Director of Public Prosecutions v KS (a pseudonym) (No 2)
[2023] ACTSC 298
•23 October 2023
SUPREME COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY
Case Title:
DPP v KS (a pseudonym) (No 2)
Citation:
[2023] ACTSC 298
Hearing Date:
29 September 2023
Decision Date:
23 October 2023
Before:
McCallum CJ
Decision:
Drug and Alcohol Treatment Order made.
Catchwords:
CRIMINAL LAW – JURISDICTION, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Judgment and Punishment – sentence – breach offences – unauthorised possession of firearms – unlawful possession of stolen property – joint commission minor theft – driving without consent – unauthorised use of firearm – burglary – arson – aggravated dangerous driving – driving while disqualified – where some offences committed with co-offenders – principle of parity – where offender has strong subjective considerations – early introduction to drugs by family member – where offending stems from drug addiction – youthful offender – appropriate weight to rehabilitation
Legislation Cited:
Crimes (Sentence Administration) Act 2005 (ACT) ss 85, 110
Criminal Code 2002 (ACT) ss 45A, 308, 311, 318(2), 321, 324, 361(1), 404(1)
Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) ss 26, 35A, 160
Firearms Act 1996 (ACT) ss 5(1), 43(1)(a)(iii)
Magistrates Court Act 1930 (ACT) s 90B
Road Transport (Safety and Traffic Management) Act 1999 (ACT) s7(1)
Road Transport (Drive Licensing) Act 1999 (ACT) s 32(2)(a)
Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) ss 10, 12(3), 12A, 17, 57, 80W, 80Y, 80ZA, 118
Cases Cited:
DPP v CR (a pseudonym) [2023] ACTSC 293
DPP v DB (a pseudonym) [2023] ACTSC 294
Green v The Queen; Quinn v The Queen [2011] HCA 49; 244 CLR 462
Hogan v Hinch [2011] HCA 4; 243 CLR 506
R v KS [2022] ACTSC 133; 18 ACTLR 160
R v KS; R v KN; R v KI (No 2) [2021] ACTSC 23
R v Mack; Mack v R [2009] NSWCCA 216
Parties:
Director of Public Prosecutions
KS (a pseudonym) ( Offender)
Representation:
Counsel
C Diggins ( DPP)
J McGuire ( Offender)
Solicitors
ACT Director of Public Prosecutions
Paul Edmonds & Associates ( Offender)
File Numbers:
SCC 108 of 2020
SCC 109 of 2020
SCC 110 of 2020
SCC 59 of 2022
SCC 60 of 2022
SCC 346 of 2022
SCC 347 of 2022
SCC 177 of 2023
SCC 178 of 2023
McCALLUM CJ:
1․KS (a pseudonym) is before the Court to be sentenced for three series of offences committed over a period of about a year from June 2021 to June 2022. He is also to be resentenced for offences committed when he was a young person. For those offences, he was originally sentenced by Loukas-Karlsson J to terms of imprisonment which were suspended from the date of her Honour’s sentence and five good behaviour orders were imposed.
2․In November last year, I cancelled the good behaviour orders attached to those sentences and was due to resentence the offender in February this year before the further charges emerged.
3․A schedule of all offences, including offences to be taken into account and transferred charges, is attached to this judgment.
The offences
Breach offences
4․It is convenient to begin with the offences committed earliest in time, being the offences for which the offender is to be resentenced. I will refer to those as the breach offences.
5․The offender was one of a number of young persons involved in a riot at the Bimberi Youth Justice Centre on 26 August 2019. He was then aged 17 years.
6․As a result of the events of that day, he pleaded guilty to offences of conspiring to escape from lawful custody, common assault, affray, and two offences of knowingly resisting a Territory official.
7․He was sentenced for those offences by Loukas-Karlsson J on 15 February 2021: R v KS; R v KN; R v KI (No 2) [2021] ACTSC 23. For three of the offences, he was sentenced to terms of imprisonment. Those sentences were suspended immediately. Upon suspending the sentences, her Honour made a good behaviour order for each offence, as required under s 12(3) of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT). Two stand-alone good behaviour orders were imposed for the other two offences. In each case, the term of the good behaviour order was 18 months expiring on 15 August 2022. The facts of those offences are set out in her Honour’s judgment at paragraphs [9]-[40]. I will not repeat them here but have of course had regard to them.
8․The sentences of imprisonment imposed by her Honour were as follows (at [168]-[170]):
168.In respect of the offence of conspiring to escape from custody (CH 1107/2019), the young person is sentenced to a term of 10 months of imprisonment, commencing on 26 August 2020 and expiring on 25 June 2021.
169. In respect of the offence of common assault (CH 1103/2019), the young person is sentenced to a term of five months of imprisonment, commencing on 26 May 2021 and expiring on 25 October 2021.
170.In respect of the offence of knowingly resist a territory official (CH 1105/2019), the young person is sentenced to a term of two months and two weeks of imprisonment, commencing on 12 September 2021 and expiring on 25 November 2021.
9․The total effective sentence was accordingly a period of imprisonment for 15 months.
Series one offences – possession of firearms
10․I will turn to deal with the series one offences.
11․On 22 June 2021, just four months after the offender was sentenced by Loukas-Karlsson J, police executed a search warrant at his home and found a large, padlocked toolbox containing two rifles and a rifle scope. Those items were later identified as part of a larger haul of firearms and related items that had been stolen from a private gun safe in a burglary committed some time earlier. It is not alleged that the offender was involved in the burglary or theft of any of those items.
12․On 25 November 2021, following forensic examination of the firearms, the offender was arrested and charged with unauthorised possession of firearms and possession of property reasonably suspected of being stolen or otherwise unlawfully obtained. He was granted bail the following day.
13․The offender pleaded guilty to those offences in the Magistrates Court on 4 March 2022. He was committed to this Court for sentence on the offence of unauthorised possession of firearms, which carries a maximum penalty of five years imprisonment. The related offence of possession of suspected stolen property was transferred to this Court at the same time, as required by s 90B of the Magistrates Court Act 1930 (ACT). That offence carried a maximum penalty of imprisonment for six months.
14․The commission of those offences constituted a breach of each of the five good behaviour orders imposed by Loukas-Karlsson J.
