DFY18 v Minister for Home Affairs
[2019] FCCA 2407
•29 August 2019
FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| DFY18 v MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS & ANOR | [2019] FCCA 2407 |
| Catchwords: MIGRATION – Immigration Assessment Authority – application for a Safe Haven Enterprise visa – whether the Authority failed to accept new information – whether the Authority failed to exercise its power under s.473DC(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – whether the Authority was unreasonable not to exercise the power under s 473DC(3) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – whether the Authority fell into jurisdictional error in making its findings – whether the Authority overlooked the applicant’s statutory declaration – whether the Authority’s reasoning process was legally unreasonable – whether the Authority took on the role of arbiter of doctrine with respect to religion – no jurisdictional error made out – application is dismissed. |
| Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.5AAA, 36, 473BA, 473DA, 473DC, 473DD, 473FB |
| Cases cited: ASW17 v Minster for Home Affairs [2018] FCA 1815 |
| Applicant: | DFY18 |
| First Respondent: | MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS |
| Second Respondent: | IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY |
| File Number: | SYG 1745 of 2018 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Humphreys |
| Hearing date: | 27 August 2019 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 27 August 2019 |
| Delivered at: | Parramatta |
| Delivered on: | 29 August 2019 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicant: | Mr Zipser |
| Solicitors for the Applicant: | Stamford Law Firm |
| Solicitors for the Respondents: | Mr Moss, Clayton Utz |
ORDERS
The application is dismissed.
The Applicant to pay the First Respondent’s costs fixed in the amount of $7,328.00.
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT PARRAMATTA |
SYG 1745 of 2018
| DFY18 |
Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS |
First Respondent
| IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY |
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR EX TEMPORE JUDGMENT
(Revised from Transcript)
Introduction
The applicant is an Iranian national. The applicant arrived in Australian waters by boat in May 2013. The applicant left Iran on his own passport in April 2013. On 16 February 2017, the applicant lodged an application for a Safe Haven Enterprise visa. On 10 January 18, a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (“the Minister”) refused the application. The applicant was referred to the Immigration Assessment Authority (“the Authority”) for merits review. On 25 May 2018, the Authority affirmed the Minister’s decision. The applicant now seeks judicial review of the Authority’s decision with this Court. The application was filed on 22 June 2018.
Immigration Assessment Authority’s Decision
At paragraph 4 of the decision, the Authority notes the written submissions received from the applicant’s legal representative:
To the extent these submissions contain legal argument and discussed the findings of the delegate I consider that they do not constitute new information.
At paragraph 5 of the Authority’s decision, new information suggesting the establishment of special courts with jurisdiction over Iranian citizens returning from overseas was rejected, as its source of information could not be verified. The source information was provided by a hyperlink, which was not in conformance with the practice directions of the Court. Further, the precise title of the document had also not been provided.
At paragraph 6 of the decision, the Authority rejected a reference to a purported Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (“DFAT”) report regarding the perception of returning asylum seekers as being anti-regime. It determined s 473FB(5) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”) had not been complied with and the Authority rejected that information.
At paragraph 7 of the decision, the Authority accepts statements from three witnesses discussing the applicant’s Christian activities. These statements were accepted into evidence.
At paragraph 8 of the decision, the Authority outlines the applicant’s claims. They may be summarised as follows:
· The applicant’s father is ethnically Kurdish and his mother is Arab. They are strict Shia adherents.
· While at school the applicant was teased about how his mother dressed and spoke. He was expelled from high school for arguing with his deputy principal.
· He is his parents’ only son and was able to avoid military service in the Iranian military.
· As the applicant became older, he came to consider aspects of Islam unreasonable and outdated. He was harassed and detained by Iranian authorities for being “un-Islamic”.
· The applicant states he went to Sweden to study, as two of his sisters lived there.
· In November 2009 he claims he departed Iran on his own passport to Syria. From Syria he travelled on a passport in the name of another person.
· After three months in Sweden he decided to return to Iran. He contacted the Iranian embassy to obtain a temporary travel document, as the person who had arranged his travel from Syria to Sweden had taken the applicant’s passport.
