Director of Public Prosecutions v Bouras
[2022] VCC 1717
•6 October 2022
*
| IN THE COUNTY COURT OF VICTORIA | Revised Not Restricted Suitable for Publication |
AT GEELONG
criminal DIVISION
CR-22-01041
Indictment No. N10147085
| DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS |
| v |
| ELLYAS BOURAS |
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JUDGE: | HIS HONOUR JUDGE TINNEY | |
WHERE HELD: | Melbourne | |
DATE OF HEARING: | 27 September 2022 | |
DATE OF SENTENCE: | 6 October 2022 | |
CASE MAY BE CITED AS: | DPP v Bouras | |
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2022] VCC 1717 | |
REASONS FOR SENTENCE
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Catchwords: Dangerous driving causing death; 38 years of age at time of offence. No prior criminal history. Prime mover and trailer going through a red light in Geelong killing 64 year old grandmother. Early plea - Worboyes v The Queen [2021] VSCA 169. Remorse. COVID-19. Category 2 offence; s5(2H)(c)(ii)
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APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the Crown | Ms S. Thomas | Office of Public Prosecutions |
| For the Accused | Mr S. Petrovich | Javor Lawyers |
HIS HONOUR:
1 Ellyas Bouras, you pleaded guilty on Tuesday of last week to one charge of dangerous driving causing death. That crime is punishable by a 10 year maximum term of imprisonment.
2 You were 38 years of age at the time of the offence but are 39 years of age now. You have no criminal or traffic history at all.
Facts
3 The prosecutor Ms Thomas opened the case to me last Tuesday in accordance with a written summary which was dated 6 September 2022.
4 Your counsel Mr Petrovich told me that it was an agreed summary and so that was marked as Exhibit A on the plea. The aspect in paragraph 40 of that document touching upon logbook entries and the allocated driving hours is entirely irrelevant to my task and I put that paragraph aside altogether. The nature of the dangerous driving has no connection to anything in that paragraph, as the following paragraph makes plain. I am not dealing with fatigue. The prosecutor spelt that out as well in her submissions.
5 In the circumstances, there is really no need for me to set out the full sentencing facts in these, my reasons, which will be very lengthy as is. That lengthy agreed summary does that and so what I will do is I will sentence pursuant to it. I still should say something, albeit briefly, about the facts of this case.
6 You were driving a very large vehicle, being a Kenworth prime mover three axle rigid tipper and trailer. It was your vehicle. You had a heavy combination endorsed licence and you had been driving for many years without incident.
7 Ms Nada Stoyanovski was born in November 1957 and so she was 64 years of age. She was the mother of four children, all grown up with ages ranging from 31 to 39; two daughters, Daniella and Kristie, and two sons, Stephen and Robert.
Mrs Stoyanovski was driving her Corolla sedan on this afternoon and she was driving to collect her young grandson Xander from work. She had her
two-year-old granddaughter Indijana secured in a child seat in the back seat of the car. The weather was fine and road conditions were good. The bitumen was in good condition and it was dry and traffic was light. There was good visibility. It was 2.16 in the afternoon. It was a 70 kilometre per hour zone and
Mrs Stoyanovski was turning right into Bacchus Marsh Road from one of the dedicated right-hand turn lanes. She turned on the green signal and she had right of way.
8 You travelled into the intersection against that red light and you struck her vehicle heavily and killed her.
9 Some motorists had seen you travelling towards the intersection at a speed that suggested you were not going to stop and of course you did not.
That is not to say you were speeding. You were not. Ms Stoyanovski’s car spun around on impact and came to rest. There is dashcam footage which shows your forward movement and also the amount of time and distance that you had to register the existence of the traffic control signals and the red light. This was not a matter of one or two seconds. The intersection was clearly visible for a significant period and over a significant distance, as you well know. Over 10 seconds.
10 People immediately went to Mrs Stoyanovski's assistance, as well as to assist Indijana in the back seat. The child survived. She was injured and distressed at the scene but, thankfully, she had been secured. Though she was later airlifted to hospital, she had only minor injuries. Ms Stoyanovski, however, had sustained non-survivable injuries and she died at the scene. She would not have known what hit her.
11 At the scene you got out immediately and went to her car. You had earbud earphones in place. You had your head in your hands at one point saying, 'Oh, no,' and, 'I didn't see the red light.' You kept saying, 'Oh, no.' A bit later on you appeared to be in shock and said to another person, 'I think I just killed someone.' You told one of the first responders, 'I was talking to me mate on the phone, and I hung up and then I have seen a red light and I hit her. Got earphones on, the hands free and everything,'
12 You had no alcohol or drugs in your system. You were not speeding. You were travelling at around 65 kilometres per hour at the time the crash sensor was triggered within your vehicle. Records disclosed that you had, in fact, been on the phone seconds before the collision, as you had suggested.
13 For whatever reason, you had simply not been concentrating as you drove towards and then into that intersection. There was no obstruction of any kind to your view of the intersection or of the traffic lights and there was no fault in your vehicle or in the road design or in the condition of the road which in any way contributed to this event.
14 Skid marks referrable to your vehicle commenced immediately before impact. In other words, within the intersection. You had simply not seen the red light and by the time it registered, you were already in the intersection and, of course, the die was cast for poor Ms Stoyanovski. Your vehicle weighed 18,000 kilograms and this style of failure was bound to have devastating consequences. It did on this day.
15 When interviewed by the police later that evening, you made a no comment interview, as was your right.
16 The agreed summary sets out some of the chronology of the matter before the court. You pleaded guilty at what I will treat as the earliest stage and have been on bail since the offending until my remand of you last week.
17 Dangerous driving causing death is what is described in the Sentencing Act as a Category 2 offence and, broadly speaking, a custodial disposition is required unless one of the exceptions in s5(2H) of the Act applies.
18 So much then for what is my brief summary of the offending. I will sentence pursuant to the more detailed agreed statement which, as I say, is marked as Exhibit A on the plea. In addition, there are photographs in the depositional material depicting the scene of the collision and the various vehicles. Also, there was that dashcam footage which I have viewed again since the plea and which was marked as Exhibit B.
Victim Impact material
19 Let me turn now then to the impact of your crimes.
20 There were two impact statements in this case from members of the family but, of course, the impact runs much deeper than that. I had in court Ms Stoyanovski's immediate family; her four children and I think in three cases on the day of the plea, their partners. There is reference to the impact of this tragedy upon her grandchildren, including Indijana who was in the car and Xander who came upon the crash with his mother Daniella.