15․On 29 April 2022, the offender came before me to be sentenced for the firearms offences and dealt with for the breach. On 20 May 2022, I ordered a Griffiths remand, standing the matters over to 18 November 2022: R v KS [2022] ACTSC 133; 18 ACTLR 160. That course was not opposed by the prosecution.
16․A Griffiths remand is a sentencing option recognised at common law in which the court in effect postpones sentencing to afford an offender the opportunity to continue on a path of rehabilitation in the community. The court then has the opportunity to consider the offender’s conduct during a lengthy period of remand when passing sentence. It was not strictly necessary in the circumstances to state the penalties the offender might receive according to whether he did or did not comply with his good behaviour obligations: cf s 118 of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act. I did however indicate that, if there were further breaches, the offender could expect to be sentenced to a term of imprisonment for at least six months whereas, if the course of the remand was favourable, he should expect that he would not be sentenced to a term of full-time imprisonment.
17․In the meantime, the offender committed further offences, referred to as the series two offences.
Series two offences – driving a stolen vehicle and failure to pay for fuel
18․In separate incidents in April 2022, a Toyota Fortuna and a Holden Astra had been stolen from residences in Canberra. On 21 April 2022, the offender and a young female were captured on closed-circuit television footage using the Toyota when they stopped for fuel at a petrol station in Belconnen. At that point, the Toyota bore the registration plates belonging to the Holden. The offender drove off without paying $89 for the fuel obtained. On 3 May 2022, the offender and a young female were again captured in CCTV footage in that vehicle at a petrol station. On this occasion, they left without paying for $97 worth of fuel.
19․The offender was charged with two offences of driving a motor vehicle without consent, each carrying a maximum penalty of imprisonment for five years, and two offences of joint commission minor theft for the stolen petrol, each carrying a maximum penalty of imprisonment for six months. Again, it is not alleged that the offender was involved in the original theft of the motor vehicles.
Series three offences – offences committed with two co-offenders
20․Turning to the series three offences, as already noted, I ordered the Griffiths remand on 20 May 2022. Within less than two months after that date, the offender had committed multiple further offences, mostly in company with two other men.
21․The three offenders were arraigned on a joint indictment filed in Court on 11 July 2023 that included the seven offences to which the offender pleaded guilty. The two co-offenders were sentenced by Taylor J on 18 October 2023: DPP v CR (a pseudonym) [2023] ACTSC 293; DPP v DB (a pseudonym) [2023] ACTSC 294.
22․The offender is being dealt with separately because the sentences for which I ordered the Griffiths remand remain to be finalised, having been adjourned earlier this year so that all the offender’s outstanding matters could be dealt with together.
23․In her comprehensive and helpful submissions, counsel for the prosecution identified seven separate incidents of offending within the series three offences.
24․The offender was not involved in the first incident.
25․The facts of the second incident may be summarised as follows. On about 3 or 4 July 2022, the other two co-offenders entered an unlocked home in Dunlop and stole house keys, car keys, a handbag and a bottle of whiskey. They took a Ford Focus from the driveway of the home, which was later captured on CCTV footage arriving at the offender’s house.
26․The offender is not charged with the burglary or the theft. However, police obtained a video of the offender taken on the phone of one of the co-offenders. The footage was played at the proceedings on sentence. It shows the offender sitting in the driver’s seat of the Ford Focus holding a shortened double-barrel shotgun. He says, “[t]hey call me Uncle Big Mac”, points the firearm out of the driver’s seat window and discharges the firearm twice. The car appears to be in a rural area.
27․The first shot was aimed up in the air but the firearm was lowered before the second shot and that shot was aimed at a more dangerous trajectory, closer to the ground. The lowering of the firearm appears to be due to the force of the first shot or the weight of the firearm, rather than any deliberate act of aiming the firearm in any particular direction. It was nonetheless a dangerous act.
28․Those are the facts relied upon to establish the offences of driving a motor vehicle without consent (count 7 on the indictment) and unauthorised use of a firearm (count 8), together with a transferred charge of driving while suspended, as the offender’s licence had been suspended since 20 May 2022.
29․The facts of the third incident are as follows. At some point later that evening, the three offenders entered the residence of a father and son in Monash and stole car keys, a Tag Heuer wristwatch, prescription glasses, $1,500 in cash and an iPad. They drove away in an Audi A5 stolen from the premises. The co-offenders filmed themselves driving the car at around 4:00am. At one point, either that night or the next day, the offender drove the Audi to his residence and picked up one of the co-offenders who can be seen on CCTV footage. Those facts are relied on for the principal charge of burglary (count 9).
30․The offender asks the Court to take into account further offences on a schedule in sentencing him for this offence, as allowed under s 57 of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act. In R v Carberry [2022] ACTSC 208 at [94]-[95], Refshauge AJ explained the process for taking matters into account as follows (the sentence was later overturned but the statement of principle remains sound):
94.The offence, however, is not one for which a conviction must be entered or a sentence imposed. Under Part 4.4 of the Sentencing Act, it is an offence to be taken into account. Having been taken into account, no proceedings may be started or continued in relation to such an offence. The offender, however, must admit his or her guilt for the offence. The prosecution must consent to the offence or offences being taken into account.
95.The way in which the offence is taken into account has, for this territory, been set out in R v Campbell [2010] ACTCA 20 at [46]-[50]. In summary, the penalty for the primary offence or offences will be affected because the commission of the additional offence or offences is taken into account. Subject to the limitation of the sentence for the primary offence, which must not exceed the maximum that the Court could have imposed for the principal offence, it is likely to make for a more severe sentence especially as punishment and personal deterrence will be given greater weight than otherwise they may have been given. Taking the offence into account is the same as taking any other relevant factor into account, especially those set out in s 33(1) of the Sentencing Act.
31․The offences on the schedule are an offence of driving the Audi motor vehicle without consent and two offences of theft relating to the stolen property of both the father and son. The co-offenders are charged with the same schedule offences. The offender is also to be dealt with for a transferred offence of driving while suspended relating to this incident.
32․The facts of the fourth incident are as follows. The next evening, 5 July 2022 at around 1:00am, the offender and the co-offenders set fire to the Ford. Showing an enviable capacity to live in the moment unburdened by the fear of being brought to a reckoning, one of the co-offenders filmed that event. His videos depict the men standing around the Ford before apparently striking it from the outside while fire starts to burn inside the cabin. The three men left the stolen Ford on fire, driving away in the stolen Audi. These facts constitute the offences of arson.
