Director of Public Prosecutions v Librando - [2024] ACTSC 100

SUPREME COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY

Case Title:	DPP v Librando
Citation:	[2024] ACTSC 100
Hearing Date:	2 April 2024, 10 April 2024
Decision Date:	10 April 2024
Before:	Baker J
Decision:	See [63]
Catchwords:	CRIMINAL LAW – JURISDICTION, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Judgment and Punishment – Sentence – theft – obtain financial advantage by deception – offender defrauded aged care facility and three residents – Bugmy considerations – reduced moral culpability – Intensive Corrections Order imposed.
Legislation Cited:	Crimes (Sentence Administration) Act 2005 (ACT), s 42 Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT), pt 4, ss 11, 33, 35, 35A, 47, 53 Criminal Code 2002 (ACT) ss 308, 321, 332
Cases Cited:	Bugmy v The Queen [2013] HCA 37; 249 CLR 571 Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) v Dalgliesh (a pseudonym) [2017] HCA 41; 262 CLR 428 Gregurke v The Queen [2014] NTCCA 11 Johnston v R [2017] NSWCCA 53 Mooney v The Queen [2018] ACTCA 24 Paterson v R [2021] NSWCCA 273 R v Horner [2023] ACTSC 23 O'Brien v The Queen [2015] ACTCA 47; 19 ACTLR 244 R v Morris [2017] ACTSC 400 R v Mynott [2020] ACTSC 3 R v NQ [2017] ACTSC 317 R v Ok [2016] ACTSC 132 R v O'Keefe 60 A Crim R 201 R v Pham [2015] HCA 39; 256 CLR 550 R v QU [2019] ACTSC 155 R v Reid [2016] ACTSC 24 R v Riordan [2015] ACTSC 26 R v Verdins [2007] VSCA 102; 16 VR 269 ST v Whyte [2015] ACTSC 340 Wyper v R; R v Wyper [2017] ACTCA 59; 19 ACTLR 288 The Queen v Boyle (ACT Supreme Court, unreported, 12 April 2012) The Queen v Rees (ACT Supreme Court, unreported, 25 May 2011)
Parties:	Director of Public Prosecutions ( Crown) Lorey Jane Librando ( Offender)
Representation:	Counsel C Daly ( Crown) J Lo Schiavo ( Offender)
Solicitors ACT Director of Public Prosecutions Andrew Byrnes Law Group ( Offender)
File Numbers:	SCC 290 of 2023; SCC 291 of 2023

BAKER J:

Introduction

On 9 November 2023, Lorey Jane Librando, the offender, pleaded guilty in the Magistrates Court to the following offences:
(a)Count 1 (CAN4436/2023) – obtain financial advantage by deception, contrary to s 332 of the Criminal Code 2002 (ACT).
(b)Count 2 (CAN4437/2023) – theft, contrary to s 308 of the Criminal Code 2002 (ACT).
(c)Count 3 (CAN10728/2023) – theft, contrary to s 308 of the Criminal Code 2002 (ACT).
(d)Count 4 (CAN2023/4002) – minor theft, contrary to s 321 of the Criminal Code 2002 (ACT).
The offences of obtaining financial advantage by deception and theft each carry a maximum penalty of a fine of $160,000, imprisonment for 10 years, or both. The maximum penalty for the offence of minor theft contrary to s 321 of the Criminal Code 2002 (ACT) is a fine of $8,000, imprisonment for 6 months, or both.
The offender now comes before me for sentence on each charge.