21 I have read the two impact statements again since the plea. As you recall, they had been read aloud by their authors last week. What a task trying to put into words a loss such as theirs and what a task reading an Impact Statement speaking of such a loss. The reading of the impact statements was a deeply upsetting experience for them, for their family members who looked on and who supported them but also for you and for your family, as you and your loved ones know that you are the person who has produced this horrible outcome.
22 I will not go into the full detail of the two impact statements but I will mention just some of the matters that were raised within them.
23 Kristie Dimitrijevski is 32 years of age. She is the youngest daughter of
Ms Stoyanovski. She feels like her life has just come to a halt and her emotions are in disarray. She was due to start a new job in October 2021 but, like many of us, she had been working remotely owing to the global pandemic. She says those at her new workplace will really never know the person that she was, as she has changed so much. She is hurt, angry, frustrated and fearful of not being able to climb out of the dark space that she says she has inhabited since the death of her mother. She has flashbacks to receiving the call from her younger brother Robert.
24 Her mother was her idol and hero and the thought of having a family that her mother will never know is so hard for her to accept. Her children will never get to meet their ‘Baba’. There have been significant financial impacts spoken of with a move to Geelong to provide support to one of the brothers and also the cost of treatment and counselling. Her mother was her safe place and her biggest supporter and she feels bereft without her.
25 Daniella Stoyanovski is the oldest of the four children, 39 years of age. So the same age as you. It was just a normal day in the school holidays for her and then, of course, everything in her life changed. She has not returned to work since. Her husband, himself an interstate truck driver, has changed jobs to be nearby to provide support. Her mother was looking after Indijana, as was her custom, and was due to pick up Daniella's 16-year-old grandson Xander from his work.
26 Daniella received a call from Xander saying that his grandma had not arrived. This was most unusual but Daniella was confident that there must be some simple explanation, such as a migraine or perhaps her mother being delayed at the grandmother's house. Of course, she learnt it was neither of those things and in a most confronting way. Having exhausted her efforts to find her mother, she was driving with her son and came upon the collision site. She describes being in shock when told the news related of her mother and she was so affected she did not even ask about the baby ‘Indi’.
27 She described Xander seeing things he should not have seen at that site and Xander running distressed from the scene screaming out that he wants his ‘Baba’, a reference to his grandmother. Daniella called her youngest brother Robert to break this news and she was then whisked away in a helicopter with Indijiana and so was, in this way, separated, as she had to be, from the support from her family. It was a nightmarish scene and one that haunts her still.
28 She grieves for the impact upon her daughter Indi as well. There has been treatment and counselling and large financial impacts which she details in her Impact Statement but it is, really, the emotional loss. Her life, she says, is changed forever. She misses her mother who she describes as the kindest of souls. She is puzzled by the level of your distraction on this day that has brought about her mother's death and she doubts that she will ever be able to forgive you.
29 Nada Stoyanovski’s family have been devastated by their loss but also the manner of her death. It was so sudden and unexpected. It was so unnecessary and just so completely avoidable, if only you had been exercising some care, but you were not, and Nada Stoyanovski’s life has been tragically cut short. She should not have died on this day and she is dead because of your driving,
Mr Bouras.
30 She was obviously much loved and is, and will continue to be, much missed.
31 So I have only touched upon a few aspects of what is within those two impact statements. I take into account the more complete documents.
32 The Stoyanovski family have been rocked by their loss. Not just those who are present in court or who were present the other day. There is a broader family, as is clear enough from the materials, including, for that matter, the large number of people who are joining this hearing today by way of Webex.
33 It is why the offence of dangerous driving causing death is as serious as it is. There is a death. A totally avoidable and unnecessary one and one that has ongoing and serious impacts, as these things always do.
34 The impact of a crime is one of a large number of matters that the court must take into account. There are many other matters that I must have regard to, including the various matters in mitigation that have been placed before me by Mr Petrovich which I will soon turn to. I am not to let the impact of your crime swamp my consideration of these other important sentencing factors in this case. I guard against that. I am not here to respond or to act emotionally in the exercise of my sentencing discretion. But I am required to take into account the impact of your crime, and I do. It has been profound. The consequences of your acts will no doubt haunt Mrs Stoyanovski's family forever.
In mitigation
35 Let me turn now to the matters that have been put by way of mitigation on your behalf. Your counsel Mr Petrovich relied upon written plea submissions that were dated 25 September of this year. He placed before me a report from a treating psychologist Ms Rebecca Pearce which was marked as Exhibit 2. There was a multitude of character references, including one from your wife and one from your sister and brother. They were marked as a bundle, Exhibit 4.
36 Your counsel took me to your background. He made submissions about the gravity of the offence. He made submissions as to your excellent driving record and the complete lack of any criminal or traffic history and hence your excellent prospects of rehabilitation and low risk of reoffence. There was an extract from VicRoads as to the absence of even a single demerit point having been incurred in the last five years. It was marked as Exhibit 4. Your counsel made submissions as to the relevant sentencing purposes in this case.
37 In a thorough plea, Mr Petrovich relied principally upon the following matters in mitigation:
· your early guilty plea in the midst of the global pandemic;
· the presence of deep and genuine remorse;
· the application of two limbs from the case of Verdins[1];
· the impacts of COVID-19 upon your custodial experience, should that be your fate; and
· if imprisoned, an increased prison burden owing to your concerns for your family.
[1]R v Verdins [2007] VSCA 102; 16 VR 269; 169 A Crim R 581 ('Verdins')
38 He argued that you should not be imprisoned. He argued that you had impaired mental functioning that would result in you being subjected to substantially and materially greater than the ordinary burden or risks of imprisonment. He relied then on what he argued was proof on the balance of probabilities of that exception which is one of those set out in s5(2H) of the Sentencing Act1991.
39 It should not be forgotten, but often enough is, that even proof of one of the exceptions does not determine the ultimate sentencing outcome. All it would do is remove the mandate, not necessarily avoid a prison outcome. A court would still have to pass an appropriate sentence (see recent discussion in the leave application of Parker[2] and the reference in that case to the case of Peers[3]).
Mr Petrovich conceded that, absent a positive finding under that provision which I have mentioned, that the only available outcome was a head sentence with a non-parole period. He referred, in his written submissions, to a few examples of other sentences imposed by other courts.