33․The facts of the fifth incident are as follows. About an hour later, police observed the stolen Audi and another car. The offender was driving the Audi at the time. Police began to follow the two cars. As police attempted to overtake them, the offender veered the Audi suddenly into the overtaking lane, blocking the police car, then swerved back and forth between lanes. Police activated their lights and sirens. The offender turned in a roundabout and sped away over the speed limit. Police lost sight of the Audi at that point. However, police in a different patrol car later saw the offender driving more than 120 kilometres an hour in an 80 kilometre an hour speed zone.
34․This driving constitutes the offence of aggravated dangerous driving. The aggravated factors are driving at speed, failing to stop for police and dangerously driving towards someone. However, I note that the offender was not charged with driving at police, a significantly more serious offence.
35․At around 2:00pm later that day, the Audi was seized by police about 300 metres from the offender’s residence.
36․The facts of the sixth incident are as follows. On 12 July 2022 at about 2:00am, the offender was again filmed driving, this time a Subaru, with the two co-offenders as passengers. Later that morning at around 4:30am, a man in Lyneham was hit with a baseball bat during the theft of his Audi RS5. The offender is not charged with that burglary or the assault on the victim. However, the next day, the offender was filmed driving that stolen Audi. He was charged with a further offence of driving a motor vehicle without consent and two offences of driving while suspended on the basis of this incident.
37․The facts of the last incident involving the offender are as follows.
38․Late on the evening of 18 July 2022, the co-offenders broke into another home and stole two French bulldogs and another Audi, this time an RS4. Again, the offender is not alleged to have been involved in this burglary but he was later filmed driving the stolen car. For that, he was charged with further offences of driving a motor vehicle without consent and driving while suspended.
39․On the afternoon of 20 July 2022, the offender and one of the co-offenders were involved in an altercation at the South Point Shopping Centre carpark where the victim was punched and kicked before the offender drove the co-offender away in the Audi RS4. For that offence, he was charged with affray on the basis that he drove the car while the co-offender was the primary assailant. He was also charged with driving while suspended. The offender was later seen by police driving through red lights, for which he was charged with a further offence of driving while suspended.
40․In summary, in series three the offender stands to be sentenced for seven indictable offences (one of which also carries the three offences on a schedule) and eight offences that have been transferred to this Court under s 90B of the Magistrates Court Act, being the seven offences of driving while suspended and one offence of affray.
41․Inevitably, all three offenders were arrested. The offender was arrested on the evening of 21 July 2022. His bail was revoked the following day, on 22 July 2022. He has remained in custody since that date, a period of some 18 months.
Procedural history
42․On 18 November 2022, the breach proceedings came back before me. On that date, the good behaviour orders made upon the suspension of the sentences imposed by Loukas-Karlsson J were cancelled, as required under s 110(2) of the Crimes (Sentencing Administration) Act 2005 (ACT). That section provides that, if satisfied of a breach:
(2)The court must cancel the good behaviour order and either—
(a) impose the suspended sentence imposed for the offence; or
(b) re-sentence the offender for the offence.
43․At that time, at the request of the offender’s counsel, I ordered that the offender be assessed for admission to the Drug and Alcohol Sentencing List.
44․When the proceedings next came before me in February 2023, the offender had been assessed as unsuitable for a Drug and Alcohol Treatment Order (DATO) but only on the basis that he did not have a suitable place to live in the ACT at that time.
45․In the assessment report prepared by Community Corrections, the authors said that, in light of the offender’s history of breaching previous community-based orders, they had some concerns about his ability to comply with another order at the time. However, they further noted that, whilst his history is concerning, it is not considered a significant enough basis to render him unsuitable for a DATO. As to accommodation, the authors of the report said it is considered that a lack of suitable stable accommodation would render his ability to comply with the intensive requirements of a DATO untenable.
46․In any event, the offender at that stage sought to have the continuation of the breach hearing vacated to await the determination of his other outstanding matters. On 5 and 7 June 2023, the offender entered pleas of guilty to the series two offences in the Magistrates Court. On 11 July 2023, he pleaded guilty in this Court to the series three offences.
47․Due to the time that had elapsed between listings and the significant number of offences to be dealt with, an updated Drug and Alcohol Sentence List assessment was ordered. The updated suitability assessment noted that the offender’s circumstances had changed. The authors said that, subject to ACT Corrective Services approving his suggested accommodation, he is now recommended as suitable. ACT Corrective Services has since approved the proposed accommodation.
48․In relation to the charges in series one, the guilty pleas were entered in the Magistrates Court. That occurred following the provision of the brief of evidence but still at an early stage. Consistently with the practice in New South Wales, I regard a plea in the Magistrates Court as an early plea, even where it is entered after the service of the police brief. I propose to allow a discount of 25 per cent to reflect the utilitarian value of those pleas.
49․In relation to the charges in series two, the offender pleaded guilty on the first day of the hearing. Civilian and police witnesses had attended Court to give evidence. The pleas nonetheless had some utilitarian value, albeit limited, at that point. I would allow a discount of about 5 per cent to reflect the utilitarian value of those pleas. However, in light of the sentences I propose to impose for those matters, the discount for the plea becomes insignificant.
50․In relation to the charges in series three, the offender entered pleas of guilty after the matters had been committed to the Supreme Court for trial but before the criminal case conference. While those pleas were not entered at the earliest opportunity, they had significant utilitarian value – 15 days of hearing time were saved. I propose to allow a discount of about 15 percent to reflect the utilitarian value of those pleas.
Objective seriousness
51․I turn to assess the objective seriousness of the offences.
52․First, as to series one, as submitted by the prosecution, the unauthorised possession of firearms is a serious offence. Section 5(1) of the Firearms Act1996 (ACT) confirms the government’s commitment to the proposition that the possession and use of firearms is a privilege that must give way to the overriding need to ensure public safety. It is unnecessary to expand upon the extreme threat to public safety posed by the proliferation and unlawful use of firearms in the community.
53․The factors the Court is required to consider in assessing the objective seriousness of offences of this kind were set out in the decision of the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal in R v Mack; Mack v R [2009] NSWCCA 216 at [40]. They include:
(a)the number of firearms;
(b)the number of firearms that were prohibited or were pistols;
(c)the nature and type of the firearms;
(d)the purpose of the possession of the firearms;
(e)the location of the property and the security under which the firearms were kept;
(f)the length of time during which the firearms were in the applicant's possession; and
(g)the circumstances in which they came into his possession.