Background

The offences

The facts of the offending are set out in an Agreed Statement of Facts dated 28 March 2024.
In July 2012, the offender began working at the Royal Freemasons Benevolent Institution (RFBI), also known as Kalparrin Aged Care. She was initially employed as a receptionist but was later given more responsibilities, including paying invoices for the maintenance of the nursing home. Between 2013 and early 2018, the offender’s husband was employed as a contractor to clean the nursing home hall. When processing invoices, the offender was required to stamp and sign the invoices, and subsequently provide each to the General Manager (Ms Saunders) who would co-sign each invoice. The offender would then send the signed invoices to the RFBI head office for payment and enter the details into the RFBI computer system.
Between 10 January 2018 and 9 August 2019, the offender processed 43 fraudulent invoices. She did this by creating a cut-out of the stamp with the General Manager’s signature and sending the invoices directly to the head office. The RFBI then paid the invoices into a joint bank account that the offender shared with her husband. This account was separate to the account into which her salary was paid. During this period, the offender obtained a total financial advantage of $48,512.50 from the RFBI (count 1).
On several occasions between 10 January 2019 and 1 August 2019, the offender used the EFTPOS card of an RFBI resident (the first victim), to withdraw cash without authorisation. The first victim was a resident of the RFBI due to her intellectual disability. The offender withdrew a total of $17,418.16 from the first victim’s account (count 2).
On several occasions between 3 March 2019 and 30 July 2019, the offender used the EFTPOS card of another resident (the second victim), to withdraw cash without authorisation. The offender withdrew a total of $10,631 from the second victim’s account (count 3). Between 20 March 2019 and 12 August 2019, the offender also made a series of repayments into the second victim’s bank account, totalling $8,740. The total amount obtained from the second victim was therefore $1,891. The repayments were deposited into the account prior to detection of the offences. The second victim is now deceased.
On 7 August 2019, the offender made two unauthorised withdrawals from the bank account of a third resident (the third victim), totalling $380 (count 4). The third victim’s daughter (who held the third victim’s power of attorney), noticed these two withdrawals. After learning her employer had noticed the missing funds, the offender logged a repayment on the computer system of the RFBI. It could not be confirmed if this cash repayment was in fact made. The third victim is now deceased.
CCTV footage was obtained of the ATM transactions made on 7 August 2019. The General Manager of the RFBI identified the offender in the footage and the offender was stood down from work. Upon being informed that she was to be stood down, the offender immediately expressed remorse and volunteered to go to the police herself. The General Manager then engaged a forensic accountant to conduct an audit, which then revealed the earlier offences.
The offender resigned on 15 August 2019. She participated in a Record of Interview with police on 23 March 2023. In the interview, the offender accepted responsibility for the offending. She explained that her mental health had deteriorated during her time working in aged care. She said that she used the money which she obtained to gamble, which eased her emotional distress.
The police investigation into the offences was delayed due to COVID-19 and charges were not laid until 24 May 2023.

Subjective Circumstances

Personal background

The offender has had a difficult and traumatic upbringing, which was outlined in an Intensive Corrections Order Assessment Report (ICOAR) and in a psychological assessment report by Ms Leesa Morris, forensic psychologist. The offender was born and raised in the Philippines. She has one full-sister, two half-sisters and one half-brother. Her mother died by suicide when she was three to four years of age. The offender’s sister then went to live with their grandmother and the offender was raised by her father and stepmother.
The offender described her childhood as “unhappy, violent and abusive”. She reported being subject to neglect and physical abuse in the family home. Her father abused alcohol. The offender was told that her “mother killed herself because she didn’t love [her]”. The offender left the family home at 18 years of age.
The offender described being physically abused by her partner in her first significant relationship, which was when she was between 16 and 18 years of age. In her second significant relationship, the offender’s partner left when he found out she was pregnant. The offender initially left her baby with her father and stepmother so that she could work to support her child. The offender met her husband when she was 25 years old. They had a son together, who is now 13 years old. The offender’s elder son is now 15 years old.

Education and Employment

The offender described her schooling in positive terms, but also reported being bullied at school for her torn and dirty clothes, as well as attending classes hungry. Following Year 12, the offender received a scholarship and obtained a Bachelor of Business, which is her highest level of education to date.
The offender has been consistently employed. She was required to support her father and stepmother financially from the time she joined the workforce, including by funding her half-siblings’ education. As a result, she often worked in multiple roles at the same time. The offender became an Australian citizen in 2012 and worked in a taxi call centre, before entering aged care work from 2014 to 2018.
Since leaving aged care work, the offender has worked in a contact centre for approximately four years. In 2022, she was the recipient of an award from the CEO for outstanding contribution to the business. She also works as a Menulog driver to earn extra income, stating she and her partner were “behind on [their] mortgage because of [her] wrongdoing”.