Prosecution
[2]Parker v The King [2022] VSCA 207
[3]Peers v The Queen [2021] VSCA 264; 97 MVR 379
40 The prosecutor Ms Thomas challenged the application of any of the principles from the case of Verdins. She argued that the report from the treating practitioner did not address the matters required to prove those matters. Was there even a diagnosis and, if so, what was it, what was the impact of it and the prognosis? The conditions were not commented on in terms of their currency or prognosis and the prosecutor argued there was no evidence in the expert report or materials more generally raising either of those limbs, either the fifth or the sixth limbs of that cases.
41 Further, that the exception under s5(2H)(c)(ii) was not made out on the materials. Further to that, even if it was, that a prison term would still be required, given the serious nature of the offending. The prosecution challenged the contention that this example of dangerous driving causing death fell towards the lower levels. They described it as falling at the mid-range. Though they conceded the existence of the various matter in mitigation here, they reminded the court that the survey of the cases disclosed that the sort of matters being relied upon in mitigation were not at all uncommon for this sort of matter.
42 The Director of Public Prosecution was calling for a head sentence and a non-parole period. I will discuss these various submissions shortly.
Background
43 Before doing that though, I will turn to your background and I will do that pretty briefly as there is ample material before me as to your background and no basis at all for me not to accept what I have been told about your background. I do accept it but I see no need to restate it all.
44 Very briefly then, you were born in August 1983, so you are now 39 years of age. You were born in Australia. Your father was himself a truckdriver. Your parents are both still living but have some serious health issues. You have a sister and brother, both older than you, and they have each written excellent references You grew up in a happy home with traditional but strict Greek parents.
45 You went from high school to Kangan TAFE and then did an apprenticeship as a motor mechanic. There is a reference from your previous employee (or master to that apprenticeship) Mr Antzakas who speaks very highly of you. Indeed, that is the tenor of any of the referees who have had any work connection to you. The written plea submissions sets out the various jobs that you have done as a driver. I just do not see the need to repeat them all. You had been driving heavy trucks since 2005 and you have no traffic convictions. You must have travelled many hundreds of thousands of kilometres, if not many more.
46 It is plain enough from the materials that you put your family ahead of yourself. You have been providing for their future. As a result of this crime, you have sold your truck and boat and taken on a lesser paid job as courier driver. There was a condition of bail prohibiting you from driving any heavy vehicle but part of you could not bear getting behind the wheel of a larger vehicle after this disaster of your making. Your wife Fiona speaks of that fear in her reference placed before me. She also speaks of the ramifications for her and the children, should you be imprisoned.
47 You have been married to Fiona for 12 years but together for much longer than that. There are two children, a nine-year-old boy and six- year-old girl. You have been a productive member of the community. You have always worked. You bought you first house when you were a very young man. You have taken pride in providing for your family. In recent times, you have been coaching one of the children's soccer sides.
48 You have none of the issues that so often plague people who sit down in that dock. No shocking deprivation or disadvantage in childhood, none of that. No issues at all with alcohol or drugs or gambling and, before this event, no mental health issues at all. You are a person otherwise of excellent character. That is pretty clear from the materials.
49 Summarising some of the references, you are a good father, a good husband, a good brother and a good work colleague. You are described as hardworking, caring, considerate, respectful, trustworthy, responsible, loyal, and an outstanding professional driver, both competent and safety conscious. A hardworking family man intent upon providing a future for his children. Now, of course, one could never compare the impact felt by you with that felt by the Stoyanovski's. For one thing, you brought on that impact and they have lost their mother or relative forever. Undoubtedly though, your life also changed very drastically on this day. That is made very clear by a number of the references, including your wife's, and your brother's.
50 You have attended seven sessions with Ms Pearce.
51 As I have said, you have no criminal or road traffic history at all. This offence is deeply out of character. You now call in aid that past good character.
Guilty Plea
52 I turn then to consider the other matters raised on your behalf. The first of those matters is your guilty plea. It was a plea made at the earliest opportunity. So you have taken this earliest responsibility for your crime. You could do no more than that.
53 As a result, the time, the cost and the effort of a committal hearing in the Magistrates' Court or a trial up in this court has been avoided. Witnesses have not been required to give evidence. Giving evidence can be a stressful experience. Well, the witnesses have been entirely spared that experience. The Stoyanovski family are at least spared the long wait that can sometimes take place for a matter to be finalised before the courts where there is a trial proceeding.
54 You have facilitated the course of justice in these various ways and you must be adequately rewarded; that is the law. Your guilty plea is worthy of extra weight for the many reasons set out in the Court of Appeal decision of Worboyes.[4] There is a very large backlog of cases that has arisen in the course of the global pandemic. Your case was never part of that backlog. It swiftly settled. So I take these various matters into account in mitigation.
Remorse
[4]Worboyes v The Queen [2021] VSCA 169
55 As to remorse, you pleaded guilty at an early stage and a guilty plea is often enough indicative of some remorse. You were remorseful at the scene. You ran from the truck to the site of Ms Stoyanovski's car. I have mentioned already, you had your head in your hands and you were saying, 'Oh, no.' You were not doing that out of self-pity. You were shocked by what you had done. You knew how serious it was.
56 I also have the report of Ms Pearce. Amongst other things, she says the following:
'The client expressed his deep devastation at being involved in such a catastrophic event and was struggling with intense feelings of guilt, shame, regret and remorse. He repeated many times that he would never forgive himself and that he couldn't imagine a time when he might heal from this mistake. In my opinion, the client possessed deep remorse, regret, shame and disappointment in himself and the event that occurred. It is my opinion that the client has learned his lesson. The accident was unintentional. He would try, to the utmost of his abilities, to avoid any recurrence of this behaviour.'
57 I also have all the many character references which I have read again since the plea. I do not see any need to descend into their detail. I said on the plea that it really would be quite amazing for someone with the many qualities spoken of in the references not to feel deep remorse in the setting of your own known failure, one which you know has brought about the death of another innocent. No one could doubt that you are deeply and genuinely remorseful and that you always have been. I certainly do not doubt that for one moment and I take that into account in your favour.
Rehabilitation
58 I turn then to your prospects of rehabilitation and my conclusion can be very easily stated. You have excellent prospects. This offence is totally out of the blue. It is totally out of character. You are a person with no criminal or road traffic history, no vices or any issues with drugs or alcohol or gambling. You are a person of excellent character. A married man with two young children and an excellent husband and father and provider and obviously a hard worker over the course of your working life. The various references are very clear. Not just of excellent character but also a safe and careful driver of many years' experience.