54․The offender had two firearms in his possession, one of which was a functioning firearm. It is unclear how the firearms came into his possession or for what purpose and no finding can be made on that issue. The offences are constituted in possession, not use. Based on the date on which they were reported stolen, the firearms could not have been in the offender’s possession for more than four days. The evidence does not permit any more precise finding than this.
55․The firearms came to the attention of police only as a result of what was termed an anonymous tip-off (other information before me indicates that the source of the tip-off is known) and were otherwise easily concealed at the offender’s home. They were not secured other than in the padlocked toolbox which police were able to access easily. For the purposes of the possession offences, it is not appropriate to have regard to the fact that the firearms were stolen as that is the subject of the separate offences of possession of property suspected of being stolen.
56․The very limited evidence concerning the offender’s involvement in these offences precludes the conclusion contended for by the prosecution that the offences were serious instances of their kind. I assess these offences as being towards the lower end of the range of offences of this kind.
57․Turning to series two, in relation to the offences of dishonestly driving a motor vehicle without consent, I accept the submission of the prosecutor that this is a serious offence which can cause significant disruption to the life of the owner of the stolen vehicle. The Toyota was used on two occasions for which the offender is to be sentenced. However, as submitted by the prosecution, the offender appears to have been using the car as his own. The offending is otherwise unremarkable and towards the lower end of objective seriousness.
58․In relation to the joint commission minor theft, the amounts of petrol stolen were $89 and $97. The offending was committed in company and in a stolen vehicle. In principle, the former is an aggravating factor but it is not one to which I would accord any significant weight here as the company of the other person has not facilitated the offence or exacerbated its seriousness as it would in, say, the case of an assault in company. The value of the stolen goods was low, even within the category of minor theft. The fact that the vehicle was stolen is reflected in the driving offence. The offending was otherwise opportunistic and unsophisticated. The offenders went to the same service station twice. Their offences were captured on CCTV both times. I assess the seriousness of these offences as being towards the lower end of the range.
59․Turning to the series three offences, there are three counts of driving a stolen vehicle. The prosecution noted that there is little to distinguish the three offences. Each entailed depriving the relevant owner of their vehicle for an ongoing period. The prosecution further submitted that there is little to separate the offender and the co-offenders on each count. In each case the offender was either the driver or a willing passenger. I would assess these offences as mid-range.
60․As to count 8, the unauthorised use of a firearm, the offender possessed and used the firearm, discharging it twice from a car in the middle of the night towards a park where it was by good fortune that no one was caught in the crossfire. The consequences could have been much more severe, if not tragic.
61․It was submitted on the offender’s behalf that the shots were fired only into the air in a remote rural area and that this should be taken into account in assessing the seriousness of the offences. However, any firing of a firearm into the dark carries the risk of tragic consequences. The offending in these offences paints a picture of impulsiveness, recklessness and naivety. I also have no doubt, as I think the offender concedes, that his conduct during this period was significantly affected by his addiction to prohibited substances, particularly including ice. The offending was also unsophisticated, the offenders having filmed themselves committing the offences and saying the words to which I have referred. I consider this offence to be relatively serious.
62․Turning to count 9, the offence of burglary, the victim was home during the burglary which occurred at 7:00am. It goes without saying that people should be entitled to feel safe and secure in their homes and not expect to have invaders at that time of the morning or, indeed, at any time. I take into account the fact that the theft of the possessions, the theft of the housekeys and the iPad containing personal identification material would have been particularly distressing for the victims. I also consider it significant that one of the items stolen was a high-powered motor vehicle.
63․The schedule offence for this matter is the fact that the offender and his co-offenders drove around in the stolen vehicle on more than one occasion. I have taken that offending into account in the manner contemplated by the statute.
64․Turning to count 16, the aggravated dangerous driving offence, as already noted the offender veered suddenly across lanes, swerving back and forth and blocking a police car while exceeding the speed limit, at one stage by 40 kilometres an hour. This offending was reckless and brazen and could have ended tragically. It shows little regard or care for human life. I regard it to be a serious offence of its kind.
65․Turning to the offence of arson (count 15), the offender was filmed moving around the burning vehicle, striking it as one of his co-offenders did, and encouraging the filming of this event. The vehicle was destroyed. Again, this was a dangerous offence involving reckless and bold behaviour. I accept, however, that the offender was almost certainly affected during this period by the impact of his use of prohibited substances. That said, it may be noted that the offenders during this period demonstrated an attitude of indifference to the law and tended, by their offending, to egg each other on.
Parity
66․It is necessary to consider the principle of parity. The basis for requiring parity in sentencing was explained by the High Court in Green v The Queen; Quinn v The Queen [2011] HCA 49; 244 CLR 462 at [28] as follows:
“Equal justice” embodies the norm expressed in the term “equality before the law”. It is an aspect of the rule of law. It was characterised by Kelsen as “the principle of legality, of lawfulness, which is immanent in every legal order.” It has been called “the starting point of all other liberties.” It applies to the interpretation of statutes and thereby to the exercise of statutory powers. It requires, so far as the law permits, that like cases be treated alike. Equal justice according to law also requires, where the law permits, differential treatment of persons according to differences between them relevant to the scope, purpose and subject matter of the law. As Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ said in Wong v The Queen:
“Equal justice requires identity of outcome in cases that are relevantly identical. It requires different outcomes in cases that are different in some relevant respect.” (emphasis in original)
Consistency in the punishment of offences against the criminal law is “a reflection of the notion of equal justice” and “is a fundamental element in any rational and fair system of criminal justice”. It finds expression in the “parity principle” which requires that like offenders should be treated in a like manner. As with the norm of “equal justice”, which is its foundation, the parity principle allows for different sentences to be imposed upon like offenders to reflect different degrees of culpability and/or different circumstances.
(Citations omitted.)
67․Those principles might be thought to have little work to do in respect of the offender’s liability for the series two offences. Those offences were committed in the company of a female who was only 16 at the time. She was dealt with as a young person and received a non-conviction order pursuant to s 17 of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act. She had one previous matter on her criminal history which was also dealt with under s 17. However, the offender was also quite young at that time. The way in which the co-offender was dealt with has some relevance.
