Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v Tan

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CITATION: DPP (Cth) v Tan [2003] NSWSC 717
HEARING DATE(S): 30/07/03
JUDGMENT DATE:
7 August 2003
JUDGMENT OF: Shaw J
DECISION: (1) Dismiss the application of the defendant; (2) Costs be reserved.
CATCHWORDS: Proceeds of crime - whether restraining orders granted ex parte should be revoked - applicable principles in relation to proof
LEGISLATION CITED: Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Cth) ss 19, 42
Proceeds of Crime Act 1987 (Cth)
CASES CITED: Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 366;
Building Construction Employees and Builders' Labourers Federation of NSW v Minister for Industrial Relations (The BLF Case) (1986) 7 NSWLR 372;
Durham Holdings Pty Ltd v NSW (1999) 47 NSWLR 340; (2001) 205 CLR 399;
Kable v DPP (NSW) (1997) 189 CLR 51;
King v Union Steamship Co (1988) 166 CLR 1;
R v Kirby; Ex parte Boilermakers' Society of Australia (1956) 94 CLR 254;

PARTIES :

Director of Public Prosecutions (Commonwealth) - Plaintiff
Dante Tan - Defendant
FILE NUMBER(S): SC 11461/03
COUNSEL: T Muir - Plaintiff
C Steirn, SC with C Jones - Defendant
SOLICITORS: DPP (Cth) - Plaintiff
CK Lawyers - Defendant

      IN THE SUPREME COURT
      OF NEW SOUTH WALES
      COMMON LAW DIVISION

      Shaw J

      7 August 2003

      11461 of 2003

      Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) (Plaintiff)

      v

      Dante Tan (Defendant);

      Re The Matter of Specified Property of Universal Lionshare Pty Limited
      JUDGMENT

1 Shaw J: In this matter the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions (“the DPP”) has initiated proceedings pursuant to the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Cth) (“the Act”) to make restraining orders in respect of certain properties apparently owned by the defendant, Mr Tan, or Universal Lionshare Pty Ltd, of which the defendant is the only shareholder, director and officer. The nature of the order is that the property must not be disposed of or otherwise interfered with by any person.

2 The defendant applies by notice of motion to revoke those orders pursuant to s 42 of the Act.

3 The original restraint proceedings, granted ex parte, depended upon s 19 of the Act. That section provides that a restraining order ‘must’ be made if the Court is satisfied of certain pre-requisite conditions. The relevant statutory pre-requisite for the making of such an order is whether the Commonwealth DPP requests that an order be made (s 19(1)(c) of the Act), and there are ‘reasonable grounds to suspect’ that the property is, for relevant purposes, the proceeds of an indictable offence of the Commonwealth or a foreign indictable offence (s 19(d) of the Act).

4 The section goes on to provide that the Court must be satisfied that the authorised officer holds the suspicion on ‘reasonable grounds’ (s 19(1)(f) of the Act). If the Court is so satisfied, then the Court must make the restraining order (s 19(1) of the Act) unless satisfied of an exception in s 19(3) of the Act, which does not apply here.

5 The emphasis in the Act…

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Details
Case
[2003] NSWSC 717
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v Tan, the matter was heard in the Supreme Court of Victoria. The Director of Public Prosecutions sought the revocation of ex parte restraining orders that had been made under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Cth). The orders had been issued against Tan, who was suspected of involvement in criminal activities related to the proceeds of crime. The central issue was whether the restraining orders should be revoked based on the applicable principles concerning the standard of proof.

The court had to determine the standard of proof required to revoke restraining orders granted ex parte under the Proceeds of Crime Act. It was argued that the standard of proof for revocation should mirror the standard applied at the time the orders were initially made. The court also needed to consider whether there was sufficient evidence to justify the revocation of the orders. The Director of Public Prosecutions contended that the standard of proof required for revocation was lower than that required for making the orders in the first place, suggesting a balance between the rights of the accused and the need to prevent the dissipation of criminal assets.

The court held that the standard of proof required to revoke restraining orders under the Proceeds of Crime Act was the same as that required to make the orders ex parte. This meant that the burden of proof was on the party seeking revocation, and the evidence needed to be such that it would justify making the orders in the first place. The court found that the Director of Public Prosecutions had not met the required standard of proof, and therefore the orders were not revoked. The decision emphasised the importance of ensuring that the rights of the accused were protected, while also recognising the need to prevent the dissipation of criminal assets.

No final orders were made in this instance as the court found that the Director of Public Prosecutions had not met the required standard of proof. The case highlights the delicate balance that must be struck between the need to protect the rights of individuals and the imperative to combat the proceeds of crime.

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