Director of Public Prosecutions v D’Jerke
[2023] ACTSC 313
•29 August 2023
SUPREME COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY
Case Title: | DPP v D’Jerke |
Citation: | [2023] ACTSC 313 |
Hearing Date: | 18 August 2023 |
Decision Date: | 29 August 2023 |
Before: | Refshauge AJ |
Decision: | (1) It be noted that Ivan Stephen D’Jerke has been assessed as eligible for a Drug and Alcohol Treatment Assessment. (2) The Drug and Alcohol Treatment Assessments be prepared. (3) The Director-General of the Health Directorate through Alcohol and Drug Services and Forensic Mental Health and the Director-General of Justice and Community Safety through ACT Corrective Services be directed to prepare a Drug and Alcohol Treatment Assessment and submit it to the Court, the accused and to members of the Treatment Order Team on or before 20 October 2023. (4) The proceedings be adjourned to 3 November 2023 at 2:30pm for sentence. (5) The prosecution be directed to file and serve its sentencing tender bundle on or before 23 October 2023. (6) The accused be directed to file and serve a copy of any documents on which he proposes to rely on or before 24 October 2023. (7) The prosecution be directed to file and serve any written submissions on sentence on or before 25 October 2023 (8) The accused be directed to file and serve any written submissions on sentence on or before 26 October 2023. (9) Mr D’Jerke be remanded in custody until then. |
Catchwords: | CRIMINAL LAW – JURISDICTION, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Judgment and Punishment – Sentence – consideration of whether to order a Drug and Alcohol Treatment Assessment where the sentence imposed may be longer than the legislative maximum – purposes of Eligibility Assessments for Drug and Alcohol Treatment Order – where issues of parity arise – liberal approach to be taken at the preliminary stage of Suitability Assessment – Suitability Assessment ordered |
Legislation Cited: | Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) ss 12A, 46J, 80S, 80T, 80ZN |
Cases Cited: | Beniamini v Craig [2017] ACTSC 30 Channon v The Queen (1978) 33 FLR 433 Cotter v Corvisy [2008] ACTSC 64; 1 ACTLR 299 Crawford v Laverty [2008] ACTSC 107 Hogan v Hinch [2011] HCA 4; 243 CLR 506 IW v City of Perth (1997) 191 CLR 1 Lowe v The Queen (1984) 154 CLR 606 R v Antonovic (No 3) [2021] ACTSC 338 R v Carberry [2022] ACTSC 208 R v Carberry; R v Deng; Carberry v The King [2023] ACTCA 3 R v Deng [2022] ACTSC 143 R v Evans; R v Reid [2020] ACTSC 169 R v Hall (No 2) [2022] ACTSC 22 R v McHughes [2021] ACTSC 92 R v Molina (1984) 2 FCR 508 R v Smith [2022] ACTSC 288 R v Winters (No 3) (unreported, Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court, 27 April 2023, Refshauge AJ) |
Texts Cited: | Don Weatherburn, What Causes Crime? (Crime and Justice Bulletin, No 54, February 2001) Trevor Bennett, Katy Holloway and David Farrington, ‘The statistical association between drug misuse and crime: A meta-analysis’ (2008) 13(2) Aggression and Violent Behavior 107 ACT Supreme Court, Notice to Practitioners: Drug and Alcohol Sentencing List, 19 December 2019 |
Parties: | Director of Public Prosecutions Ivan Stephen D’Jerke ( Offender) |
Representation: | Counsel M Howe ( DPP) S Baker-Goldsmith ( Offender) |
| Solicitors ACT Director of Public Prosecutions Fortify Legal ( Offender) | |
File Number: | SCC 277 of 2022 |
REFSHAUGE AJ:
Introduction
1․In order to have a peaceful community where its members are safe and their possessions are protected, legislatures have created crimes, namely prohibited conduct that should not be committed so as to ensure that safe, secure and peaceful society. In order to try and encourage and, if necessary, mandate the prohibition of such crimes, the legislature has tasked the courts with responding to the breaches of the criminal law by imposing sentences. Hence the courts have made it clear that the ultimate purpose of sentencing is the protection of the community: see Channon v The Queen (1978) 33 FLR 433 at 437; R v Molina (1984) 2 FCR 508 at 510.
