Dickens v Dickens Dickens v Dickens - [2015] HCASL 142

DICKENS
v
DICKENS
DICKENS
v
DICKENS
[2015] HCASL 142
S83/2015
S84/2015

On 7 June 2013, the Family Court of Australia (Rees J) made orders varying parenting orders which had been made on 20 December 2011 in relation to the applicant's and the respondent's two children; and, on 16 September 2014, Johnston J made further orders suspending contact between the applicant and the younger of those two children.
On 14 April 2015, Ainslie-Wallace J refused applications by the applicant for extensions of time in which to appeal against those orders. As her Honour noted in her reasons for judgment, the application for extension of time in which to appeal against the orders of Rees J was some 21 months out of time and the application for extension of time in which to appeal from the orders of Johnston J was six months out of time, and the applicant did not offer any satisfactory reason for his delay in either case. The judge also found that there was no merit in the applicant's proposed grounds of appeal in either case.
The applicant now seeks special leave to appeal from the rejection of both applications for extension of time. As the applicant does not have legal representation, the application falls to be dealt with under r 41.10 of the High Court Rules 2004.
Ainslie-Wallace J decided each application for extension of time in accordance with settled principle, and hence no point of general principle would fall for consideration if special leave to appeal were granted in either case. Nor has the applicant advanced a sufficient reason to doubt the soundness of Ainslie-Wallace J's exercise of discretion in either case.
It is, therefore, not in the interests of justice generally or in these particular cases that special leave to appeal be granted.
Pursuant to r 41.10.5 we direct the Registrar to draw up, sign and seal orders dismissing each application.

G.A.A. Nettle
3 September 2015 M.M. Gordon

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

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Details

Case: [2015] HCASL 142
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Dickens v Dickens concerns an applicant's attempts to appeal decisions made by the Family Court of Australia concerning parenting orders related to his two children. The Family Court had previously varied and suspended contact orders in relation to the applicant's children, and the applicant sought extensions of time to appeal these decisions. Ainslie-Wallace J rejected the applicant's applications for extensions of time, finding that they were significantly out of time and that the applicant did not provide satisfactory reasons for the delay. The applicant, unrepresented, now seeks special leave to appeal from the refusal of these applications.

The central legal issues in this case are whether Ainslie-Wallace J correctly exercised her discretion in denying the extensions of time and whether the applicant has provided a sufficient reason to doubt the soundness of this exercise of discretion. The court must also determine whether granting special leave to appeal would be in the interests of justice generally or in the particular circumstances of this case.

The High Court found that Ainslie-Wallace J had correctly exercised her discretion in denying the extensions of time, as the applications were significantly out of time and the applicant did not provide satisfactory reasons for the delay. The Court noted that the judge's decisions were in accordance with established principles and there was no merit in the proposed grounds of appeal. Furthermore, the Court concluded that there was no sufficient reason to doubt the soundness of the judge's exercise of discretion, and that granting special leave to appeal would not be in the interests of justice generally or in these particular cases.

The High Court dismissed both applications for special leave to appeal. Pursuant to r 41.10.5 of the High Court Rules 2004, the Registrar was directed to draw up, sign and seal orders dismissing each application. The Court's decision reaffirms the importance of timely applications and the need for satisfactory reasons to be provided for any delay in seeking extensions of time in family law matters.

Orders