Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) v O'Conner - [2006] NSWSC 458

No judgment structure available for this case.

Reported Decision:
181 A Crim R 294

New South Wales

Supreme Court

CITATION: Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) v O’Conner [2006] NSWSC 458

HEARING DATE(S): 1 May 2006, 11 May 2006

JUDGMENT DATE :
12 May 2006

JUDGMENT OF: Johnson J at 1

EX TEMPORE JUDGMENT DATE: 05/12/2006

DECISION: 1. The direction made by the Second Defendant on 8 February 2006 under ss.91 and 93 Criminal Procedure Act 1986 requiring V to attend to give evidence at the committal proceedings against the First Defendant is quashed.; 2. The matter is remitted to the Goulburn Local Court to be heard and determined according to law.; 3. The First Defendant is to pay the Plaintiff’s costs of and incidental to the Summons.; 4. The First Defendant is granted a certificate under s.6 Suitors’ Fund Act 1951.; 5. The order made by Johnson J on 1 May 2006 staying the committal proceedings until further order of the Court is dissolved.; 6. Orders may be entered forthwith.

CATCHWORDS: CRIMINAL LAW - committal proceedings - direction under ss.91 and 93 Criminal Procedure Act 1986 that complainant attend to give evidence - refusal of prosecution application for adjournment of ss.91 and 93 application - whether denial of procedural fairness - special reasons test - whether actual or constructive failure by Magistrate to exercise jurisdiction on ss.91 and 93 application - legal status of Local Court Practice Note - adequacy of reasons for direction

LEGISLATION CITED: Supreme Court Act 1970
Crimes (Local Courts Appeal and Review) Act 2001
Criminal Procedure Act 1986
Crimes Act 1900
Justices Act 1902
Local Courts Act 1982
Suitors’ Fund Act 1951

CASES CITED: Waterhouse v Gilmore (1988) 12 NSWLR 271
Sankey v Whitlam (1978) 142 CLR 1
Saffron v Director of Public Prosecutions (1989) 16 NSWLR 397
Tahmindjis v Brown (1985) 60 ALR 120
Foley v Molan (Levine J, 20 August 1993, unreported, BC9301863)
JW v Director of Public Prosecutions [1999] NSWSC 1244
McKirdy v McCosker (2002) 127 A Crim R 217
Leahy v Price (Adams J, 28 September 1998, unreported, BC9804950)
Dawson v Director of Public Prosecutions [1999] NSWSC 1147
TS v George (Studdert J, 14 April 1998, unreported, BC9802154)
Hanna v Kearney (Studdert J, 28 May 1998, unreported, BC9803179)
O’Hare v Director of Public Prosecutions [2000] NSWSC 430
Lawler v Johnson (2002) 56 NSWLR 1
Director of Public Prosecutions v Rainibogi [2003] NSWSC 274
Black v Director of Public Prosecutions [2003] NSWSC 442
Meagher v Stephenson (1993) 30 NSWLR 736
Hill v King (1993) 31 NSWLR 654
Australian Securities and Investment Commission v Farley (2001) 51 NSWLR 494
Kant v Director of Public Prosecutions (1994) 34 NSWLR 216
B v Gould (1993) 67 A Crim R 297
R v Anderson (Court of Criminal Appeal, 15 February 1994, unreported)
Tez v Longley (2004) 142 A Crim R 122
Director of Public Prosecutions v Scheibel (2004) 145 A Crim R 576
Wong v Director of Public Prosecutions [2005] NSWSC 129
Blazevski v Judges of the District Court of NSW (1992) 62 ALD 197 (Court of Appeal, 10 November 1992, BC9101492)
Soulemezis v Dudley (Holdings) Pty Limited (1987) 10 NSWLR 247
Downes v Director of Public Prosecutions [2000] NSWSC 1054
Goldsmith v Newman and South Australia (1992) 59 SASR 404
R v Kennedy (1997) 84 A Crim R 341
Boumelhem v Director of Public Prosecutions (2002) 135 A Crim R 454
Nitiva v DPP [1999] NSWCA 332
Whalley v Commissioner of Police [2003] NSWSC 273
Acuthan v Coates (1986) 6 NSWLR 472

PARTIES: Director of Public Prosecutions (Plaintiff)
Anthony William O'Conner (also known as O'Connor) (First Defendant)
Roger David Prowse, Magistrate (Second Defendant)

FILE NUMBER(S): SC 11118/06

COUNSEL: Mr D Arnott SC (Plaintiff)
Mr S Siva (First Defendant)

SOLICITORS: SC Kavanagh - Solicitor for Public Prosecutions (Plaintiff)
Michael Bartlett - The Advocate Law Company Pty Limited (First Defendant)

LOWER COURT JURISDICTION: Local Court

LOWER COURT FILE NUMBER(S): ---

LOWER COURT JUDICIAL OFFICER : Roger Prowse, Magistrate

LOWER COURT DATE OF DECISION: 08/02/2006

LOWER COURT MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: ---

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
COMMON LAW DIVISION

Johnson J

12 May 2006

11118/06
Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) v Anthony William O’Conner (also known as O’Connor) and Anor

JUDGMENT

1 JOHNSON J: By Summons filed on 8 March 2006, the Plaintiff, the Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW), seeks relief under s.69 Supreme Court Act 1970 arising from a direction made on 8 February 2006 by the Second Defendant, Magistrate Roger Prowse, that a witness be required to attend to give evidence at committal proceedings concerning the First Defendant, Anthony William O’Conner.

2 The Plaintiff seeks, in the alternative, a declaration and relief in the nature of mandamus under s.69 Supreme Court Act 1970 or an order granting leave to appeal under s.57(1)(b) Crimes (Local Courts Appeal and Review) Act 2001 (“Appeal and Review Act”) and, if leave is granted, further relief under s.59 Appeal and Review Act.

3 The proceedings relate to a direction under ss.91 and 93 Criminal Procedure Act 1986 made by the Second Defendant at Goulburn Local Court on 8 February 2006 requiring a prosecution witness (whom I will describe as “V”) to attend and give evidence at committal proceedings concerning the First Defendant.

The Present Hearing

4 The hearing of the Plaintiff’s Summons commenced before me in the Duty Judge list on 1 May 2006. Mr Arnott SC appeared for the Plaintiff, Mr Siva of Counsel appeared for the First Defendant. In accordance with usual practice, a submitting appearance was filed on behalf of the Second Defendant.

5 A number of affidavits were read for the Plaintiff and the First Defendant. Two deponents were cross-examined on their affidavits. The hearing was adjourned until yesterday, 11 May 2006 when submissions were completed. Having formed a concluded view with respect to the matter, it is appropriate that I proceed to judgment. The First Defendant is in custody. The committal proceedings ought proceed without further delay.

The Alleged Offences

6 On 15 November 2005, the First Defendant was arrested at Goulburn and charged with six counts of aggravated sexual assault upon V involving a threat to inflict actual bodily harm on V by means of an offensive weapon, a knife, contrary to s.61J(1) Crimes Act 1900. In addition, the First Defendant was charged with robbing V of certain property, being $360.00 in cash and two mobile phones, whilst being armed with an offensive weapon, a knife, contrary to s.97(1) Crimes Act 1900. The alleged offences were said to have been committed at Figtree on 22 May 2005.

7 It is appropriate to refer to the nature of the charges brought against the First Defendant. V was a sex worker who operated from a motel room. She alleges that the First Defendant sexually assaulted her at knife point and stole her money and mobile phones.

8 The prosecution alleges that at about 6.30 pm on Sunday, 22 May 2005, in response to an advertisement inserted in a local newspaper under the “Escorts and Adult Services” section, the First Defendant attended Room 50 in the Sovereign Motel, Figtree, in the Wollongong area. After telling the First Defendant that the cost for her services would be $160.00, it is alleged that the First Defendant handed V the sum of $200.00. When she turned away to get his change, he pulled a knife and pointed it at her stomach, threatening to kill her if she did not comply with his wishes. It is alleged that the First Defendant tied V’s hands behind her back with plastic cable ties and placed silver duct tape around her eyes, mouth and head. Whilst she lay on the bed, he then forced her to fellate him (Charge 1). He then applied lubricant to her vagina and performed vaginal/penile intercourse (Charge 2). When V complained of sore wrists, the First Defendant then tied her hands up with duct tape and cut the plastic cable ties from her wrists. He then forced her to fellate him again (Charge 3), again penetrated her vagina with his penis (Charge 4) and then inserted a dildo into her vagina (Charge 5). At one stage, V states that she felt the blade of a knife between her legs and the point being pushed against her thighs.

9 The final sexual act alleged involved the First Defendant pushing his penis into V’s mouth, again forcing her to fellate him to the point of ejaculation. She was told not to spit out his semen (Count 6).

10 It is alleged that the First Defendant then stole $360.00 in cash from V’s handbag together with two mobile phones. Before leaving the motel room, he warned her to lie face down on the bed for 10 minutes or she would be killed.

11 After the First Defendant left the motel room, V unbound her hands, called the motel manager and the police were contacted. The police arrived at the scene at about 7.30 pm and investigations commenced.

12 The First Defendant was not arrested until six months later, on 15 November 2005. He lived in Victoria and was a construction worker. This involved interstate work and, at the time of the alleged offences, he was working and living in the Wollongong area. The delay in his being charged was due to the fact that he went overseas. He was, in fact, born in Dublin and has a strong Irish accent. When interviewed by police by way of ERISP, the First Defendant denied any involvement in the offences or being at the motel at the time. He did, however, make some admissions which the prosecution contends are significant.

13 When the First Defendant was charged on 15 November 2005, his fingerprints were taken and a buccal swab was taken from him for the purpose of DNA analysis.

Proceedings in the Local Court

14 The First Defendant appeared before the Goulburn Local Court on 16 November 2005 and the proceedings were adjourned until 21 December 2005. Bail was refused.

