Director of Public Prosecutions v B

Link copied
Case Copied 12 min read

SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Magistrates Appeals: Civil)

DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS v B

[2013] SASC 120

Judgment of The Honourable Justice Peek

29 July 2013

PROCEDURE - SUPREME COURT PROCEDURE - SOUTH AUSTRALIA

EVIDENCE - PROHIBITION OF PUBLICATION OF EVIDENCE

EVIDENCE - PROHIBITION OF PUBLICATION OF EVIDENCE - STATUTORY POWERS

EVIDENCE - PROHIBITION OF PUBLICATION OF EVIDENCE - IDENTIFICATION OF PERSONS

Appeal against refusal by a Magistrate to grant a suppression order extending to the defendant's name and address - defendant charged with murder - the deceased was a well-known public servant - case expected to attract extensive media and social media interest - Magistrate suppressed publication of images and photographs of the defendant but not his name or address.

Whether the Magistrate erred in not suppressing the defendant's name and address from publication - whether the potential for contamination of identification evidence gave rise to a sufficiently serious threat of prejudice to the proper administration of justice to justify the suppression of the respondent's name.

Held (Peek J): Appeal allowed - failure to suppress the name and address of the defendant from publication posed a serious threat of prejudice to the proper administration of justice - the potential contamination of identifcation evidence by the use of social media represents a serious detriment to both the defendant and to the prosecution's ability to gather uncontaminated evidence - special circumstances exist giving rise to a sufficiently serious threat to the proper administration of justice to justify the making of a suppression order suppressing from publication the name and address and any image or photograph of the respondent for a period of 28 days.

Evidence Act 1929 s 69A, referred to.
Police v Strauss (2013) 115 SASR 90; Channel Seven Adelaide Pty Ltd v An Accused (2008) 103 SASR 459; R v Francis (2007) 251 LSJS 221, discussed.

WORDS AND PHRASES CONSIDERED/DEFINED

"suppression order", "special circumstances", "serious threat of prejudice to the proper administration of justice", "displacement effect", "Facebook", "social media websites"

DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS v B
[2013] SASC 120

Magistrates Appeal

PEEK J

Introduction

  1. The Director of Public Prosecutions appealed against the refusal of a Magistrate on the morning of 19 July 2013 to make an order suppressing from publication the name and address of the defendant who had been arrested for, and charged with, the murder of Ms Dianne Rogan, late of Whyalla.  Her death occurred on or about 11 July 2013.  On the afternoon of 19 July 2013, I allowed that appeal and made the following order:

    I suppress from publication the name and address and any image or photograph of the person arrested for the murder of Ms Dianne Rogan, late of Whyalla, which murder occurred on or about 11 July 2013 for a period of 28 days commencing from 4.45pm on Friday 19 July 2013.

  2. I then gave brief reasons and indicated that I would later publish written reasons.  Those reasons follow.

    Background

  3. On 16 July 2013, SA Police (SAPOL) made an application…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Director of Public Prosecutions v B and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2013] SASC 120
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Director of Public Prosecutions v B involved an appeal against the refusal of a Magistrate to grant a suppression order extending to the defendant's name and address. The defendant was charged with the murder of a well-known public servant and the case was expected to attract extensive media and social media interest. The Magistrate had already suppressed the publication of images and photographs of the defendant but refused to suppress his name or address.

The legal issues before the court were whether the refusal by the Magistrate to make final orders suppressing the defendant's name and address posed a serious threat to the proper administration of justice, and whether special circumstances existed that justified the making of such suppression orders. The court was required to balance the public interest in open justice and the right of the media to report on court proceedings with the need to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice.

The court held that the refusal to suppress the defendant's name and address posed a serious threat to the proper administration of justice. The potential contamination of identification evidence by the use of social media represented a serious detriment to both the defendant and to the prosecution's ability to gather uncontaminated evidence. The court found that special circumstances existed that gave rise to a sufficiently serious threat to the proper administration of justice to justify the making of a suppression order suppressing from publication the defendant's name, address, and any image or photograph for a period of 28 days. The appeal was allowed, and the suppression order was made.

