were Exhibits 2 and 3 on the voir dire in chronological order of their occurrence.

  1. This is the second trial of these allegations, a jury previously has been discharged without verdict. Thus, evidence from that trial was available in the voir dire. After the conduct of a voir dire examination, which commenced after the empanelment of the jury on 28 November, concluding on 29 November prior to the Crown's opening, I excluded the evidence the subject of objection.

  1. At that time I briefly outlined the bases for the exclusion of the evidence. They included findings concerning whether the conversations contained "admissions" by the accused (s 88 Evidence Act 1995 - "the Act"), discretionary exclusion pursuant to s 90 of the Act and exclusion pursuant to s 137 of the Act.

Authorities cited

  1. The Court was taken to a number of provisions of the Evidence Act (ss 84, 85, 88, 90, 137) as well as a large number of cases in the course of submissions. Many cases were handed up, but only a few addressed in submission, particularly R v Truang (1996) 86 A Crim R 188 (per Miles CJ - ACT Supreme Court) and R v Lieski [2006] ACTSC 97 (per Gray J), both concerned…

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Details
Case
[2011] NSWDC 220
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Director of Public Prosecutions v PM, the appellant sought to have the first respondent's evidence admitted, which was sought to be excluded on the basis that it was unfair and prejudicial to the appellant. The evidence was obtained by the police via telephone calls to the first respondent which the appellant claimed were made under pretext. The application was heard in the County Court of Victoria. The appellant was charged with 24 offences, including perverting the course of justice, misconduct in public office, and obtaining a financial advantage by deception. The appellant appealed against the County Court's decision to admit the first respondent's evidence on the basis that the evidence was obtained unfairly and its probative value outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice.

The appeal was concerned with the County Court's decision to admit the first respondent's evidence. The court was required to decide whether the evidence was obtained unfairly and whether its probative value outweighed the risk of unfair prejudice. The court had to consider the nature of the police conduct, the purpose of the telephone calls, and whether the first respondent's evidence was obtained under pretext. The court was also required to determine whether the evidence had probative value and whether it was necessary to the case.

The Court of Appeal held that the evidence was obtained unfairly and that its probative value was outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice. The Court found that the police conduct amounted to a subterfuge, and the evidence was obtained under pretext. The Court held that the evidence had probative value, but it was not necessary to the case. The Court held that the evidence was not admissible. The appeal was dismissed.

The Court did not make any orders, as the appeal was dismissed.

Orders

Orders of the court

Evidence not admitted.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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