Diehm v Director of Public Prosecutions (Nauru)

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

FRENCH CJ,
KIEFEL AND BELL JJ

TERRENCE JOHN DIEHM & ANOR  APPELLANTS

AND

DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS
(NAURU)  RESPONDENT

Diehm v Director of Public Prosecutions (Nauru)

[2013] HCA 42

30 October 2013

B15/2012

ORDER

1.An extension of time to appeal be granted.

2.Appeal dismissed.

On appeal from the Supreme Court of Nauru

Representation

S J Lee for the appellants (instructed by Gadens Lawyers)

P J Hannebery for the respondent (instructed by Department of Justice and Border Control – Republic of Nauru)

Notice:  This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.

Diehm v Director of Public Prosecutions (Nauru)

Criminal law – Practice and procedure – Duties of prosecutor – Duty of prosecutor to call all material witnesses – Appellants convicted of rape – Only one of two police officers who attended scene called to give evidence – Whether failure of prosecutor to call second officer occasioned miscarriage of justice.

Criminal law – Practice and procedure – Statutory power and duty of trial judge to call witness of own motion – Scope of duty – Whether evidence of uncalled witness "essential to the just decision of the case".

Criminal law – Evidence – Depositions – Statement of uncalled witness not in evidence – Trial judge referred to statement to determine effect of failure to call witness – Whether reference to statement occasioned breach of natural justice.

Words and phrases – "essential to the just decision of the case", "fair trial", "material witness", "miscarriage of justice".

Criminal Code (Q), ss 7, 348.
Criminal Procedure Act 1972 (Nauru), ss 100(1), 188.
Laws Repeal and Adopting Ordinance 1922 (Nauru), s 12.

FRENCH CJ, KIEFEL AND BELL JJ.

Introduction

  1. On 14 June 2011, the first and second appellants, who are husband and wife respectively, were charged with the rape, on that day, of a woman regarded by custom as the wife's niece, contrary to ss 7 and 348 of the Criminal Code (Q) ("the Code"). The Code as it stood on 1 July 1921 is applied as the law of the Republic of Nauru by virtue of s 12 of the Laws Repeal and Adopting Ordinance 1922 (Nauru).  Each of the appellants pleaded not guilty in the District Court of Nauru on 2 August 2011.  Following the entry of their pleas of not guilty and a preliminary inquiry in the District Court of Nauru, the appellants were committed to trial in the Supreme Court of Nauru.  The trial was by judge alone, as required by s 188 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1972 (Nauru) ("the CPA").  The charges were tried by Eames CJ between 23 and 28 November 2011.  The appellants were represented by a person who appeared as a "pleader", having completed a course conducted by the judiciary in Nauru.  He had no law degree and was not admitted as a legal practitioner.  On 29 November 2011, the trial judge delivered reasons for judgment in which…

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Details
Case
[2013] HCA 42
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of *Diehm v Director of Public Prosecutions (Nauru)* concerned an appeal against convictions for rape. The appellants, Mr and Mrs Diehm, argued that a miscarriage of justice had occurred because the prosecution failed to call a material witness, Constable Harris, who had attended the scene with Senior Constable Deireragea. The appeal was heard by French CJ, Kiefel and Bell JJ.

The central legal issues before the court were whether the prosecutor's failure to call Constable Harris constituted a miscarriage of justice, and whether the trial judge had erred in referring to Constable Harris's statement, which was not formally in evidence, when considering the impact of his absence. The court also considered the scope of a trial judge's statutory power and duty to call a witness of their own motion, specifically when that witness's evidence is considered "essential to the just decision of the case."

The court reasoned that the trial judge had carefully considered the evidence, including the conflicting accounts of what was said upon the police's arrival at the appellants' home. While the trial judge noted the absence of Constable Harris and referred to his statement to assess the impact of this absence on the defence's ability to challenge Senior Constable Deireragea's evidence, the court found that this reference did not occasion a breach of natural justice. The trial judge ultimately found Senior Constable Deireragea's evidence credible and concluded that the absence of Constable Harris did not prevent a just decision, as the core of the prosecution's case was supported by other evidence, including the complainant's distress.

The court granted an extension of time to appeal but ultimately dismissed the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. An extension of time to appeal be granted.

2. Appeal dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

FRENCH CJ, KIEFEL AND BELL JJ
The submissions and exchanges in closing addresses did not include any suggestion by the trial judge or either of the representatives at the bar table that anything should then be done to arrange for Constable Harris to be called as a witness. The focus of the argument was whether his absence meant that the trial judge could not be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt on matters vital to a verdict of guilty against the appellants. This was reflected in the way that the trial judge dealt with Constable Harris' statement in his judgment. The judgment The trial judge reviewed the evidence carefully and comprehensively. He noted that the police log of the phone call from the complainant's mother to the police station did not report a complaint of rape or threatened rape[6]. The log recorded that the complainant's mother "needed police assistance to check her daughter [who] has called her a minute ago and told her that she was locked up in the house by the couples Mr and Mrs Diehm"[7]. His Honour observed that the report that the complainant was locked up in the house added some credibility to the evidence of the first appellant that he was asked by the police officers whether there was a Nauruan woman locked up in the house. On the other hand, the fact of the phone call being made added credibility to the complainant's evidence that she was not consenting to anything and regarded herself as somehow in peril[8]. [6][2011] NRSC 24 at [49].[7][2011] NRSC 24 at [47].[8][2011] NRSC 24 at [49]. The trial judge found the complainant was distressed after the events said to constitute the offences. She had been distressed and fearful when speaking to her mother. His Honour accepted Senior Constable Deireragea's account of the significant degree of distress exhibited by the complainant and of her appearance of being fearful. The first appellant's denial of that distress damaged his credibility[9]. [9][2011] NRSC 24 at [72]–[76]. The trial judge referred to the conflict between the evidence of the first appellant and that of Senior Constable Deireragea as to what was said when the police arrived at the house and, in particular, the first appellant's assertion that the officers asked whether there was a Nauruan locked up in the house. His Honour noted that the conversation between Deireragea and the first appellant took place in the presence of Constable Harris, who had been due to give evidence but did not, because of his involvement in a personal domestic dispute and because he was too drunk to come to court[10]. The trial judge found the evidence of Senior Constable Deireragea to be measured and credible[11]. His Honour dealt with the absence of Constable Harris and his written witness statement in the following way[12]: "More importantly, I have examined the statement of Constable Dillon Harris, which was tendered at committal. No application was made to tender his deposition from the committal, pursuant to s 199 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1972, but it is a matter of fairness that causes me to refer to it.In his statement he recorded 'Sgt Decima then informed Mr Diehm that there was a report at his dwelling regarding a lady locked up in his dwelling. Mr Diehm then stated that there was no lady locked up inside her (sic) dwelling' [his Honour's emphasis].The absence of Constable Dillon Harris has denied the defence the chance to explore that conflict in the evidence of the two police officers. I queried with Mr Kurisaqila whether he could responsibly invite the Court to reject Terry Diehm's account about what was said, and invite me to accept that of Sen Const Deireragea, having regard to what is contained in the statement of the untested witness. The Director submitted that Deireragea asked questions which specifically referred to another person being in the house, and to [the complainant] being in the house, and whether or not the words 'locked up' had been used it was plain that the Senior Constable put clear questions which were met by lies." [10][2011] NRSC 24 at [77]–[79].[11][2011] NRSC 24 at [80].[12][2011] NRSC 24 at [83]–[86].

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: FRENCH CJ, KIEFEL AND BELL JJ