In summary, the court held that the refusal to suppress the defendant's name and address posed a serious threat to the proper administration of justice and that special circumstances existed that justified the making of a suppression order. The appeal was allowed, and a suppression order was made suppressing the defendant's name, address, and any image or photograph for a period of 28 days.

Orders

Orders of the court

Held (Peek J): Appeal allowed - failure to suppress the name and address of the defendant from publication posed a serious threat of prejudice to the proper administration of justice - the potential contamination of identifcation evidence by the use of social media represents a serious detriment to both the defendant and to the prosecution's ability to gather uncontaminated evidence - special circumstances exist giving rise to a sufficiently serious threat to the proper administration of justice to justify the making of a suppression order suppressing from publication the name and address and any image or photograph of the respondent for a period of 28 days.

Background

Background to the litigation

I then gave brief reasons and indicated that I would later publish written reasons. Those reasons follow.Background On 16 July 2013, SA Police (SAPOL) made an application to a Magistrate for an order suppressing all or any information, including any photograph or image, that may identify the defendant. His Honour made an interim order pursuant to s 69A, Evidence Act 1929 to that effect and adjourned further consideration of a final suppression order until the morning of 19 July 2013. On the morning of Friday, 19 July 2013, the Magistrate made an order suppressing only the publication of any image or photograph of the defendant; his Honour refused to suppress the name or address of the defendant. Upon application of SAPOL, the Magistrate ordered that the operation of that order be stayed until 5:00pm on that same day, 19 July 2013 and that the previous interim order made on 16 July 2013 suppressing all or any information that may identify the defendant continue in force until 5:00pm on 19 July 2013. The hearing of the appeal by the Director of Public Prosecutions against the refusal of the Magistrate to make final orders suppressing the name and address of the defendant was listed as a matter of urgency before me on the afternoon of 19 July 2013. Members of the media were notified in the normal way through the Courts Administration Authority Media and Communications Branch as to the time and place of the hearing of the appeal. When the hearing of the appeal was called on at just before 4:00pm on 19 July 2013, I made an interim order suppressing the name and address of the defendant, it being unclear at that time whether the hearing of the appeal would be completed before 5:00pm when the previous interim order of the Magistrate would expire. (It was necessary to make that interim order because without it the appeal could have been rendered futile; it was justified in order to protect the integrity of the process of this Court and to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice in respect of the hearing of this appeal.) On the hearing of the appeal, counsel for the DPP appeared to prosecute the appeal. The members of the media present selected Ms Candice Marcus of ABC News to make submissions in opposition to the appeal being allowed. The legislation Section 69A, Evidence Act 1929 relevantly provides:69A—Suppression orders (1) Where a court is satisfied that a suppression order should be made— (a) to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice; or (b) to prevent undue hardship— (i) to an alleged victim of crime; or (ii)to a witness or potential witness in civil or criminal proceedings who is not a party to those proceedings; or(iii)to a child, the court may, subject to this section, make such an order. (2)If a court is considering whether to make a suppression order (other than an interim suppression order), the court— (a) must recognise that a primary objective in the administration of justice is to safeguard the public interest in open justice and the consequential right of the news media to publish information relating to court proceedings; and (b) may only make a suppression order if satisfied that special circumstances exist giving rise to a sufficiently serious threat of prejudice to the proper administration of justice, or undue hardship, to justify the making of the order in the particular case. Consideration

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Finally, it is to be noted that the accused is in custody and not on bail; his next court appearance will be after the proposed 28 day period expires. Since the fact that the defendant is not on bail has been reported (and the media are quite free to further report that fact), public anxiety as to the identity of the defendant will be less than in a situation where a defendant is at large on bail. Conclusion Having undertaken the balancing exercises, I was satisfied that special circumstances do exist which give rise to a sufficiently serious threat of prejudice to the proper administration of justice to justify the making of an order suppressing the name and address (as well as any image or photograph) of the defendant and that the Magistrate erred in failing to make such order. Accordingly, I allowed the appeal and made the suppression order reproduced above which will remain in force for the stated 28 day period.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.