59 So you have been a very good and careful driver over the course of your life and you have slipped up terribly on this day with these dreadful consequences. You are, as I have said already, deeply remorseful. You have excellent future prospects and a very low risk of any reoffence. I could spend far longer traipsing through the excellent character references placed before me but what is the point? I accept them. No-one is suggesting you are in any way revelling in this offence; of course you are not. No-one is suggesting you are not taking it very seriously; of course you are. No-one is suggesting that you are a bad man; plainly, you are not. No-one is suggesting you are anything other than the man spoken of in those references and I accept that you are.
60 However, I am afraid it is not that unusual to have a person with no criminal history at all before the court for this type of offence. That sort of man, a deeply remorseful person of good background with excellent prospects, is not at all uncommon in this sort of sad case.
Hardship
61 Your counsel raised the invidious position of your wife and children and the impacts upon them in the event of your being sent to prison. Some of the references touched upon that issue as well. Well, of course one can have only sympathy for their position but what you and they need to understand is that it is only in exceptional circumstances that third party or family hardship can be taken into account by a court. That is the law and I must apply it. Proof of actual hardship is not enough and that is because there is almost always actual hardship, often significant hardship, encountered when a person with a dependent family is sent to prison. It happens all the time.
62 The circumstances must be such that they rise above the general, and sometimes tragic hardship very commonly suffered by families upon the imprisonment of a family member. Your counsel correctly conceded that this case did not rise to that level and it does not. This high test has developed in response to a number of considerations. As I say, it is almost inevitable that imprisoning a person will have an adverse effect upon others. It will here, there is no doubt about it.
63 It is always tough for children, especially young children, to be separated from a parent. Presumably, there are very often great adjustments that have to be made and serious enough impacts upon young children and the routines of life, sometimes with loss of housing or loss of schooling and the loss of a parent and that parents' income and so on. But I cannot take into account the impact upon them in this case.
64 I did raise though with your counsel that you will be imprisoned and will not be able to assist or provide for your family, financially or otherwise. I am sure you will worry about your wife and children's predicament. You will worry about your own parents. These things are part of your nature. You will feel impotent to assist. I do accept that these things will increase the burden of imprisonment felt by you.
65 It is permissible for me to take them into account in that way, in the absence of exceptional circumstances. That is because they are not going to third party hardship, but rather, are relied upon as increasing your burden of imprisonment. Prison will be hard enough for you as a first time prisoner. It will be harder still for you as a result of these very understandable concerns that you will feel for your family and I do take that into account.
Verdins
66 There were some submissions made as to the application of the fifth and the sixth limbs from the well-known case of Verdins. As I briefly explained at the time so that people who were sitting in court could understand, that is a decision of our Court of Appeal dealing with the impact upon the sentencing process of mental health conditions existing either at the time of offending or sentence or both. That is something of a gross simplification of those principles, but it is sufficient for present purposes.
67 The enlivenment of those principles is not dependent upon a precise diagnostic label. What matters is what the evidence shows about the nature, the extent and the effect of the impairment experienced and how it affected the offender, either at the time of offence or how it is likely to impact upon their experience of prison. Now, there is no suggestion that there was any impairment at the time of the offending; plainly there was not. Rather, it was the development of the conditions spoken of in the report of Ms Pearce and the impact of those conditions upon your experience of prison and the claim levelled by your counsel of there being a serious risk of deterioration of your mental health in a prison setting. These are, broadly speaking then, those fifth and sixth limbs.
68 Now, there was some criticism by the prosecutor Ms Thomas of Ms Pearce's failure to refer to matters that needed to be acknowledged under the relevant Expert Witness Practice Direction. Initially, Ms Thomas was objecting to the report even being received by the court. It looked rather like this might provoke an adjournment application and I wondered out aloud as to the utility of that approach. Ms Pearce was, after all, a treater and if she was familiar with the Practice Direction and had just omitted to mention it, then the report would not likely change and, likewise, if she was unfamiliar with it, the same outcome would likely be achieved.
69 So I was not receptive to this formal challenge and I ruled that I would receive the report in its current form but that, of course, either party would be free make submissions about the nature of the evidence contained within it and whether or not it enlivened the two principles from the case of Verdins or the extent, if any, to which it raised or supported the exception relied upon in s5(2H)(c)(ii). So that report was received and marked as Exhibit 2.
70 The prosecutor's concern over and above the failure to mention that Practice Direction related to the vagueness of the diagnosis. She argued, well, what was it? When was it made? How current was it, given that the treatment was to alleviate the symptoms of acute traumatic stress related to the accident? (see p1). The ‘symptoms were consistent with a diagnosis of acute stress disorder; so within three months of the triggering event’ (see p1). Well, the triggering event was in January. The treatment had involved seven sessions to alleviate the symptoms, so how current was that diagnosis? What was the actual prognosis or the current position?
71 As to the evaluations referred to on the second and third pages of that report, the prosecutor argued they seemingly fell shy of an actual diagnosis being made. There were symptoms of depression and anxiety and symptoms consistent with a diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder but no apparent diagnosis. There was nothing in the report in any way dealing with the impact of any conditions upon the experience within a prison setting and nothing speaking of any likely significant deterioration in such a setting.
72 I asked your counsel to isolate the conditions that he relied upon and he did so. Whilst it is true that there are views expressed by some non-experts in some of the character references as to what is likely to happen in custody or how you might fare, I cannot act on those opinions in terms of mental health considerations.
73 I am ultimately left in no doubt that the event on 10 January of this year had a deep impact upon your life and also upon your mental health. You obtained treatment for what I am prepared to accept was an acute stress disorder. The tests conducted on 14 September are a snapshot of your subjective level of depression, anxiety and symptoms related to post-traumatic stress disorder (see p3 at the bottom paragraph). Your self-report suggests you have symptoms in a clinically significant range for depression and anxiety and in the moderate range for stress. The post-traumatic stress disorder checklist indicates that you then currently experienced symptoms consistent with a diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder.
74 Now, all of that testing was conducted on 14 September of this year and one large stressor in your life at that point was, of course, the very dark storm cloud represented by this case and the uncertainty of your fate. There is also an aspect at the end of the report of a question mark as to whether you need any more treatment where the author says, 'I would not hesitate to work with him again if the need should arise.'