Mental Health

In her interview with the ICOAR authors, the offender disclosed multiple past attempts of self-harm and suicide but reported it had been two to three years since any attempts at self-harm.
A psychological assessment of the offender was conducted on 31 October 2023 by Ms Morris, forensic psychologist. Ms Morris noted that the offender suffers from complex Post Traumatic Stress Disorder arising from her childhood and distress from her mother’s death. She reported the offender has engaged in “long term avoidant behaviours and cognitive patterns to manage … [these] symptoms.” She stated the offender had also developed a Persistent Depressive Disorder from at least her teenage years. Ms Morris expressed the opinion that the offender’s trauma condition was aggravated while working in aged care. Ms Morris considered that the offender’s problematic gambling was a coping mechanism and, in this way, “a symptom of her trauma condition, rather than a separate gambling disorder”.
The offender had never attended psychological counselling prior to her offending. However, in the last few years, the offender has attended ACT Mental Health, gambling support services and Relationships Australia. The offender reported improvements after undergoing therapeutic intervention. Despite these improvements, Ms Morris is of the opinion that the offender’s trauma condition is permanent and that she will remain susceptible to further triggers.

Character references

The offender tendered three character references, from her husband, sister, and a co-worker and friend. The offender’s husband described her as “a very selfless person who puts everyone first before herself”. He stated he had seen her cry many times at the deaths of residents at the RFBI. He reports that the offender deeply regrets her betrayal of their trust. The offender’s husband noted the “extraordinary steps” that the offender has taken to address her gambling problem and mental health issues.
The offender’s sister outlined the offender’s difficult childhood, recalling their father and stepmother had hit and yelled at the offender and that they also “mocked her”, saying that “[their] mother committed suicide because she did not love us”. The offender’s sister commended the offender on her perseverance and achievements despite this hardship, including excelling at school and financially supporting three half-siblings. She stated the offender had taken full responsibility for her actions and that she was focused on “rehabilitating herself by reconnecting with her faith and embracing nature …”.
The offender’s co-worker described the offender’s success at work and her dedication to her family, describing her as “reliable and humble”. She noted she had personally witnessed the positive changes the offender had made in her life since the offending and that she had pledged her continuing support for the offender.

Letter from the offender

In a letter to the Court, the offender apologised to the victims of the offences and to Kalparrin Aged Care for her betrayal of their trust and the “immense financial loss” they have suffered as a result. She said that she is “embarrassed and ashamed beyond words” and that she has taken full responsibility for her actions. The offender explained that she accepts that she lied to her husband, neglected her children, drained their life savings and almost lost their house. She said that she fears that her criminal conviction would lead her to lose her job. The offender stated she has sought professional help since the charges were laid and has found the counselling sessions to be very helpful. She stated that she has made numerous donations to mental health organisations and “will do all that [she] can to pay [her] dues to the Kalparrin facility and its … residents”.

Loss of employment

I was informed by the prosecutor and the offender’s solicitor that the offender has, in fact, since lost her job following adverse media publicity concerning these sentence proceedings.

