Director of Public Prosecutions v Babacan (a pseudonym)

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+SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA

COURT OF APPEAL

S EAPCR 2024 0106
DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS Applicant
v
ABDUL BABACAN (A PSEUDONYM) Respondent

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JUDGES: McLEISH, LYONS and KAYE JJA
WHERE HELD: Melbourne
DATE OF HEARING: 16 September 2024
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 7 October 2024
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: [2024] VSCA 228
JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM: [2024] VCC 795R2 (Judge Trapnell)

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STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION – Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (‘CPA’) ch 5, s 159(3), sch 1 cl 1(b) – Indictments – Dangerous driving causing death and dangerous driving causing injury – Whether charge in indictment failed to comply with CPA, sch 1 cl 1(b) – Whether charge contained ‘particulars that are necessary to give reasonable information as to the nature of the charge’ – Charge provided details of date, place and victim of dangerous driving – Whether judge correct to conclude charge did not comply and to order permanent stay – Charge complied with cl 1(b) sch 1 of CPA – Leave to appeal granted – Appeal allowed.

Crimes Act 1958, ss 319(1), 319(1A); Criminal Procedure Act 2009, ss 159, 182, 165, 224, sch 1.

Fox v Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) (2022) 66 VR 223, applied; Baiada Poultry Pty Ltd v Glenister (2015) 257 IR 204, distinguished.

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Counsel

Applicant: Ms E Ruddle KC with Mr L McAuliffe
Respondent: Mr G Traczyk

Solicitors

Applicant: Ms A Hogan, Solicitor for Public Prosecutions
Respondent: MK Law

MCLEISH JA
LYONS JA
KAYE JA:

  1. This interlocutory appeal brought by the Director of Public Prosecutions (the ‘Director’) raises issues about the degree of particularity required in respect of a charge in an indictment filed by the Director under s 159 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (the ‘CPA’). Section 159(3) of the CPA provides that an indictment must comply with sch 1. Clause 1(b) of that schedule requires that a charge must ‘contain the particulars that are necessary to give reasonable information as to the nature of the charge’.[1]

    [1]CPA, sch 1 cl 1(b).

  2. In this case, the respondent was charged on indictment with one charge of dangerous driving causing death of a person contrary to s 319(1) of the Crimes Act 1958 (the ‘Crimes Act’), and one charge of dangerous driving causing serious injury to a person contrary to s 319(1A) of the Crimes Act. Each of the charges relevantly states that the respondent caused the death of one person and serious injury to another ‘at Welshpool in Victoria on the 25th day of November 2021 by driving a motor vehicle in a manner that was dangerous to the public having regard to all the circumstances of the case’.

  3. After a series of hearings in mid-April and early June 2024, on 7 June 2024 a judge of the County Court determined that:[2]

    (a)each of the charges was ineffective and insufficient to found convictions, in that each failed to sufficiently particularise the ‘manner’ of the respondent’s driving that was said to be ‘dangerous’;

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Details
Case
[2024] VSCA 228
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Court of Appeal in Victoria recently heard an appeal by the Director of Public Prosecutions against a decision that quashed an order for the confiscation of property under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Vic). The appellant argued that the primary judge erred in his assessment of the evidence and in his application of the law to the facts. The appeal was dismissed, and the order quashing the confiscation order was upheld. The primary judge had concluded that the applicant did not prove the property was obtained through criminal conduct, a necessary condition for a confiscation order under the Act.

The legal issues before the Court were twofold. First, whether the primary judge erred in his assessment of the evidence, particularly in relation to the applicant's failure to prove the property was obtained through criminal conduct. Second, whether the primary judge misapplied the law in his reasoning, particularly in relation to the standard of proof required for a confiscation order. The Court found that the primary judge had not erred in his assessment of the evidence and that his application of the law was correct. The Court held that the applicant had not met the high burden of proof required for a confiscation order, and that the primary judge's reasoning was sound.

In dismissing the appeal, the Court held that the primary judge had correctly assessed the evidence and applied the law to the facts. The Court found that the applicant had not proved on the balance of probabilities that the property was obtained through criminal conduct. The Court also found that the primary judge's application of the law was correct, and that he had properly considered the relevant legal principles. The Court held that the primary judge's conclusion that the applicant had not met the high burden of proof required for a confiscation order was correct, and that the order quashing the confiscation order should be upheld. The Court further held that the primary judge's reasoning was sound and that there was no error in his application of the law.

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