15 The proceedings came before the Second Defendant sitting at Goulburn Local Court on 21 December 2005. On that day, it appears from the evidence that Mr Love, a solicitor from the DPP, appeared as prosecutor and Mr Bartlett, solicitor, appeared for the First Defendant. The Second Defendant directed that the police brief of evidence be served by 25 January 2006 with the matter being listed for election/reply on 8 February 2006. A notation on the bench sheet for that day indicates that the proceedings were adjourned for committal proceedings or application under s.91 Criminal Procedure Act 1986 on 8 February 2006. The First Defendant was directed to serve by 3 February 2006 any written submission in support of an application under s.91 that any prosecution witness be required to attend for cross-examination at the committal proceedings. The First Defendant was again refused bail and the matter was adjourned until 8 February 2006.

16 The evidence before me reveals that a partial prosecution brief of evidence had been served on the First Defendant or his legal representative on 20 December 2005 (Annexure A, Affidavit of Kristine Chapman, 12 April 2006; paragraph 4, Affidavit of Helen Langley, 10 March 2006; paragraph 6, Affidavit of Michael Bartlett, 24 April 2006). Mr Bartlett understood the directions made on 21 December 2005 to mean that the balance of the prosecution brief of evidence was to be served by 25 January 2006 with the First Defendant to reply to that material on 8 February 2006 (paragraph 6, Affidavit of Michael Bartlett, 24 April 2006).

17 I am satisfied, on the totality of the evidence before me, that prior to 3 February 2006, the prosecution had served on the First Defendant’s solicitor the prosecution brief with the exception of certificates relating to DNA analysis and what is described as the SAIK kit results concerning the physical examination of V at Wollongong Hospital. In particular, by that time, the First Defendant’s solicitor had been provided, at least, with the following:

(a) statement of Senior Constable Manuel Rosete dated 7 November 2005 - he attended the Sovereign Motel, Figtree on 22 May 2005, made observations of V and took photographs and other investigatory steps and, on 15 November 2005, was involved in the arrest and ERISP interview of the First Defendant and the taking of the buccal swab from him for DNA analysis;

(b) statement of Senior Constable David Turner dated 27 November 2005 - he attended the Sovereign Motel, Figtree on 22 May 2005 with Senior Constable Rosete and made observations of V and the premises;

(c) statement of Sergeant Christopher Francis Taylor dated 22 November 2005 - he was the first police officer to the scene at the Sovereign Motel, Figtree at 7.30 pm on 22 May 2005 and made observations of V and the premises;

(d) statement of Constable Liam Watson dated 6 October 2005 - he attended the Sovereign Motel, Figtree on 22 May 2005 and took possession of certain exhibits;

(e) statement of V dated 22 May 2005 - describing the circumstances leading up to and including the alleged offences committed on her on that day;

(f) an ERISP interview between police and the First Defendant at Goulburn Police Station on 15 November 2005 comprising some 272 questions and answers;

(g) certificate of fingerprint analysis dated 22 November 2005 of Detective Sergeant Nicholas John Barrett - with respect to the finding of the fingerprints of the First Defendant on items located in room 50 in the Sovereign Hotel, Figtree;

(h) statement of Senior Constable Darren Peter Knott dated 26 September 2005 concerning fingerprint examination of duct tape and a glossy black handbag;

(i) 21 photographs of Room 50, Sovereign Motel, Figtree on 22 May 2005 and the contents of that room;

18 Mr Arnott SC, for the Plaintiff, pointed to the following important features in the prosecution case:

(a) immediate complaint by V to the police;

(b) finding by the police of the cable tie in the motel room;

(c) when police arrived at the motel room, not only did V still have the duct tape around her wrists, it was entangled in her hair (photographs of V in this state were taken and included in the prosecution brief), but , in addition, police observed that her hands were noticeably slightly swollen and red from her blood circulation having being restricted;

(d) the First Defendant’s fingerprints were found on a piece of duct tape and on the outside of V’s black glossy handbag;

(e) the First Defendant’s DNA (semen) was found on the oral, pharyngeal and cheek/face smear swabs taken from V;

19 Shortly after 3.30 pm on Friday, 3 February 2006, Mr Bartlett sent by facsimile to Mr Love of the Wollongong Office of the DPP, a written application and written submission seeking that V attend to give evidence at the committal proceedings under ss.91 and 93 Criminal Procedure Act 1986. I shall return to aspects of this submission later in this judgment.

20 On 6 February 2006, advice was sent to the Police Prosecutors at Goulburn by Alison Dunn, Manager Support Services at the Wollongong Office of the DPP that Mr Love, solicitor, would be appearing in the four matters (including the First Defendant’s matter) in which the DPP was a party and which were listed at Goulburn Local Court on 8 February 2006 (paragraph 4, Affidavit, Joanne Meiers, 13 April 2006).

21 On Monday, 6 February 2006, Kristine Chapman, a solicitor in the Wollongong Office of the DPP, received Mr Bartlett’s s.91 application and submissions which had been transmitted by facsimile on the afternoon of 3 February 2006. On 6 February 2006, Ms Chapman attempted to contact Mr Bartlett, but was unsuccessful (paragraph 4, Affidavit, Kristine Chapman, 12 April 2006).

22 On 7 February 2006, Ms Joanne Meiers, a Prosecution Officer, Administration, at the Wollongong office of the DPP, was advised that Mr Love would not be attending Court the following day because he was suffering from a dislocated shoulder (apparently suffered on 6 or 7 February 2006) and was unable to drive a motor vehicle for any long distances. Mr Love verbally advised Ms Meiers of instructions he required to be sent for the matters in his practice which were in the list at Goulburn on 8 February 2006. Ms Meiers then required Ms Chapman to provide instructions in the First Defendant’s matter.

23 Ms Chapman was unable to attend Goulburn Local Court on 8 February 2006 in place of Mr Love as she was appearing in the DPP list at the Wollongong Local Court that day. Accordingly, Ms Chapman gave Ms Meiers instructions to be transmitted to the Goulburn Police Prosecutors. She told Ms Meiers:

“I have only just got the section 91 submissions so I will need a two-week adjournment. This is a Wollongong matter so can the matter be adjourned to Wollongong Local Court?”

“S91 representations from defence received 7/2/06. This office will require two weeks to respond. Matter should be returned to Wollongong LC for hearing. DPP list day at Wollongong is every Wednesday at 11.45 am.”

24 Because Mr Love was unable to drive through injury, on 7 February 2006 he wrote to the Registrar at Goulburn Local Court to advise of his non-attendance on 8 February 2006. The letter, which was addressed to the Second Defendant care of the Registrar, was in the following terms:

“I wish to advise the Court that due to a recent injury, I will be unable to attend Goulburn Local Court on Wednesday 8 February 2006. Due to the timing of the injury, there are no solicitors available to attend in my place. As a result, the Police Prosecutor has been asked to appear on behalf of the DPP in the following matters:

1. Murray Alan FITZSIMMONS H 25812106

2. Adon John BURNS H 25866762

3. Joshua Luke SHARWOOD H 25092121;

H 25778708

4. Anthony William O’CONNER H 270 82082

I note that a DPP solicitor will be present at Goulburn Local Court on Friday 10 February 2006. Should the DPP be required to appear in any of the above matters, it would be appreciated if the matter could be adjourned to 10 February 2006.”

25 The evidence before me reveals that the facsimile transmission of this letter was unsuccessful but that this was not realised at the time. Had this letter been received, the course of events on 8 February 2006 may have been altered significantly. An explanation was provided in the letter to the Court that an adjournment was needed due to a recent injury to Mr Love and that no other DPP solicitor was available to attend Goulburn Local Court in his place on 8 February 2006. It was noted that a DPP solicitor would be present at that Court on Friday 10 February 2006 and stated that, if the DPP was required to appear in any of the four stated matters (including the First Defendant’s matter), it was requested that the matter be adjourned to 10 February 2006. However, this letter was not received at the Goulburn Local Court.

26 On 7 February 2006, Ms Chapman attempted to contact Mr Bartlett and left a message for him to contact her. On 8 February 2006, when Ms Chapman arrived at work, there was a voicemail message from Mr Bartlett returning her call.

27 Ms Chapman rang Mr Bartlett at about 8.40 am on 8 February 2006. At that time, Mr Bartlett was driving to the Goulburn Courthouse. Affidavits of Ms Chapman and Mr Bartlett have been read in these proceedings and both were cross-examined before me. Although there is some difference in detail as to their recollections of the telephone conversation, there is, in my view, no dispute as to the substance. Ms Chapman indicated that she had recently received Mr Bartlett’s s.91 application and submission and that the prosecution would seek an adjournment for two weeks. Ms Chapman informed Mr Bartlett that Mr Love was injured and could not travel to Goulburn and thus Ms Chapman had been allocated the matter. Ms Chapman informed Mr Bartlett that the s.91 application was opposed and that an adjournment was needed by the prosecution to respond to the application. Mr Bartlett indicated that he would oppose the adjournment application.

The Hearing on 8 February 2006

28 In due course, on Wednesday 8 February 2006, the First Defendant’s matter was called on before the Second Defendant sitting at the Goulburn Local Court. The matter was No. 36 in the Court list. After some discussion concerning the return of a subpoena directed to the Commissioner for Police, the topic of the s.91 application arose for consideration:

“BARTLETT: Your Honour we were in court on 21 December and on that occasion I made a - I brought it to the Court’s attention I intended to make an application under section 91 for the complainant to attend court. Your Honour made certain directions in relation to the matter, namely that my application was to be served on the DPP by 3 February, which it was. There were no directions to file it so I’d hand it up. I have prepared the written application.

HIS HONOUR: I don’t usually need to see them, that’s why I don’t usually make those directions, but I don’t mind you handing it up now. The person to whom it ought be directed is the DPP and --

BARTLETT: It has been served on the DPP and certainly it’d be my application for that application to proceed today, your hearing on or your decision on whether the complainant should attend to give evidence at committal.

HIS HONOUR: Is there anyone here from the DPP?

BARTLETT: Your Honour I received a phone call from a Miss Chris Chapman whilst I was travelling to court to say she wasn’t coming and she would be seeking - asking the police to seek an adjournment. We’d oppose that.