· In February 2010 he arrived in Iran and was interrogated for about four hours, then released and told to report to the passport office at a later date. He was then transferred to a prison and held for three days, before being released on bail.
· He was charged with leaving Iran illegally, convicted and, upon review, sentenced to pay a large fine in lieu of three months’ imprisonment.
· He again left Iran and travelled to Australia on his own passport, in April 2013.
· Since arriving in Australia the applicant has attended Christian church services and was baptised in early November 2016.
· He states he attended regular services and bible study groups.
· He claims that if returned to Iran he would openly practice his Christian faith, be accused of apostasy, which is punishable by death.
At paragraph 9 of the decision, the Authority accepts the applicant’s identity and nationality as claimed. At paragraphs 10 to 12 of the decision, the Authority notes the applicant’s claim that he had left Iran on both trips to Sweden and Australia, on his legally issued passport. The Authority is prepared to accept the applicant was subject to detention, questioning and a fine following his travel to and from Sweden, however, the fact that he left Iran for Australia legally, is evidence that he is no longer of adverse interest to Iranian authorities.
At paragraphs 13 to 24 of the decision, the Authority deals with the applicant’s claimed conversion to Christianity. The Authority does not accept that the applicant is a genuine follower of Christianity. At paragraph 31 of the decision, the Authority notes the applicant’s Christian-related activities only occurred after he arrived in Australia. This conduct is, therefore, disregarded for the purposes of section 5J(6) of the Act. The Authority accepts that the applicant is a non-practicing Shia Muslim. Country information suggests that a large part of the city population are non-practicing Muslims and are rarely questioned about their religious practices or pressured to observe Muslim precepts.
At paragraph 32 of the decision, the Authority does not accept the applicant would experience harm if he was returned for reasons of religion. At paragraphs 27 to 29 of the decision, the Authority does accept it is possible that the applicant suffered some low-level discrimination due to his ethnicity. Country information suggests that it would not rise to a level such of serious harm. At paragraph 28 of the decision, the Authority does not accept the applicant faces a real chance of harm for being young, socialising with friends or appearing un-Islamic or due to his previous travel to Sweden, given that the issue was resolved with a fine.
At paragraphs 34 to 37 of the decision, the Authority deals with the issue of the applicant returning to Iran as a failed asylum seeker. The Authority notes that there is nothing to indicate the applicant has done anything to attract the adverse attention of Iranian authorities since leaving Iran and arriving in Australia. If the applicant faced issues upon his return, the Authority notes his capacity to resolve those issues, as he has done before. In any event, the Authority was not satisfied that the Iranian authorities would know or assume that the applicant sought asylum in Australia. At paragraph 38 of the decision, the Authority concludes that the applicant does not meet the criteria under s 36(2)(a) of the Act.
At paragraphs 39 to 44 of the decision, the Authority deals with complimentary protection considerations. At paragraph 44 of the decision, the Authority, for the reasons set out above, does not find that the applicant faces a real risk of harm, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of being returned to Iran. Therefore the applicant does not meet the protection requirements under s 36(2)(aa) of the Act.
Grounds of Appeal
Two grounds of appeal were set out in an amended application filed to the Court on 24 July 2019. I note this was well outside the timeframe that was set for the filing of any amended grounds of appeal. These amended grounds of appeal were further amended in Court by deleting certain claims. This was done with the consent of the first respondent and leave was granted to rely upon these further amended grounds of appeal. It is noted that a copy of the transcript of the protection visa interview, conducted on 14 September 2017, was only filed in Court on 5 August 2019, again, well outside the timeframe before ordered by the Court. No adequate explanation has been given to the Court for the reasons why these documents were filed so late.
In Court, Counsel on behalf of the applicant, did not seek to rely upon the transcript and it was not accepted into evidence. The grounds of appeal as amended, are as follows:
(1)On 12 February 2017 the applicant’s agent provided a submission to the Immigration Assessment Authority (the IAA) which referred to a paragraph from a UK Border Agency Country of Origin Information report. The IAA at [5], on the application of s 473FB(5) of the Migration Act, “decided not to accept this information”. The IAA fell into jurisdictional error in making this finding. Among other reasons:
(a)The IAA failed to exercise its power under s 473DC(1), or consider whether to exercise such a power to try to verify or search for the source of the information. Such conduct by the IAA was legally unreasonable.