Victim Impact Statement

The prosecution also tendered a Victim Impact Statement from Ms Saunders, the General Manager of the RFBI. The offender’s counsel objected to the admission of this statement. He contended that Ms Saunders does not satisfy the definition of “victim” in s 47 of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT), which states:
victim, of an offence, means—
(a)a person (a primary victim) who suffers harm because of the offence; or
(b)if a primary victim dies because of the offence—a person who was financially or psychologically dependent on the primary victim immediately before the primary victim’s death.
The definition of “victim” must be read together with the definition of “harm” in the same provision, which states:
harm includes—
(c)physical injury; and
(d)mental injury or emotional suffering (including grief); and
(e)pregnancy; and
(f)economic loss; and
(g)substantial impairment of rights accorded by law.
As is apparent from the above, the category of persons who may make a victim impact statement under Part 4.3 of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act is very broad. It includes any person who has “suffered harm” because of the offence. Such harm is not limited to physical injury, but also includes economic loss, mental injury and emotional suffering.
Ms Saunders is not only the General Manager of the entity which the offender defrauded. She is also the person whose signature the offender effectively forged when she created a stamp which she used to secure payments to her husband’s account. The creation of the stamp of Ms Saunders’ signature shares common features with identity theft. It is entirely understandable that a person whose signature has been used, without their permission, may suffer from feelings of violation and vulnerability, embarrassment and shame. Where the person who used the signature without permission is a close co-worker, those feelings are likely to be heightened by the breach of trust. Such responses are well within the “emotional suffering” that is contemplated by s 47.
I received the victim impact statement on a provisional basis to rule on the objection made by the offender’s counsel. In that statement, Ms Saunders discloses that she has “developed paranoia” since the offending and has become “suspicious of others”. She described how the offending has impacted upon her self-esteem, and how the constant vigilance which has resulted from the offending has increased her anxiety and self-doubt. She concluded, “my health and wellbeing have been affected since discovering what [the offender] had been doing to innocent, trusting older people and her employer”.
It is clear from the statement that Ms Saunders has suffered emotional harm because of the offences. Accordingly, I admitted her statement into evidence in the sentence proceedings. I have taken into account the statement in accordance with s 53 of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act.

Determination

The offences are serious. As the prosecutor submitted, the offence of obtaining a financial advantage by deception occurred over an extended 19 month period. The offender obtained $48,512.50 during the course of her deception. Whilst the offending was not particularly sophisticated, the duration of the offending, the large number of invoices generated and paid (that is, 43), combined with the methods used (the creation of a stamp replicating the General Manager’s signature and the use of plausible reasons for payment into an account belonging to the offender’s husband that had been legitimately paid into in the past) is clear demonstration of planning and deliberation in the offences.
The two theft offences and the minor theft offence were also serious charges of their kind. The two theft charges involved two residents of the aged care facility in which the offender worked. The offender stole a total of $17,418.16 from one resident over a period of almost seven months. The offender stole $10,631 from the other resident over a period of almost six months (although, as mentioned above, $8,740 of this was repaid, leaving a total of $1,891). The minor theft was of a lesser amount, namely $380, from a third resident. It is unclear whether this amount was repaid. All three residents were vulnerable. Each of them lacked agency of their own. They relied on paid staff of the aged care facility to assist them. The first resident was particularly vulnerable. She has an intellectual disability and did not have a power of attorney at the time of the offences. The offender was well aware of the vulnerability of each of these residents.
As the offender’s counsel properly accepted, the offences involved a significant breach of trust: see similarly O’Keefe v R (1992) 60 A Crim R 201. The offender had been an employee of the RFBI for a number of years prior to the offending. She was the person primarily responsible for the company’s finances, and was afforded a high level of responsibility and trust, both by the company and by the residents. She abused this trust.
I am required to consider the offender’s background and mental condition, and to consider the relationship between the offending and these matters: see s 33(1)(m) of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act. As outlined above, the offender had a difficult and traumatic background, particularly following the death of her mother by suicide. Ms Morris, forensic psychologist, is of the opinion that the offender has met the criteria for a persistent depressive disorder since her teenage years. The offender also has symptoms of complex Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder PTSD, which became exacerbated by her time working in aged care. Specifically, the death of aging residents at the facility was a constant reminder of the circumstances in which the offender’s mother had died and the responsibility which she felt for that death. As a result, the offender’s intrusive thoughts of self-harm intensified.
The prosecutor accepted that the offender’s background was such as to give rise to Bugmy considerations, and that the offender’s moral culpability was reduced by reason of her deprived upbringing: Bugmy v the Queen [2013] HCA 37; 249 CLR 571 at [40] – [44]. However, the prosecutor contended that the offender’s mental illnesses were not such as to reduce her moral culpability or that other Verdins considerations (such as the relevance of mental illness to hardship in custody) were enlivened: R v Verdins [2007] VSCA 102; 16 VR 269 at [32].
I accept that the offender’s mental illnesses are relevant to whether “a given sentence will weigh more heavily on the offender than it would on a person in normal health” and that they are relevant to whether “there is a serious risk of imprisonment having a significant adverse effect on the offender’s mental health”: Verdins at [32]. In this respect, I note Ms Morris’ unchallenged evidence that the efficacy of the offender’s trauma treatment would be significantly diminished if the offender were to be sentenced to a full-time period of imprisonment.