75 I understand the issues raised by the prosecutor in her submissions to me and I have considered those matters that have been flagged by her. But having reviewed the materials, I am ultimately prepared to accept that you have those conditions. They will have some role in increasing your burden in prison, so I give some limited weight to that fifth limb. I am left with a sense that a consultant forensic psychologist would have perhaps explained the conditions and linked them in to the Verdins fifth limb submission that was being made. Instead, you had a treater but I actually do not doubt her opinion and I am loathe to disadvantage you in the circumstances.
76 The fact is, I have not been too complimentary in relation to a large number of the consultant forensic psychologists who do the rounds in these courts. Frankly, a large number of them provide pretty shaky opinions in these areas based on a single video link consultation. There is very often a real lack of rigour in those sorts of reports. That is not at all the impression that I have from this report. It is the report of someone who was treating you because you actually needed treatment for the conditions spoken of.
77 The sixth limb is not made out at all. There is no satisfactory evidence before me of any serious risk of imprisonment having a significant adverse effect on those conditions. Maybe it will, maybe it will not. I hope it does not but I cannot know and I must not guess. So, in conclusion, there is only some very limited weight given to the fifth limb of Verdins and none to the sixth. It is not possible for me to conclude that these conditions would result in you being subjected to ‘substantially and materially greater than the ordinary burden or risks of imprisonment’. I will come back to that later when dealing with the exception raised here under s5(2H)(c)(ii), but I suppose in that single sentence I have already previewed my finding on that topic.
COVID-19
78 I turn to the issue of COVID-19 and its impact upon you in a prison setting. It is not if you are being sent to prison, you have been. It was not a major plank on the plea and that, no doubt, was because of the improving situation within prisons. In fact, I raised this issue with your counsel to ensure that it was not overlooked. I do not doubt that the COVID-19 virus and the response to it by those running the prisons has increased the burden felt by prisoners generally over the course of the pandemic. It has not been a good time to be in prison. But you have not been in custody until last week, so what has occurred over the last couple of years is not relevant. I am instead looking towards the future and things have opened up to a large degree from about March of this year with visits resuming from about then.
79 As to the future impact upon prisoners arising from the COVID-19 virus, that is impossible for me to determine and I am not free to speculate about that. Those whose job it is to run the prisons would be able to reflect on the impact of any ongoing limitations on a case-by-case basis. I have sent you to prison. The authorities will have the power to address any increased burden in your case by way of conferring emergency management days in relation to the sentence I am about to impose. I cannot know if that will take place or not and I make it plain that I do not proceed on the assumption that it will. To take that sort of thing into account would be to contemplate future Executive action and I am not free to engage in that process.
80 My impression is that the prisons have lagged a bit behind the community in terms of COVID restrictions being lifted. They also tend to bring them back in more rapidly which is understandable, given the setting. I think it likely that prisoners will still have some issues thrown up by COVID-19 in the coming several months. There are still some lockdowns and the day-to-day uncertainty that they cause prisoners will no doubt persist. You would have already experienced the isolation of quarantine upon receipt at prison last week. It is a pretty bleak start to a prison sentence for a first time prisoner.
81 I take into account the increased prison burden imposed by the response to COVID-19 in the manners that I have described.
General
82 I turn now then to some general statements as to the crime to which you have pleaded guilty and relevant sentencing principles at play. The first is a pretty obvious statement actually. Dangerous driving causing death is an inherently serious offence. There is always that tragic outcome, a death, and most often, dire impact upon the relatives of the person killed. The cases demonstrate, however, that there can in fact be sizeable differences in the moral culpability of an offender. The offence can encompass a very wide range of conduct.
83 Each instance of the offence will necessarily involve a serious breach of the proper management or control of a vehicle so as to be dangerous to others. Dangerousness in this respect involves a serious breach creating a real risk of death or serious injury. It is not dependent upon what the driver thought of their driving or what the driver may or may not have foreseen. The driving must have a feature which subjects other road users to some risk over and above the risks ordinarily associated with road use. We are not talking about momentary ‘carelessness’ or minor mistakes. After all, even the best drivers occasionally lose attention for a moment or make minor mistakes.
84 By your plea, you have admitted the elements of this offence.
85 The court still needs to engage in an assessment of the dangerousness in this case and that will be informed by the extent of the risk which the driving created, as well as the potential harm, should the risk eventuate. As I said on the plea, I am sure it must seem quite strange, if not odd, to grieving relatives sitting in the body of a court, to watch lawyers and a judge discussing where on the spectrum of offence seriousness the particular crime sits, a crime that has, after all, killed a loved one. In this case, adjectives were employed by counsel at each end of the Bar table ‘towards the lower level’, said Mr Petrovich, ‘at the mid-range’ said the prosecutor Ms Thomas.
86 Whatever adjective is employed to describe the offence, the outcome for the Stoyanovski family is remains completely unaltered. Nada Stoyanovski has been killed.
87 However, as inherently serious as the offence of dangerous driving causing death is, I do still needs to engage in an assessment of the gravity of this instant offence. We as judges are required to perform that task (see the case of Lombardo[5], Peers[6] and also Woldesilassie[7]).
[5]Director of Public Prosecutions v Lombardo [2022] VSCA 204
[6]Peers v The Queen [2021] VSCA 264; 97 MVR 379
[7]Woldesilassie v The Queen [2-18] VSCA 1332
88 The gravity of dangerous driving causing death or serious injury offending is heavily influenced, as I have said, by the offender’s moral culpability and the objective dangerousness of their driving.
89 An offender will have a higher moral culpability when they knew the risks associated with their driving behaviour. They will have lower moral culpability if the accident or collision occurred because of the momentary inattention or misjudgement or where, for instance, external circumstances such as the poor design of an intersection or road may have contributed to the collision.
90 So one question to ask is, 'What degree of care, and in particular, what degree of alertness to risk, was reasonably to be expected of the driver in the circumstances?' Tthe degree of dangerousness of the offender's driving is assessed by reference to the extent of the risk that it creates. The extent of risk includes both the likelihood that something will go wrong and the extent of harm which will result if it does.
91 A New South Wales decision of Whyte[8] from 2002 is often enough cited as providing a non-exhaustive list of features that might aggravate the gravity of driving offences that cause either death or serious injury. In fact, it is mentioned in many of the cases to which I will soon turn and some I have already mentioned. These features, as I say, are not exhaustive, but they might include things such as:
[8]R v Whyte [2002] NSWCCA 343; 55 NSWLR 252
·the extent and the nature of the injuries inflicted;
·the number of people put at risk;
·the speed;
·the degree of intoxication or of substance abuse;
·erratic driving;
·competitive driving or showing off;
·the length of the journey during which others were exposed to risk;
·ignoring warnings;
·escaping police pursuit;
·sleep deprivation;
·failing to stop.
