Digital Cinema Network Pty Ltd v Omnilab Media Pty Limited

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Digital Cinema Network Pty Ltd v Omnilab Media Pty Limited [2013] FCA 1060

Citation: Digital Cinema Network Pty Ltd v Omnilab Media Pty Limited [2013] FCA 1060
Parties: DIGITAL CINEMA NETWORK PTY LTD (ACN 132 404 481) v OMNILAB MEDIA PTY LIMITED (ACN 002 585 391), OMNILAB MEDIA CINEMA SERVICES PTY LTD (ACN 145 363 391) and MICHAEL GEOFFREY SMITH
File number: VID 1077 of 2013
Judge: MURPHY J
Date of judgment: 18 October 2013
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – leave to appeal from interlocutory judgment – whether decision attended by suffıcient doubt — whether substantial injustice to party – whether primary judge’s decision based on error of fact – procedural fairness — discretion of trial judge — effect of Federal Court docket system
Legislation:

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth)
Foreign Evidence Act 1994 (Cth)

Cases cited: Adam P Brown Male Fashions Pty Ltd v Philip Morris Inc (1981) 148 CLR 170
Autodesk Inc and Anor v Dyason (No 2) (1993) 176 CLR 300
Brambles Holdings Ltd v Trade Practices Commission (1979) 28 ALR 191
Bright v Femcare Ltd & Anor (2002) 195 ALR 574
Cement Australia Pty Ltd & Ors v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2010) 187 FCR 261
Décor Corp Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCA 397
Digital Cinema Network Pty Ltd v Omnilab Media Pty Limited (No 2) [2011] FCA 509
Digital Cinema Network Pty Ltd v Omnilab Media Pty Limited [2013] FCA 497
House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499
In re the Will of F. B. Gilbert (dec) (1946) 46 SR (NSW) 318
Lennox v Amcor Ltd t/as Amcor Cartonboard (No 2) [2009] FCA 962
Omnilab Media Pty Ltd v Digital Cinema Network Pty Ltd [2011] FCAFC 166; 86 ACSR 674
Venus Adult Shops Pty Ltd & Ors v Fraserside Holdings Ltd & Anor (No 2) (2007) 239 ALR 724
Date of hearing: 17 October 2013
Date of last submissions: 16 October 2013
Place: Melbourne
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 71
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr S Senathirajah with Mr D Morgan
Solicitor for the Applicant: Corrs Chambers Westgarth
Counsel for the First and Second Respondents: Mr A J Sullivan QC and Mr C N Bova
Solicitor for the Respondents: Holding Redlich
Counsel for the Third Respondent: The Third Respondent did not appear

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

VID 1077 of 2013

BETWEEN:

DIGITAL CINEMA NETWORK PTY LTD (ACN 132 404 481)
Applicant

AND:

OMNILAB MEDIA PTY LIMITED (ACN 002 585 391)
First Respondent

OMNILAB MEDIA CINEMA SERVICES PTY LTD (ACN 145 363 391)
Second Respondent

MICHAEL GEOFFREY SMITH
Third Respondent

JUDGE:

MURPHY J

DATE OF ORDER:

17 OCTOBER 2013

WHERE MADE:

MELBOURNE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.Leave to appeal is refused.

2.The Applicant to pay the costs of the First and Second Respondents.

Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT…

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Details
Case
[2013] FCA 1060
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Digital Cinema Network Pty Ltd v Omnilab Media Pty Limited, the court was called upon to decide an application for leave to appeal against a decision made by the primary judge in a case involving international litigation and the acquisition of evidence from a foreign jurisdiction. The applicant, DCN, sought to appeal the refusal of the primary judge to issue a new letter of request to a United States District Court to compel the testimony of a witness, Mr Zylberstein. DCN contended that the primary judge had made a mistaken assumption about the facts, thereby misapplying her discretion, and that it had been denied natural justice due to the lack of opportunity to provide evidence and make submissions on certain matters. The court was required to determine whether the primary judge’s discretion was misapplied and whether DCN had been denied natural justice. Additionally, the court had to assess the importance of Mr Zylberstein’s evidence to DCN’s case and the procedural arguments regarding the nature of the application and the primary judge’s power to refuse it.