HIS HONOUR: So do you have any instructions, sergeant?

PROSECUTOR: As always your Honour I appear by default on behalf of the DPP when they don’t turn up. I can simply ask that this matter be adjourned as I don’t have what you would call the proper instructions.

HIS HONOUR: Well I don’t mind standing it down so you can ring them and try and get some.

PROSECUTOR: Perhaps that might be the best thing your Honour, I certainly haven’t spoken …

…

HIS HONOUR: How did these become served on the DPP? You faxed them?

BARTLETT: I faxed them; I faxed them on 3rd and Miss Chapman confirmed she’d received them. She said she didn’t get them till Monday. Certainly I faxed them on Friday so I assume there is some delay in them getting from the fax machine to her desk.

HIS HONOUR: Oh well depends what time you faxed them I suppose, what time they popped out the other end. All sorts of things, but she might have been in court and didn’t go back to the office, who knows?

BARTLETT: I don’t know.

HIS HONOUR: Anyway how long do you think that’ll take you?

BARTLETT: Well they’re in writing, I mean --

HIS HONOUR: No no no, sorry I meant the prosecutor. How long do you think it’ll take you or someone on your behalf to contact the DPP to find out if they have any other bases for their application for an adjournment apart from what they’ve told you so far which appears to be nothing?

PROSECUTOR: It shouldn’t take long to contact them, the only problem is that I haven’t seen that letter, those instructions in writing. It’s just that I imagine I’ll have to discuss it with them at some stage too.

HIS HONOUR: Oh well not before 12?

PROSECUTOR: Thank you.

HIS HONOUR: Is that going to inconvenience you?

BARTLETT: No your Honour …”

29 Further discussion ensued between his Honour, Mr Bartlett and the Police Prosecutor concerning the ability of the First Defendant to appear in person from custody or by way of audio visual link and the matter was stood in the list until 2.00 pm.

30 Given the issues raised in these proceedings, it is appropriate to set out the contents of Mr Bartlett’s written submission which had been served on 3 February 2006:

“The defendant seeks the attendance of V at the committal hearing of the above listed charges so that she can be cross examined about the contents of the statement that she made to police on 22/5/05. The defendant would raise the following issues to support this application:

1. V is the complainant in the charges laid by police against the defendant. There is no other person who directly witnessed the acts complained of by [left blank] .

2. The Police Brief Facts describe the complainant as a ‘casual sex worker’. The complainant confirms in her statement that these allegations arose after she had advertised sex in return for money. Her occupation as a prostitute raises an issue of whether she is a person of good fame and character.

3. The complainant has some criminal record for dishonesty. This record raises the issue of her credibility as a witness of truth.

4. The complainant had a charge dismissed under s32 of the Mental Health Act [sic] in 1988 (as stated in the Police record). Having a charge dismissed under these circumstances raises an issue as to her reliability as a witness.

5. The defendant has only one prior conviction. This was for lower range PCA in 1986. He is now 39 years old and has no record for violence or dishonesty. There is nothing in his Police record that would indicate he is either violent or dishonest.

6. In paragraph 9 the complainant states that the defendant gave her $200 prior to the alleged offences. She also states in paragraph 9 .. ‘I turned around to my vinyl bag (apparently with the $200) … When I turned back he said .. ‘You are being held up’’ In paragraph 16 the complainant states: … ‘at some stage he had taken the 4 X $50 back from my hands that he had given me.’ If her complaint is followed through from paragraph 9, when the defendant gave her $200 it is extremely unclear when he took the money back. The complainant’s evidence in paragraph 9 raises the inference she had put the $200 in her bag. Why can’t the complainant clearly state what happened to that $200? It is extremely unusual for an armed robber to initially give their victim cash monies.

7. The complainant states (paragraph 11): ‘he was speaking to himself in some type of foreign language.’ The defendant only speaks English.

8. The complainant alleges in paragraph 11 of her statement: … ‘he then winded tape around my eyes, mouth and head’. She later states in paragraph 11: ‘When he put the tape over my head I could still see a little bit.’ If tape was around her eyes one of those statements may be untrue.

9. The complainant states (paragraph 12) ‘He then wound some more tape around my eyes and I could see a soft black fabric on top of the tape partially covering my right ear’. How could she still see when two lots of tape had been wound around her eyes? How could she see her right ear?

11. The complainant states (paragraph 13): … ‘he then got on top of me and stuck his penis in my mouth.’ How did that happen when the complainant stated in paragraph 11 that her mouth was taped?

12. In paragraph 11 the complainant states her hands were initially tied behind her back at the wrists with plastic ties. In paragraph 13 she states ‘I felt more tape being wound around my hands.’ How did the defendant tie her hands with tape (as shown in the police photos) when her wrists were already held together with plastic ties?

13. In paragraph 13 the complainant states .. ‘he used something to cut the plastic binding around my hands.’ How did this happen when the complainant was (apparently) bound with the plastic binding ties and taped? Did the plastic binding fall to the floor or not? The police photos indicate a black plastic tie on the floor and a plastic tie still on the left wrist of the complainant under the tape. Why are the final resting positions for the two plastic ties so different?

14. In paragraph 13 the complainant states she felt a ‘hard sharp blade pushed between my legs and the sharp end was pushed up against both thighs.’ There is no medical evidence to corroborate this incident. The SAIK kit results from Wollongong Hospital are not part of the brief of evidence. The defence wants to clarify exactly where and how this alleged knife was used to try and ascertain why there is no corroboration of this assault.

15. In paragraph 15 the complainant states: …’he released my hands slightly but they were still bound.’ How did he release her hands slightly when they are allegedly bound with tape? The police photos do not appear to show tape that has been loosened.

16. In paragraph 15 the complainant states: … ‘he took the black fabric from my head’. How did she see what this item was when her eyes were taped?

17. I [sic] paragraph 16 the complainant states: … ‘I got up from the bed and unwound my hands free.’ If she was bound as she has previously described how could she simply unwind her hands free?

18. The police photographs show the complainant’s wrists have tape still wrapped around them after she unwound her hands free. Why is this tape still around the complainant’s wrists after she has claimed to have ‘unwound my hands free’? How did she unwind her hands? The police photos appear to show the tape is broken. If that is the case, how did the complainant break tape of that strength when her hands were behind her back?

19. In paragraph 17 the complainant states: … ‘I then rang the Motel manager and told him what had happened.’ This conversation appears to be the first complaint (if a complaint was made). No statement has been supplied from the Motel manager. The defence would seek to ask the complainant what she told the Motel manager.

20. In paragraph 17 the complainant states she spoke to some uniformed police. Sergeant Christopher Francis Taylor has supplied a statement in which he says he was the first police officer on the scene. He says that the complainant ‘told him something’. Sergeant Taylor has seen fit not to include possible evidence of complaint (if there was one). The defence wants to ask the complainant what she told Sergeant Taylor.

21. It is not clear from the brief of evidence how many pieces of tape were recovered and where they were recovered from. The defence need to clarify with V exactly how many pieces of tape were allegedly used so that her evidence can be checked against the exhibits recovered from the scene.

The defendant would submit that there are numerous inconsistencies in the statement of complaint made by V. The defendant would submit that in all the circumstances there are special reasons why it is in the interests of justice that he be given the opportunity to clarify these issues prior to trial, by cross examining the complainant at committal.”

31 Returning to the events at Goulburn Local Court on 8 February 2006, the matter was called on at a later time and the Second Defendant enquired as to whether the Police Prosecutor had spoken with the DPP. Once again, given the issues raised in these proceedings, it is appropriate to set out in full what was said:

“HIS HONOUR: Have you been able to speak with the Crown, sergeant?

PROSECUTOR: No I haven’t been able to speak to them but I do have --

HIS HONOUR: That’ll do, we’ll just wait, there’s just an inquiry that didn’t need Mr O’Conner to be physically present for you to answer it that’s all. Anyway he’s here now. Now take a seat there Mr O’Conner. Mr Bartlett indicated whilst you were being brought up that he was seeking the section 91 application to proceed, I asked the police prosecutor whether he’d been able to speak to the Crown and as you were coming he said that he hasn’t and that’s as much that’s occurred.

Now what were you going to go and say?

PROSECUTOR: I have had them fax me some written instructions, I can put those - I’ll read those onto the record and I understand that they’re disputed but nevertheless they’re the instructions that I’ve got.

HIS HONOUR: Well firstly you’ve got my copy of Mr Bartlett’s submission.

PROSECUTOR: Oh yes, I’ll return that your Honour. The fax instructions that I received are section 91 representations from the defence, received 7 February 2006, ‘This office will require two weeks to respond. The matter should be returned to Wollongong Local Court for hearing. DPP list day at Wollongong is every Wednesday at 11.45 am.’ We attempted to ring the person who sent those instructions to us, we’re told that they weren’t working today, they’ll be in tomorrow and that’s as far as we’ve got your Honour.

HIS HONOUR: So if they weren’t working today and they’re in tomorrow who sent those?

PROSECUTOR: Yes it seems some - well I think what’s happened --

HIS HONOUR: I mean people often come in on their days off and work when they’re not required to.

PROSECUTOR: I can only assume that that may have happened this morning cause I note that the facts were sent this morning.

HIS HONOUR: Oh they could’ve gone home, yes that’s true.

PROSECUTOR: But I’m not able to assist cause we haven’t been able to speak to those people.

HIS HONOUR: Now Mr Bartlett what do you want to say?

BARTLETT: Your Honour I note the prosecutor has indicated the application was received on 7 February, I strongly dispute that. I faxed that application on 3 February in accordance with your directions. I have my fax coversheet here, it’s dated 3 February; I’ve noted in my diary I sent it on 3 February. 7th was yesterday, I did not send it on 7th, I sent it on 3rd. That information is wrong.

