Dex16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

DEX16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 654

Appeal from: DEX16 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2017] FCCA 2511
File number(s): NSD 2137 of 2017
Judge(s): GREENWOOD J
Date of judgment: 10 May 2019
Catchwords: MIGRATION – consideration of whether the Immigration Assessment Authority fell into error in assessing the claims made by the appellant in relation to questions arising under s 36(2)(a) and s 36(2)(aa) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – consideration of whether the IAA “considered” the “review material” for the purposes of s 473CB and s 473CC of the Act
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 36(2)(a), 36(2)(aa), 473CA, 473CB, 473CC, 473DA, 473GA, 473GB
Cases cited:

Carrascalao v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 252 FCR 352, (2017) 347 ALR 173

Tickner v Chapman (1995) 57 FCR 451; 1995 133 ALR 226

Date of hearing: 21 May 2018
Date of last submissions: 21 May 2018
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 80
Solicitor for the Appellant: Rasan Selliah & Associates
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr T Reilly
Solicitor for the First Respondent: MinterEllison

ORDERS

NSD 2137 of 2017
BETWEEN:

DEX16

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

GREENWOOD J

DATE OF ORDER:

10 MAY 2019

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal is dismissed. 

2.The appellant pay the costs of the first respondent of and incidental to the appeal. 

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

GREENWOOD J:

Background

  1. In this appeal, the appellant asserts two propositions. 

  2. The first is that the Immigration Assessment Authority (the “IAA”) fell into jurisdictional error because it failed to consider (that is to say, failed to engage in an “active intellectual process” of considering) particular “information” and “submissions” that the appellant says it was required to consider, as a matter of law.  The second issue is whether the IAA considered the “cumulative effect” of the claims made by the appellant as an applicant before the IAA seeking review of a decision of the Minister’s delegate to refuse the grant of an application by the appellant for a Safe Haven Enterprise Visa (otherwise known as a “SHEV”). 

  3. The appellant is a 32 year old Sri Lankan national of Tamil ethnicity born in Point Pedro in the Jaffna District in the Northern Province of Sri Lanka. He arrived, without documents, at Christmas Island, on 17 August 2012. Thus, for the purposes of s 46A(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the “Act”), he was an “unauthorised maritime arrival”. It is not in controversy that the appellant was given written notice by the Minister under s 46A(2) of the Act which enabled him to lodge an application for a protection visa in the form of a SHEV. He lodged that application on 19 October 2015…

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Details
Case
[2019] FCA 654
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Dex16 appeals against the decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) to dismiss his application for a Subclass 866 Special Humanitarian Visa (SHEV). The appeal was heard in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia, with Dex16 represented by Mr Selliah of Rasan Selliah & Associates and counsel Mr Karp. The Minister for Immigration and Border Protection was represented by Mr Reilly of MinterEllison. Dex16, a Hindu Tamil male from Kandavalai, Kilinochchi District, claims he worked for the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) as a driver from 2007 to 2009, transporting food, building and first aid supplies, injured and deceased people. He was forcibly taken to a series of Internally Displaced Persons camps, ending at Menik Farm, where he was interrogated and beaten by the Criminal Investigation Division (CID) due to his past association with the LTTE. Upon his release in May 2010, he was required to report regularly to his local CID office, subject to monitoring and occasional interrogation. Dex16 departed Sri Lanka out of fear of being harmed by Sri Lankan authorities. The Minister's delegate accepted 21 of Dex16's factual claims as credible, but refused his application for a SHEV.

The court had to determine whether the IAA properly considered the "review material" provided to it under s 473CB and s 473CC of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) when reviewing the delegate's decision. The appellant's essential contention is that the IAA failed to discharge its statutory obligation to review the delegate's decision by failing to consider the review material. The court examined the IAA's review process and whether it adhered to the statutory requirements in reviewing the delegate's decision. The court found that the IAA did consider the review material and properly exercised its discretion in reviewing the delegate's decision.