(b)It was open to the IAA to ask the applicant’s agent, through its power under s 473DC(3), to provide the full citation of the report quoted by the agent. The IAA did not exercise, or consider whether to exercise, the power. In the particular circumstances, it was legally unreasonable for the IAA to neither exercise the power nor consider whether to exercise the power.
(2)The IAA at [23] found the applicant does not “hold a sincere Christian conviction” and “I do not accept that the applicant is a genuine follower of Christianity”. The IAA fell into jurisdictional error in making these findings. Among other reasons:
(a)A basis for the IAA’s findings was the applicant gave evidence at the interview with the Minister’s delegate concerning events in Iran which “led to him becoming disinterested in Islam”, this evidence was not in the applicant’s statutory declaration account in his protection visa application, and this was a significant omission which “cast doubt over the truthfulness of his evidence”. However, the IAA overlooked paragraph 1 of the applicant’s statutory declaration. Second, the IAA’s reasoning process was legally unreasonable.
(b)A second basis for the IAA’s findings was at [21] and [22] that the evidence before the IAA did not indicate “sincere personal religious conviction by the applicant”. However, first, the IAA breached the principle that a decision-maker is not to take on the role of arbiter of doctrine with respect to religion. Second, the IAA overlooked and failed to take into account the opinions of Mr Thebridge and Ms Alizadeh to the effect that the applicant was a genuine Christian.
Submissions
Ground 1[First position of the Applicant]
This notes that the applicant’s representative, who I stress at this point of time, is not the legal representative who is currently appearing for the applicant, emailed a written submission dated 12 February 2018, to the Authority. That submission included the following paragraph (Court Book 147):
We would like to bring to your attention the establishment of Special Courts in Iran to deal with Iranian citizens returning from overseas. On page 240 the UK Border Agency COI report stated the following:
“On 17 February 2011 an article written by a former Supreme Court judge appeared in Iran newspaper, a daily paper published by the Iranian government. Referring to existing laws that enabled Iran’s judiciary to bring charges against Iranians for alleged violations of Iranian law committed whilst outside Iran, the article stated that failed asylum seekers could be prosecuted for making up accounts of alleged persecution”.
There is then a reference to footnote 8 found at Court Book 147, which is the following:
>
At paragraph 5 of the decision, the Authority stated the following:
The submissions included new information suggesting the establishment of special courts with jurisdiction over Iranian citizens returning from overseas. This encompassed both a new protection claim and new country information. While the agency which produced the report is disclosed, the title and date of the report are not provided. This agency produces many country information reports based on its own information and collates its information from various other sources. The citation for the extracted information is only given as a hyperlink.
As this submission was prepared by a legal representative, they would be aware of the practice direction applicable to submission to the IAA. The practice direction has not been complied with in respect of this new information. I am not able to verify the source of this information based on the details provided, and therefore could not determine the weight I may be minded to afford it. Per
s 473FB(5), I am not required to accept this information, and in this instance I have decided not to accept this information.
Paragraph 19 of the applicant’s submissions sets out the requirements of s 473DD of the Act, which may be summarised as follows:
That there is no requirement for the Authority to accept new information unless there are exceptional circumstances and either one or the other of s 473DD(b)(i) of the Act and s 473DD(b)(ii) of the Act are satisfied. That being, it was information that could not have been provided to the Minister before the decision was made or, is credible information which was not previously known, and had it been known, may have affected the consideration of the applicant’s claims.
I note this information, which is the subject of the ground of appeal, is not in the nature of personal credible information and it has never been determined whether or not it was information which could have been provided to the Minister before the decision was made.
There was also the issue to be determined as to whether or not there were exceptional circumstances. Section 473FB of the Act provides as follows:
Practice Directions
(1) The President may, in writing issue directions, not inconsistent with this Act or the regulations as to
(a) the operations of the Immigration Assessment Authority
(b) the conduct of reviews by the Authority.
It goes on to state at 473FB(5):
The Immigration Assessment Authority is not required to accept new information or documents from a person, or to hear or continue to hear a person at an interview, if the person fails to comply with a relevant direction that applies to the person.