2․For a long time, the courts had a limited range of sentences available: see Cotter v Corvisy [2008] ACTSC 64; 1 ACTLR 299 at [1]-[3]; 302. Largely, these were imprisonment or fines. This was seen as a consequence which would deter offenders and others from committing these crimes. More recently, the courts have recognised that rehabilitation can be more effective to protect the community: see, for example, Hogan v Hinch [2011] HCA 4; 243 CLR 506 at 537; [32].
3․As a result, the identification of criminogenic risks has become important to create more targeted sentences that address the causes of such risks and try and address these to prevent the repetition of criminal behaviour which these risks can cause.
4․A very significant criminogenic risk is drug dependency, especially where it has been shown that there is a link between drugs and crime. Thus, in What Causes Crime? (Crime and Justice Bulletin, No 54, February 2001), Professor Don Weatherburn wrote (at page 5):
[I]llicit drug consumption almost certainly does cause crime but not by driving large numbers of otherwise law-abiding people into crime. The influence of illicit drug consumption stems from two sources. Firstly, many individuals already involved in crime commit far more offences once they become drug-dependent. This is because offenders addicted to expensive illicit drugs usually commit higher rates of property crime to fund their addiction. Secondly, there is some evidence that competition among drug suppliers for control of illicit drug markets occasionally prompts them to engage in violence toward each other.
(Footnotes omitted.)
5․Further, Trevor Bennett, Katy Holloway and David Farrington in ‘The statistical association between drug misuse and crime: A meta-analysis’ (2008) 13(2) Aggression and Violent Behavior 107 (at 112), they reported that a substantial meta-analysis showed “that the odds of offending are about 2.8 to 3.8 times greater for drug users than non- drug users”.
6․As a result, since 1989, the option of creating drug courts to try and address drug use as a way of addressing crime has grown in popularity and, it must be said, in success: see, for example, R v Antonovic (No 3) [2021] ACTSC 338 at [1]-[7].
7․The drug court model in this Territory is the Drug and Alcohol Sentencing List of the Supreme Court. It administers a Drug and Alcohol Treatment Order (Treatment Order), made under s 12A of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) (Sentencing Act).
8․A Treatment Order requires the offender to be sentenced to imprisonment for a period of one to four years. The imprisonment is, however, suspended, but only if the offender then engages in intensive therapy with rigorous supervision, including case management, as well as being subject to judicial supervision.
9․It is expected that the offender who undergoes such a program will become abstinent and crime-free. This requires significant effort as becoming drug free is a great challenge to overcome the pernicious nature of drug dependencies: R v Smith [2022] ACTSC 288 at [167].
10․There is, of course, a risk that some offenders would see this as a way to avoid incarceration without undertaking the rehabilitation which was mandated. Accordingly, a careful appraisal of prospective participants to ensure that they are likely to commit to the Treatment Order program and so succeed is necessary.
11․Further, there are eligibility requirements. This means that a number of offenders who may benefit from such a program may not be eligible or assessed as suitable: see ss 12A, 80S and 80T of the Sentencing Act. That is to say, it is not enough for an offender to be dependent on drugs, or even using them, but only if they meet the eligibility and suitability criteria are they able to be sentenced to a Treatment Order.
12․In this context, it is now necessary to consider whether Ivan Stephen D’jerke should progress within the Treatment Order assessment process.
Assessment process for Drug and Alcohol Treatment Orders
13․The process is generally as follows. An offender who may wish to seek to serve a sentence of imprisonment by a Treatment Order must proceed in accordance with the procedures set out in the Notice to Practitioners issued by the then Registrar on 19 December 2019 (ACT Supreme Court, Notice to Practitioners: Drug and Alcohol Sentencing List, 19 December 2019) which provides for the steps to be taken for those who might seek an order. Paragraph 6 of the Notice requires as follows:
When an offender wishes to be assessed for a drug and alcohol treatment order under s 12A of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 or the DPP seeks such an order:
a)The offender (or their legal representative) and the DPP must sign the standard threshold eligibility assessment form.
b)On receipt of the form, the Court will refer the offender to the next suitable Drug and Alcohol Sentencing List (DASL).
c) Threshold eligibility assessment will precede this appearance.