You gave directions on 21 December in this matter, the directions were that that application was to be sent to the DPP by 3 February, I complied with that direction. In my fax coversheet I indicated ‘Please find following, section 91 application for the attendance of

at the committal hearing for cross-examination. This application is before Goulburn Local Court on 8 February 2006, please contact me if you have any queries.’ Now I get a phone call at quarter to 9 on the way to court this morning, pull over to the side of the road and talk to a prosecutor who says ‘We’re not coming, I’ve told the police to get an adjournment.’

In my respectful submission that is simply not good enough, the Court gave clear directions. My understanding of what was to occur was quite clear, that this application would be dealt with today, Mr O’Conner is in custody. The committal hearing is being held up so that this - your decision in this matter can be heard, and for the prosecutor to say ‘We’re not coming’ in my respectful submissions is simply not good enough.

I’d oppose the change of venue, there’s no reason given for that. In my respectful submission the application’s been made in writing, the application is supported by the case law and we’d ask your Honour to make the decision whether you want this

to attend for cross-examination or not.

HIS HONOUR: Do you want to say anything about that sergeant?

PROSECUTOR: Well your Honour I don’t think it was in for the committal of a section 91 today, I think it may have if --

HIS HONOUR: It was in today for a paper committal or a section 91 argument. Mr Bartlett had to give notification to the Crown by 3 February as to which witnesses he would be seeking to have directed to attend. He says that he did it.

PROSECUTOR: Oh I can’t - I don’t have anything to say on that, I only have those limited instructions.

HIS HONOUR: But it was in for those two purposes, either a paper committal, if that was abandoned ie the section 91 argument, or it was in for determination of the argument.

PROSECUTOR: The only other thing I can add is that the reason I imagine that it’s been asked that this goes back to Wollongong is cause the incident happened in that area, it happened in Figtree which I understand is in the Wollongong area and I understand it’s a matter where things such as this which is basically a hearing - well not a hearing, a total hearing, but a hearing should happen in the area where the situation occurred, and not sent to other courts for a hearing.

So that’s the only thing I could think that the DPP would want me to put in relation to the reason that it’s to go to Wollongong.

HIS HONOUR: Oh I could work that part out. What do you think about the special circumstances argument advanced by Mr Bartlett?

PROSECUTOR: The only thing I can say your Honour is that you have my instructions, I’m not in a position to argue that in any way.

HIS HONOUR: Good.

BARTLETT: Your Honour --

HIS HONOUR: I’ve always found in the past Mr Bartlett that when you’ve been successful you really don’t want to run the risk of then becoming unsuccessful.

BARTLETT: Thank you your Honour.

HIS HONOUR

: That never stopped me from going on at length though I must say, as others pointed out to me time and time again.”

32 Following a further interruption, Mr Bartlett continued with his submissions on the s.91 application:

“BARTLETT: Well your Honour the point I was going to make is you’ll note in my submissions one of the main concerns we have about the complainant’s evidence is how her hands are tied with tape and how the plastic ties came to be where they were, and certainly it would have been my application that she give evidence in the witness box and demonstrate how her hands were tied in that way to clarify the situation.

HIS HONOUR: Isn’t it mandatory though?

BARTLETT: Beg your pardon?

HIS HONOUR: Isn’t it mandatory nowadays? Or is it not?

FURTHER DISCUSSION AS TO SUITABLE DATE

HIS HONOUR: There’s been so many recent amendments that I have something lodged in my mind that it’s now mandatory, or if not mandatory, almost for complainants to have their evidence given in that fashion.

BARTLETT: Yes your Honour, I’ll research the matter.

HIS HONOUR: Not only children. I understand what you’re saying, probably it has a lot of weight but I’ve got a vague memory of something coming, some amendment being made in the great legislative rush towards the end of the last year that made it compulsory almost.

FURTHER DISCUSSION AS TO SUITABLE DATE

HIS HONOUR: I’ll mark it CCTV so that we make sure that the facility’s there and I’ll hear from you on the day further, if I need to, if it isn’t a requirement.

BARTLETT: Yes, I’ll have to research that issue your Honour.”

33 At the conclusion of Mr Bartlett’s submissions, the Second Defendant gave the following judgment:

“HIS HONOUR: This is a matter where Anthony O’Conner has made an application for the attendance of one - application to the Court for direction to be given for the attendance of one witness at a committal hearing. The witness sought to be cross-examined is the complainant in allegations of aggravated sexual assault.

In those circumstances the law quite clearly requires the accused to demonstrate special reasons why the complainant ought be called to give evidence, or be cross-examined either at large or in relation to particular aspects of her purported evidence.

I note that when the matter was before this Court on 21 December 2005 it was clearly stated by the Court that the brief was to be served by 25 January 2006, with the matter back on 8 February 2006 for what I termed a reply to the brief, which was then contemplating either a paper committal or a s 91 argument.

I made a further direction that if Mr Bartlett, on behalf of the accused, was to make such an application he had to provide notification to the Crown pursuant to the relevant subsection of the Act, by 3 February 2006, and Mr O’Conner was directed to attend by way of AVL link, and bail was refused as it has been ever since Mr O’Conner first appeared before this Court on 16 November 2005.

Mr Bartlett says from the bar table, and no doubt can hand up the document if necessary, that he complied with the direction of the Court, and transmitted by way of facsimile the s 91 application to the Crown on 3 February 2006. I note that today, 8 February 2006, there is no attendance of Crown Solicitor. The police prosecutor has been forced to take up the matter at the last moment without adequate instructions, and in fact the matter had to be stood down for a number of reasons, one of which so that the police prosecutor could desperately attempt to contact the Director of Public Prosecution’s office in Wollongong to obtain some instructions of some sort in relation to the matter. Between the time of standing down two goals have been achieved, a) Mr O’Conner’s now before the Court so that Mr Bartlett could speak with him, and, secondly, the police prosecutor has obtained instructions of a very limited and brief nature from somebody at the Director of Public Prosecution’s office who’s no longer available, they not being at work today.

The police prosecutor has forlornly attempted to rebut and resist - I will withdraw the word ‘rebut’, resist Mr Bartlett’s application but can provide no grist to underpin his proposition. However, it is not up to the police prosecutor to prove the negative, so to speak, it is up - the onus is cast on Mr Bartlett to convince the Court on behalf of the accused that special circumstances exist. It seems to me, having regard to the decisions in the matter, and the material made out by Mr Bartlett on behalf of Mr O’Conner - which I now note they are different spellings of his surname, it is O’Conner on the charge sheet, and O’Connor on Mr Bartlett’s submission, but probably nothing as such turns on that - that having regard to those detailed submissions and given the nature of the case as advised to the Court in the two bail applications that have been made it would appear that the inconsistencies that Mr Bartlett says are redolent in the complainant’s statement are such that when taken together and considered as a whole and not individually there is a real chance that doubt could be raised in the Court’s mind as to whether any or all of the offences with which Mr O’Conner has been charged were actually committed by him, and that is especially so given what it is that he contends is the true situation pertaining.

In view of all of those matters taken together, as I said as a coagulation, I am satisfied that special circumstances do exist, that in the interests of justice

will be directed to attend cross-examination.”

34 Having made that direction, the Second Defendant adjourned the committal proceedings for hearing on 14 March 2006 at Goulburn Local Court.

35 Mr Bartlett informed the Court that no application was made for bail. The Police Prosecutor enquired as to the application for the matter to be transferred to Wollongong:

“PROSECUTOR: Hour Honour, just one thing, I’m sure I’ll be asked, --

HIS HONOUR: Mm.

PROSECUTOR: -- can I just ask, obviously the application to have the matter moved to Wollongong has been refused?

HIS HONOUR: Oh yes, sorry, I’ll say that as well.

I DO NOT PROPOSE TO MOVE THE MATTER FROM HERE TO WOLLONGONG.

If there was any such application on foot it would have been made previously. It may well have been, I’ve made no note of that.

I note that Mr O’Conner is being held at Goulburn, it would seem to me that the inconvenience to be occasioned to him moving him from Goulburn to Wollongong however, in custody, is far greater than any inconvenience that would be suffered by the complainant in attending not in custody at Goulburn. I was initially asked by the police prosecutor to remit the matter to Wollongong at a date some three weeks ago merely to fix another date to maintain or allow the Crown to be in a position to respond to an argument that they really ought to have been able to respond to today in accordance with the directions of the Court, and it seems to me that the balance of convenience rests in Mr O’Conner’s favour and THE MATTER WILL REMAIN HERE.”

36 On 8 March 2006, the present proceedings were commenced in this Court by Summons. As I have mentioned, the hearing of the Summons came before me as Duty Judge on 1 May 2006 and continued yesterday.

Nature of Relief Claimed by Plaintiff

37 The Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief and relief in the nature of mandamus under s. 69 Supreme Court Act 1970 with respect to the direction given by the Second Defendant on 8 February 2006 under ss.91 and 93 Criminal Procedure Act 1986. The applicable principles on such an application were stated by Hunt J (as his Honour then was) in Waterhouse v Gilmore (1988) 12 NSWLR 271 at 276-278. In order to warrant the grant of declaratory relief in relation to committal proceedings, the circumstances must be “most exceptional” or some “special reason” must be shown: Sankey v Whitlam (1978) 142 CLR 1 at 25-26, 81-82; Waterhouse v Gilmore at 277B. The undesirability of this Court intervening in committal proceedings has often been stressed: Waterhouse v Gilmore at 277B. A claim for declaratory relief is not to be used as a means of appeal except in special circumstances: Waterhouse v Gilmore at 277C-D.

38 As committal proceedings are purely executive in nature, it has been held that a Magistrate’s decision whether to commit for trial is not accessible to correction by this Court in the exercise of it supervisory jurisdiction at common law by way of prohibition or certiorari: Waterhouse v Gilmore at 275D-E. However, there is no obstacle to a grant of relief in the nature of mandamus under s.69 Supreme Court Act 1970 in relation to decisions given in the course of committal proceedings.

39 When mandamus is sought to command the relevant court to reconsider the matter before it according to law, it is usual practice to seek certiorari also in order to quash the erroneous determination and thus clear the way for the fresh consideration and determination of that matter. An inability to grant certiorari in relation to committal proceedings, however, will not stand in the way of a grant of mandamus: Waterhouse v Gilmore at 276C-D.