68․The expectation of parity is of greater significance in sentencing the offender for the series three offences. As already noted, the co-offenders were sentenced by Taylor J last week. I have had regard to the sentences imposed by her Honour.
69․There is little basis for distinguishing the objective seriousness of the offending of the three offenders. However, as I will explain, in my assessment this offender has a significantly stronger subjective case. I have determined that it is appropriate, where the offending was the same, to impose the same sentence as that imposed by Taylor J. I have taken the offender’s strong subjective case into account in determining how he should serve his sentences.
Subjective circumstances
70․At the time of all three series of offences, the offender was still subject to the suspended sentence orders and good behaviour orders which had been imposed by Loukas-Karlsson J on 15 February 2021. During the series three offences, he was also on bail on the Griffiths remand which I imposed on 20 May 2022. Those are plainly aggravating factors and it is necessary to consider their significance, both in determining the terms of the offences but also in determining the manner in which the offender should serve his sentence and the degree of supervision he will need.
71․The offender has an extensive criminal history. Plainly that is a relevant factor in considering whether he should be afforded leniency. That said, he has in my assessment reached something of a turning point in his life where, if the community can provide him with comprehensive, wrap-around support, he may be able to use this opportunity to address his drug addiction. As I will explain, that addiction is not of his own making and that is a very significant factor in sentencing him.
72․The offender’s subjective circumstances are summarised in several documents to which I have paid careful attention. A pre-sentence report dated 24 July 2023 forms part of the prosecution tender bundle (exhibit A). The author of that report notes that the offender’s criminal history contains a number of offences he committed as a juvenile, for which he was sentenced to various community-based orders and periods of detention at Bimberi Youth Justice Centre. The breach offences from 2019 were committed when he was remanded there.
73․The pre-sentence report notes that, while the offender was under the supervision of ACT Corrective Services, he demonstrated periods of compliance, although ultimately both community-based orders were breached by way of reoffending. As already noted, upon conviction for the July 2022 offences (the series one offences), he will be in breach of the suspended sentence order imposed by Loukas-Karlsson J on 15 February 2021.
74․The offender is now 21 years of age. He has spent time in custody throughout his late teenage years and now into adulthood. He told the author of the pre-sentence report, and I have no difficulty accepting, that his offending is very much related to his drug use and impulsiveness.
75․His descriptions of his childhood have varied among different reports before me. He has, in some conversations, acknowledged that his father has been a great support to him and provided a constructive environment. However, his childhood was marred by family violence at the hands of both his father and his mother, instability and secondary homelessness.
76․The offender told the author of the pre-sentence report that he began consuming alcohol and cannabis when he was aged 12 years. He began using methylamphetamine at the age of 14 years when it was offered to him by a family member. That is a significant factor in assessing his culpability for his offending and the way in which the Court should now deal with the offender. A person who is introduced to such an addictive drug, when they are too young to make a decision about the use of drugs, by a family member, who is likely to have influence over them, must be considered to have less moral culpability than a person who has a more structured and supportive upbringing. Methylamphetamine is known to be highly addictive. Unsurprisingly, after being introduced to it in his early teens, the offender immediately became a daily user and began to sell drugs to fund his habit. He used a variety of other drugs, including using heroin every few months, cocaine and various other substances. The pre-sentence report details extensive use of a variety of drugs by the offender throughout his youth and into adulthood.
77․The offender was diagnosed with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) while in custody at Bimberi but has been reported as being compliant with medication for that disorder only while in custody.
78․The offender stated that he has had a turbulent relationship with his mother owing to her own continued drug use and mental health struggles. He has supportive relationships with a half-sister and brother. He also reported a positive relationship with an intimate partner but it is unclear to me whether that relationship is ongoing.
79․The offender reported having difficulties at school and being suspended and expelled for behavioural outbursts and inattention. He completed Year 10 whilst in custody at Bimberi. He has an impressive period of employment in the building industry which spanned a period of some two years. That employment gives me great encouragement as to the offender’s ability to undertake rehabilitation with proper support. His employer described him as a person who paid great attention to his work. Unfortunately, he lost that employment when the employer secured a contract to do defence work and the offender was unable to obtain the necessary security compliance to be involved in that work.
80․Nonetheless, that period of focus on skills using his hands, developing a trade and maintaining secure work whilst still remaining apparently drug free is very encouraging. That is a strength which could be supported if he is permitted to serve his sentence by way of a DATO. He has also completed a number of qualifications whilst in custody and that is to his credit.
81․The author of the pre-sentence report further notes that the offender has made positive steps to engage in rehabilitation programs including brief intervention for alcohol and drug treatment and has reassessed his interest in engaging in various services available whilst he was in custody. The author further notes that the offender was remorseful for his offences although, while he engaged with the statement of facts, he attempted to minimise the severity of the charges.
82․Turning to the DATO assessments, as already noted, the offender has recently been assessed as a suitable candidate for a DATO. I have had regard to the fact that the ACT Corrective Services officers who prepared those reports have some reservations as to the offender’s capacity to comply with the stringent requirements of such an order. In my assessment, it is significant in those circumstances that he has nonetheless been assessed as suitable. The whole point of such orders is to recognise the difficulty of overcoming an addiction, which is now well understood to be a medical issue as much as a criminogenic one. The possibility of occasional non-compliance is addressed in such orders by providing constant monitoring, substantial wrap-around support from a multidisciplinary team and a carrot-and-stick approach in which participants are rewarded for progress in their rehabilitation and punished for breaches by the imposition of sanction points with the threat of cancellation of the DATO and return to gaol as the ultimate sanction.
83․The offender is not eligible for a DATO if his aggregate sentence exceeds four years: see s 12A(1)(b) of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act. The prosecution did not oppose the making of a DATO in principle but submitted that, due to the seriousness of the series three offences, a total sentence under four years would be inadequate. In that context, the prosecutor noted in particular that those offences occurred while the offender was on a Griffiths remand. It was noted that his criminality escalated when he was given the opportunity to demonstrate rehabilitation during that period of remand. It is important, in light of that submission, to give careful consideration to the appropriate individual sentences before determining how the sentence should be served.
Sentence
84․Having regard to all of those considerations, I propose to deal with the separate offending in different ways.