The fact that the offending was related to the offender’s gambling addiction does not, of itself, reduce the offender’s culpability for the offending: Johnston v R [2017] NSWCCA 53 at [36] and the cases cited therein. However, an assessment of the offender’s moral culpability requires a broader contextual understanding of the circumstances in which the offending arose.
In the present case, the offender’s traumatic upbringing is directly related to her mental illnesses (symptoms of PTSD and depression). In this way, Bugmy considerations are inextricably related to Verdins considerations: see similarly R v Horner [2023] ACTSC 23 at [29]. These interrelated features of the offender’s subjective case are relevant to the assessment of the offender’s moral culpability for the offences. Specifically, as noted above, Ms Morris made the following observations in her report:
[The offender’s] reports indicate that she had significant reduced ability to reason and consider her conduct and its impact on others at the time. Her entire focus was in avoiding her emotional distress and suicidal thinking, and this was facilitated by gambling. In such an aroused state of ‘fight or flight’, [the offender’s] thoughts would have been specific to her survival.
Contrary to the prosecutor’s submission, it is not necessary for the offender to demonstrate that she had no awareness of the wrongfulness of her conduct for a finding of reduced moral culpability to be made. If the evidence demonstrated such a complete lack of awareness, the offender would be entitled to a finding of not guilty by reason of mental impairment: s 28 of the Criminal Code.
Rather, principles concerning reduced moral culpability both in the Bugmy and Verdins context recognise that a person may, whilst criminally liable for their conduct, be less “worthy of blame” than other offenders whose capacity to understand the consequences of their actions is not adversely affected by their background or mental illness: see similarly R v Paterson [2021] NSWCCA 273 at [209]. In view of the evidence of Ms Morris, I accept that the offender’s moral culpability for her offending is reduced to an extent. It is important to emphasise though that this finding does not excuse the offending. It remains the case that the offender abused the trust that was placed in her by the aged care facility in which she worked, and that she stole significant sums from vulnerable residents who relied on her integrity. The sentence to be imposed must denounce this conduct.
The offender’s counsel drew my attention to evidence in the Agreed Statement of Facts that the offender had repaid various sums of the funds that she had stolen prior to the detection of the offending (see at [9] and [10] above). He contended that these repayments were strong evidence of remorse and that they constituted “reparation” for the loss or damage resulting from the offences. The prosecutor opposed such a finding. She submitted that the circumstances in which the repayments were made were an aspect of the offender’s deception, and that the repayments were made by the offender in the hope of avoiding detection.
I am not satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the offender’s repayments stemmed from remorse. They are equally consistent with the offender hoping to avoid detection. It follows that I am not satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the payments were made as “reparation”, such that s 33(1)(h) of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act applies. However, I am also not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the repayments were deliberately made by the offender to avoid detection. The circumstances in which the repayments were made are not sufficient to demonstrate this aggravating factor beyond reasonable doubt.
However, little turns on this. As outlined above, it is clear that there was a degree of planning in the offences. I am also satisfied on the basis of other evidence that the offender is remorseful. In particular, the offender’s remorse is readily demonstrated in her letter to the Court, the character references tendered on her behalf, the psychological report of Ms Morris, and in her pleas of guilty. Further, regardless of the offender’s motive for making the repayments, those repayments are relevant to the assessment of the nature and circumstances of the offending, and to a consideration of the harm that was occasioned to each of the victims.
Having regard to the offender’s remorse, prior good character and proactive efforts to address her gambling addiction and mental illnesses, I am satisfied that the offender has good prospects of rehabilitation.
As noted above, the offender has lost her job since the offending and since her plea of guilty in this court. I accept the prosecutor’s submission that this does not adversely affect her prospects of rehabilitation. I do not accept the offender’s submission that it amounts to extra curial punishment that should mitigate the sentence to be imposed. The loss of employment is a natural consequence of offending of this nature.
In determining the sentence to be imposed, I have taken into account the comparative cases provided to be on behalf of the prosecution and the offender, namely R v Reid [2016] ACTSC 24; R v Morris [2017] ACTSC 400; R v NQ [2017] ACTSC 317; R v Ok [2016] ACTSC 132; R v QU [2019] ACTSC 155; Gregurke v The Queen [2014] NTCCA 11; Mooney v The Queen [2018] ACTCA 24; R v Mynott [2020] ACTSC 3; R v Riordan [2015] ACTSC 26; ST v Whyte [2015] ACTSC 340; The Queen v Boyle (ACT Supreme Court, unreported, 12 April 2012); The Queen v Rees (ACT Supreme Court, unreported, 25 May 2011). I have however, borne in mind the limitations of these cases, which concern offending and offenders with different objective and subjective characteristics to the offender. I have also borne in mind that sentences imposed in comparative cases illustrate, but do not define, the possible range of sentences available, and cannot cap the sentencing discretion: R v Pham [2015] HCA 39; 256 CLR 550 at 560 [29]; Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) v Dalgliesh (a pseudonym) [2017] HCA 41; 262 CLR 428 at 445 [51] – [53].