92 As I say, it is a non-exhaustive list and the case law I have mentioned a moment ago and many other cases I will come to make clear enough that the absence of one or more of these features does not mean that a case cannot be regarded as serious or even very serious.
93 Your counsel pointed to the absence of many features of aggravation mentioned in that case. These matters are also discussed in the case of Stephens[9], a case out of our Court of Appeal. Some of these things are also mentioned in the character references. Your counsel raised the absence of alcohol or drugs or excessive speed or fatigue. Well, the decisions of Stephens and the more recent decision of Weybury[10] spell out that moral culpability is not to be assessed by listing all the aggravating features that could have been present but were not and then asserting that the instant case cannot therefore be regarded as serious or even very serious because of the absence of some of those factors. The dangerousness and your moral culpability fall to be assessed by reference to all of the conduct and all of the circumstances of this case.
[9] Stephens v The Queen [2016] VSCA 121
[10]DPP v Weybury [2018] VSCA 120
94 Offending by someone with knowledge of the risks associated with the driving would ordinarily be adjudged to be more blameworthy than by someone without knowledge. The degree to which particular consequences of the acts were or should have been foreseen will also inform this question of moral culpability (again, see the case of Stephens).
95 Well, as was plain here, there are some matters of aggravation absent here. Many of those matters that I have mentioned. You were not driving at high speed. You were not in any way affected by alcohol or by drugs. You were not engaging in erratic driving or showing off. You were not escaping from the police or driving when you were sleep deprived. You were not engaging in what you knew at the time to be a dangerous or even a risky manoeuvre such as, for instance, crossing double lines on a bend or overtaking at some other point when it seemed risky. So those and many of the various features of aggravation were obviously absent in this case.
96 However, many of the potential features of aggravation, as listed in the cases or that are often raised on a dangerous driving causing death plea as being features of aggravation absent, would though often enough give rise to a more serious charge, being that of culpable driving if they were present.
97 What I must do is assess your culpability by reference to the offence you are charged with, not by the spectrum of offending for the more serious offence of culpable driving (see the decision of Weybury[11]).
[11] Ibid at [35]
98 If those other features were present, well, the answer is, I would deal with you for such a crime. They are not present there. What I have got to do is deal with you for your crime. The absence of those features does not alter the serious features that do exist in this case and they are serious. I do not accept that this example falls at the lower level at all.
99 You were a very experienced truck driver. You were driving a very large truck. You were familiar with that truck. It was your truck. It weighed 18,000 kilograms. I was told by your counsel that you were familiar with the road that you were travelling on. It was broad daylight. The road was in good condition. It was dry, visibility was good. Road design played no role at all in this crime. There was no fault in the traffic control signal. There was no fault in your truck. You had a red light facing you and that had been so for quite some time and over quite some distance. You just did not see it at all and that speaks of the extent and the magnitude of your failure to drive appropriately on this afternoon. There was no emergency braking in this case until just before impact.
100 Others could see this impending disaster. Others were slowing or stopping or already stationary at this intersection on the other side of the road. This did not register with you either. You were not speeding but you travelled into the intersection against a red light at around 65 kilometres per hour. Ms Stoyanovski was doing nothing wrong at all. She entered on the green light. You were not concentrating and the driving of a truck of that size, as you know, requires real vigilance. The ramifications of a collision would be expected to be quite dire. They were.
101 There is an added responsibility which comes with driving a vehicle of that size. It is why you have the heavy combination endorsed licence. You were not paying anything like sufficient attention to your task. You have tried to understand yourself how it might be that you drove in this way and, to some extent, that involves you trying to reconstruct events. I was told that you apparently have a practice of checking all your blind spots when passed by another vehicle. Your counsel also conceded you were likely distracted by the phone call that you had received and hung up from.
102 The fact is, we will never know, and you will never know, why it was that you spent so long not focussing on what was right in front of your own eyes. Not on a blind spot but on the road ahead which had two operational red lights facing you. The dashcam footage gives a clear enough sense of the timing and distance over which you had the opportunity to observe the next intersection.
103 So there was some brief discussion on the plea as to where this offence fitted on the spectrum of offence seriousness. Mr Petrovich was not submitting that this was some minor offence or that the consequences of this offence were anything other than calamitous for the Stoyanovski family. Your counsel was arguing that this was a momentary inattention case falling at the lower levels of offence seriousness. I do not agree. Plainly, it is not an offence in the very highest of categories but I believe that, for the reasons I have identified, it does not represent a lower level example of the offence of dangerous driving causing death at all. It falls towards the mid-level.
104 The term 'momentary inattention' is often enough used in these cases. It is used, I suppose, to distinguish a case from one where a person has, for instance, intentionally engaged in a risky manoeuvre or consumed alcohol or drugs intentionally or from a person who has engaged in a longer course of conduct. The fact is though, that many of the cases of dangerous driving causing death or serious injury will not involve a deliberate or a reckless manoeuvre or a lengthy course of conduct or any contribution from alcohol or drugs. To quote the Court of Appeal from the case of Wolldesilassie, a case with some similarities. They said this:
‘It may readily be accepted that the appellant’s driving was not attended by any aggravating features of the type described by Spigelman CJ in the case of Whyte. The appellant was driving at a speed well below the prescribed limit. He was not affected by the consumption of alcohol or drugs and he was not intentionally engaging in conduct that involved undue risk to other users, such as overtaking another vehicle when it was unsafe to do so. On the other hand, the appellant's inattention to his driving and his almost total lack of concentration meant that he was simply not in control of the vehicle.'[12]
[12] Ibid at [33]
105 They went on to say that the inattention to the driving was prolonged and extended and was such that he completely missed noticing and reacting to a number of warning signs that an experienced driver routinely encounters and responds to almost automatically, such as other traffic slowing down, such as the actual observable red light in that case.[13]
[13]Ibid at [34]
106 He, by the way, was driving a Ford utility, not an 18-tonne truck.
Purposes
107 I have to consider a number of purposes of sentencing. I must pay regard to your prospects of rehabilitation. I have already commented on those prospects; they are excellent. If all I was required to do as judge was to focus on the rehabilitation of an offender, probably no-one would ever be sent to prison actually. But you certainly would not be, that is for sure. Rehabilitation is however only one of the purposes of sentencing that I must have regard to. There are many other purposes that I must pay adequate weight to.