The court found that the primary judge’s conclusion that it was too late to send another letter to the Royal Courts of Justice was not clearly erroneous, and there was a basis for her view that DCN had ample opportunity to obtain Mr Zylberstein’s evidence. The court also noted that the importance of Mr Zylberstein’s evidence to DCN’s case was not as critical as DCN argued, considering that Mr Zylberstein had not cooperated with DCN or its solicitors and had indicated a weak recollection of the events. Furthermore, the court held that DCN had not been denied natural justice, as the primary judge was not required to give notice of her case management concerns before determining the interlocutory application on the material submitted. The court also rejected the argument that the primary judge had no power to refuse the "formal" interlocutory application made on 2 October. The court concluded that the primary judge’s decision involved the exercise of a discretion in a matter of case management, and appellate interference with such decisions must be kept in a tight rein.

In conclusion, the court dismissed the application for leave to appeal and ordered DCN to pay the costs of the Omnilab Parties. The court found no clear error in the primary judge’s decision and held that the procedural arguments advanced by DCN did not succeed. The ratio of the decision is that in matters of case management, appellate courts must exercise restraint in interfering with the primary judge's discretion, and parties must present the material on which they rely to avoid potential injustices.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

In any event this issue is ultimately unimportant because it is plain from her Honour’s reasons that she would have dismissed the application, and I have dismissed the application for leave to appeal on questions of substance rather than form. Whether the primary judge made mistaken assumption about the facts and whether the applicant was denied natural justice DCN contends that the exercise of discretion by the primary judge miscarried because her Honour took a mistaken view of the facts. In a similar vein, DCN contends that it was denied natural justice because, in reliance upon a mistaken view of the facts, her Honour dismissed the application without giving DCN the opportunity to put on evidence and make submissions which would have shown the error: Lennox v Amcor Ltd t/as Amcor Cartonboard (No 2) [2009] FCA 962; Autodesk Inc and Anor v Dyason (No 2) (1993) 176 CLR 300 at 309 per Brennan J; Venus Adult Shops Pty Ltd and Ors v Fraserside Holdings Ltd and Anor (No 2) (2007) 239 ALR 724 at [6] per French and Kiefel JJ. DCN’s contention that it was denied natural justice is based on the following arguments:(a)The primary judge did not:i.inform DCN that its alleged failure to prosecute its application in the United States; andii.an alleged delay in making the application to the Federal Court;may be relevant to her Honour’s decision on the application;(b)The primary judge did not provide an opportunity to the applicant to put on any evidence on those matters and consider that evidence; and(c)The primary judge did not provide an opportunity to make submissions in relation to those matters and consider those submissions. It may be accepted that one of the possible deficiencies in an informal approach to bringing interlocutory applications is that it may give rise to a practice that the parties do not put the same quality of material forward in support of the application as they might have done had it been made more formally. This is though a matter for the parties. Even when an application is not made on Form 35 it remains incumbent on the party seeking the order to put forward the material on which it relies. While it would clearly have been preferable for DCN to have understood her Honour’s case management concerns and to have addressed them by evidence and submissions, I do not accept that her Honour was required to give notice to DCN of these concerns before determining the interlocutory application on the material it submitted. It must be remembered that the question being dealt with was not one of high principle, but rather one of case management. The Court does not lightly seek the assistance of a foreign court and where it appeared there was delay and there had already been ample opportunity the primary judge was able to determine the application on the material put forward. Further, in my view DCN overstates the facts which her Honour misapprehended. In the reasons the primary judge observed at [8] that “[t]he questions raised by the United States District Court remain unanswered”, and at [17] that “the Applicant took none of the steps which were required of it to give effect to the order.” In response, DCN correctly notes that its US attorney had in fact responded to the US District Court and had by 15 August obtained an order in relation to Mr Zylberstein’s evidence.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