85․In relation to the breach matters, having regard to the fact that the offender was subject of a Griffiths remand and spectacularly failed to take advantage of that opportunity to demonstrate rehabilitation, I consider it appropriate in accordance with s 110(2)(a) of the Crimes (Sentence Administration) Act to impose the suspended sentences. As indicated at [9] above, the effective term of the suspended sentences was a term of imprisonment for 15 months. Those sentences should be backdated to 20 July 2022, the day before the offender’s arrest on 21 July 2022, to further take into account the day spent in custody after arrest for the series one offences.
86․I note that, for part of the period since that date, the offender was serving sentences imposed by a Magistrate for different offences. However, it is necessary in accordance with the principle of totality to take a “last look” at the total effective sentence to be imposed. I propose that the previously suspended sentences which are now to be served should be backdated to that date to reflect the fact that the offender has now had a substantial period of time in custody.
87․In relation to the series one offences, I propose orders as follows.
88․For the offence of possessing two firearms whilst not authorised by a licence or permit to possess or use the firearms, I propose a sentence of a period of four and a half months imprisonment, discounted from six months to reflect the benefit of the plea.
89․In relation to the charge of having property in premises that is reasonably suspected of being stolen or otherwise unlawfully obtained, I propose a sentence of six weeks, discounted from two months imprisonment, again to reflect the plea.
90․For the reasons I have explained, having regard to the principle of totality and the importance of not imposing an unduly crushing sentence on such a young man, I consider it appropriate to backdate those sentences entirely so as to be served from 20 April 2023 until 23 October 2023. I acknowledge that the effect of backdating both the breach sentences and the series one sentences and further providing for total concurrency between the two entails a measure of leniency. However, for the reasons I have explained, I consider that appropriate in the case of this young offender. Although there was a period of significant offending before his arrest last year, he has now served a significant period of imprisonment. The impact of that on a young person is not to be dismissed lightly.
91․Turning to the series two offences, I propose the following orders.
92․First, in relation to each of the charges of joint commission minor theft, I propose to make a s 17 non-conviction order. That is because the amount involved was very small and, whilst parity is not a significant consideration in these matters, I note that it is the way in which the co-offender was dealt with. I do not consider that these offences pass the threshold of s 10 of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act. Accordingly, I consider any separate punishment inexpedient.
93․For each of the charges of driving a vehicle without consent, I propose to impose a good behaviour order for a period of three months.
94․That leaves the series three offences. In relation to those matters, I propose to make the following orders.
95․First, in relation to the charge of driving a motor vehicle without consent (count 7), a sentence of imprisonment for five months, reduced from six months to reflect the plea. In relation to the charge of unauthorised use of a firearm (count 8), a sentence of 10 months imprisonment, reduced from 12 months to reflect the plea. I would propose that there be partial concurrency between those two sentences so as to give an aggregate term of imprisonment for 12 months from 23 October 2023 to 22 October 2024.
96․Turning then to the offence of burglary (count 9), which is one of the more serious offences for which the offender stands to be sentenced for today, I note that this offence involved the two co-offenders. I have had regard to the sentence imposed on the co-offenders by Taylor J, which was a sentence of 14 months, reduced from 18 months to reflect the benefit of the plea. That is the sentence I propose for the offender in relation to this offence.
97․In relation to the charge of arson (count 15), again I consider it appropriate to impose the same sentence as was imposed by Taylor J in respect of one of the co-offenders whom her Honour assessed to have a higher level of responsibility in terms of his role in the offending because he lit the fire while the other co-offender only filmed the event. This offender is in the same category as the one that lit the fire sentenced by Taylor J. The sentence imposed by her Honour was a period of imprisonment for 12 months, reduced from 15 to reflect the value of the plea.
98․I propose that the sentence in relation to count 9 would add a year to the sentences imposed for counts 7 and 8, so that the sentence for count 9 will end on 22 October 2025.
99․In relation to the sentence for arson, that was separate, very serious offending. I consider that the sentence for that offence should commence on 23 October 2025 and end on 22 October 2026.
100․For the charge of aggravated dangerous driving (count 16), there is no issue of parity. The manner of driving was quite dangerous. It is fortunate that no injury or accident occurred. That is to the offender’s benefit because the law pays regard to consequences. Had anyone been killed or injured he would of course face a significantly more serious charge and a significantly longer sentence. I consider that a sentence of imprisonment for three months is appropriate. That should be wholly cumulative upon the other offending because it is entirely separate and because of the seriousness of the offence. That sentence will end on 22 January 2027.
101․That leaves the two counts of driving a motor vehicle without consent (counts 21 and 30). For each of those offences, I propose to impose a sentence of imprisonment for five months, reduced from six, as Taylor J did in relation to the co-offenders. I propose to make those two sentences cumulative upon the others but concurrent with each other in order to give effect to the principle of totality.
102․Those sentences will accordingly expire on 22 June 2027, giving a total effective sentence of three years and eight months from today.
103․I will hear the parties as to the structure of those proposed orders before pronouncing formal orders [discussion followed].
104․I note that counsel for the offender has requested a further opportunity to be heard on the issue of licence disqualification periods. This arises in relation to the transfer charges of driving while disqualified and the offence of aggravated dangerous driving. I stand over sentencing for the transfer charges and consideration of the disqualification periods to 10 November 2023.
Orders
105․I make the following orders:
(1)For the breach offences, pursuant to s 110(2)(a) of the Crimes (Sentence Administration) Act, I impose the sentences previously suspended by Loukas-Karlsson J, as follows:
(a)For the offence of conspiracy to escape from custody (CC CAN 1107/2019), I sentence the offender to 10 months imprisonment commencing on 20 July 2022 and expiring on 19 May 2023.
(b)For the offence of common assault (CC CAN 1103/2019), I sentence the offender to 5 months imprisonment commencing on 20 April 2023 and expiring on 19 September 2023.
(c)For the offence of resisting a Territory official (CC CAN 1105/2019), I sentence the offender to 2 months and 14 days imprisonment commencing on 6 August 2023 and expiring on 19 October 2023.
(2)For the offence of affray (CC CAN 1106/19), pursuant to s 110(2)(b) of the Crimes (Sentence Administration) Act, I resentence the offender to the rising of the court.
