Dickson v The Queen - [2016] HCATrans 307

[2016] HCATrans 307

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
SYDNEY No S171 of 2016

B e t w e e n -
ANTHONY JAMES DICKSON
Applicant
and
THE QUEEN
Respondent
Application for special leave to appeal

BELL J
KEANE J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT SYDNEY ON FRIDAY, 16 DECEMBER 2016, AT 12.16 PM

MS R.L. SEIDEN, SC: May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MR W.P. LOWE, for the applicant. (instructed by Tully & Chiper Lawyers)

MR M.G. McHUGH, SC: May it please your Honours, I appear with my learned junior, MR S. FLOOD, for the respondent Crown. (instructed by Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth))

BELL J: Yes.

MS SEIDEN: Thank you, your Honours. Your Honours, if I could start with the indictment, which your Honours will find at application book, page 5, and the first count of which the applicant was convicted of, and your Honours will note the two confederates to the conspiracy and the time period, 15 November 2005 to 2 December 2011:

did conspire with each other to dishonestly cause a loss or to dishonestly cause a risk of a loss to a third person, namely the Commonwealth –

Count 6 is on the next page, and your Honours will note the same confederates and substantially the same time period, between 15 November 2005 and 26 June 2012, they:

did conspire with each other to deal with property . . . believing it to be the proceeds of crime.

the property being the proceeds from the first conspiracy, your Honours.

BELL J: Yes.

MS SEIDEN: If we might start with count 6, for that raises the question, the significant question the applicant contends, how to ensure that an accused is not convicted of the same conspiracy twice and, your Honours, Agius provided one solution to that question and that was to ensure that the time periods for each conspiracy are mutually exclusive, and that follows from the fact that the conspiracy, the offence of conspiracy, is continuing in the existence of an agreement to dishonestly do something during a specified time period. So the offence lies in the continuation of the state of affairs through the two time periods. So, if one has mutually exclusive time periods, there can be two offences of conspiracy, but here we have overlapping time periods and ‑ ‑ ‑

BELL J: Overlapping time periods but a different agreement.

MS SEIDEN: Well, your Honour, it is submitted that it was the same agreement. The Court of Criminal Appeal found there was one overarching scheme and the trial judge in the first interlocutory decision described it as one agreement and the question of whether there was one agreement did not go to the jury.

If I could take your Honours to the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal; it is at application book, the relevant passage is page 441, and the very…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Dickson v The Queen

Details

AGLC: Dickson v The Queen [2016] HCATrans 307
Case: [2016] HCATrans 307
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of *Dickson v The Queen* concerned an appeal by the applicant, Dickson, against his conviction for murder. The dispute arose from Dickson's assertion that he had acted in self-defence when he killed the victim. The appeal was heard by Bell and Keane JJ of the Supreme Court of Queensland.

The central legal issue before the Court was whether the trial judge had erred in law by failing to adequately direct the jury on the issue of self-defence, specifically concerning the applicant's subjective belief as to the necessity of using force. The applicant argued that the jury instructions did not sufficiently explain that the assessment of self-defence should be based on the applicant's own perception of the circumstances, even if that perception was mistaken.

Bell and Keane JJ allowed the appeal, quashing the conviction and ordering a new trial. Their Honours held that the jury directions at trial were inadequate because they did not clearly convey that the question of whether the applicant believed it was necessary to use force, and whether that force was reasonably necessary, was to be determined by reference to the applicant's subjective state of mind. The Court reiterated the principle that the defence of self-defence requires an honest and reasonable belief in the necessity of using force, and that the reasonableness of the belief is assessed from the perspective of the accused, given the circumstances as he perceived them. The failure to properly direct the jury on this subjective element constituted a material error of law.

Orders