In summary the applicant makes the following submissions, which I deal with below:(a)Mr Zylberstein’s evidence is critical to DCN’s case;(b)the 11 September Application was not an interlocutory application for the purposes of the Rules. The applicant therefore argues that the Court could not refuse to entertain the “formal” interlocutory application made on 2 October;(c)even if the 11 September Application was an interlocutory application the primary judge had no power to refuse to accept the “formal” interlocutory application for filing on 2 October; (d)DCN was denied natural justice; and(e)the primary judge’s discretion miscarried in that the primary judge’s decision was based in factual errors.The importance of Mr Zylberstein’s evidence It may be accepted that Mr Zylberstein’s evidence may well be material to the case. Had this not been so the primary judge would not have ordered the issue of the letters of request to the US District Court in the first place. However, I am not satisfied that the evidence is as critical or vital as DCN contends. By this I do not decide that Mr Zylberstein’s evidence could not prove valuable to DCN’s claim. I offer these remarks only as part of my assessment as to the extent of any injustice that may be suffered by DCN if leave to appeal is not granted (on the assumption that the decision to be appealed is wrong). There are numerous indicators from which I infer that it is unlikely that Mr Zylberstein will be as valuable in DCN’s case as it argues. First, Mr Zylberstein has not provided a proof of evidence and appears to have not even advised Corrs what he is prepared to say. I infer that he has not cooperated with DCN or its solicitors which I see as a sign that his evidence will not assist. Similarly, through a Disney lawyer, he advised by letter of 6 September that he had only a weak recollection of the events and issues surrounding the negotiations with Mr Smith regarding the VPF agreements and did not consider that he had relevant evidence to give. The gap between the evidence that DCN hopes that Mr Zylberstein will give and that which appears more likely is shown in the outlines of evidence filed in the proceeding. In the outline of his evidence filed by DCN dated 1 February 2013, DCN said that it expected that Mr Zylberstein would give the following evidence in the quantum trial:Disney would have entered into a VPF agreement with DCN in or around September 2010 on terms substantially the same as those contained in the draft VPF agreements then being exchanged. The cross examination of Mr Hogan revealed that this outline was not based on any proof of evidence or even advice provided by Mr Zylberstein. I infer that it is more a statement of what DCN hopes his evidence will be. This is apparent too from an earlier outline of evidence served in December 2010 for the liability hearing. In this outline DCN said that it expected Mr Zylberstein would give the following evidence:But for the events set out above, it is likely that the VPF agreements that DCN had been negotiating with Disney would have already been executed and operative.

Decision

Reasons for decision

I can see no clear error in the primary judge’s conclusion that by 11 September it was too late for another letter to be sent to the Royal Courts of Justice. Her Honour considered that it was not established that the necessary logistical arrangements could be made in the time available, and the evidence does not show that view to be erroneous. Her Honour considered that DCN had ample opportunity to obtain Mr Zylberstein’s evidence and had not taken it. There was a basis for this view as Mr Zylberstein’s country of residence was readily ascertainable on social media or by a telephone call. CONCLUSION The primary judge’s decision involved the exercise of a discretion in a matter of case management. A tight rein must be kept on appellate interference with such decisions. I refuse the application for leave to appeal and order DCN to pay the costs of the Omnilab Parties.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

On 10 October 2013 the applicants filed the application for leave to appeal. On 10 October 2013 the primary judge provided reasons for the refusal to issue a new letter of request in relation to Mr Zylberstein.CONSIDERATION In summary the applicant makes the following submissions, which I deal with below:(a)Mr Zylberstein’s evidence is critical to DCN’s case;(b)the 11 September Application was not an interlocutory application for the purposes of the Rules. The applicant therefore argues that the Court could not refuse to entertain the “formal” interlocutory application made on 2 October;(c)even if the 11 September Application was an interlocutory application the primary judge had no power to refuse to accept the “formal” interlocutory application for filing on 2 October; (d)DCN was denied natural justice; and(e)the primary judge’s discretion miscarried in that the primary judge’s decision was based in factual errors.The importance of Mr Zylberstein’s evidence It may be accepted that Mr Zylberstein’s evidence may well be material to the case. Had this not been so the primary judge would not have ordered the issue of the letters of request to the US District Court in the first place. However, I am not satisfied that the evidence is as critical or vital as DCN contends. By this I do not decide that Mr Zylberstein’s evidence could not prove valuable to DCN’s claim. I offer these remarks only as part of my assessment as to the extent of any injustice that may be suffered by DCN if leave to appeal is not granted (on the assumption that the decision to be appealed is wrong). There are numerous indicators from which I infer that it is unlikely that Mr Zylberstein will be as valuable in DCN’s case as it argues. First, Mr Zylberstein has not provided a proof of evidence and appears to have not even advised Corrs what he is prepared to say. I infer that he has not cooperated with DCN or its solicitors which I see as a sign that his evidence will not assist. Similarly, through a Disney lawyer, he advised by letter of 6 September that he had only a weak recollection of the events and issues surrounding the negotiations with Mr Smith regarding the VPF agreements and did not consider that he had relevant evidence to give. The gap between the evidence that DCN hopes that Mr Zylberstein will give and that which appears more likely is shown in the outlines of evidence filed in the proceeding. In the outline of his evidence filed by DCN dated 1 February 2013, DCN said that it expected that Mr Zylberstein would give the following evidence in the quantum trial:Disney would have entered into a VPF agreement with DCN in or around September 2010 on terms substantially the same as those contained in the draft VPF agreements then being exchanged. The cross examination of Mr Hogan revealed that this outline was not based on any proof of evidence or even advice provided by Mr Zylberstein. I infer that it is more a statement of what DCN hopes his evidence will be.