14․The “standard threshold eligibility form” requires the offender or his or her legal representative to complete a checklist as to eligibility as follows:
The offender may be eligible to be sentenced to a drug and alcohol treatment order (DATO) as the offender:
□ is over 18 years of age;
□ has entered or indicated a guilty plea to an eligible offence;
□ is likely to be sentenced to a total term of imprisonment of between one and four years;
□ is not subject to a sentencing order for another offence;
□ agrees to complete the treatment program;
□ is dependent on alcohol and or a controlled drug, with the dependency substantially contributing to the offence;
□ is able to reside in the ACT for the term of the sentence;
□ has not committed a serious violence offence or a sexual offence; and
□ has given informed consent to screening and assessment for a [Treatment Order].15․This approximates the eligibility criteria set out in s 12A of the Sentencing Act. Not all of the criteria are black and white.
16․The offender who completes the form is then referred to assessors of the Alcohol and Drug Services and Forensic Mental Health of Canberra Health Services for what is called, in paragraph 6(c), the “threshold eligibility assessment”. It is generally called the “Eligibility Assessment”: see R v McHughes [2021] ACTSC 92 at [7]. The forms containing these assessments set out a short summary of the personal details of the offender, a demographic summary, the relevant background (that is alcohol, tobacco or other drug history or relevant psychiatric and psychological risks as the case may be), the assessment (or current presentation) risk issues, including relevant suicide issues and other vulnerabilities or protective factors and a recommendation as to suitability to progress or not for the Drug and Alcohol Treatment Assessment (Suitability Assessment) under s 46J of the Sentencing Act. The reason for this preliminary assessment was explained in R v McHughes at [10] as follows:
It appears that the rationale for this process is that a complete Suitability Assessment is a complex and time-consuming operation. The assessments range over a wide spectrum of matters as needed to explain the relevant considerations of the seven specific matters in Table 46K of the Sentencing Act. In addition, they take at least four weeks for an offender in custody or six weeks for an offender on bail, thus delaying the progression of the matter somewhat significantly. For these reasons, such assessments should not be sought if there is no real prospect that a Treatment Order can or should be made. Such reasons, however, should not be used to the detriment of people who suffer from any disability unless they are given every opportunity to overcome that disability.
17․Since that time, the number of participants seeking Treatment Orders has increased and the time taken for preparation of Suitability Assessments is now eight weeks for both offenders both in custody or in the community.
18․The importance of the Suitability Assessments is that, under s 80T of the Sentencing Act, the court sentencing an offender must not make a Treatment Order unless it has considered a Suitability Assessment. Thus, without a direction to prepare such an Assessment, no Treatment Order can be made.
Consideration
19․In this case, Ivan Stephen D’Jerke has pleaded guilty to two offences of aggravated robbery. The indictment is rather curious as it contains alternative circumstances of aggravation. It is difficult to see to what an offender is pleading in entering a plea of guilty or not guilty. That, however, is not for consideration in the proceedings at this stage.
20․Mr D’Jerke has been found eligible by both assessments to be referred to Suitability Assessments to be prepared. Ms S Baker-Goldsmith, counsel for Mr D’Jerke, requested that the Court direct that the Suitability Assessments be prepared.
21․Mr M Howe, counsel for the prosecution, however, submitted that the Court should not do so. He raised four issues. The first is that the sentence will likely be of more than four years in length and so render Mr D’Jerke ineligible for a Treatment Order. The second ground is that the minimum period that justice requires Mr D’Jerke to serve in full-time custody will be more than has been served by the time the sentence is imposed. The third reason is “a matter of parity” as the co-offender is to be sentenced soon. The fourth reason is efficiency in the sense of the Court’s resources. Were Mr Howe's submissions to be accepted, Mr D’Jerke could not then be sentenced to serve a sentence of imprisonment by a Treatment Order.
22․Ms Baker-Goldsmith submits that it is premature for the Court to decide that Mr D’Jerke will ultimately not be eligible because of the likely length of the sentence and the Suitability Assessments should be directed to be prepared.
23․In support, she tendered, without objection, a letter dated 25 January 2023 from Karralika Programs Inc in which it is stated that Mr D’Jerke has been assessed as eligible for admission to that facility’s residential drug rehabilitation program. This shows his interest in rehabilitation in that he has taken some, but limited, steps to engage. It is not irrelevant that he has been in custody for some time, but there is no evidence of other rehabilitation such as participation in the Solaris Therapeutic Community program or other programs in custody.
24․The second, third and fourth reasons raised by Mr Howe can be dealt with first.
