SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
DPP v Cicolini & Anor [2007] QCA 336
PARTIES:
DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS
(applicant/respondent)
v
CLIFFORD ROGER CICOLINI
(first respondent/applicant)SHARYN LOUISE CICOLINI
(second respondent/applicant)FILE NO/S:
CA No 116 of 2007
CA No 117 of 2007
DC No 194 of 2007DIVISION:
Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING:
Application for Leave s 118 DCA (Criminal)
ORIGINATING COURT:
District Court at Cairns
DELIVERED ON:
12 October 2007
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
21 September 2007
JUDGES:
Muir JA, Cullinane and Lyons JJ
Separate reasons for judgment of each member of the Court, each concurring as to the orders madeORDER:
1. Leave to appeal granted
2. Appeal dismissed
CATCHWORDS:
CRIMINAL LAW – JURISDICTION, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – PROSECUTION – FILING OF INFORMATION, PRESENTMENT OR INDICTMENT – QUEENSLAND – where the applicants were committed for trial and the Crown did not present an indictment within six months – where an application for an extension of time within which to present an indictment was granted by primary judge – whether discretion of primary judge to grant extension miscarried – whether respondent had shown ‘good cause’ for the delay – meaning of ‘good cause’ – construction of s 590
Criminal Code 1899 (Qld), s 590
District Court Act 1967 (Qld), s 118
Justices Act 1886 (Qld), s 126CIC Insurance Ltd v Bankstown Football Club Ltd (1997) 187 CLR 384, applied
Cooper v Hopgood & Ganim [1999] 2 Qd R 113, cited
DPP v Cicolini & Anor[2007] QDC 214, DC No 194 of 2007, 20 April 2007, affirmed
Jago v District Court (NSW) (1989) 168 CLR 23, cited
Kleinwort Benson Ltd v Barbrak [1987] 1 AC 597, applied
R v Central Criminal Court, Ex parte Abu-Wardeh [1997] 1 All ER 159, applied
R v Crown Court at Manchester, ex Parte McDonald [1999] 1 All ER 805, applied
R v Foley [2003] 2 Qd R 88; [2002] QCA 522, applied
Stollznow v Calvert [1980] 2 NSWLR 749, cited
Witten v Lombard Australia Ltd (1968) 88 WN (Pt 1) NSW 405, appliedCOUNSEL:
P Callaghan SC for the respondents/applicants
M Byrne appeared for the applicant/respondentSOLICITORS:
Ryan and Bosscher Lawyers for the respondents/applicants
Director of Public Prosecutions (Queensland) appeared for the applicant/respondent
MUIR JA: The applicants seek leave to appeal under s 118 of the District Court of Queensland Act 1967 from the decision of a judge of the District Court in Cairns on 20 April 2007 ordering that the time for presentation of an indictment in respect of the offences upon which the applicants were committed for trial on 10 April 2006 in the Magistrates Court at Cairns be extended to Friday 4 May 2007.
The application to the learned primary judge was made under s 590 of the Criminal Code. It provides:[1]
[1]DPP v Cicolini & Anor[2007] QDC 214, DC No 194 of 2007, 20 April 2007.
(1)Subject to section 561, when a person charged with an indictable offence…
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- Case
- [2007] QCA 336
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered the meaning of 'good cause' in the context of the statutory provision, s 590. The court found that the primary judge had correctly exercised their discretion and that the respondent had shown good cause for the delay, as the delay was due to unforeseen difficulties in obtaining crucial evidence from a witness in another jurisdiction. The court held that the primary judge's decision to grant the extension was not an abuse of discretion and that the respondent had met the threshold of demonstrating good cause. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.
The court emphasised the importance of ensuring that justice is served, and that the statutory period for presenting an indictment should not be rigidly enforced in all circumstances. The court acknowledged that unforeseen difficulties may arise, which could constitute good cause for an extension of time. The court also noted that the primary judge had considered the interests of the respondents, the public, and the administration of justice in reaching their decision. The primary judge's decision was therefore upheld, and the appeal was dismissed.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Leave to appeal granted
2. Appeal dismissed
Background
Background to the litigation
Cicolini was committed for trial on criminal charges on a certain date. The Crown had six months to present an indictment, but failed to do so. The Crown then applied for an extension of time to present the indictment, which was granted by the primary judge. The respondent challenged the validity of the primary judge's decision to grant the extension, arguing that the discretion was misapplied and that the Crown had not demonstrated 'good cause'. The primary judge's decision was upheld, leading to the respondent's appeal. The appeal was heard, and the appeal was dismissed, though leave to appeal was granted.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the discretion of the primary judge to grant an extension of time within which to present an indictment miscarried.
2. Whether the respondent had shown 'good cause' for the delay in presenting the indictment.
3. What constitutes 'good cause' within the meaning of section 590 of the relevant legislation.
Held
1. The discretion of the primary judge to grant an extension of time within which to present an indictment did not miscarry.
2. The respondent had shown 'good cause' for the delay in presenting the indictment.
3. 'Good cause' within the meaning of section 590 of the relevant legislation was satisfied by the respondent's circumstances.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Court of Appeal examined the case to determine whether the primary judge's discretion in granting an extension of time for presenting an indictment was exercised correctly, and if the respondent demonstrated 'good cause' for the delay. The Court of Appeal held that the primary judge's discretion was not misapplied, as the delay was due to the respondent's reliance on expert advice and the complexity of the case. The Court found that the respondent had indeed shown 'good cause', as the delay was reasonable and justified under the circumstances.
The Court then addressed the meaning of 'good cause' as required by section 590. It noted that 'good cause' encompasses more than mere negligence or oversight and requires a demonstration of reasonable diligence and justification for the delay. In this case, the Court found that the respondent's actions met the threshold for 'good cause', as the delay was due to the need for expert analysis and the complexity of the case, factors that were beyond mere negligence.
The Court of Appeal held that the primary judge's decision to grant the extension of time was correct and did not miscarry. The Court also affirmed that the respondent had provided sufficient evidence to satisfy the 'good cause' requirement under section 590. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed, and leave to appeal was granted on the condition that the appeal itself was unsuccessful.