Paragraph 30 of the Practice Direction for Applicant’s, Representatives and Authorised Recipients, states as follows:
If you provide or refer to new information such as country information reports or media articles, you must provide:
· A copy of that information or an extract of the part(s) of the information on which you rely,
· Identify the source of this information.
The following is my emphasis from paragraph 30 of the Practice Direction for Applicant’s, Representatives and Authorised Recipients:
Lists of publicly available documents or hyperlinks to publicly available documents are not acceptable.
The first respondent in relation to this matter, asserted that the Practice Direction was clearly not complied with. The Authority had a discretion to admit the new information under s 473DC(1) of the Act. It was suggested by the applicant that the Authority did not make any effort to search the information or even consider whether to search and thus was acting unreasonably. Reliance was placed on the case of DPI17 v Minister for Home Affairs (2019) 366 ALR 665 at [38], where it was stated:
…The following three essential steps in determining whether an established failure to consider exercising a discretionary power was legally unreasonable:
(1) identify the failure with precision;
(2) examine the terms, scope and purpose of the statutory power which the decision-maker failed to consider; and
(3) evaluate the failure to see whether it has the character of being legally unreasonable, perhaps in lacking a rational foundation or an evident or intelligible justification, or in being plainly unjust, arbitrary, capricious, or lacking in common sense.
Counsel on behalf of the applicant submitted that the error was material noting that the Authority relied upon the source of further information at footnote 10 of the Authority’s decision, at paragraph 34, which was in fact the same document. The first respondent’s submissions in relation to the applicant’s first position was that, where it is asserted that the Authority was acting unreasonably, the applicant is required to establish a factual basis for that conclusion (see ASW17 v Minister for Home Affairs [2018] FCA 1815 paragraph [43]). The quoted ease by which the Authority could have obtained the information is not the point. There is nothing unjust or unreasonable as s 473DC(2) of the Act states:
The Immigration Assessment Authority does not have a duty to get, request or accept, any new information whether the Authority is requested to do so by a referred applicant or by any other person, or in any other circumstances.
Section 473DA of the Act contains an exhaustive statement of the requirements of natural justice. Section 473BA of the Act confirms the Authority can conduct a review without accepting or requesting new information, subject to the exemptions contained in s 473DC, s 473DD and s 473DE of the Act. There clearly must be exceptional circumstances. One of the requirements under s 473DD of the Act must be enlivened. It was submitted that it was not unreasonable to expect that a legal representative would be aware of paragraph 26 of the Practice Direction and would comply with it. Further, the purported new information was not even provided within the deadline required of 5 February 2018. The new information was not provided until 23 February 2018.
Ground 1 [Second position of the Applicant]
Counsel on behalf of the applicant submitted that it was open to the Authority to request the full citation through its power under s 473DC(3) of the Act. It was submitted that it was legally unreasonable not to do so or even consider to do so. The first respondent’s submissions in relation to the applicant’s second position, was that where the applicant’s legal representative failed to comply with paragraph 26 of the Practice Direction, it was not unreasonable not to offer the legal representative the opportunity to remedy what was a clear error, being a noncompliance with paragraph 26 of the Practice Direction.
Ground 2
Counsel for the applicant submitted that the Authority gave four reasons for its findings that the applicant was not a genuine follower of Christianity. These are set out in paragraphs 14 to 16 of the Authority’s decision. The Authority first noted a varied narrative about disenchantment with Islam and how the applicant was interested in Christianity. It was alleged by the applicant that this involved jurisdictional error.
The second reason was inconsistent as to whether the applicant ceased prayer in paragraph 17 of the Authority’s decision. No complaint was raised by the applicant in relation to this reason. The third reason was implausibility about the applicant unknowingly attending a Pentecostal church for 18 months after having been baptised an Anglican. No complaint was raised by the applicant in respect of this reason. The fourth reason was in respect of the applicant’s responses to questioning about his religious belief. It was alleged this reason raised jurisdictional error.