25․As to the ground that the minimum period Mr D’Jerke is required to spend in custody will not be served by the time he is sentenced, it is on reflection, not entirely clear. When a Treatment Order is made, the Court can identify which offences are associated offences. Thus, even though a sentence is imposed for an offence at the same time as the sentence for the primary offence for which the Treatment Order is made, it will not necessarily be an associated offence to the primary offence.
26․If the sentence for one offence in a series of offences has, for example, because of pre-sentence custody and the appropriate backdating of the start of the sentence, been completely served by the time the sentence is imposed, then that offence and its sentence does not need to be an associated offence and so, will have been fully served. Similarly, sentences that simply impose fines cannot be associated offences. If the period of that sentence has not been completely served by the time the sentence is imposed, then the offence must be made an associated offence and incorporated into the Treatment Order. If it is not, then the balance of the sentence unserved becomes a sentencing order which renders the offender ineligible for a Treatment Order.
27․On the other hand, if that sentence added to the primary offence renders the whole sentence, including the backdated portion, more than four years, it also renders the offender ineligible for a Treatment Order. It is not entirely clear whether that is what Mr Howe was referring to under this ground but it appears to be that. That is to say, if the Court were to backdate the sentence for the first aggravated robbery to the time Mr D’Jerke entered custody, namely 17 April 2022, and Suitability Assessments were directed to be prepared, the sentence would be imposed on or about 30 October 2023. That would be approximately 1 year, 6 months and 14 days of sentence.
28․If so, the sentence for the offence could remain eligible if it was for a period of anything up to four years. That, the submission appears to be, would not be a period that would satisfy the interests of justice as a sufficient sentence for the first offence committed, even if the other sentence were for four years imprisonment. Thus, the argument goes the total sentence would still be greater than four years imprisonment even if the pre-sentence custody applied to the sentence for the first offence. It would not take up the whole of the matter or, if it would, it would be a sentence that would be inadequate. This may be accepted but, in any event, Ms Baker-Goldsmith did not submit otherwise.
29․The next submission was that there was a matter of parity involved. This argument was not completely articulated either. It appears that what was being submitted is that rather than parity, the argument related to co-offenders being sentenced, namely the co-offenders should preferably be sentenced by the same judge. As Brennan J said in Lowe v The Queen (1984) 154 CLR 606 at 617:
The sentencing of co-offenders always requires a comparison of their conduct and antecedents. The imposition of comparable sentences upon co-offenders whose respective conduct and antecedents warrant disparate sentences is unjust. Similarly the imposition of disparate sentences upon co-offenders whose conduct and antecedents are comparable is unjust. A justified sense of unfair treatment is produced in either case. To facilitate the comparison of conduct and antecedents it is desirable that, where practicable, co-offenders be sentenced by the same judge at the same time.
30․That, however, is by no means a principle of law. As his Honour pointed out, it is merely “desirable”, perhaps highly desirable. There is no error, however, in co-offenders being sentenced by other judges. Indeed, their moral culpability for the respective conduct and antecedents may differ and will often then lead to different sentences. As his Honour added:
As regard must be had to the comparative gravity of the conduct of co-offenders and to their respective antecedents, an appealable error is not shown by an offender who merely points to a lesser sentence imposed upon his co-offender.
31․There are times when co-offenders will not be sentenced by the same judge and there may be good reasons for this. Indeed, that one co-offender consents to the making of a Treatment Order and another does not, or is ineligible, would be one such circumstance. That could justify different judges sentencing them. There are many other examples, such as where a co-offender is in custody in another jurisdiction when another is to be sentenced immediately. The delay would not be justified simply because the other co-offender was unable to be accessed by the jurisdiction where the sentence was to be imposed. That could also occur where one is suitable for a Deferred Sentence Order and another offender is not.
32․The desirability is important but cannot override the justice of an appropriate sentencing regime, such as by the choice of an available option for an offender in sentence. This does not mean that parity will not be respected by both sentences and the principle still respected, even if different judges imposed the sentence.
33․The fourth submission was a related submission, namely that it would be more efficient for the same judge to sentence both offenders in this case. Of course, justice cannot be overridden by efficiency or expediency. Indeed, were that to be appropriate, the co-offender, Mr Campbell, should be referred to this Court so both could be sentenced together. Any judge of this Court can make a Treatment Order and any other sentencing order, although there is a sound basis for the good practice that the judge managing the Drug and Alcohol Sentencing List does impose the majority of sentences for Treatment Orders so that they can be appropriately done in the way that generally improves the operation of the Court. Nevertheless, were it to be possible, co-offenders could both be sentenced by the Drug and Alcohol Sentencing List judge or both be sentenced by another judge who could also, if appropriate, make a Treatment Order for Mr D’Jerke.
