HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Mason C.J.
MICHAEL GERARD DEVENISH AND ORS v. JEWEL FOOD STORES PTY. LIMITED
15 August 1990
Decision
MASON C.J. This is an application under O.70, r.7 of the High Court Rules by the respondent to the appeal for an order for security for costs in the form of an irrevocable bank guarantee in the sum of $25,000 to be provided by the second appellant, the respondent having agreed with the first appellants not to seek to enforce any order for costs against those appellants. The sum of $25,000 is estimated to be the costs still to be incurred by the respondent in connection with the preparation of the appeal on its side of the record.
The applicant's case for security for costs rests on two grounds: one, that the significance of the proceedings to both parties now relates solely to costs; and, two, that the second appellant will be unable to meet an order to pay the respondent's costs of the appeal in the event that the appeal is dismissed and that the appeal is being funded by a third party.
The first ground may be disposed of shortly. There is no material which supports an inference that the costs of the proceedings is the only subject of contention in the appeal. The Court's decision to grant special leave establishes that the appeal involves a matter of public importance. Moreover, it seems that counsel for the respondent briefly argued that the application for special leave should be refused because the costs of the proceedings had become the real bone of contention between the parties. In deciding to grant special leave, the Court must be taken to have rejected this argument.
Although that is sufficient to dispose of the first ground, I should make the additional point that the nature of the argument is such that the appropriate time to raise it was on the hearing of the special leave application itself, rather than on an application for security for costs. I say that because the argument goes to the question whether special leave to appeal should be granted at all, an argument which might, in appropriate circumstances, sustain an application for revocation of an order granting special leave to appeal. But I do not suggest that the circumstances of the present case are appropriate to the making of such an application.
The second ground advanced by the respondent rests on the proposition that the second appellant will no longer have available to it a source of funds from which it has hitherto defrayed the costs of the litigation. So much is accepted. It is admitted by the second appellant that the source of funds previously available to it is no longer available to it and that a sum of $123,576 has been provided from that fund by an outside body to the second appellant in connection with the costs of the proceedings previously incurred.
However, the evidence falls short of establishing satisfactorily to my mind that…
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Details
- Case
- [1990] HCA 35
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
Devenish (the applicant) sought judicial review of a decision by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) concerning the applicant's eligibility for a redundancy payment under the *Long Service Leave Act 1955* (NSW). The AAT had affirmed a decision by the respondent, Jewel Food Stores Pty Ltd (the employer), that the applicant was not entitled to a redundancy payment because his employment had not been terminated by the employer due to redundancy. The applicant argued that the AAT had erred in law by misinterpreting the meaning of "redundancy" as defined in the Act and relevant case law.
The primary legal issue before the High Court was whether the AAT had correctly interpreted and applied the concept of "redundancy" in the context of the *Long Service Leave Act 1955* (NSW). Specifically, the court had to determine if the applicant's dismissal, which arose from the employer's decision to cease operations at a particular store and transfer staff to another location, constituted a redundancy within the meaning of the Act, thereby entitling the applicant to a redundancy payment.
Mason C.J. held that the AAT had erred in its interpretation of redundancy. His Honour explained that redundancy, in the context of employment termination, refers to a situation where an employee's position is no longer required by the employer, irrespective of the employee's performance or conduct. The employer's decision to close the store meant that the applicant's position at that store was no longer required, and this constituted a redundancy. The fact that the employer offered alternative employment at another location did not negate the redundancy of the original position. The appeal was allowed.
The primary legal issue before the High Court was whether the AAT had correctly interpreted and applied the concept of "redundancy" in the context of the *Long Service Leave Act 1955* (NSW). Specifically, the court had to determine if the applicant's dismissal, which arose from the employer's decision to cease operations at a particular store and transfer staff to another location, constituted a redundancy within the meaning of the Act, thereby entitling the applicant to a redundancy payment.
Mason C.J. held that the AAT had erred in its interpretation of redundancy. His Honour explained that redundancy, in the context of employment termination, refers to a situation where an employee's position is no longer required by the employer, irrespective of the employee's performance or conduct. The employer's decision to close the store meant that the applicant's position at that store was no longer required, and this constituted a redundancy. The fact that the employer offered alternative employment at another location did not negate the redundancy of the original position. The appeal was allowed.
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