108 I must punish you and I must do that justly and proportionately. Punishment is quite important in this sort of case. I must also denounce your conduct. That is also of importance here. I must pay appropriate weight to specific deterrence. Specific deterrence relates to the need to deter the offender, that is you, from future offending. Well, as to that purpose, and for that matter, community protection, which is another purpose of sentencing, those two purposes drop away very significantly in this case. The community has never needed any protection from you in the past nor in, my judgement, is it likely to need it in the future. I have said already, you are deeply remorseful for this crime.
109 With the exception of this offending, you have never offended in the past at all. What need is there to deter you? What need is there to protect the community from you? The answer is, there really is no need.
110 It would be very different indeed, if you had, for instance, say, relevant criminal history or an appalling driving record or even if you were displaying a dismissive or perhaps a cavalier attitude to this offence and the tragic outcome brought about by your driving. In any of those settings, there would be less positive findings available as to your future prospects and a finding as to a higher risk of reoffence and, accordingly, a greater need to reflect specific deterrence and community protection in any sentence selected. But I am not dealing with such a situation and I am not dealing with such a man; not at all. I am dealing with a deeply remorseful person with no history before the courts at all, a driver with an excellent record, a person with the excellent prospects that I have described and the very low risk of any future offending. One who, plainly, has just not seen the red light.
111
So those purposes have no weight in my task. You have surely been deterred already. I do not doubt that you will regret your involvement in the death of
Ms Stoyanovski for the rest of your life. Not because it has thrown your life into chaos, though it has. Not because you have been sent to prison, but because you have killed another human being, a person you know to be a mother and a grandmother. You will never forget 10 January and your role in the death of that other.
112 So specific deterrence and community protection, which might be very important purposes in some cases which come before the court, have no real role to play in my task.
113 General deterrence is, however, in a completely different position. General deterrence relates to the need to deter other future potential offenders. It is a matter of real importance in this sort of case. The court must send a clear message to other road users in the community. The roads are dangerous enough places at the best of times, even with people doing their best to drive appropriately. Driving is probably the most dangerous thing we all do.
114 Drivers must understand that significant punishment awaits those who, by their dangerous driving, cause the death of another on our roads. It is an offence which, after all, involves a serious breach of what we expect from responsible careful drivers and which always ends with tragic consequences. So the message must be sent to future potential offenders and, as you have demonstrated, any driver can, in a matter of moments, by virtue of an act or an omission, engage in a serious breach of their proper management of a motor vehicle with tragic consequences. Well, they must not and the courts must send that message loud and clear from the sentences imposed.
115 I do have to have regard to the maximum penalty. It is 10 years' imprisonment. I must also pay regard to the impact of your crime. I have spoken of that at length. I have to pay regard to current sentencing practices, though it is not a single controlling factor. I have looked at the relevant Sentencing Advisory Council data for cases dealt with between July 2016 and June 2021. That is not much use as much of that data would relate to offending, which would predate the inclusion of this offence as a Category 2 offence under the Sentencing Act 1991. That provision only applies to offences committed after 28 October 2018. There had also been statements made in that case of Stephens that I have referred to already, as to the inadequacy of some past sentencing practices for this crime.
116 I have read a large number of cases. I have read all the cases referred to in the defence outline. None of those is on all fours. There's a marine case referred to there relating to a boat striking a diver (the case of Mouat[14]) and that bears no resemblance at all to a road collision and the Judge in that case drew that important distinction himself. There is just no parallel.
[14]DPP v Mouat [2022] VCC 1546
117 I have looked at Stephens[15] and Weybury[16] and other cases such as Neethling[17], Pan[18] and Singh[19]. I have looked at Peers[20] and the case of Gray[21], a decision out of this court, in fact I was the sentencing judge with leave refused by McLeish JA in 2021[22]. I have looked at some of the other red-light cases including Woldesilassie, both the County Court decision[23] and the Court of Appeal decision to which I have already referred, the case of Wilson[24] and the case of Bennett[25]. I have looked at that case from a week before last of Lombardo[26] to which I have already referred.
[15]Stephens v The Queen [2016] VSCA 121
[16]DPP v Weybury [2018] VSCA 120
[17]DPP v Neethling [2009] VSCA 116
[18]Pan v The Queen [2020] VSCA 42
[19]Singh v The Queen [2021] VSCA 161
[20]Peers v The Queen [2021] VSCA 264; 97 MVR 379
[21]DPP v Gray [2021] VCC 896
[22]Gray v The Queen [2021] VSCA 322; 98 MVR 179
[23]DPP v Woldesilassie [2017] VCC 1332
[24]DPP v Wilson [2016] VCC 2059
[25]DPP v Bennett [2017] VCC 2014
[26]Director of Public Prosecutions v Lombardo [2022] VSCA 204
118 I have also looked at the relevant portion of the Judicial College of Victoria sentencing manual. There are summaries, not just of a large number of Court of Appeal decisions, but also of the many sentences passed by judges of this court.
119 Having said all of that though, let me say that no amount of looking at what has happened in other cases can provide the answer to my task. It is actually not that helpful in this area. I am exercising a sentencing discretion in your case. Other cases are not precedents. There is no such thing as one correct sentence and one is never going to find a case on all fours. Statistics, and I have referred to those, well, they have got inherent limitations. They provide no detail of the various matters which would explain the individual sentences reflected in the data.
Category 2
120 I have mentioned the exception that is relied upon here by Mr Petrovich. In the absence of an exception under s5(2H) of the Sentencing Act, I must sentence you to prison. That is mandated. Earlier, I mentioned the case of Peers and the leave application of Parker[27]. Even proof of the exception or falling under one of the other exceptions where there is no onus, provides no guaranteed outcome. It simply removes the mandate but not the Court's obligation to impose an appropriate sentence, taking into account the relevant principles as well as current sentencing practices. However, as an exception has been raised by your counsel, I must deal with his submission in these my reasons and I do that now.
[27]Parker v The King [2022] VSCA 207
121 I apologise in advance for trawling through legislation but I have no option but to do so.
Section 5(2H)(c)(ii)
122 The exception relied upon is found in s5(2H)(c)(ii) of the Sentencing Act 1991. That provision reads that in sentencing an offender for a Category 2 offence, a court must make an order under Division 2 of Part 3 (which relates to confinement), unless:
'The offender proves on the balance of probabilities that he has impaired mental functioning that would result in the offender being subject to substantially and materially greater than the ordinary burden or risks of imprisonment.'