(3)For the offence of resisting a Territory official (CC CAN 432/20), pursuant to s 110(2)(b) of the Crimes (Sentence Administration) Act, I resentence the offender to the rising of the court.
For the series one offences:
(4)For the offence of unauthorised possession of firearms (CAN 2110/2022), the offender is convicted and sentenced to 4 months and 23 days imprisonment commencing on 20 April 2023 and expiring on 11 September 2023.
(5)For the offence of unlawful possession of stolen property (CAN 11395/2021), the offender is convicted and sentenced to 42 days (6 weeks) imprisonment, commencing 12 September 2023 and expiring 23 October 2023.
For the series two offences:
(6)For the first offence of joint commission minor theft (CAN 9752/2022), pursuant to s 17(2)(a) of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act, without convicting the offender, I direct that the charge be dismissed.
(7)For the second offence of joint commission minor theft (CAN 9755/2022), pursuant to s 17(2)(a) of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act, without convicting the offender, I direct that the charge be dismissed.
(8)For the first offence of driving without consent (CAN 9753/2022), pursuant to s 13 of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act, I make a good behaviour order for three months commencing today.
(9)For the second offence of driving without consent (CAN 5527/2023), pursuant to s 13 of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act, I make a good behaviour order for three months commencing today.
For the series three offences:
(10)For the offence of driving without consent (CAN 9060/2022; count 7), the offender is convicted and sentenced to 5 months imprisonment commencing on 23 October 2023 and expiring on 22 March 2024.
(11)For the offence of unauthorised use of a firearm (SC CAN 37/2023; count 8), the offender is convicted and sentenced to 10 months imprisonment commencing on 23 December 2023 and expiring on 22 October 2024.
(12)For the offence of burglary (SC CAN 38/2023; count 9), the offender is convicted and sentenced to 14 months imprisonment commencing on 23 August 2024 and expiring on 22 October 2025.
(13)For the offence of arson (CAN 9063/2022; count 15), the offender is convicted and sentenced to 12 months imprisonment commencing on 23 October 2025 and expiring on 22 October 2026.
(14)For the offence of aggravated dangerous driving (CAN 9066/2022; count 16), the offender is convicted and sentenced to 3 months imprisonment commencing on 23 October 2026 and expiring on 22 January 2027.
(15)For the offence of driving without consent (CAN 9071/2022; count 21), the offender is convicted and sentenced to 5 months imprisonment commencing on 23 January 2027 and expiring 22 June 2027.
(16)For the offence of driving without consent (CAN 9073/2022; count 30), the offender is convicted and sentenced to 5 months imprisonment commencing 23 January 2027 and expiring 22 June 2027.
(17)I stand over the transfer charges of driving while disqualified to 10 November 2023 at 11:30am in the Drug and Alcohol Sentencing List for sentence.
106․Having regard to those terms of imprisonment, the offender is eligible for a DATO in respect of the series three offences.
107․It is appropriate to state why I consider that he should be permitted to serve his sentence in that way. Plainly, it is an order that will give substantial weight to the object of rehabilitation. The offender has had a difficult life of instability and chaos underpinned by substance abuse, to which he was exposed from an early age by the adults who were supposed to nurture and take care of him. As was noted by Loukas-Karlsson J at [140] when her Honour first sentenced the offender, he has a background which plainly attracts the application of the Bugmy principles. There is perhaps nothing more disturbing than reading about a person in the offender’s current position that his first introduction to the use of drugs was by a member of his own family.
108․I acknowledge that the offender has a considerable criminal history, having commenced offending in his late teens. However, his offending has plainly been precipitated and perpetuated by his addiction to prohibited substances. As already noted, it is well understood that drug addiction is a medical condition and that the path to rehabilitation is not linear. It may be expected that he may suffer the odd setback, but the material before me in the Drug and Alcohol Sentencing List assessment reports persuades me that it is appropriate to give this offender, at his young age, the opportunity to address his drug addiction as the priority which will not only serve his rehabilitation but best protect the community: cfHogan v Hinch [2011] HCA 4; 243 CLR 506 at [32] (French CJ).
109․Accordingly, I make the following further orders:
(18)A Drug and Alcohol Treatment Order under s 12A of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act in respect of the primary offence of burglary (SC CAN 38/2023) of which he has been convicted and for which he has been sentenced to 14 months imprisonment.
(19)I extend that order to the offences of driving without consent (CAN 9060/2022), unauthorised use of a firearm (SC CAN 37/2023), arson (CAN 9063/2022), aggravated dangerous driving (CAN 9066/2022) and driving without consent (CAN 9071/2022; CAN 9073/2022) of which he has been convicted and for which he has been sentenced, and which are associated offences of the primary offence.
(20)It be noted that convictions and sentences imposed for the primary and associated offences have been recorded and are hereby incorporated into the Drug and Alcohol Treatment Order in the Custodial Part of the Order.
(21)The Drug and Alcohol Treatment Order be for 3 years and 8 months from today, 23 October 2023 to 22 June 2027.
(22)The Treatment and Supervision Part of the Drug and Alcohol Treatment Order be for 18 months from today, 23 October 2023 until 22 April 2025.
(23)The Custodial Part of the Drug and Alcohol Treatment Order for the primary and associated offences be hereby suspended under s 80W of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act from today, 23 October 2023 until 22 June 2027.
(24)Under s 80ZA of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act, KS be required to sign an undertaking to comply with his good behaviour obligations under s 85 of the Crimes (Sentence Administration) Act from the day after the end of the Treatment and Supervision Part of the Drug and Alcohol Treatment Order, 23 April 2025, until the end of the total sentence, 22 June 2027, with a probation condition that he accept supervision by the Commissioner of ACT Corrective Services or his delegate for the period of the undertaking or such lesser period as the person supervising him considers appropriate and obey all reasonable directions of the person supervising him including as to alcohol and drug testing, counselling and treatment.
(25)The Treatment and Supervision Part of the Drug and Alcohol Treatment Order is subject to the following conditions:
(a)The core conditions set out in s 80Y of the Crimes(Sentencing) Act;
(b)That KS undertake any program, treatment or counselling, alcohol and drug testing or case management that may be required by any member of the Treatment and Supervision Team and obey all reasonable directions of any member of that Team about where he resides, with whom he associates and his attendance from time to time;
(c)That KS not return a positive test sample under alcohol and drug testing; and
(d)That KS comply with any directions of the Court from time to time about attendance at Court in person or by electronic means.