The offender pleaded guilty to all charges in the Magistrates Court. The prosecutor properly accepted that the pleas were entered at a very early opportunity, and accepted that a full discount should be afforded for each of the offences, other than the theft, which, she contended, was an overwhelming case. I am not satisfied the theft case was overwhelming. I will afford a 25% discount in respect of the offender’s guilty plea pursuant to ss 33(1)(j) and 35 of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act. Contrary to the submissions made on behalf of the offender, I do not accept that there should be any further discount for assistance to law enforcement authorities pursuant to s 35A of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act. At least some of the offending had already been detected at the time that she made her admissions. The full discount for the guilty plea will be ample to reflect the utilitarian value of her admissions.
For the reasons outlined above, the offending conduct was serious. Despite some reduction of the offender’s moral culpability arising from her background and mental illnesses, general deterrence and the need to make the offender accountable for her actions remain important considerations. I am satisfied that the s 10 threshold is crossed, and that no sentence other than imprisonment is appropriate.
However, it remains necessary to consider the form of the custody that should be imposed. A sentence of imprisonment may be served in the community by way of a suspended sentence or an Intensive Correction Order (ICO). I do not consider that a suspended sentence would suffice to meet the purposes of sentencing in this case.
However, the offender has been assessed as suitable for an ICO. Whilst an ICO is unquestionably a less punitive order than a sentence of full-time detention, it remains a form of imprisonment, to which onerous conditions may attach. As the Court of Appeal held in Wyper v R; R v Wyper [2017] ACTCA 59; 19 ACTLR 288 at [128] – [129], an ICO is a “sentence of last resort before full-time imprisonment”. Such orders are:
… designed to be punitive while still allowing the courts to incorporate elements of rehabilitation… It is flexible … but still sufficiently structured to ensure every order places appropriate demands on an offender.
The prosecution did not submit that the offending required the offender to serve a period of full-time imprisonment.
Particularly where the offender’s moral culpability is reduced for the reasons described above, and where the offender’s experience of custody would be experienced more harshly by reason of her mental illnesses, I am satisfied that it is not necessary for a term of full-time imprisonment to be imposed to satisfy the need for punishment, general and specific deterrence, and accountability. An ICO, particularly with onerous community service requirements, will achieve those sentencing purposes.
Further, as outlined above, I am satisfied that the offender has good prospects of rehabilitation. The facilitation of the offender’s continued rehabilitation is also a significant consideration in the present case. Finally, the delay in the commencement of the proceedings, whilst not the fault of the AFP or the prosecution, is a further consideration in favour of imposing a community-based sentence at this time.
Accordingly, I am satisfied that it is appropriate to order that the offender serve her term of imprisonment by way of an ICO.
The sentences to be imposed must take account of principles of totality. Whilst the offending occurred over largely the same period, the offences involved different victims. It is necessary for the sentences imposed to recognise the separate criminality involved in each offence and to recognise the separate harm occasioned to each individual victim. For this reason, the sentences to be imposed will be partially accumulated: see O'Brien v The Queen [2015] ACTCA 47; 19 ACTLR 244 at [26].
The offender’s counsel submitted that an overall sentence of no more than 14 months, to be suspended or served by ICO, would be appropriate. I do not agree. I consider that the offending is of such seriousness that an overall sentence of significantly in excess of 14 months is required. However, as mentioned, I am satisfied that the sentence to be imposed can be appropriately served by way of an ICO.
The sentences I will impose are as follows:
(a)Count 1 (CAN4436/2023) – obtain financial advantage by deception: 2 years’ imprisonment, reduced to 1 year and 6 months’ imprisonment as a result of the offender’s guilty plea, commencing on 10 April 2024 and expiring on 9 October 2025.
(b)Count 2 (CAN4437/2023) – theft: 1 years and 6 months’ imprisonment, reduced to 1 year, 1 month and 15 days’ imprisonment as a result of the offender’s guilty plea, commencing on 18 May 2025 and expiring on 2 July 2026.
(c)Count 3 (CAN10728/2023) – theft: 1 years and 6 months’ imprisonment, reduced to 1 year, 1 month and 15 days’ imprisonment as a result of the offender’s guilty plea, commencing on 11 February 2026 and expiring on 25 March 2027.
(d)Count 4 (CAN2023/4002) – minor theft: 1 month’ imprisonment, reduced to 23 days’ imprisonment as a result of the offender’s guilty plea, commencing on 18 March 2027 and expiring on 9 April 2027.
The total effective sentence will be 3 years’ imprisonment to be served by way of an ICO.
Section 11 of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act provides:
11 Intensive correction orders
…
(2)The court may make an intensive correction order if the sentence of imprisonment is for more than 2 years but not more than 4 years, but only if the court considers it is appropriate to do so, having regard to—
(a)the level of harm to the victim and the community caused by the offence; and
(b)whether the offender poses a risk to 1 or more people or the community; and
(c)the offender’s culpability for the offence having regard to all the circumstances.
As outlined above, I have carefully considered each of these matters, and in particular, the level of harm to the victim and community and the offender’s culpability. I do not consider that the offender poses a risk to the community. For the reasons set out above, I am satisfied that the imposition of a ICO is appropriate in the circumstances.