Impairment of mental functioning
123 That provision requires proof of impairment of mental functioning. That is the starting point. That term is defined in s10A(1) and includes a mental illness within the meaning of the Mental Health Act2014 . Mental illness is defined in s4 of the Mental Health Act and includes a medical condition that is characterised by a significant disturbance of thought, mood perception or memory.
124 I am prepared to conclude it would cover the conditions spoken of in Ms Pearce's report. So I am satisfied that you have a mental impairment. There is then the deliberately very high bar provided by the words 'substantially and materially'. As I previewed when dealing with my finding as to limb 5 of Verdins, I was prepared to find some limited increased burden but that is all it is. There is not any material before me suggesting that your condition, that is, that your impaired mental functioning, would result in you being subject to substantially and materially greater than the ordinary burden or risks of imprisonment. I am not satisfied on the balance of probabilities that this exception is made out.
125
I must imprison you and I must do so not in combination with a
Community Corrections Order. So the suggestion in your counsel's submissions as to a short, sharp sentence with a Community Corrections Order is simply not open.
126 Let me make very clear though that this offending would have demanded a prison outcome, even had you satisfied the Court of this exception. It is just too serious to avoid that outcome.
127 Your counsel conceded that, if the court was not satisfied that the exception was made out, and I am not, that a prison sentence with a non-parole period would be required here. Plainly, that concession was correct.
128 Given the dimensions of the sentence required in this case, I must, as a matter of law, fix a non-parole period. I am prohibited from speculating as to whether you will be released on parole. The Adult Parole Board will make that decision as to whether you can be released. It has got nothing to do with me. I do take into account all of the matters placed before me when considering the head sentence and the non-parole period in this case. As I said the other day in the course of the plea, the ‘plea in mitigation’ almost writes itself in this case. A 39-year-old man of excellent background and work record, no criminal or traffic past offending, a stable family life, an early guilty plea attended by deep and genuine remorse with excellent future prospects.
129 Well, the plea writes itself but the ending is not the one that you or your family hoped for or the one that your counsel urged me to consider. The sad ending, I will soon pronounce in what is a very sad case, is demanded by the gravity of the offence and the impact caused by it, as well as the need to pay regard to matters other than your rehabilitation and also to pay regard to current sentencing practices.
Sentence
130 I often enough say that there are no winners in cases like these. There are truly none. I expect that when I adjourn in a short moment from now, there will probably be disappointment and sadness spread across, not one, but two families who are sitting before me in court; yours and the Stoyanovskis. Probably no-one will be happy. But my job is to pass the appropriate sentence and that is what I must do.
131 A day like so many others, in what has been a productive working life for you, went pear-shaped at around 2:16pm when you ran through that red light. Your life changed in that moment. In that same instant, of course, the Stoyanovski family has been shattered and they will never forget this day.
132 You will never forget what you have done. You would do anything to take back your act or to mend their family but, of course, that is impossible.
133 I hope and trust that the Stoyanovski family will understand that my sentence is not to be taken as some attempt by me to measure out the worth of
Nada Stoyanovski's life. That is not my sentencing task at all and it would be an impossible one in any event. A value cannot be assigned to a human life. Her life was priceless. She cannot be replaced and she will be missed forever by her many loved ones. There will be no comfort for them in the sentence which I will now impose; none.
134 But what remains to be done is for this Court to pass an appropriate sentence for this serious crime, taking into account all of the relevant matters that have been placed before it.
135 Mr Bouras, if you would stand up please. I apologise to have taken so long to get to this point.
136
On the charge of dangerous driving causing the death of
Nada Stoyanovski, I convict and sentence you to 34 months or two years and
10 months' imprisonment.
Non-Parole Period
137 I fix a period of 18 months during which you will not be eligible for release on parole.
Section 18
138 You have served a total of nine days by way of pre-sentence detention and that is declared in the records of the court pursuant to s18 of the Sentencing Act.
6AAA
139 I have taken into account your guilty plea. If you had pleaded not guilty and been found guilty of this offence by a jury, I would have sent you to prison for four years and eight months. I would have fixed a non-parole period of three years and two months and that declaration is to be entered into the records of the Court. Just grab a seat then for a moment please.
Licence
140 I must also make an order against your licence. Dangerous driving causing death is a serious motor vehicle offence. There is, as a result, a mandatory requirement to make an order against your licence, to cancel and disqualify and that is for a period of no less than 18 months. A licence order, when it is made by a court, is protective but it also operates as a form of additional punishment.
141 You are going to prison for a substantial period. Whenever you are released, you will need to try to establish yourself back in the community. A licence is obviously an asset in the job market generally, but for you, of course, it has been essential to your career as a professional driver for very many years. You are receiving sizeable punishment by virtue of the prison sentence that I have just pronounced and I have already spoken of the way in which community protection and specific deterrence have dropped away in this sentencing task. You have also been deprived of your right to drive a heavy vehicle for a number of months whilst you have been on bail. It was one of the conditions of your bail.
142 The reality is that the mandatory minimum disqualification period of 18 months would have no tangible impact upon you at all, given the sentence that I have imposed. I have considered whether I should make an order in such terms as to link it to your release date, whenever that should be, in the manner discussed in cases such as Tran[28] and Caldwell[29]. That sort of order would bring about a significant period of disqualification which would be awaiting you upon your ultimate release from prison, whenever that is.
[28][2002] VSCA 52
[29][2004] VSCA 40
143 In the end, I have taken the view that this is not desirable in this case.
144 On the charge of dangerous driving causing death, I cancel all licences to drive held by you and I disqualify you from obtaining any other permit or from driving in this State for a period of two years commencing from today's date.
145 Let me just see if there any other matters I need to deal with. Are there any other matters from your perspective, Ms Thomas?
146 MS THOMAS: No, there is not, Your Honour.
147 HIS HONOUR: Mr Petrovich?
148 MR PETROVICH: No, Your Honour.
149 HIS HONOUR: You'll go and see your client next door and discuss with him what's taken place here today and his rights in relation to it obviously?
150 MR PETROVICH: Yes, Your Honour.
151 HIS HONOUR: My practice is to revise my reasons. As soon as I get them I'll do that. Once they've been revised, I'll provide them to the parties. So I generally do it within - on the day that I get them but it shouldn't be too long. Let me just see then. So there's nothing else from either of you? No, all right. Well, that completes the matter then, Mr Bouras. So Mr Bouras can be removed then and your counsel will come out and see you, Mr Bouras.
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