34․It is then appropriate to address the first submission. Mr Howe submitted that given the offending and Mr D’Jerke's prior criminal history, the sentences for the offences could not justly be of a term of less than four years.
35․Mr Howe tendered, without objection, the agreed statement of facts. That shows Mr D’Jerke and his co-offender entered a residence in Kambah through an unlocked door. The co-offender held a knife at the finger of the victim, the occupant, demanding money and drugs. Mr D’Jerke also then put a knife, possibly the same knife, to the victim's throat, demanding her laptop and phone. One of the co-offenders punched the victim on the right side of her face. The co-offender searched the house and later took the victim's phone and laptop, forcing her to provide the passwords for them. One of the co-offenders then punched the victim again on her left check when a password was incorrect. Mr D’Jerke had a machete with him and then he placed that near the victim's throat. The co-offenders took the victim’s car key and then drove off in her Subaru motor vehicle, taking three toolboxes as well as the phone and the laptop. They left the premises.
36․The next day, Mr D’Jerke and his co-offenders went to the residence of a former friend who lived with her two 17-year-old children. They entered the residence by creating a large hole in the laundry door. Mr D’Jerke then kicked open the bedroom door of the children’s aunt who was also living there, swore at her while holding a machete and asked for money. At the same time, the co-offender entered the bedroom of the occupant, holding a crowbar and demanded the phone from her, threatening to strike her.
37․The boy entered the bedroom yelling, “get out, get out”, tasered the co-offender who hit him with the crowbar on his forearm, knocking the taser out of his hand, and hit him again leaving bruises and a raised red mark on his arms. The girl then urged the co-offenders to go and Mr D’Jerke took a speaker and CCTV system and ultimately left.
38․Mr Howe also tendered, without objection, Mr D’Jerke's criminal history. There are 133 offences on his record for which he had been sentenced, including sentences of imprisonment a number of times. Most of the offences were of violence and dishonesty, including 30 offences of aggravated burglary; burglary or attempted burglary or break, enter and steal; 2 offences of aggravated robbery; and 5 offences of assault or assault occasioning actual bodily harm. There were other serious offences.
39․Certainly, it is difficult to see how these offences by Mr D’Jerke, given his criminal record, would in total justify a sentence of four years or less.
40․Ms Baker-Goldsmith, however, submitted that Mr D’Jerke’s moral culpability was moderated by his severe childhood disadvantage. She also submitted that the offences were, in fact, part of a course of conduct which would require consideration of totality and possibly some concurrency. That the offences were committed on separate days does not necessarily deny a course of conduct: Crawford v Laverty [2008] ACTSC 107 at [42]. This is relevant and may lead also to a high degree of concurrency amongst the sentences: Beniamini v Craig [2017] ACTSC 30 at [169].
41․While Mr Howe took the Court to some recent sentencing, R v Deng [2022] ACTSC 143, R v Carberry [2022] ACTSC 208 (though he should probably have referred to the appeal decision, R v Carberry; R v Deng; Carberry v The King [2023] ACTCA 32 for these two decisions, where a Crown appeal against inadequacy of a sentence was upheld), R v Hall (No 2) [2022] ACTSC 22 and R v Evans; R v Reid [2020] ACTSC 169; Ms Baker-Goldsmith referred to the recorded sentences for the offences of aggravated robbery where the range was wider. She pointed out that in R v Winters (No 3) (unreported, Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court, 27 April 2023, Refshauge AJ) the Court said of sentences for the offence of aggravated robbery:
The Sentencing Database shows that 80 per cent of the sentences were of full-time imprisonment, 69 per cent of all sentences, and of sentences between 18 months and five years' imprisonment with the majority within the range of 18 months to three years over 55 per cent.
42․It is also to be recognised that in the sentences upon which Mr Howe relied, both Mr Deng and Mr Carberry sought that Treatment Orders be made but the sentences in both cases, even before they were increased on appeal, were in total more than the four years imprisonment maximum, rendering them both ineligible for the sentences to be served by a Treatment Order.