(26)I direct KS to sign a sealed copy of this Order and an undertaking to comply with the Order and any obligations under the Crimes (Sentence Administration) Act for the period that this Order is in force to before he leaves the Court precincts.
(27)I direct KS to appear on 27 October 2023 at 11:30am in the Drug and Alcohol Sentencing List.
I certify that the preceding one hundred and nine [109] numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Sentence of her Honour Chief Justice McCallum
Associate:
Date: 17 April 2024
ANNEXURE TO JUDGMENT OF 23 OCTOBER 2023 –
DPP v KS (a pseudonym) (No 2) [2023] ACTSC 298
| Offence | Legislation | Maximum penalty | Date committed | Plea date | |
| Series one (SCC 59, 60 of 2022) | |||||
| Unauthorised possession of firearms other than prohibited firearms | MC CAN 2110/2022 | Firearms Act 1996 s 43(1)(a)(iii) | 5 years imprisonment | 22 June 2021 | 4 March 2022 (in Magistrates Court but after the prosecution brief) |
| Unlawful possession of stolen property | MC CAN 11395/2021 | Criminal Code 2002 s 324 | 6 months imprisonment and 50 penalty units | 22 June 2021 | 4 March 2022 (in Magistrates Court but after the prosecution brief) |
| Breach series (SCC 108, 109, 110 of 2020) | |||||
| Conspiracy to escape from custody | CC CAN 1107/2019 | Crimes Act 1900 s 160 | 5 years imprisonment and 100 penalty units | 26 August 2019 | 29 Oct 2020 (in Supreme Court after conferencing) |
| Common assault | CC CAN 1103/2019 | Crimes Act 1900 s 26 | 2 years imprisonment | 26 August 2019 | 29 Oct 2020 (in Supreme Court after conferencing) |
| Resist Territory public official | CC CAN 1105/2019 | Criminal Code 2002 s 361(1) | 2 years imprisonment and 200 penalty units | 26 August 2019 | 29 Oct 2020 (in Supreme Court after conferencing) |
| Affray | CC CAN 1106/2019 | Crimes Act 1900 s 35A(1) | 2 years imprisonment | 26 August 2019 | 29 Oct 2020 (in Supreme Court after conferencing) |
| Resist Territory public official | CC CAN 432/2020 | Criminal Code 2002 s 361(1) | 2 years imprisonment and 200 penalty units | 26 August 2019 | 18 May 2020 (on first mention in Magistrates Court) |
| Series two (SCC 177, 178 of 2023) | |||||
| Drive motor vehicle without consent | MC CAN 9753/2022 | Criminal Code 2002 s 318(2) | 5 years imprisonment and 500 penalty units | 21 April 2022 | 7 June 2023 (fifth mention in Magistrates Court) |
| Minor theft (joint commission) | MC CAN 9752/2022 | Criminal Code 2002 s 321 via s 45A | 6 months imprisonment and 50 penalty units | 21 April 2022 | 6 June 2023 (fifth mention in Magistrates Court) |
| Drive motor vehicle without consent | MC CAN 5527/2023 | Criminal Code 2002 s 318(2) | 5 years imprisonment and 500 penalty units | 3 May 2022 | 7 June 2023 (first mention in Magistrates Court) |
| Minor theft (joint commission) | MC CAN 9755/2022 | Criminal Code 2002 s 321 via s 45A | 6 months imprisonment and 50 penalty units | 3 May 2022 | 6 June 2023 (5th mention in Magistrates Court) |
| Series three (SCC 346, 347 of 2022) | |||||
| Indictable offences | |||||
| Drive motor vehicle without consent | MC CAN 9060/2022 | Criminal Code 2002 s 318(2) | 5 years imprisonment and 500 penalty units | 3 July 2022 | 11 July 2023 (in Supreme Court before conferencing) |
| Unauthorised use of firearm other than prohibited firearms | SC CAN 37/2023 | Firearms Act 1996 s 43(1)(a)(iii) | 5 years imprisonment | 3-7 July 2022 | |
| Burglary (joint commission) | SC CAN 38/2023 | Criminal Code 2002 s 311 via s 45A | 14 years and 1400 penalty units | 4 July 2022 | |
| Arson (joint commission) | MC CAN 9063/2022 | Criminal Code 2002 s 404(1) via s 45A | 15 years imprisonment and 1500 penalty units | 5 July 2022 | |
| Aggravated dangerous driving (first offender) | MC CAN 9066/2022 | Road Transport (Safety and Traffic Management) Act 1999 s7(1) | 3 years imprisonment and 300 penalty units; 3 months disqualification (automatic) | 5 July 2022 | |
| Drive motor vehicle without consent | MC CAN 9071/2022 | Criminal Code 2022 s 318(2) | 5 years imprisonment and 500 penalty units | 13 July 2022 | |
| Drive motor vehicle without consent | MC CAN 9073/2022 | Criminal Code 2022 s 318(2) | 5 years imprisonment and 500 penalty units | 19 July 2022 | |
| Offences scheduled under the principal offence of burglary | |||||
| Theft (joint commission) | SC CAN 39/2023 | Criminal Code, s 308 via s 45A | 10 years imprisonment and 1000 penalty units | 4 July 2022 | N/A |
| SC CAN 41/2023 | |||||
| Drive motor vehicle without consent | MC CAN 9064/2022 | Criminal Code 2002 s 318(2) | 5 years imprisonment and 500 penalty units | 5 July 2022 | |
| Transferred offences | |||||
| Drive while licence suspended (first offender) | MC CAN 9067/22 | Road Transport (Drive Licensing) Act 1999 s 32(2)(a) | 6 months and 50 penalty units; 12 months disqualification (automatic) | 3 July 2022 | N/A |
| MC CAN 9068/22 | 5 July 2022 | ||||
| MC CAN 9070/22 | 12 July 2022 | ||||
| MC CAN 9074/22 | 13 July 2022 | ||||
| MC CAN 9072/22 | 19 July 2022 | ||||
| MC CAN 7072/22 | 20 July 2022 | ||||
| MC CAN 9754/22 | 20 July 2022 | ||||
| Affray | MC CAN 7415/22 | Crimes Act 1900 s 35A(1) | 2 years imprisonment | 20 July 2022 | |
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