The appeal was dismissed, and Dex16 was ordered to pay the costs of the first respondent of and incidental to the appeal. The Federal Circuit Court Rules 2011, Rule 39.32, governs the entry of orders in this case.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal is dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the costs of the first respondent of and incidental to the appeal.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

In this appeal, the appellant is represented by Mr Selliah of Rasan Selliah & Associates. The appellant was represented by Mr Karp of counsel instructed by those solicitors in the application before the Federal Circuit Court of Australia. I mention that matter simply to note that in the proceedings before this Court and the primary Court, the appellant has had the benefit of legal representation. The Minister is represented by Mr Reilly instructed by MinterEllison. Other contextual background matters The appellant’s lawyers draw particular attention to these matters. In the appellant’s statement attached to his application of 5 October 2015 for a SHEV taken together with claims made by him in his SHEV “interview”, the appellant made these claims. He said that he left Jaffna with his family when he was three months of age. The family settled in a particular place and lived in that area for about 25 years. It was a place controlled by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (“LTTE”) until 2009. The family farmed land, growing rice. The appellant claimed that it was compulsory for one family member to contribute to the activities of the LTTE either as a fighter or in some other position. He said that he needed a job and worked as a driver for the LTTE from 2007 to 2009. He says that he was paid reasonably well. He helped transport injured people to hospital for treatment and helped deliver first aid (medicine) to the injured. He delivered food to LTTE members although he was not (and at the time of his claims was not) an LTTE member. He did not receive any weapons training or become an LTTE fighter. He said that towards the end of the civil war in 2009, there were thousands of civilians trapped in Putumattalan when the Sri Lankan army attacked that area. He was quite badly injured in March 2009 and remained in hospital for 20 days. He claimed that approximately two weeks after leaving hospital, the army forcibly took all Tamil people living within a two kilometre radius of the Manik Farm detention camp, to that camp, where he remained for approximately one year: although the appellant describes the farm as “Manik Farm” in his statement of 5 October 2015, the farm is otherwise described as “Menik Farm” in many places and, accordingly, I will use the term “Menik Farm”. He arrived at the camp on 20 April 2009. He claimed that he was “very scared and had a very bad life there” because he was interrogated and beaten. He claimed that he was frequently interrogated and questioned about his work with the LTTE. He claimed that once a week people in the camp were asked to line up in front of one or two men wearing scarves hiding their faces. He claimed that people who were singled out were taken to another detention camp near Colombo and, as far as the appellant knows, those individuals never returned to the Manik Farm. The appellant was never singled out from such a line‑up. The appellant was released in May 2010 although he was required to report to the local CID office in his village on three more occasions and asked to register/report until otherwise advised not to. He claimed that he was frightened that on one of these occasions he would be interrogated and would be “abducted or killed”. He claimed that members of the Criminal Investigation Division (“CID”) said that they had information about him and threatened him with detention if he did not give them any information. He believed that within the army there were some Tamils who worked for the CID and passed on information about him to the CID concerning suspected involvement with the LTTE. In 2011, fearing that he may again be the victim of paid informants who knew about his background of working for the LTTE, he ceased work and made arrangements to leave the country.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The appellant also emphasises the observation in Ms Lim’s submission at AB 196 that although Ministerial Direction Number 56 requires decision‑makers to take into account Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (“DFAT”) reports when considering a matter, “other relevant country information is also to be taken into account” and “indeed, DFAT Country Report – Sri Lanka of 16 February 2015 states that it is not an exhaustive source of country information”. The delegate’s decision As to the delegate’s decision, the appellant emphasises this claim at para 79 concerning the CID’s interest in him at a time after his departure from Sri Lanka: The applicant has claimed that following his departure from Sri Lanka his parents were approached once by the local CID enquiring how he had left the country. He claims his parents told the CID they did not know how he had departed and they have not been approached since. I accept this claim. At para 80, the delegate accepts a wide‑range of factual claims as “credible”. 21 separate factual assertions by the appellant fall into that category. The appellant, in oral submissions, emphasises virtually every one of those findings made by the delegate which were then put before the IAA by the Secretary. The delegate’s findings on these factual matters and claims are set out below:•the applicant is a Hindu Tamil male whose rural home village is Kandavalai, in Kilinochchi District (a former LTTE stronghold)•he was not a LTTE member, nor did he receive weapons training or participate in armed conflict•the applicant undertook paid non-combatant work for the LTTE from 2006 to 2009•he was the focus of LTTE recruitment in 2007 because he was the only single male child in the family•from 2007 he undertook full time driving work for the LTTE, transporting food, building and first aid supplies, injured and deceased people. During this time he lived at various LTTE accommodations in Kilinochchi and Mullaitivu, returning occasionally to Kandavalai to visit his family•the applicant was not aware of where the LTTE stashed their weapons•he received injuries from a grenade attack on his vehicle in October 2001 and received hospital treatment for his injuries•the applicant has significant scarring from his war injuries, which is visible on his arm, chest and abdomen•following his discharge from hospital the applicant spent two weeks convalescing and then on 20 April 2009 he was forcible taken to a series of Internally Displaced Persons camps•the last camp he stayed in was Menik Farm in Vavuniya. He was there with his parents and younger sister. They stayed there for one year•the CID interrogated him four times at Menik Farm, because of his past association with the LTTE. During one of these interrogations he was beaten heavily•he was never taken to a Rehabilitation Centre or Prison•he was witness to the people being taken out of the camp, in CID “line ups” at Menik Farm and never returning (presumed missing)•upon release from Menik Farm, in May 2010 the applicant was required to report regularly to his local CID office, which he did. This reporting requirement reduced over time•the applicant was subject to monitoring by the CID and [was] occasionally interrogated (formally questioned) by his local CID with regard to his past association with the LTTE, as well as his present circumstances. At these times he was not physically beaten but was subject to verbal threats•local informants were operational in the area the applicant lived and worked and they may have provided information to the CID about the appellant which resulted in him being called in for questioning•the applicant worked as a casual bus conductor from 2010 to 2011•he came to the attention of CID officers at Omanthai sometime in 2010 and 2011. At this point he was not detained or called in for interrogation but became fearful as a consequence that he may be harmed by these CID officers in the future•the applicant departed Sri Lanka out of a subjective fear that he would be harmed by Sri Lankan authorities•the applicant’s family were approached once about how the applicant departed Sri Lanka

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The decision of the Minister’s delegate to refuse the appellant’s application for a SHEV is a fast track reviewable decision. Section 473CA provides that the Minister must refer a fast track reviewable decision to the IAA as soon as reasonably practicable after the decision is made. Section 473DB(1) casts an obligation on the IAA in undertaking a review of a fast track reviewable decision to consider the “review material” provided to the Authority under s 473CB. Section 473CB(1) relevantly provides:Material to be provided to Immigration Assessment Authority473CB (1) The Secretary must give to the Immigration Assessment Authority the following material (review material) in respect of each fast track reviewable decision referred to the Authority under section 473CA:(a) a statement that:(i)sets out the findings of fact made by the person who made the decision; and(ii)refers to the evidence on which those findings were based; and(iii)gives the reasons for the decision;(b)material provided by the referred applicant to the person making the decision before the decision was made;(c)any other material that is in the Secretary’s possession or control and is considered by the Secretary (at the time the decision is referred to the Authority) to be relevant to the review;(d)… Section 473CB(2) provides that the Secretary must give the review material to the IAA at the same time as, or as soon as reasonably practicable after, the decision is referred to the IAA. Section 473CC provides that the IAA must review a fast track reviewable decision referred to it under s 473CA and may either affirm the decision under review or remit the decision for reconsideration with relevant directions. Division 3 of Part 7AA taken together with ss 473GA and 473GB (which fall within Division 6 of Part 7AA) is taken to be an exhaustive statement of the requirements of the natural justice hearing rule in relation to reviews conducted by the IAA: s 473DA. The appellant’s essential contention in this appeal (apart from the “cumulative effect” point) is that the IAA failed to discharge its statutory obligation to review the delegate’s decision, by failing to consider review material provided to the IAA under s 473CB. It will be necessary to return to the content of that contention later in these reasons. However, it is also necessary to identify the essential elements of the appellant’s claims (and assertions of fact) put to the IAA as the context within which the IAA had particular information and submissions put to it. In this appeal, the appellant is represented by Mr Selliah of Rasan Selliah & Associates. The appellant was represented by Mr Karp of counsel instructed by those solicitors in the application before the Federal Circuit Court of Australia. I mention that matter simply to note that in the proceedings before this Court and the primary Court, the appellant has had the benefit of legal representation. The Minister is represented by Mr Reilly instructed by MinterEllison. Other contextual background matters