43․There is no doubt that some offenders who seek a Treatment Order will find, on sentence, that the eligibility range renders them unsuitable, both being a sentence of less than 12 months imprisonment or a sentence, whether for one offence or more than one offence, for more than 4 years imprisonment.
44․It is undesirable to have the conduct of a sentencing exercise at the stage of consideration of the Eligibility Assessments when considering whether direction should be given for Suitability Assessments to be prepared. On the other hand, as noted above, the point of having a process such as the Eligibility Assessment is to cull those cases where a Treatment Order cannot, or is very unlikely, to be made.
45․The difficulty is when the process raises questions about whether the Treatment Order could be made but is unlikely. The reasons are not limited to the length of any sentence. Indeed, in R v McHughes, the question was whether the cognitive impairment suffered by Mr McHughes would render him likely to fail and be unable to engage adequately with drug rehabilitation so that a direction should not be made that Suitability Assessments be prepared and that no Treatment Order can be considered or made. In that case, however, the Court felt that further assessment of Mr McHughes’ capability would be helped by the Suitability Assessments, though ultimately a Treatment Order was not made.
46․There is often, of course, often no bright line which identifies those cases in which the Court can draw one to show that no Treatment Order should be made at this preliminary stage. There is some clarity, as s 12A(9) of the Sentencing Act does define some offences for which an offender is not eligible for a Treatment Order. Similarly, the offender must have pleaded guilty to the offence.
47․Many other issues are more problematic, such as whether an offender is dependent on alcohol or a controlled drug. There is again no bright line between recreational use and drug dependency.
48․The legislation which inserted the provisions relating to Treatment Orders is beneficial or, as is sometimes called, remedial legislation. Thus, it is designed to provide a remedy not otherwise available. Such legislation should be given “a fair, large and liberal” interpretation: IW v City of Perth (1997) 191 CLR 1 at 12, 39. This is, however, not a question of statutory construction, but of the line that must be drawn so as not to waste resources through preparing Suitability Assessments when a Treatment Order will not be made.
49․There is no clarity about how high a burden there is on an offender to show that it is not so unlikely that a Treatment Order will be made in this case because the likely length of the sentence will exceed the maximum eligibility limit. Perhaps some hint of the liberality that should be applied to the making of this decision is in the provision s 80ZN of the Sentencing Act, which prohibits the taking of an appeal against a refusal to order a Suitability Assessment. Such a decision will then completely close the door for the making of a Treatment Order without any review of the decision, suggesting that a court should take considerable care in making such a decision.
50․The decision in this case is finely balanced and a difficult one to decide. There seems no doubt that if further offences had been committed by Mr D’Jerke he would so likely reach that maximum limit that, while no sentence can be reasonably predicted, it would not be appropriate to direct preparation of Suitability Assessments.
51․Given the arguments raised by Ms Baker-Goldsmith, however, relating to his personal circumstances, that limit has not been reached in this case and directions will be made for preparation of Suitability Assessments and the matter be listed for sentence.
52․It needs to be said, of course, that that does not mean that a Treatment Order will be made on sentence. That awaits the submissions on sentence and the evidence and material that will be before the Court at that stage.
Orders
53․Accordingly, I order as follows:
(1)It be noted that Ivan Stephen D’Jerke has been assessed as eligible for a Drug and Alcohol Treatment Assessment.
(2)The Drug and Alcohol Treatment Assessments be prepared.
(3)The Director-General of the Health Directorate through Alcohol and Drug Services and Forensic Mental Health and the Director-General of Justice and Community Safety through ACT Corrective Services be directed to prepare a Drug and Alcohol Treatment Assessment and submit it to the Court, the accused and to members of the Treatment Order Team on or before 20 October 2023.
(4)The proceedings be adjourned to 3 November 2023 at 2:30pm for sentence.
(5)The prosecution be directed to file and serve its sentencing tender bundle on or before 23 October 2023.
(6)The accused be directed to file and serve a copy of any documents on which he proposes to rely on or before 24 October 2023.
(7)The prosecution be directed to file and serve any written submissions on sentence on or before 25 October 2023
(8)The accused be directed to file and serve any written submissions on sentence on or before 26 October 2023.
Mr D’Jerke be remanded in custody until then.
| I certify that the preceding fifty-three [53] numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of his Honour Acting Justice Refshauge Associate: Date: 11 January 2024 |
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