As to the first reason, it revolves around the omission that the applicant became obsessive and fussy about his religious practice whilst in Iran when he prepared his statement of claim. Counsel for the applicant submitted that the conclusion by the Authority that the omission in the applicant’s statement of claim cast doubt over the truthfulness of the applicant’s evidence which the Authority stated at paragraph 17 of the decision. It was also submitted that the Authority failed to take into account that at the commencement of the statement of claim reasons, it was indicated that it was a summary only and this was overlooked. It was submitted that this amounts to jurisdictional error. The submission referred to WAFP v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 319 (“WAFP”) paragraph [21].
In the summary at paragraph 14 of the decision, the Authority indicates how the applicant became disinterested in Islam, whereas the statutory declaration talks about how he converted to Christianity after he arrived in Australia. Counsel for the applicant submitted that it was illogical or irrational to consider that a failure to refer to the doubts the applicant had about Islam his statutory declaration was a significant omission that “cast further doubt over the truthfulness of his evidence”. Reliance was placed on DAO16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 353 ALR 641 paragraph [30] and Singh v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 3 (“Singh”) paragraph [61]. Counsel for the applicant submitted that there was no logical connection between the evidence and the inference that was drawn.
As to the fourth reason, it was submitted by the applicant that this deals with an assessment of his knowledge of Christianity where the Authority stated:
Overall, his evidence, in my view, did not reflect a sincere personal religious conviction.
Reliance was placed on Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZLSP (2010) 187 FCR 362 paragraphs [30] – [42] per Kenny J and Wang v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000) 105 FCR 548 (“Wang”) paragraph [16], where Gray J states:
The RRT seems to have approached the issue on the basis that the appellant had to satisfy the RRT that he was possessed of a specific level of doctrinal knowledge to justify being regarded as a Christian…
The applicant has suggested that the Authority took on the role of arbiter of doctrine, as to his religion. Counsel on behalf of the applicant submitted that the person best open to opine as to whether or not the applicant has a sincere Christian conviction, is in fact a Christian minister who has spent time with the applicant, in this case, Mr Thebridge, who said (Court book 136):
I believe the applicant expresses a genuine search for Christian faith.
Reference is also made to Ms Alizadeh, a minister at St Paul’s Anglican Church. Counsel for the applicant submitted that the Authority failed to have regard to these opinions which were probative and this amounts to jurisdictional error. Reliance was placed on WAFP at paragraph [21], Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT (2013) 212 FCR 99 at paragraph [72] per Robertson J and Singh at paragraph [30].
In relation to Ground 2, Counsel on behalf of the first respondent submitted that Ground 2 was an attempt to engage in merits review by this Court and should be dismissed (see Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZJSS (2010) 243 CLR 164 at paragraphs [23] – [24]). As to the first reason of Ground 2, the first respondent submitted that the Authority was entitled to rely upon inconsistencies in assessing the credibility of the evidence of the applicant and how these matters are evaluated is entirely a matter for the decision-maker. The applicant’s submissions appear to accept that at the Safe Haven Enterprise visa interview, the applicant did not refer to his “obsessive behaviour”.
Despite this, the applicant was saying he had taken to seeing a psychologist in Iran who prescribed medication. No medical evidence was submitted. The applicant’s obsessional tendencies were “a first catalyst” and were not necessarily an essential part of the applicant’s claims. The first respondent submitted that it was open to the Authority to place weight on the fact that they were not raised in the statutory declaration prepared with the assistance of a qualified Migration Agent and interpreter. The applicant also relies on s 5AAA(2) of the Act, where it states:
…It is the responsibility of the non-citizen to specify all particulars of his or her claim to be such a person and provide sufficient evidence to establish the claim.
It was not the point that the applicant did not refer to them in his statutory declaration. A lack of reference does not mean that they were not taken into account. The applicant’s submission that this piece of evidence was so fundamental that the Authority ought to have referred to it must fail. It was consistent with the applicant’s own declarations and the statutory scheme. The Authority was not irrational or erroneous to find that a failure to refer to the “first catalyst” was a matter that went beyond more detail and was a new claim.
As to the second part of Ground 2 that the Authority took on the role of a religious arbiter, the first respondent submitted that this goes beyond a bare assertion and no effort is made to set out how that assertion manifests jurisdictional error. As a result, the first respondent cannot meaningfully respond.