40 Relief in the nature of mandamus may be granted where there is an actual or constructive failure to exercise jurisdiction: Waterhouse v Gilmore at 276D-E; Saffron v Director of Public Prosecutions (1989) 16 NSWLR 397 at 399, 418-420.

41 The requirements of procedural fairness (including the audi alteram partem rule) extend to committal proceedings and this Court may grant relief where denial of procedural fairness is demonstrated in that context: Tahmindjis v Brown (1985) 60 ALR 120 at 133-134.

42 There have been a number of decisions of this Court where relief in the nature of mandamus, either with or without declaratory relief, has been granted with respect to an order under s.91 and s.93 Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (or their statutory predecessors in the Justices Act 1902) either requiring the attendance of a witness to give evidence in committal proceedings or declining to make such an order: Foley v Molan (Levine J, 20 August 1993, unreported, BC9301863); TS v George (Studdert J, 14 April 1998, unreported, BC9802154); Hanna v Kearney (Studdert J, 28 May 1998, unreported, BC9803179); Leahy v Price (Adams J, 28 September 1998, unreported, BC9804950); Dawson v Director of Public Prosecutions [1999] NSWSC 1147; JW v Director of Public Prosecutions [1999] NSWSC 1244; O’Hare v Director of Public Prosecutions [2000] NSWSC 430; Lawler v Johnson (2002) 56 NSWLR 1; McKirdy v McCosker (2002) 127 A Crim R 217; Director of Public Prosecutions v Rainibogi [2003] NSWSC 274 and Black v Director of Public Prosecutions [2003] NSWSC 442.

43 In the alternative to these remedies, the Plaintiff seeks leave to appeal under s.57(1)(b) Appeal and Review Act upon a ground that involves a question of law alone and contends that the order under challenge is an order made by a Magistrate in relation to a person in any committal proceedings for the purpose of that provision. The application for leave to appeal falls to be determined under s.58(1) Appeal and Review Act. If leave is given, the Court may determine an appeal against an order referred to in s.57(1)(b) by setting aside the order and making such other order as it thinks just or by dismissing the appeal: s.59(2).

44 Mr Siva submitted that the s.91 direction made on 8 February 2006 is not “an order that has been made by a Magistrate in relation to a person in any committal proceedings”. He submits that the s.91 order is not part of the committal proceedings, but is a step antecedent to the hearing of committal proceedings. Accordingly, he submits that such an order is not an order “in” the committal proceedings.

45 The Court may decline to exercise its jurisdiction to grant relief under s.69 Supreme Court Act 1970 where a statutory appeal is available: Meagher v Stephenson (1993) 30 NSWLR 736 at 738-9; Hill v King (1993) 31 NSWLR 654 at 656, 658-9. However, such a course is not mandatory. Even where a statutory avenue of appeal was available and may have been preferable, the Court has granted prerogative relief: Australian Securities and Investment Commission v Farley (2001) 51 NSWLR 494 at 500-501 (paragraph 24). In circumstances where it is contended that there is some doubt as to whether the statutory avenue of appeal, by leave, is available in this case, I will, in due course, give initial consideration to the Plaintiff’s application for declaratory relief and relief in the nature of mandamus. Mr Arnott SC submitted that this was the primary relief sought by the Plaintiff in this case.

Sections 91 and 93

Criminal Procedure Act 1986

46 Part 2 of Chapter 3 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (ss.47-120) provides for committal proceedings before the Local Court with respect to indictable offences. Division 3 of Part 2 of the Act (ss.71-96) provide for the adducing of prosecution evidence in committal proceedings.

47 Evidence for the prosecution must be given by written statements that are admissible as evidence: s.74(1). Written statements are to be served on the accused person: s.75. Section 91 is in the following terms:

“91 Witness may be directed to attend

(1) The Magistrate may direct the attendance at the committal proceedings of the person who made a written statement tendered as evidence under this Division. The direction may be given on the Magistrate’s own motion or on the application of the accused person or the prosecutor.

(2) The Magistrate must give the direction if an application is made by the accused person or the prosecutor and the other party consents to the direction being given.

(3) In any other circumstance, the Magistrate may give a direction only if satisfied that there are substantial reasons why, in the interests of justice, the witness should attend to give oral evidence. A direction may not be given if the written statement has already been admitted in evidence.

(4) The written statement is not admissible in evidence in the proceedings after the direction is given unless the Magistrate withdraws the direction. This does not affect a statement admitted in evidence before a direction is given.

(5) A direction given on the application of the accused person or the prosecutor may be withdrawn only:

(a) on the application, or with the consent, of the applicant, or

(b) if the applicant fails to appear, on the application of the other party.

(6) The regulations may make provision for or with respect to the determination of substantial reasons under subsection (3).

(7) If a person attends to give oral evidence because of a direction under this section, the Magistrate must not allow the person to be cross-examined in respect of matters that were not the basis of the reasons for giving the direction, unless the Magistrate is satisfied that there are substantial reasons why, in the interests of justice, the person should be cross-examined in respect of those matters.

(8) A direction may not be given under this section so as to require the attendance of the complainant in proceedings for a child sexual assault offence if the complainant:

(a) was under the age of 16 years:

(i) on the earliest date on which, or

(ii) at the beginning of the earliest period during which,

any child sexual assault offence to which the proceedings relate was allegedly committed, and

(b) is currently under the age of 18 years.

(9) For the purposes of subsection (8):

child sexual assault offence

means:

(a) a prescribed sexual offence, or

(b) an offence that, at the time it was committed, was a child sexual assault offence for the purposes of subsection (8), or

(c) an offence of attempting, or of conspiracy or incitement, to commit an offence referred to in paragraph (a) or (b).

complainant

, in relation to any proceedings, means the person, or any of the persons, against whom a prescribed sexual offence with which the accused person stands charged in those proceedings is alleged to have been committed, and includes:

(a) in relation to an offence under section 80E of the Crimes Act 1900, the person who is alleged to have been the subject of sexual servitude, and

(b) in relation to an offence under section 91D, 91E or 91F of the Crimes Act 1900, the person under the age of 18 years who is alleged to have participated in an act of child prostitution, and

(c) in relation to an offence under section 91G of the Crimes Act 1900, the person under the age of 18 years who is alleged to have been used for pornographic purposes.”

48 Section 92 provides as follows:

“92

When accused person may apply to have witness attend

(1) The accused person in any committal proceedings may not apply for a direction under section 91 unless the accused person has served on the prosecutor a notice requesting the attendance at the proceedings of the person who made the statement concerned.

(2) The notice must be served within the time set by the Magistrate.

(3) The last date for service of the notice set by the Magistrate must be at least 14 days before the time set by the Magistrate for taking the prosecution evidence in the committal proceedings.

(4) The Magistrate may specify a later date.”

49 Section 93 is in the following terms:

“93

Victim witnesses generally not to be cross-examined

(1) Despite section 91, in any committal proceedings in which the accused person is charged with an offence involving violence, the Magistrate may not, under that section, direct the attendance of an alleged victim of the offence who made a written statement unless the Magistrate is of the opinion that there are special reasons why the alleged victim should, in the interests of justice, attend to give oral evidence.

(2) The regulations may make provision for or with respect to the determination of any such special reasons.”

50 It was common ground in this case that the First Defendant was charged with an offence involving violence, as defined in s.94(1)(a) and (f) Criminal Procedure Act 1986 so that the provisions of s.93 were applicable in combination with those contained in s.91 of the Act.

51 The provisions now contained in ss.91 and 93 Criminal Procedure Act 1986 are the statutory successors to provisions enacted initially in this State more than a decade ago. In Kant v Director of Public Prosecutions (1994) 34 NSWLR 216 at 225D-E, Gleeson CJ (Clarke JA agreeing) observed that the general purpose of s.48EA Justices Act 1902 (the predecessor to ss.91 and 93) was not in doubt. The second reading speech revealed that the provision involved a restriction on cross-examination of victims so as to shorten the length of committal proceedings and to strike an appropriate balance between the rights of an accused person and the need to reduce the trauma that court proceedings impose on the victims of crime. Gleeson CJ noted the Minister’s statement that the result of the provision was that a victim would not have to suffer the trauma of giving evidence twice unless this is justified.

52 The nature and operation of the test involving the requirement of “special reasons” in the “interests of justice” has been considered in a number of decisions: B v Gould (1993) 67 A Crim R 297; R v Anderson (Court of Criminal Appeal, 15 February 1994, unreported); O’Hare v Director of Public Prosecutions; Director of Public Prosecutions v Rainibogi; TS v George; Tez v Longley (2004) 142 A Crim R 122. The meaning of the term “special reasons” was considered in those cases against the background of the particular factual circumstances of each case. In B v Gould, Studdert J provides examples of circumstances where “special reasons” might be found:

(a) if material placed before the Magistrate suggests that there is a real possibility that, if the alleged victim is subject to cross-examination, the accused person will not be committed to trial;

(b) if the alleged victim has given more than one version of an alleged offence and those versions are inconsistent.

53 A number of observations should be made about ss.91 and 93 Criminal Procedure Act 1986. Section 91(2) provides that the Magistrate must give a direction for the attendance of a witness if an application is made by the accused person or the prosecutor and the other party consents to the direction being given. In my view, this provision extends to a witness who is caught by s.93(1) of the Act. It is necessary to read ss.91 and 93 together. There is no good reason to confine the ability for an order to be made by consent to a s.91 “substantial reasons” case only. In this regard, I note that s.48E Justices Act 1902, in the form in which it stood prior to repeal in July 2003, contained in s.48E(1A) a consent provision such as s.91(2) of the present Act. Section 48E(2) dealt with both “substantial reasons” and “special reasons” cases. It is clear that a consent order could have been made with respect to a “special reasons” case under s.48E of the repealed Justices Act 1902. In my view, there is no good reason to adopt a different construction with respect to ss.91 and 93 of the present Act.

