Director of Public Prosecutions v Patterson

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SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA
COURT OF APPEAL

S EAPCR 2025 0052

DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS Applicant
v
ERIN PATTERSON Respondent

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JUDGES: EMERTON P, PRIEST and T FORREST JJA
WHERE HELD: Melbourne
DATE OF HEARING: 3 April 2025
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 17 April 2025
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: [2025] VSCA 82
JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM: R v Patterson (Ruling 6) [2025] VSC 108R (Beale J)

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CRIMINAL LAW – Interlocutory appeal – Coincidence evidence – Three charges of murder and one of attempted murder by alleged poisoning of four lunch guests – Three charges of attempted murder of husband by alleged poisoning in three preceding episodes – Whether evidence relating to alleged poisoning of lunch guests admissible to prove that husband was poisoned – Whether evidence relating to alleged poisoning of husband admissible to prove lunch guests deliberately poisoned – Whether circular reasoning – Whether charges relating to husband should be severed from those relating to lunch guests – Whether probative value of coincidence evidence substantially outweighs any prejudicial effect on the accused – Judge was correct to sever indictment – Leave to appeal refused.

Evidence Act 2008 ss 98(1), 101(2); Perry v The Queen (1982) 150 CLR 580 considered.

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Counsel

Appellant Dr N Rogers SC with Ms S Lenthall
Respondent Mr C Mandy SC with Ms S Stafford

Solicitors

Appellant Ms A Hogan, Solicitor for Public Prosecutions
Respondent Doogue + George

EMERTON P

T FORREST JA:

Introduction

  1. The respondent is charged with four counts of attempted murder (charges 1–4) and three counts of murder (charges 5–7). Charges 1, 2 and 3 relate to three separate incidents involving the respondent’s estranged husband, Simon Patterson (Events 1, 2 and 3 respectively). Charges 4, 5, 6 and 7 relate to one incident (Event 4) involving four members of Simon Patterson’s family — Gail and Donald Patterson (Simon’s parents) and Heather and Ian Wilkinson (Simon’s maternal aunt and her husband).

  2. The prosecution alleges that the respondent deliberately poisoned the five family members with meals she prepared that contained either an unknown poison or poisons (charges 1–3) or death cap mushrooms (charges 4–7).

  3. On 24 January 2024, the prosecution filed a notice of its intention to adduce coincidence evidence[1] to establish that the respondent deliberately poisoned the family members or intended to do so.

    [1]Pursuant to s 98(1)(a) of the Evidence Act 2008.

  4. Section 98(1) of the Evidence Act 2008 governs the use of coincidence evidence and relevantly provides:

    Evidence that 2 or more events occurred is not admissible to prove that a person did a particular act or had a particular state of mind on the basis that, having regard to any similarities in the events or the circumstances in which they occurred, or any similarities in both the events and the circumstances in which they occurred, it is improbable that the events occurred coincidentally unless—

    …

    (b) the court thinks that the evidence will, either by itself or having regard to other evidence adduced or to be adduced by…

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Details
Case
[2025] VSCA 82
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Director of Public Prosecutions v Patterson, the appellant, a woman, was facing charges of murder and attempted murder related to incidents of alleged poisoning. The case was heard in the Supreme Court of Victoria, where the appellant sought to appeal an interlocutory decision made by the trial judge. The key issues before the court were whether evidence relating to the alleged poisoning of four lunch guests was admissible to prove that the appellant's husband was poisoned in separate incidents, and whether evidence relating to the alleged poisoning of the husband could be used to prove that the lunch guests were deliberately poisoned. The appellant argued that the evidence presented a risk of circular reasoning and that the charges relating to her husband should be severed from those relating to the lunch guests.

The court considered whether the probative value of the coincidence evidence substantially outweighed any prejudicial effect on the appellant. It was noted that the similarities between the incidents, such as the consumption of meals prepared by the appellant and the subsequent severe gastrointestinal illnesses, provided a solid foundation for the jury to inferentially reason that the similarities were unlikely to have arisen coincidentally. The court also examined whether the trial judge had erred in assessing the probative value and prejudicial effect of the coincidence evidence. The prosecution submitted that the trial judge did not address the prejudicial effect of the first use of coincidence evidence in the ruling, while the respondent argued that the prejudicial effect of the coincidence evidence was high, particularly given the weak evidence pertaining to the incidents involving the husband.

The court found that the trial judge had correctly severed the indictment, separating the charges relating to the husband from those relating to the lunch guests. It was held that the probative value of the coincidence evidence substantially outweighed any prejudicial effect on the appellant, and therefore the evidence was admissible. The court also found that there was no circular reasoning in the use of the coincidence evidence. The appeal was dismissed, and leave to appeal was refused.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

There is no dispute that the Patterson children were not present on any of the occasions that were followed by severe gastric illnesses. The trial judge considered this to be inconsequential as it was commonplace that adults would organise to meet without children present. However, there is evidence that it was not commonplace in this family. The respondent went to some lengths to explain the absence of the children at what was otherwise a family lunch by concocting a tale about a cancer diagnosis that she needed to discuss in the absence of the children. Simon’s evidence is that after he and the respondent separated in 2015, the only times they went away together without the children were the three occasions on which he became ill.Value of the evidence Although the defence will no doubt challenge some of the evidence the prosecution puts forward to establish the similarities, particularly Simon’s evidence about Events 1 to 3, we are satisfied that the prosecution is capable of establishing most if not all of the similarities for which it contends. Taken together, these similarities provide a solid foundation for the jury to reason inferentially that it is improbable that the similarities arose coincidentally. On each occasion that the affected persons suffered severe gastrointestinal illness, their symptoms were closely preceded by a meal prepared and served by the respondent, who is known to have served poisonous meals to her guests in Event 4 and not to have been poisoned by what she served herself. There is evidence that those meals, and the meals in Events 1 to 3, were prepared and served in such a way that ensured that only the affected persons consumed them. We therefore consider that the coincidence evidence could rationally affect the assessment of the existence of facts in issue in the case to a significant extent.[23] Put another way, the coincidence evidence, if admitted, could have a significant effect on:(a)whether the illnesses suffered by the affected people were caused by consuming food prepared by the respondent; and(b)the food prepared by the respondent was poisoned; and(c)the respondent deliberately poisoned the food. The trial judge erred in assessing the probative value of the similarities in Events 1 to 4. Ground 3 is that the trial judge erred in failing to properly assess the prejudicial effect that the coincidence evidence may have on the respondent. The prosecution submits that the trial judge did not address the prejudicial effect of the first use of coincidence evidence in the Ruling. As to the second use, it is submitted that the trial judge’s assessment under s 101 conflates the legitimate, high probative value of the evidence with unfair prejudice. The pathway of reasoning which his Honour labels ‘rank propensity’ is, in fact, phrased another way, legitimate coincidence reasoning, and it would be entirely permissible for the jury to reason in this way. The respondent submits that the prejudicial effect of the coincidence evidence, namely, the risk of the jury misusing and overvaluing the evidence in their assessment of charges 1, 2 and 3, even after carefully formulated directions, is high. Moreover, directing on the different, permissible uses of the evidence and maintaining the critical importance of separate consideration, will be a difficult task. Following and applying those directions would require an unrealistic level of mental gymnastics from a jury. This is especially so when the body of evidence for Events 1, 2 and 3 is weak, while the evidence pertaining to Event 4 involves admissions and other incriminating conduct.

Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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