Director of Public Prosecutions v Dyke

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA Not Restricted

AT MELBOURNE

COMMON LAW DIVISION

S ECI 2019 02032

DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS Appellant
v
GRAEME LESLIE DYKE Respondent

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JUDGE:

BEALE J

WHERE HELD:

Melbourne

DATE OF HEARING:

21 May 2020

DATE OF JUDGMENT:

9 June 2020

CASE MAY BE CITED AS:

DPP v Dyke

MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION:

[2020] VSC 300

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APPEAL – Question of law – Whether a notice of alleged incriminating conduct must be served by the prosecution in summary trials as well as jury trials – Magistrate found evidence was capable of being incriminating conduct but excluded the evidence for lack of a notice – Magistrate acquitted respondent – Whether magistrate would still have acquitted respondent if evidence of incriminating conduct had been admitted – Jury Directions Act2015 (Vic) ss 1, 3, 4A, 5, 19, 20, 21 – Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) ss 3, 272 – Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) ss 25, 32.

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APPEARANCES:

Counsel Solicitors
For the Appellant Mr P Bourke Office of Public Prosecutions
For the Respondent  Mr L Howson Oakleys Law

HIS HONOUR:

Background:

  1. After a summary trial at the Latrobe Valley Magistrates’ Court, the respondent Graeme Leslie Dyke was acquitted of the following charges:

(1) theft of six heifers contrary to s 74 of the Crime Act 1958 (Vic);

(2) wounding four heifers contrary to s 9(1)(a) of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act 1986 (Vic); and

(3) removing National Livestock Identification System tags from the ears of four heifers contrary to s 9A(2) of the Livestock Disease Control Act 1994 (Vic).

  1. In brief, it was alleged at trial that the respondent stole some heifers and tried to conceal the fact that they were stolen by cutting off parts of their ears, thereby removing identifying features, including tags.

  1. At trial, the prosecution sought to rely on certain evidence as evidence of alleged incriminating conduct by the respondent. First, the prosecution relied on evidence that four heifers found in his possession (which could have been four of the six stolen heifers) had recently had parts of their ears cut off. Second, the prosecution relied on evidence that the respondent had allegedly falsified the birth records in relation to those four heifers. Third, the prosecution relied on evidence of the respondent’s behaviour and remarks when police, whilst in his company, discovered those four heifers.

  1. The learned magistrate was of the view that the evidence was capable of being incriminating conduct but accepted the respondent’s submission that as no notice of incriminating conduct had been served pursuant to s 19 of the Jury Directions Act 2015 (Vic) (‘JD Act’), the evidence was inadmissible as incriminating conduct. The prosecution submitted that the notice requirement only applied in jury trials. Consistent with that position, the prosecution did not seek a dispensation from the notice requirement.

  1. The appellant submits the learned magistrate erred in law, first, in holding that the s 19 notice requirement applies to…

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Details
Case
[2020] VSC 300
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Director of Public Prosecutions sought leave to appeal against an acquittal of the respondent, Mr Dyke, on the basis that the magistrate erred in law by excluding evidence on the basis that a notice of alleged incriminating conduct had not been served. The trial judge found that the evidence was capable of being incriminating conduct, but held that the lack of a notice meant the evidence could not be admitted. The respondent was acquitted, and the Director appealed to the Court of Appeal, seeking to determine whether a notice of alleged incriminating conduct must be served by the prosecution in summary trials as well as jury trials.

The central issue was whether the failure to serve a notice of alleged incriminating conduct in a summary trial precluded the prosecution from adducing the evidence, and if so, whether this was a jurisdictional error. The Court considered the relevant statutory provisions, including sections of the Jury Directions Act 2015 and the Criminal Procedure Act 2009, as well as the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006. The Court also considered the purpose of the notice requirement and whether the failure to serve a notice was a jurisdictional error that would lead to an acquittal.

The Court held that the failure to serve a notice of alleged incriminating conduct was not a jurisdictional error and, therefore, the magistrate would not have acquitted the respondent even if the evidence had been admitted. The Court reasoned that the notice requirement is intended to protect the accused’s right to a fair trial, but the failure to serve a notice does not necessarily mean that the evidence cannot be adduced. The Court found that the magistrate had the discretion to admit the evidence despite the lack of a notice, and that the magistrate would have acquitted the respondent even if the evidence had been admitted. The Court also found that the notice requirement was not intended to be a jurisdictional error, and that the failure to serve a notice did not necessarily mean that the evidence could not be adduced.

The Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the acquittal of the respondent. The Court held that the failure to serve a notice of alleged incriminating conduct was not a jurisdictional error, and that the magistrate would not have acquitted the respondent even if the evidence had been admitted. The Court found that the notice requirement was not intended to be a jurisdictional error, and that the failure to serve a notice did not necessarily mean that the evidence could not be adduced. The Court held that the magistrate had the discretion to admit the evidence despite the lack of a notice, and that the magistrate would have acquitted the respondent even if the evidence had been admitted.

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