Orders

The orders of the Court will be as follows:
(1)In respect of Count 1 (CAN4436/2023) – obtain financial advantage by deception, the offender is convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 1 year and 6 months, commencing on 10 April 2024 and expiring on 9 October 2025.
(2)In respect of Count 2 (CAN4437/2023) – theft, the offender is convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 1 year, 1 month and 15 days, commencing on 18 May 2025 and expiring on 2 July 2026.
(3)In respect of Count 3 (CAN10728/2023) – theft, the offender is convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 1 year, 1 month and 15 days, commencing on 11 February 2026 and expiring on 25 March 2027.
(4)In respect of Count 4 (CAN2023/4002) – minor theft, the offender is convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 23 days, commencing on 18 March 2027 and expiring on 9 April 2027.
(5)The total effective sentence is a term of imprisonment of 3 years.
(6)I order that those sentences be served by way of an Intensive Correction Order subject to the core conditions listed in s 42 of the Crimes (Sentence Administration) Act 2005 (ACT) and the following additional conditions under s 11(5) of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT):
(a)That the offender engage in gambling addiction programs and psychological counselling as directed by ACT Corrective Services; and
(b)That the offender perform 100 hours of community service within 12 months.

I certify that the preceding sixty-three [63] numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Sentence of her Honour Justice Baker

Associate:

Date: 10 April 2024