SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA
COURT OF APPEAL
S APCR 2018 0133
| DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS | Applicant |
| v | |
| JACK JARVIS (a pseudonym)[1] | Respondent |
[1]Because this is an interlocutory proceeding, a pseudonym has been used in place of the name of the respondent and the reasons have been prepared in a form which omits identifying details.
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| JUDGES: | MAXWELL P, NIALL and WEINBERG JJA |
| WHERE HELD: | MELBOURNE |
| DATE OF HEARING: | 16 July 2018 |
| DATE OF ORDERS: | 16 July 2018 |
| DATE OF REASONS: | 18 July 2018 |
| MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2018] VSCA 173 |
| JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM: | DPP v [Jarvis] (Unreported, County Court of Victoria, Judge Smallwood, 12 July 2018) |
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CRIMINAL LAW – Appeal – Interlocutory appeal – Offences – Elements – Particulars – Course of conduct offences – Indictment specified period of offending – Complainant gave evidence of offending outside specified period – Whether leave to amend should be granted – Whether ‘specified period’ was element of offence or particulars – Appeal allowed – Leave to amend granted – Criminal Procedure Act 2009 sch 1 cl 4A.
WORDS AND PHRASES – ‘specified period’.
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| APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the Applicant | Mr A J Moore | Mr J Cain, Solicitor for Public Prosecutions |
| For the Respondent | Mr J F Desmond with Mr A L Hands | D’Alessandro & Associates |
MAXWELL P
NIALL JA
WEINBERG JA:
Summary
Last Wednesday (11 July 2018), a jury was empanelled in the respondent’s trial in the County Court. He faces four sexual offence charges, all relating to the same complainant (‘J’). Three of the four charges are ‘course of conduct’ charges, alleging sexual penetration of a child under 16.[2]
[2]Contrary to Crimes Act 1958 s 45(1) as amended by the Crimes (Sexual Offences) Act 1991.
Each charge alleges that the respondent
at various places in Victoria between the 1st day of February 1995 and the 31st day of January 1998 took part in an act of sexual penetration with [J] …
Each charge alleges a different form of sexual penetration.
In his evidence-in-chief, J said that the sexual offending against him began when he was 11. On that basis, the alleged course of conduct offending had commenced in 1994 rather than in 1995. As a result, the prosecutor sought leave to amend the dates in the indictment.
After hearing argument, his Honour refused the application for leave to amend. In his Honour’s view, on the proper construction of the course of conduct provisions in the Criminal Procedure Act 2009[3] (‘CPA’) the period specified in the indictment was an element of the course of conduct offence. On the prosecutor’s application, his Honour then certified the matter as appropriate for an interlocutory appeal under s 295(3)(c) of the CPA.
[3]Clause 4A of schedule 1.
The interlocutory application was brought on for hearing as a matter of urgency, so as to leave open the possibility of the trial continuing with the same jury. Having had the assistance of written and oral argument from trial counsel, we concluded that leave to…
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- Case
- [2018] VSCA 173
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the court was whether the specified period of offending was an element of the course of conduct offence or merely a particular of the charge. If the specified period was an element, then any amendment to it would invalidate the charge. If, however, it was only a particular, then the court could grant leave to amend it without affecting the validity of the charge. The court had to determine the correct interpretation of the statutory provisions and decide whether the amendment would prejudice the respondent’s ability to mount a proper defence.
The court held that the specified period was not an essential element of the offence but rather a particular of the charge. The court found that the statutory language and the legislative intent supported the view that the period was a particular rather than an element. The court also considered that the amendment would not prejudice Jarvis’s ability to defend himself and that it was in the interests of justice to allow the amendment. Consequently, the court allowed the appeal and granted leave to amend the particulars of the charge.
The final orders of the court were that the appeal was allowed, leave to amend the particulars of the charge was granted, and the matter was remitted to the lower court for further proceedings. The court’s decision clarified the legal position regarding the specified period in course of conduct offences and reinforced the distinction between elements of an offence and particulars of a charge.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi