Devon v Ji

Case [2016] FCA 797


FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Devon v Ji [2016] FCA 797

File number: VID 496 of 2015
Judge: DAVIES J
Date of judgment: 11 July 2016
Catchwords:

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for summary judgment – whether National Credit Code applies – where two loans alleged to be interrelated – where National Credit Code previously held not to apply to first loan

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for summary judgment – allegations of unconscionable conduct – where no factual foundation identified

Legislation:

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 31A

National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth) Sch 1 National Credit Code s 13

Cases cited:

Devon v Thirteenth Kaysan Pty Ltd [2016] FCA 357

Raftland Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (2008) 238 CLR 516; [2008] HCA 21

Spencer v Commonwealth (2010) 241 CLR 118; [2010] HCA 28

Date of hearing: 1 June 2016
Registry: Victoria
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations
Sub-area: Commercial Contracts, Banking, Finance and Insurance
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 12
Counsel for the Applicant: The Applicant appeared in person
Counsel for the Twenty-Seventh Respondent: M Gronow
Solicitor for the Twenty-Seventh Respondent: Obst Legal

ORDERS

VID 496 of 2015
BETWEEN:

HUGH DEVON

Applicant

AND:

JUN JI

Fourth Respondent

YUNSHENG CHEN
Fifth Respondent

JOSEPH WYTWORNIK
Sixth Respondent (and others named in the Schedule)

JUDGE:

DAVIES J

DATE OF ORDER:

11 JULY 2016

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.Judgment be entered for the twenty-seventh respondent against the applicant pursuant to s 31A(2) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth).

2.The applicant pay the twenty-seventh respondent’s costs of the proceeding.

3.The matter be listed for hearing on a date to be fixed on the question of whether the proceeding should be dismissed against the remaining respondents.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

DAVIES J:

  1. This proceeding was commenced by the applicant (“Mr Devon”) against 27 respondents (some of whom appear to be named twice). The proceeding as against the first, second, third and twelfth respondents was dismissed summarily pursuant to s 31A(2) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (“the Act”) on the application of those respondents on the ground that the claims against them had no reasonable prospect of success: Devon v Thirteenth Kaysan Pty Ltd [2016] FCA 357 (“Devon v Thirteenth Kaysan”). The twenty-seventh respondent has now made application pursuant to s 31A(2) of the Act and/or r 26.01(1) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) for an order dismissing the whole of Mr Devon’s claims against him.

  2. The subject matter of the proceeding concerns two loan transactions.  One of the loan transactions related to an amount of $1.5 million advanced by the first and second respondents to Southco Enterprises Pty Ltd (“Southco”), a company of which Mr Devon was the sole director at the relevant time (“the first loan”). The first…

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AGLC
Devon v Ji [2016] FCA 797
Case
[2016] FCA 797
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Devon v Ji involved an application for summary judgment by the plaintiff, Devon, against the defendant, Ji. The dispute centred on two loans that Devon alleged were interrelated and involved unconscionable conduct by Ji. Notably, the National Credit Code was previously held not to apply to the first loan. The court had to decide whether the National Credit Code applied to the second loan and if there were any real issues of fact or law that required determination at trial.

The court addressed the issue of whether the National Credit Code applied to the second loan, considering the relationship between the two loans. The court concluded that the National Credit Code did not apply to the second loan as it was not part of the same credit transaction. The court also examined the allegations of unconscionable conduct and found that there was no factual foundation for these claims. The court held that the plaintiff had no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding against the defendant based on the lack of a real prospect of success.

Following the analysis, the court granted the defendant's application for summary judgment under section 31A(2) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976. The court ordered that judgment be entered in favour of the defendant, the plaintiff pay the defendant's costs, and the matter be listed for hearing to determine if the proceeding should be dismissed against the remaining respondents. This decision underscores the importance of a strong factual and legal basis for claims to warrant a trial.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Judgment be entered for the twenty-seventh respondent against the applicant pursuant to s 31A(2) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth).

2. The applicant pay the twenty-seventh respondent’s costs of the proceeding.

3. The matter be listed for hearing on a date to be fixed on the question of whether the proceeding should be dismissed against the remaining respondents.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

In Devon v Thirteen Kaysan at [14]–[15] I set out the relevant principles to apply on an application for summary judgment pursuant to s 31A(2) as follows:SUMMARY JUDGMENT PRINCIPLES14.The power of the Court to grant summary judgment is contained in s 31A of the Act. That section provides as follows:31A Summary judgment(1)The Court may give judgment for one party against another in relation to the whole or any part of a proceeding if:(a)the first party is prosecuting the proceeding or that part of the proceeding; and(b)the Court is satisfied that the other party has no reasonable prospect of successfully defending the proceeding or that part of the proceeding.(2)The Court may give judgment for one party against another in relation to the whole or any part of a proceeding if:(a)the first party is defending the proceeding or that part of the proceeding; and(b)the Court is satisfied that the other party has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding or that part of the proceeding.(3)For the purposes of this section, a defence or a proceeding or part of a proceeding need not be:(a)hopeless; or(b)bound to fail;for it to have no reasonable prospect of success.(4)This section does not limit any powers that the Court has apart from this section.(5)This section does not apply to criminal proceedings.15.The applicable principles to apply in determining the application for summary dismissal were not in dispute and are set out in Spencer v Commonwealth (2010) 241 CLR 118; [2010] HCA 28. Chief Justice French and Gummow J stated at [24]–[25] (footnotes omitted):24.The exercise of powers to summarily terminate proceedings must always be attended with caution. That is so whether such disposition is sought on the basis that the pleadings fail to disclose a reasonable cause of action or on the basis that the action is frivolous or vexatious or an abuse of process. The same applies where such a disposition is sought in a summary judgment application supported by evidence. As to the latter, this Court in Fancourt v Mercantile Credits Ltd said:"The power to order summary or final judgment is one that should be exercised with great care and should never be exercised unless it is clear that there is no real question to be tried."More recently, in Batistatos v Roads and Traffic Authority (NSW) Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ repeated a statement by Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ in Agar v Hyde which included the following:"Ordinarily, a party is not to be denied the opportunity to place his or her case before the court in the ordinary way, and after taking advantage of the usual interlocutory processes. The test to be applied has been expressed in various ways, but all of the verbal formulae which have been used are intended to describe a high degree of certainty about the ultimate outcome of the proceeding if it were allowed to go to trial in the ordinary way."There would seem to be little distinction between those approaches and the requirement of a "real" as distinct from "fanciful" prospect of success contemplated by s 31A. That proposition, however, is not inconsistent with the proposition that the criterion in s 31A may be satisfied upon grounds wider than those contained in pre-existing Rules of Court authorising summary dispositions.25.Section 31A(2) requires a practical judgment by the Federal Court as to whether the applicant has more than a "fanciful" prospect of success. That may be a judgment of law or of fact, or of mixed law and fact. Where there are factual issues capable of being disputed and in dispute, summary dismissal should not be awarded to the respondent simply because the Court has formed the view that the applicant is unlikely to succeed on the factual issue. Where the success of a proceeding depends upon propositions of law apparently precluded by existing authority, that may not always be the end of the matter. Existing authority may be overruled, qualified or further explained. Summary processes must not be used to stultify the development of the law. But where the success of proceedings is critically dependent upon a proposition of law which would contradict a binding decision of this Court, the court hearing the application under s 31A could justifiably conclude that the proceedings had no reasonable prospect of success.In applying s 31A of the Act, the Court does not conduct fact finding but must assess the strength of the allegations made by reference to the pleadings, affidavits and any other evidence adduced, in order to determine whether the claim is sufficiently strong to warrant a trial. Although the test for summary judgment does not require the respondents to show that the Applicant’s claims against them are hopeless or bound to fail, the Court must consider whether there are any real, as opposed to fanciful, issues of fact or law that require proper determination at a trial. The Court should be cautious to dismiss a claim summarily where questions of fact or law arise.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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