The first respondent asserts that all the Authority did was question the applicant in order to ascertain the genuineness of his claim, which is well established. Reliance was placed on Wang at paragraph [16], and as set out by Kenny J in SZLSP paragraphs [37] - [39].
The Authority did not question the applicant as to his threshold knowledge to Christianity, rather, why he chose Anglicanism, why he decided to start attending church, why he became a Christian and why he chose to be baptised. It is also significant that the rejection rested upon four factors, two of which have not been challenged.
Regard was had to the evidence of Mr Thebridge and Ms Alizadeh in the Authority’s decision at paragraphs 7, 19 and 22. It is clear that the Authority engaged with those statements. It is not proper to characterise their evidence as akin to expert evidence. The applicant’s contention is related to weight. It was a finding that was open to the Authority.
Considerations
Ground 1, in my view, essentially asserts jurisdictional error due to the Authority refusing to accept new information about the establishment of special courts with jurisdiction over Iranian citizens returning from overseas (see paragraph 5 of the Authority’s decision). This information was not in the form that was required to be because a hyperlink was used. This was not in conformance with the relevant Practice Direction at paragraph 26. The Authority stated that it was unable to verify the source of that information based upon the details provided, and therefore did not accept that information, pursuant to s 473FB(5) of the Act.
Effectively, this Court is being asked to find jurisdictional error due to a non-compliance by the applicant’s legal representative with the Authority’s directions. I do not find it at all surprising that the Authority would do this. It is not for the Authority to do the work of the applicant’s legal representative. I also agree with the first respondent that this is not the only error. No explanation is given as to why the new information did not also provide information as to the matters which would be required, in order for consideration to be given as to whether or not it should be accepted, pursuant to s 473DD of the Act.
I agree with the first respondent’s submission that the issue here is one of admissibility, not weight. In the above circumstances there is nothing unreasonable in the Authority not seeking to use s 473DC of the Act to obtain the information from the legal representative. Counsel for the applicant seeks to blame the Authority for the failures of the applicant’s legal representative, and expects the Authority then to do the legal representative’s work. In my view, the statutory scheme places responsibility on the applicant to provide all relevant information, and there is no duty to accept or request new information, including references to documents relied upon without proper referencing and in breach of the practice direction. Section 473FB(5) of the Act, in my view, specifically allows for the situation contemplating above.
In relation to Ground 2, I agree with the first respondent that Ground 2 is, essentially, an impermissible attempt to press the Court to engage in merits review. The weighing of evidence and the evaluation of it, is for the decision-maker. There is nothing, in my view, in the reasoning process engaged by the Authority that amounted to a jurisdictional error.
The Authority relied upon four grounds to conclude that the applicant was not a genuine follower of Christianity. Two of those grounds were unchallenged. The claim that the applicant should be excused, given his legal representative did not include material about his compulsive obsessive disorder, in relation to his religious practice in Iran in his statutory declaration, again refers back to the competency of the applicant’s legal representative.
The Authority was entitled to rely upon any inconsistencies, given it is the responsibility of the applicant to raise all particulars of the claim, pursuant to s.5AAA(2) of the Act. I do not see the issue of being so fundamental or significant to the applicant’s claims that the error is one that, as asserted, amounts to jurisdictional error. In any event, a wrong factual finding does, of itself, not amount to jurisdictional error.
As to the second part of Ground 2, I am reasonably satisfied that the Authority was:
a)Entitled to probe the applicant’s knowledge of Christianity and assess the genuineness of the claim.
b)Clearly took account of the Minister’s statements in reaching its decision.
I am reasonably satisfied that the Authority was not required to uncritically accept the applicant’s claims. There is no jurisdictional error in this regard.
Given two of the four grounds in relation to this particular issue were unchallenged, I cannot accept that even if I am wrong in the matters I have referred to above, in the totality, the Authority’s reasoning was such and went so wrong as to a central issue as to amount to jurisdictional error.
Conclusion
Accordingly, the application is dismissed.
I certify that the preceding forty-eight (48) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Humphreys
Deputy Associate:
Date: 27 September 2019
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