Diamond Ace Super Fund Pty Ltd v Rodapa Development Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Diamond Ace Super Fund Pty Ltd v Rodapa Development Pty Ltd
[2020] FCA 1582

File number: ACD 45 of 2019
Judge: GRIFFITHS J
Date of judgment: 2 November 2020
Catchwords: COSTS – application for an order that the second respondent, third respondent and non-party sole director of those respondents be jointly and severally liable to pay the applicants’ costs of the proceeding on the normal basis – whether the second and third respondent surrendered or capitulated to the substantive relief – whether the reasonableness of the parties’ conduct was relevant – whether a non-party costs order should be made – order made as sought  
Cases cited:

Arawak Holdings Pty Ltd v King Tide Company Ltd [2018] QCA 148

Australian Law Company Pty Ltd v Initiative Holdings Pty Ltd [2019] FCA 1561

Chapman v Luminis Pty Ltd [2003] FCAFC 162

Dunghutti Elders Council (Aboriginal Corporation) RNTBC v Registrar of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Corporation (No 4) [2012] FCAFC 50; 200 FCR 154

FPM Constructions v Council of the City of Blue Mountains [2005] NSWCA 340

Hooke v Bux Global Ltd (No 8) [2019] FCA 671

Jeffery & Katauskas Pty Ltd v SST Consulting Pty Ltd [2009] HCA 43; 239 CLR 75

Knight v FP Special Assets Ltd [1992] HCA 28; 174 CLR 178

Murphy v Mackay Labour Hire Pty Ltd [2018] QCA 90

Re the Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of the Commonwealth of Australia; Ex parte Lai Qin [1997] HCA 6; 186 CLR 622

Travaglini v Raccuia [2012] FCA 620

Vanguard 2017 Pty Ltd; in the matter ofModena Properties Pty Ltd v Modena Properties Pty Ltd (No 2) [2018] FCA 1461

Yates Property Corporation Pty Ltd v Boland (No 2) [1997] FCA 760

Yates v Boland [2000] FCA 1895

Zhao v Suzhou Haishun Investment Management Co Ltd [2020] VSCA 34

Registry: Australian Capital Territory
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations
Sub-area: Corporations and Corporate Insolvency
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 76
Counsel for the Applicants: Mr M A Karam
Solicitor for the Applicants: McInnes Wilson Lawyers
Counsel for the First Respondent: The First Respondent did not file an appearance
Counsel for the Second and Third Respondents: Mr P Somers
Solicitor for the Second and Third Respondents: Bennett & Philp Lawyers

ORDERS

ACD 45 of 2019
BETWEEN:

DIAMOND ACE SUPER FUND PTY LTD (ACN 611 351 163)

First Applicant

RANCE INVESTMENTS PTY LTD (ACN 057 138 208)

Second Applicant

PETROZE PTY LTD (ACN 103 401 083) (and another named in the Schedule)

Third Applicant

AND:

RODAPA DEVELOPMENT PTY LTD (ACN 606 267 725)

First Respondent

PRIMWOOD INVESTMENTS PTY LTD (ACN 607 560 270)

Second Respondent

PRIMROSE 35 PTY LTD (ACN 610 520 682)

Third Respondent

JUDGE:

GRIFFITHS J

DATE OF ORDER:

2 NOVEMBER 2020

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The second and third respondents and David Hunt are jointly and severally liable to pay the applicants’ costs of and incidental to the proceeding on the normal basis,…