54 That said, however, there is no question of consent arising in this case. Indeed, the prosecution made clear that the s.91 application was opposed.

55 Section 91(5) provides that a direction given on the application of the accused person or the prosecutor may be withdrawn only in defined circumstances. The effect of this provision appears to be that any argument that a direction for attendance of a witness may be revisited, as an interlocutory order, is excluded by statute: cf Director of Public Prosecutions v Scheibel (2004) 145 A Crim R 576 at 584-5; Wong v Director of Public Prosecutions [2005] NSWSC 129 at paragraph 10. For that reason, it was not open to the Plaintiff to have the matter relisted before the Second Defendant for the purpose of a fully argued application to withdraw or revoke the direction which had been given on 8 February 2006. That course was not open because of s.91(5) of the Act. Accordingly, there is utility in the proceedings brought by the Plaintiff in this Court.

The Plaintiff’s Grounds

56 The Summons contained four grounds alleging that the Second Defendant had erred in law in:

“(i) failing to provide proper reasons for his ruling under s91 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 that the victim of the alleged offences involving violence be called upon to give evidence at committal.

(ii) having failed to give proper reasons for directing the victim of the alleged offences involving violence be called, failing then to specify what topic or topics might be the subject of cross examination.

(iii) holding that, from the written submissions served by the first defendant in support of his application under s.91 and s.93 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986, and the nature of the case as it appeared to the court in two bail applications, there were sufficient grounds for the court to find special reasons existed so that the victim of the alleged offences involving violence was directed to attend to be cross examined.

(iv) failing to comply with the procedural requirements pertaining to applications under ss.91 and 93 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 by Clauses 2.4 and 2.5 of the Local Court Practice Note 9/2003.”

57 At the hearing before me, Ground 4 was extended to include a claim that the Second Defendant had denied procedural fairness to the Plaintiff in the circumstances of the case.

Submissions of the Plaintiff

58 Mr Arnott SC submitted that the Plaintiff was denied procedural fairness on 8 February 2006. In support of this argument, he drew my attention to Local Court Practice Note 9 issued by his Honour Judge Price, the Chief Magistrate, on 13 August 2003, concerning procedures to be adopted for committal hearings in the Local Court for proceedings commenced on or after 7 July 2003. Practice Note 9 includes the following elements:

“2.

Case management after the first appearance

.

2.1 The Court will adjourn the matter for not less than eight weeks, allowing six weeks for service of the brief and two weeks for reply.

2.2 The matter will be listed for mention on the reply date.

2.3 On the reply date, any applications for a direction under s 91 Criminal Procedure Act 1986 will be considered either as a contested application or by consent. If by consent, agreement as per the Form 1 that forms part of this Practice Note is to be completed and signed by both parties and the presiding Magistrate.

2.4 If the s 91 application is contested or if s93 (special reasons) applies, the application will be set down for hearing at the earliest available opportunity. In such cases, a copy of the brief is to be delivered to the court not less than two days prior to the s 91/s 93 hearing, or as otherwise directed by the Court.

2.5 Submissions in support of contested s 91 applications are to be in writing, served on the other parties and filed with the court at least seven days before the application is heard.

2.6 If no application for a direction under s 91 is made, or a direction under s 91 is made by consent, the Court will set a date for a committal for trial or sentence on the first available date in the court diary.”

59 The Plaintiff submits that compliance with paragraphs 2.4 and 2.5 of the Practice Note in this case would have seen a longer period of time between the date when the s.91 application was served and the date when the matter was next before the Court. It was submitted that the Practice Note was intended to set down time standards which were to be followed. The Plaintiff submits that the Practice Note was not complied with in this case.

60 The Plaintiff submits that this factor, in combination with a number of other features, gave rise to a denial of procedural fairness in this case. Those additional features included (a) the inability of the DPP solicitor to attend court at Goulburn on 8 February 2006 for reasons which were made known to Mr Bartlett, but not to the learned Magistrate, (b) the approach taken by the Police Prosecutor which involved nothing more than the passing on of messages from the DPP with no active advocacy in support of the adjournment application or, for that matter, the s.91 application and (c) the refusal of the learned Magistrate to adjourn the matter at all although a significant question fell to be determined by his Honour but, in the absence of an adjournment, without any submissions or assistance from the prosecution on issues relevant to the application. The Plaintiff submits, in effect, that the application proceeded ex parte because no contribution at all was made by the Police Prosecutor to the substance of the argument once the adjournment was refused.

61 The Plaintiff relies upon Blazevski v Judges of the District Court of NSW (1992) 62 ALD 197 (10 November 1992, BC9101492), a decision of the NSW Court of Appeal, in support of the submission that denial of procedural fairness is demonstrated in this case. It was submitted that, as a result of the convergence of a series of unusual and unfortunate events, the learned Magistrate was left with a distorted picture as to the position of the DPP involving an apparently high-handed attitude that the proceedings ought be adjourned for two weeks because the prosecution said so. The true position was not made known to his Honour through a combination of factors involving the failure of Mr Love’s facsimile of 7 February 2006 to be transmitted, the factually erroneous message from Ms Meiers which was communicated and the fact that those who were present did not communicate to the learned Magistrate that it had been, at least, suggested that Mr Love’s injury had led to an unexpected inability for him to attend and the unavailability of any other DPP solicitor to do so at short notice.

62 It is submitted that the Plaintiff was deprived of the opportunity of making submissions in opposition to the application which would have had a material and significant impact upon the application.

63 The Plaintiff submits that his Honour failed to give reasons to enable his decision to be seen and understood: Soulemezis v Dudley (Holdings) Pty Limited (1987) 10 NSWLR 247 at 279; Downes v Director of Public Prosecutions [2000] NSWSC 1054 at paragraphs 14-19. His Honour’s reference to Mr Bartlett’s written submissions, and information provided in bail applications, did not amount to proper reasons. It was submitted that the written submissions canvassed a variety of matters and it is impossible to know which item or items the Magistrate considered as satisfying the test of “special reasons” in the “interests of justice” and why: Director of Public Prosecutions vRainibogi at paragraph 49.

64 The learned Magistrate was not provided with the prosecution brief, or parts thereof, including the statement of V. It is clear that a range of documents, including V’s statement, were in the possession of the solicitor for the First Defendant as they were referred to in his written submission. The Plaintiff submits that the failure of the Second Defendant to give proper reasons is compounded by the manner in which the application was determined involving, on the face of it, a bare acceptance of the matters contained in the written submissions (or at least some or them) without the learned Magistrate conducting an independent process of examining any part of the brief, including V’s statement.

65 The Plaintiff submits that in regards to asserted inconsistencies in V’s account (being the only specific matter to which the Second Defendant referred) his Honour misunderstood the question to be asked. A desire for cross-examination for the purpose of affecting the credibility of a witness in the eyes of the Court does not amount to special reasons: Goldsmith v Newman and South Australia (1992) 59 SASR 404 at 410; R v Kennedy (1997) 84 A Crim R 341 at 352. The Plaintiff noted that there may be a justification for oral examination where inconsistencies result in a defendant not knowing the case which he has to meet. However, the Plaintiff submits that that is not this case. The Plaintiff pointed to the statement of Studdert J in B v Gould at 303-4 as follows:

“Again, if the alleged victim has given more than one version of an alleged offence and those versions are inconsistent, this may warrant that the alleged victim attend for cross-examination under the section. I would caution however that the possibility always exists that a witness will be discredited and his or her testimony may be broken down in cross-examination. A recognition of that possibility and the confidence that the potential cross-examiner may express as to what may happen if he is given the opportunity to cross-examine could not of itself suffice to afford ‘special reasons’.”

66 Reliance was also placed upon the following observation of Sperling J in Boumelhem v Director of Public Prosecutions (2002) 135 A Crim R 454 at 458 (paragraph 23):

“As to the reference to inconsistent versions of events, there would be cases where it is not clear what version of events will be advanced as the case for the accused to meet. That may justify oral examination. But there is no such doubt in the present proceedings.”

67 The Plaintiff submitted that the matters relied upon in the First Defendant’s written submissions were not, in reality, inconsistencies of the type referred to in B v Gould and Boumelhem. The matters raised appear to rise no higher than a desire to clarify certain areas and, perhaps, to establish whether there is an inconsistency. That is not the concept which has been referred to in the authorities concerning the construction of this section.

68 The Plaintiff submits that his Honour accepted, without demur, the contention that there were inconsistencies in the complainant’s account and concluded “there is a real chance that doubt could be raised in the court’s mind as to whether any or all of the offences … were committed by [the defendant]”. The Plaintiff submits that his Honour’s short reasons do not disclose how he could come to this conclusion, let alone how he could accept the submission that there appeared to be inconsistencies “redolent in the complainant’s statement”. His Honour did not read the complainant’s statement.

69 The Plaintiff submits that his Honour did not give discrete consideration as to what topic or topics might be the subject of cross-examination and the limits of cross-examination: Director of Public Prosecutions v Rainibogi at paragraph 49.

70 The Plaintiff submits that, in the face of a very strong prosecution case, the areas of proposed cross-examination appeared to be a fishing expedition. Mr Arnott SC emphasises that the First Defendant had denied completely any involvement in the offence in his interview with police. Accordingly, the position taken by the defence, on that approach, involved an issue as to the identity of the offender. In this regard, although the learned Magistrate did not know that DNA evidence implicated the First Defendant, he was informed that there was fingerprint evidence implicating him in the offence.

71 After the hearing was adjourned from 1 May 2006 to 11 May 2006, Mr Siva provided a further written submission which states that his instructions were that the Second Defendant had been informed on a bail application on 21 December 2005 that the First Defendant now acknowledged that he had been in the room with V on 22 May 2005. There is no evidence before me that the Magistrate was so informed. Mr Bartlett swore an affidavit in the proceedings and attended on 1 May 2006 for cross-examination, but this matter was not raised on that day. Mr Arnott SC informed me at the resumed hearing that the prosecution did not know, at this time, whether such a statement had been made to the Second Defendant on 21 December 2005. I note, in this respect, that there is nothing in Mr Bartlett’s written submission of 3 February 2006 indicating that this was the position.

72 Mr Arnott SC submits that it would be erroneous to approach the resolution of the present matter upon the basis that this information, which was said to have been provided to the learned Magistrate at a bail application some six weeks before 8 February 2006 was, in some way, in his Honour’s mind at the time of his ruling on that day. Even if such an indication had been given at the bail application on 21 December 2005 (a matter about which I express no concluded view given the absence of evidence before me on the point), I am not prepared to accept, in the absence of any express statement in his Honour’s reasons and in the absence of any express statement in the written or oral submissions put to his Honour on 8 February 2006, that he did, in fact, take it into account.

73 In my view, the debate concerning this issue serves to highlight the inadequacy of the learned Magistrate’s reasons, a matter to which I will return later in this judgment.

Submissions of the First Defendant

74 Mr Siva submitted that there had been no denial of procedural fairness in this case. He submitted that Mr Bartlett had served his s.91 application and submission in accordance with the order of the Court and had made clear his intention to oppose an adjournment application on 8 February 2006. He submitted that the failure of the Plaintiff to communicate adequately with the Court or the Goulburn Police Prosecutor concerning the reasons for the adjournment application on that day was not a matter which should operate against the First Defendant. In substance, he submits that the learned Magistrate was informed of the prosecution application and the fact that it was opposed. He submits that Mr Bartlett was under no obligation to reveal to the learned Magistrate the fact that, as part of his conversation with Ms Chapman, he had been informed that an injury to Mr Love was said to be, in some way, linked to the adjournment application.

75 The First Defendant submits that the Police Prosecutor was present and made the adjournment application with such information as was available to him. The application was refused. The Police Prosecutor did not ask for an adjournment for a day or two. The only application was for a two-week adjournment and that application was refused.

76 Mr Siva submits that the Second Defendant’s reasons complied with the requirements of the law. He correctly instructed himself as to the onus of proof on the application and as to the need for the First Defendant to establish “special reasons”. Although his Honour’s reasons were short, Mr Siva submits that they revealed his thought processes sufficiently and involved a complete acceptance of Mr Bartlett’s written submissions.

77 Mr Siva submits that there is no obligation on the part of a Magistrate to identify, as part of a s.91 direction, the topics which are to be permissible areas for cross-examination. He submitted that s.91(7) operates at the time when the witness attends to give oral evidence and not at the time of the making of the s.91 direction. In any event, he submits that the appropriate conclusion is that his Honour directed that each of the areas specified in Mr Bartlett’s written submission were permissible areas of cross-examination.

78 Mr Siva submitted that Practice Note 9 had been amended since 1 January 2006 in a respect which was relevant to the present case. He submits, in any event, that there is no evidence that any person involved in the circumstances of this case was relying upon the provisions of the Practice Note to determine the procedures and times for steps to be taken where a s.91 application is to be made.

79 The First Defendant submitted that no case for declaratory relief or relief in the nature of mandamus had been demonstrated. The exceptional step of the Supreme Court interfering in committal proceedings which are presently on foot ought not be taken in this case. The s.91 direction had been given and the committal proceedings ought take place with V being called to give evidence in accordance with that direction.

Resolution of Competing Submissions

The Procedural Fairness Ground

80 In Blazevski, Kirby P (as his Honour then was) referred to cases where appellate courts will intervene on an appeal against the refusal of an adjournment and said at 200:

“In ‘particular circumstances’, therefore, appellate courts will resolutely intervene both for the assurance of justice and the manifest appearance of justice and to uphold the integrity of the system of justice. See

R v Sussex Justices; Ex parte McCarthy

[1924] 1 KB 256 (CA) at 258. Courts providing judicial review to rectify departures from the requirements of procedural fairness will likewise give relief for departures from such requirements which will have taken the trial court outside the proper exercise of its jurisdiction. In criminal cases, they will do so where the injustice has been done to the prosecution as well as to the accused. See for example

R v Dudley Justices; Ex parte Director of Public Prosecutions

, (Times Law Reports, 24 June 1992) at 10 (Mann LJ).”

81 In Nitiva v Director of Public Prosecutions [1999] NSWCA 332, the Court of Appeal (Sheller and Beazley JJA and Cole AJA) said at paragraph 64:

“The principles upon which an adjournment ought to be granted are well established. The court has a discretion to grant or refuse an adjournment. However, a refusal to grant an adjournment can, in certain circumstances, constitute a denial of procedural fairness: see

Sullivan v Department of Transport

(1978) 20 ALR 323. As Deane J said in that case at 343 ‘… it is important to remember that the relevant duty of the court is to ensure that a party is given a reasonable opportunity to present his case’.”

82 Practice Notes issued by the Chief Magistrate of the Local Court appear to have a statutory foundation: s.28B Local Courts Act 1982; cf Whalley v Commissioner of Police [2003] NSWSC 273 at paragraphs 10-18 concerning Supreme Court Practice Notes. However, there is no evidence in this case that any DPP solicitor was relying upon the Practice Note and was, in a sense, taken by surprise by the course taken which was inconsistent with the Practice Note. In these circumstances, although the Practice Note is part of the legislative and quasi-legislative background to a s.91 application, it does not have any substantial effect on the outcome of the proceedings.

83 The practical effect of what occurred on 8 February 2006, with the refusal of the Plaintiff’s adjournment application, was to deprive the Plaintiff of an effective opportunity to appear and to assist the Court in the making of an important decision affecting the committal proceedings. As Howie J observed in McKirdy v McCosker at 225 (paragraph 31), such an application is an important part of the committal proceedings. The parties who appear on behalf of the prosecutor and the accused person are expected to assist the Court in the determination of the statutory question falling for determination: McKirdy v McCosker at 225 (paragraphs 29-31).

84 In my view, the Second Defendant was not assisted at all by the approach adopted by the Police Prosecutor on 8 February 2006. The passive stance of the Police Prosecutor has contributed to the defective approach adopted by the Second Defendant. I accept that Mr Bartlett was entitled to oppose the application for adjournment. He had complied with the order of the Court and was ready to proceed. The First Defendant was in custody. Erroneous information provided to the Court concerning the date when he served his s.91 application was, no doubt, a source of irritation to him. It would, however, have been helpful if he had informed the learned Magistrate that Ms Chapman had mentioned Mr Love’s injury in the context of the prosecution’s adjournment application. Nevertheless, it was not an ex parte application. The police prosecutor was purporting to appear for the prosecution on the application. I do not make any criticism of Mr Bartlett for his omission in this respect.

85 I have given careful consideration to the Plaintiff’s submission that a denial of procedural fairness occurred in this case. The refusal of an adjournment in this case left the Court with no prosecution assistance in the determination of an important question. In that sense, the Plaintiff was not given a reasonable opportunity to present his case on the s.91 application. Nevertheless, because the Police Prosecutor was purporting to appear for the Plaintiff, however ineffectively on that day, I do not find that a denial of procedural fairness occurred in this case.

86 However, I am satisfied that the Plaintiff is entitled to relief which he seeks on other grounds.

The ss.91 and 93 Hearing

87 In circumstances where the learned Magistrate had refused the adjournment and the s.91 application was proceeding, in reality, without any contribution from the Police Prosecutor, there was, in my view, a heightened need for the learned Magistrate to scrutinise the application. The power to make a direction under s.91 and s.93 is an exceptional one. The court is required to have regard to all the circumstances of the particular case to determine whether it is satisfied that there are “special reasons” in the “interests of justice” to require the witness to attend.

88 Here, there was an uncritical acceptance of the First Defendant’s written submissions as satisfying the statutory test. It was apparent from the written submissions that the First Defendant’s solicitor had available to him V’s statement, the photographs of V and other material apparently contained in the police brief. Where his Honour had determined to proceed without prosecution submissions or assistance on the application, it was incumbent on him to request that he be provided with that material. If the Police Prosecutor did not have it, then the learned Magistrate ought to have requested Mr Bartlett to make it available. It was, after all, the First Defendant who bore the onus of satisfying the statutory test.

89 It was not appropriate for his Honour to approach the matter in a manner which involved the First Defendant’s application being granted, as if by default. I am satisfied that is what happened in this case.

90 A proper examination of the written submissions made by the First Defendant raised a very real question as to whether the “special reasons” test could be made out at all in the circumstances of the case. It seems to me that the alleged inconsistencies referred to in the written submissions, on examination, were not inconsistencies of the type referred to in B v Gould and in Boumelhem, that is saying two things which were clearly inconsistent with each other. On the written submissions put forward for the First Defendant, there were areas where clarification was sought to see if there was an inconsistency. That is not the concept, in my view, referred to in B v Gould and Boumelhem. It will, of course, be a matter for consideration in the circumstances of each particular case whether the inconsistencies class of “special reasons” can be made out. It does not seem to me, however, on the matters raised in the written submissions, that this head of argument could be made out in this case.

91 I am satisfied that a constructive, if not actual, failure to exercise jurisdiction has been demonstrated on the part of the Second Defendant by his failure to seek and examine any part of the prosecution brief and, in particular, the statement of V and the photographs referred therein.

The ss.91 and 93 Decision

92 I am satisfied that the Second Defendant has failed to give reasons for his direction in a manner which attracts a grant of relief as sought by the Plaintiff. I accept that due allowance must be made for the ex tempore form of his Honour’s reasons: Acuthan v Coates (1986) 6 NSWLR 472 at 476; Lawler v Johnson at 9. I accept also that there is a degree of informality that attends proceedings before a Magistrate and that there are constraints imposed upon the Local Court and those who appear before it by reason of the workload of that Court and the desirability of having matters, especially those of an interlocutory nature, determined expeditiously: McKirdy v McCosker at 225-6 (paragraph 32).

93 Nevertheless, I am satisfied that what has occurred here is, to use the words of Grove J in Black v Director of Public Prosecutions at paragraph 28, no more than the adoption by the Second Defendant of “a rhetorical statement” made by the First Defendant’s solicitor and that a failure to exercise jurisdiction has resulted. There is a requirement to give adequate reasons on applications under this provision: Lawler v Johnson (paragraph 57). This is so, in my view, especially given the final nature of a s.91 direction, absent s.91(5) circumstances. The reasons in this case, in my view, suffer from “a lamentable lack of clarity”: Dawson v Director of Public Prosecutions at paragraph 28. The learned Magistrate did not analyse the material before him in a way that disclosed the process of reasoning that led to his conclusion that the prerequisites of ss.91 and 93 had been satisfied: Leahy v Price at page 10.

94 The reasons of the learned Magistrate do not disclose how a conclusion could be reached that the alleged inconsistencies are “redolent in the complainant’s statement” in circumstances where his Honour did not examine that statement. The items raised in Mr Bartlett’s written submissions do not appear to support such a conclusion.

95 Nor is any foundation revealed for the expression of opinion that “there is a real chance that doubt could be raised in the court’s mind as to whether any or all of the offences with which Mr O’Connor has been charged were actually committed by him and that is especially so given what it is that he contends is the true situation pertaining”. There is no identification in the reasons of what the alleged “true situation pertaining” is said to be. The submissions made on behalf of the First Defendant invited acceptance of this as being a reference back to what was allegedly said to the Second Defendant on an earlier bail application; namely, that despite the First Defendant’s clear and categorical denial of being in the room at all in his lengthy ERISP with police, that there was now a concession that he was in the room after all. I have already indicated that there is no evidence before me of that matter. However, the fact that one is left to engage in a process of surmise and guesswork to attempt to understand the learned Magistrate’s reasons points clearly to a failure to give reasons that discharge the legal obligation imposed on him on this application.

96 The requirement for proper reasons was even greater in this case given the Second Defendant’s determination that the application would proceed with no prosecutor assisting the Court and making submissions. It was necessary, in these circumstances, if the application was to proceed at all, that the reasons for this decision be properly and fully articulated. They were not. This approach contributed to the constructive failure to exercise jurisdiction which occurred in this case.

97 I am satisfied that the apparent rolled-up acceptance by the Second Defendant of the matters referred to in Mr Bartlett’s written submission as satisfying the “special reasons” test was also erroneous. Section 91(7) requires a Magistrate to reveal in reasons for giving a direction under the section, the matters which are said to satisfy the statutory test. There has been a failure of the type identified in Director of Public Prosecutions v Rainibogi (at paragraph 49) resulting from the Second Defendant’s failure to consider the matters raised separately, and then as a totality.

98 Mr Siva submitted that the appropriate course in this case, even if there was some question about the range of matters that could be the subject of permissible cross-examination of V, was to leave it to the Magistrate at the committal proceedings to exercise the power under s.69 Criminal Procedure Act 1986 to terminate cross-examination on any particular matter if the Magistrate was satisfied that further cross-examination on that matter would not help the Magistrate to make a determination under ss.62 or 64 of the Act. I do not accept this submission.

99 In my view, it is necessary that there be a s.91 and s.93 application conducted according to law in this case. The very significant deficiencies identified in the present case should not be left to resolution during cross-examination of V. There should be a proper consideration, according to law, of the application that V be required to give evidence for the purpose of ss.91 and 93 of the Act.

Conclusion

100 I propose to make an order in the nature of mandamus pursuant to s.69 Supreme Court Act 1970, and to quash the direction given by the Second Defendant on 8 February 2006. In the circumstances, I do not consider that it is necessary to make a declaration. Nor is it necessary to further consider the question whether a statutory avenue of appeal is available, by leave, under s.57 Appeal and Review Act 2001.

101 The Plaintiff has sought an order for costs against the First Defendant. Mr Siva submits that, given the contribution of officers of the Plaintiff to events that occurred on 8 February 2006, I should not make a costs order against his client in the event that relief was granted.

102 I am satisfied that an order for costs should be made against the First Defendant. He has participated in the hearing before me and resisted the grant of relief on all bases. I have held that relief should be granted to the Plaintiff. In my view, costs should follow the event. I will, however, grant to the First Defendant a certificate under s.6 Suitors’ Fund Act 1951.

103 I make the following orders:

(a) the direction made by the Second Defendant on 8 February 2006 under ss.91 and 93 Criminal Procedure Act 1986 requiring V to attend to give evidence at the committal proceedings against the First Defendant is quashed;

(b) the matter is remitted to the Goulburn Local Court to be heard and determined according to law;

(c) the First Defendant is to pay the Plaintiff’s costs of and incidental to the Summons;

(d) the First Defendant is granted a certificate under s.6 Suitors’ Fund Act 1951 ;

(e) the order made by me on 1 May 2006 staying the committal proceedings until further order of the Court is dissolved;

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Citations

Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) v O'Conner [2006] NSWSC 458

Most Recent Citation

Tural v Potter; B a H v Magistrates' Court of Victoria [2000] VSC 80

Cases Citing This Decision

89

Antoun & Anor v The Queen [2005] HCATrans 823

Chandler v The Director of Public Prosecutions [2000] NSWCA 125

Cases Cited

22

Statutory Material Cited

7

O'Hare v DPP [2000] NSWSC 430

Hinch v Attorney-General (Vic) [1987] HCA 56

O'Hare v DPP [2000] NSWSC 430

Cited Sections

CITATION:	Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) v O’Conner [2006] NSWSC 458
HEARING DATE(S):	1 May 2006, 11 May 2006
JUDGMENT DATE :	12 May 2006
JUDGMENT OF:	Johnson J at 1
EX TEMPORE JUDGMENT DATE:	05/12/2006
DECISION:	1. The direction made by the Second Defendant on 8 February 2006 under ss.91 and 93 Criminal Procedure Act 1986 requiring V to attend to give evidence at the committal proceedings against the First Defendant is quashed.; 2. The matter is remitted to the Goulburn Local Court to be heard and determined according to law.; 3. The First Defendant is to pay the Plaintiff’s costs of and incidental to the Summons.; 4. The First Defendant is granted a certificate under s.6 Suitors’ Fund Act 1951.; 5. The order made by Johnson J on 1 May 2006 staying the committal proceedings until further order of the Court is dissolved.; 6. Orders may be entered forthwith.
CATCHWORDS:	CRIMINAL LAW - committal proceedings - direction under ss.91 and 93 Criminal Procedure Act 1986 that complainant attend to give evidence - refusal of prosecution application for adjournment of ss.91 and 93 application - whether denial of procedural fairness - special reasons test - whether actual or constructive failure by Magistrate to exercise jurisdiction on ss.91 and 93 application - legal status of Local Court Practice Note - adequacy of reasons for direction
LEGISLATION CITED:	Supreme Court Act 1970 Crimes (Local Courts Appeal and Review) Act 2001 Criminal Procedure Act 1986 Crimes Act 1900 Justices Act 1902 Local Courts Act 1982 Suitors’ Fund Act 1951
CASES CITED:	Waterhouse v Gilmore (1988) 12 NSWLR 271 Sankey v Whitlam (1978) 142 CLR 1 Saffron v Director of Public Prosecutions (1989) 16 NSWLR 397 Tahmindjis v Brown (1985) 60 ALR 120 Foley v Molan (Levine J, 20 August 1993, unreported, BC9301863) JW v Director of Public Prosecutions [1999] NSWSC 1244 McKirdy v McCosker (2002) 127 A Crim R 217 Leahy v Price (Adams J, 28 September 1998, unreported, BC9804950) Dawson v Director of Public Prosecutions [1999] NSWSC 1147 TS v George (Studdert J, 14 April 1998, unreported, BC9802154) Hanna v Kearney (Studdert J, 28 May 1998, unreported, BC9803179) O’Hare v Director of Public Prosecutions [2000] NSWSC 430 Lawler v Johnson (2002) 56 NSWLR 1 Director of Public Prosecutions v Rainibogi [2003] NSWSC 274 Black v Director of Public Prosecutions [2003] NSWSC 442 Meagher v Stephenson (1993) 30 NSWLR 736 Hill v King (1993) 31 NSWLR 654 Australian Securities and Investment Commission v Farley (2001) 51 NSWLR 494 Kant v Director of Public Prosecutions (1994) 34 NSWLR 216 B v Gould (1993) 67 A Crim R 297 R v Anderson (Court of Criminal Appeal, 15 February 1994, unreported) Tez v Longley (2004) 142 A Crim R 122 Director of Public Prosecutions v Scheibel (2004) 145 A Crim R 576 Wong v Director of Public Prosecutions [2005] NSWSC 129 Blazevski v Judges of the District Court of NSW (1992) 62 ALD 197 (Court of Appeal, 10 November 1992, BC9101492) Soulemezis v Dudley (Holdings) Pty Limited (1987) 10 NSWLR 247 Downes v Director of Public Prosecutions [2000] NSWSC 1054 Goldsmith v Newman and South Australia (1992) 59 SASR 404 R v Kennedy (1997) 84 A Crim R 341 Boumelhem v Director of Public Prosecutions (2002) 135 A Crim R 454 Nitiva v DPP [1999] NSWCA 332 Whalley v Commissioner of Police [2003] NSWSC 273 Acuthan v Coates (1986) 6 NSWLR 472
PARTIES:	Director of Public Prosecutions (Plaintiff) Anthony William O'Conner (also known as O'Connor) (First Defendant) Roger David Prowse, Magistrate (Second Defendant)
FILE NUMBER(S):	SC 11118/06
COUNSEL:	Mr D Arnott SC (Plaintiff) Mr S Siva (First Defendant)
SOLICITORS:	SC Kavanagh - Solicitor for Public Prosecutions (Plaintiff) Michael Bartlett - The Advocate Law Company Pty Limited (First Defendant)
LOWER COURT JURISDICTION:	Local Court
LOWER COURT FILE NUMBER(S):	---
LOWER COURT JUDICIAL OFFICER :	Roger Prowse, Magistrate
LOWER COURT DATE OF DECISION:	08/02/2006
LOWER COURT MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION:	---