DGS v GRS

[2012] QDC 74

DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

DGS v GRS [2012] QDC 74

PARTIES:

DGS
(Appellant)

AND

GRS
(Respondent)

FILE NO/S:

Appeal 3389/11; MAG53328/11 (3)

DIVISION:

PROCEEDING:

Appeal

ORIGINATING COURT:

District Court, Brisbane

DELIVERED ON:

2 May 2012

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

11 January 2012

JUDGE:

McGill DCJ

ORDER:

Appeal dismissed.

CATCHWORDS:

FAMILY LAW – Domestic Violence – whether complaints to authorities capable of being intimidation or harassment - whether findings of fact justified – appeal dismissed.

Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 1989 s 11.

BBB v RAB [2006] QDC 80 – considered.
Kebby v Waldron (1943) 43 SR (NSW) 342 – applied.
LJC v KGC [2012] QDC 67 – followed.
MAN v MAM [2003] QDC 398 – considered.
Parsons v Raby [2007] QCA 98 – applied.

COUNSEL:

H.R. Trotman for the appellant

The respondent in person

SOLICITORS:

Michael Lynch Family Lawyers for the appellant

The respondent was not represented

1. This is an appeal under the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 1989 (“the Act”) against a protection order made on 9 August 2011 against the appellant on the application of the respondent. The appeal is by way of rehearing on the record: s 65 of the Act. There was a hearing which extended over two days in the Magistrates Court.[1] In addition, transcripts of the proceeding and decision on an earlier occasion in that court in relation to another matter under the Act between the parties were put in evidence, along with the application for the order dated 25 March 2011, a temporary protection order made on that day, affidavits of each of the parties, and two bundles of material produced on subpoena, a number of police occurrence reports, and the records of a psychiatrist.

   [1]Apart from the parties, two witnesses gave evidence and there was material subpoenaed from the Police Service which appears to have been treated as in evidence.

1. The case is unusual because the domestic violence relied on for making the order was in the form of harassment or intimidation, largely by means of complaints to various authorities about the behaviour of the respondent, some of which alleged criminal behaviour in respect of the child of the parties.  There was also one incident of a different nature, causing a private investigator to go to the respondent’s home under the pretence of being a potential tenant, which was also found to be part of a course of conduct.  It was submitted on behalf of the appellant that this latter finding was wrong because there was no evidence that the respondent was in fact intimidated or harassed by this incident, that the other matters referred to by the magistrate were not capable of constituting intimidation or harassment, and that in any case there was no proper basis on the evidence upon which the magistrate could properly have found that these incidents had occurred.  It was also submitted that there was no proper basis for a finding that it was likely that the appellant would commit a further act…