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Details
Case
[2020] FCA 1582
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicants, Diamond Ace Super Fund Pty Ltd and others, sought an order for costs against the respondents, Rodapa Development Pty Ltd and others, and Mr David Hunt in the Federal Court of Australia. The applicants had initiated proceedings against the respondents, who were trustees of various trusts, alleging improper administration and potential dissipation of trust funds. The substantive proceeding was dismissed, and the applicants now sought costs on the ordinary basis, including against Mr Hunt, who was a director of the respondent companies. The court had to determine whether the second and third respondents had effectively surrendered or capitulated to the applicants' claims, thereby warranting an award of costs. Additionally, the court had to consider whether a non-party, Mr Hunt, could be held liable for costs due to his role and interest in the proceedings. The court found that the second and third respondents had indeed surrendered to the applicants' claims by consenting to the appointment of new trustees without contesting the applicants' allegations. This surrender was a strong ground for awarding costs to the applicants. The court also found that Mr Hunt, by funding the respondents' opposition and having a personal interest in the proceedings, was liable for costs. Consequently, the court made an order that the second and third respondents, as well as Mr Hunt, were jointly and severally liable for the applicants' costs on the ordinary basis.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The second and third respondents and David Hunt are jointly and severally liable to pay the applicants’ costs of and incidental to the proceeding on the normal basis, as agreed or taxed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the following reasons, I consider that the second and third respondents and Mr David Hunt should be jointly and severally liable for the applicants’ costs on the ordinary basis. Summary of background facts On 25 March 2020, the Court made orders which had the effect of finalising the substantive proceeding, without any hearing, save for the issue of costs. The orders were expressly unopposed by the second and third respondents. The previous trustees were replaced by new trustees and the substantive proceeding was dismissed. It is noted that the first respondent did not lodge a notice of appearance in the proceeding but the order on 25 March 2020 dismissing the proceeding applied to it and no issue as to costs has been raised viz a viz the first respondent. In brief, in the substantive proceeding (which was commenced on 26 June 2019), the applicants sought the removal and replacement of the trustees of three trusts. The first respondent is the corporate trustee for the Hood Street Development Unit Trust (Hood Trust); the second respondent is the trustee of the Primrose Street Trust (Primrose Street Trust), and the third respondent is the trustee of the Primrose 35 Trust (Primrose 35 Trust). Mr Hunt was a director of each of the three respondent companies at all relevant times. The three trusts were originally established for the purpose of conducting three separate apartment development projects in the suburb of Sherwood in Queensland. The applicants claimed that:(a)the first applicant (Diamond Ace) invested in the first and third projects and became a beneficiary of the Hood Trust and the Primrose 35 Trust; and (b)all four applicants (i.e. Diamond Ace, Rance Investments Pty Ltd, Petroze Pty Ltd and Briash Pty Ltd) invested in the second project and became beneficiaries of the Primrose Street Trust, each seeking to obtain a financial return on the completion and sale of the apartments. The applicants claimed that the respondents did not properly administer the three trusts and may have caused trust funds to have been dissipated to the detriment of unit holders. Costs In support of their interlocutory application on costs the applicants rely on two affidavits by their instructing solicitor, Ms Shelley Mulherin, which are dated 19 February and 16 March 2020 respectively. The second and third respondents rely upon an affidavit by Mr David Hunt sworn 2 March 2020 and an affidavit sworn 2 March 2020 by their instructing solicitor, Mr Lachlan Thorburn. The applicants say that the second and third respondents should pay their costs in accordance with the normal rule. They also contend that Mr Hunt should be liable to pay costs because:(a)he funded the opposition by the second and third respondents to the applicants’ proceeding (before those parties consented in December 2019 to new trustees being appointed);(b)he had a personal interest in the subject matter of the proceeding, given that it principally related to his conduct as director of each of the respondent trustee companies and involved allegations of breach of duties in dealings with other entities related to him; and (c)he caused the proceeding against the first respondent to be delayed.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

For these reasons, and while acknowledging that a costs order is generally only made against a non-party in exceptional circumstances, I am satisfied that it is appropriate in the particular circumstances here that such an order should be made. Conclusion For these reasons, orders will be made that the second and third respondents, as well as Mr Hunt, pay the applicants’ costs of and incidental to the proceeding on an ordinary basis, as agreed or taxed. Those costs include the costs of the interlocutory application filed on 19 February 2020.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Both the applicants and the second and third respondents filed supplementary written submissions concerning the correct test to be applied in determining costs. To avoid adding to the length of these reasons, I will address that matter in the next section of these reasons for judgment. Consideration and determination In Australian Law Company Pty Ltd v Initiative Holdings Pty Ltd [2019] FCA 1561 at [16] to [21], I summarised some of the relevant principles relating to matters which are raised for determination in the present proceeding as follows:(a)The starting point is that costs normally are assessed having regard to the approach of McHugh J in Re the Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of the Commonwealth of Australia; Ex parte Lai Qin [1997] HCA 6; 186 CLR 622 at [9]. In a case where it appears that both parties have acted reasonably in commencing and defending the proceeding and that conduct continues to be reasonable until the litigation is settled, the proper exercise of the Court’s cost discretion usually means that there is no order as to costs. (b)However, as McKerracher J pointed out in Travaglini v Raccuia [2012] FCA 620 at [13], a distinction is drawn in cases where one party effectively surrenders, as opposed to a case in which a supervening event renders the proceeding futile or moot. In the former case, it is often appropriate to make an award of costs in favour of the party receiving the effective surrender. This distinction was recognised by the Full Court in Chapman v Luminis Pty Ltd [2003] FCAFC 162 at [7]. (c)It is clear that the Court may make a costs order against a non-party (including on an indemnity basis): see, for example, Vanguard 2017 Pty Ltd; in the matter ofModena Properties Pty Ltd v Modena Properties Pty Ltd (No 2) [2018] FCA 1461 and Hooke v Bux Global Ltd (No 8) [2019] FCA 671. I would also add a reference to the following passage from the recent decision of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Victoria in Zhao v Suzhou Haishun Investment Management Co Ltd [2020] VSCA 34 at [12] (Tate, McLeish and Hargrave JJA) (emphasis added):… We accept as a general principle that where a party litigates for some time and then acts so as to effectively surrender or capitulate to the other, that will usually be a strong ground to award costs against the party who has surrendered or capitulated. But each case will depend on its own facts. The relevant principles concerning costs orders against a non-party are set out in cases such as Knight; Jeffrey & Katauskas and Dunghutti Elders Council (Aboriginal Corporation) RNTBC v Registrar of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Corporation (No 4) [2012] FCAFC 50; 200 FCR 154. As the Full Court observed in Dunghutti at [89]:We think that the only precondition to the exercise of power [to order a non-party to pay costs] would have to be that the non-party has a sufficient connection with the unsuccessful party and the litigation to warrant the Court exercising its jurisdiction. The connection between the non-party and the unsuccessful party in the litigation must be material to the question of costs… . The Full Court added at [90] that an order for costs against a non-party is only made in “exceptional circumstances”.