Re Foster, J.L. v Ex parte Foster, J.L.

Case [1994] FCA 186


JUDGMENT No. ........ ........ .. ..... ...... 106

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA )

GENERAL DIVISION

BANKRUPTCY DISTRICT OF THE STATE ) NO. QB 368 of 1993
QF OUEENSLAND 1
Re r JOHN LEWIS FOSTEq

Bankrupt

EX parte:  jom LEwIS FOSTER Applicant

RECEIVED

And :  R ANDREW DUUS
FEDERAL COURT OF ~rustee/Respondent

AUSTRALIA PRINCIPAL -ISTRY

" 1

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EINPELD a BRISBANE 14 APRIL 1994

(Judgment delivered in Sydney)

On 8 March 1994 I dismissed an application by the bankrupt to invalidate a resolution passed at a meeting of creditors on 18 March 1993 to remove the trustees of his estate. The substitute trustee who opposed the bankrupt's application sought an order for costs against both the bankrupt and Mrs Foster his wife. I

that costs be awarded against the estate. No evidence or

4% -

adr~u3ned that application to permit evidence to be led on the subject and for written submissions. I observed at the time that it is now settled law that the Court may make orders for costs against non-parties but that I was unwilling to do so without giving the person concerned an opportunity to be heard.

The present trustee has filed an affidavit and has also asked

submissions have come from Mrs Foster but the bankrupt has now sought an order for costs against the trustee "on the basis that Mrs Foster was not a party to the litigation" and that accordingly the calling of her solicitor during the hearing was "highly irregular". This contention provides no basis for an order that the trustee pay the bankrupt's costs and this application is dismissed.

The affidavit of the present trustee establishes that Mrs Foster has been financially supporting her husband since his bankruptcy. Together with the evidence in these proceedings of Mrs Foster's solicitor who also representedMr Foster, the trustee's affidavit leads to the strong inference that Mrs Foster is funding this application by her husband and that she has an active interest in the outcome of the litigation. There is evidence that the bankrupt and his wife have jointly been engaged in manipulating events calculated to deprive the bankrupt estate of assets that might otherwise be available for distribution to creditors, to mislead the trustee or deprive him of relevant information and

documentation, and to use any available procedure to frustrate the due administration of the estate.

The bankrupt argues that some remarks of members of the High Court in Kniaht to which I referred in the judgment on 8 March and by Mason CJ in Devenish v Jewel Food Stores Ptv Ltd [l9901 64 ALJR 533 mean that the trustee should have made an application for security for costs prior to the hearing rather than apply for the order now sought against Mrs Foster. Those remarks in the

High Court are not in point here. I cannot see that justice would have been served here by the trustee requiring the bankrupt to provide security for the costs of this application. On the evidence this would have led to one of two results: either that the application would have been stayed because the bankrupt could not have provided security or Mrs Foster would have provided the security with the same result as is now sought.

In my opinion, an order that Mrs Poster pay the costs of the application is required for "the just disposal" of these proceedings: see Caboolture Park Sho~pina Centre Ptv Ltd (in liquidation) v White Industries (Old) Ptv Ltd [l9931 117 ALR 253 at 258. I think it likely that the application to defeat the resolution (actually there were two resolutions) to change trustees was designed to be part of the campaign to keep assets in the hands of the Fosters that ought, at least arguably, be available to creditors. The application was quite misconceived and had no prospects of success. In my opinion Mrs Foster would never have agreed to fund it unless she had something significant

to gain from its success. This was the hope if not likelihood

that without the present trustee a less rigorous and impartial approach to the administration of the estate would mean more assets and income remaining in her and her husband's hands and unavailable to creditors than would otherwise be the case.

I order that the bankrupt and Rita Mary Foster pay the trustee's costs of and incidental to the application to be taxed and paid forthwith. For the reasons given on 8 March, I do not see the

need for a present order that the costs be paid out of the estate but will reserve liberty to apply in the event that it becomes necessary.

There is a further application by the bankrupt for the costs involved in the attendance on subpoena by the trustee of his wife's solicitor, Mr Bax. Mr Bax's evidence was relevant to the issue of costs. He was the instructing solicitor for the bankrupt's counsel. He was in and in the vicinity of the Court before and after giving evidence for this purpose as well as to answer the subpoena. His brief evidence added an insignificant amount of time to the hearing and could have cost little or nothing. This application is trivial and will be dismissed.

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Re Foster, J.L. v Ex parte Foster, J.L. [1994] FCA 186
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[1994] FCA 186
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CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case involves the bankrupt, John Lewis Foster, and the trustee of his estate, R Andrew Duus. The bankrupt sought to invalidate a creditors' resolution to remove the trustees, which the court dismissed. The substitute trustee then sought an order for costs against both the bankrupt and the bankrupt's wife, Rita Mary Foster. The bankrupt, in turn, sought an order for costs against the trustee on the basis that Mrs Foster was not a party to the litigation and thus her solicitor's attendance was irregular. The court dismissed the bankrupt's application for costs against the trustee and ordered that both the bankrupt and Mrs Foster pay the trustee's costs of the application.

The central legal issue in this case was whether the bankrupt or Mrs Foster should bear the costs of the application. The bankrupt argued that the trustee should have made an application for security for costs prior to the hearing rather than applying for an order against Mrs Foster. The court, however, found that such an application would have likely led to the same result as is now sought. The bankrupt also sought to have the costs involved in the attendance on subpoena of Mrs Foster's solicitor dismissed, but the court found this application trivial and dismissed it.

The court reasoned that Mrs Foster had been financially supporting her husband since his bankruptcy and had an active interest in the outcome of the litigation. There was evidence that the bankrupt and his wife had jointly engaged in actions to deprive the estate of assets available for distribution to creditors, mislead the trustee, and frustrate the due administration of the estate. The court found that the bankrupt's application to defeat the resolution to change trustees was misconceived and had no prospects of success. It was likely designed as part of a campaign to keep assets in the hands of the Fosters that should, at least arguably, be available to creditors. The court concluded that an order that Mrs Foster pay the costs of the application was required for "the just disposal" of these proceedings.

The court ordered that the bankrupt and Mrs Foster pay the trustee's costs of and incidental to the application to be taxed and paid forthwith. The court did not see the need for a present order that the costs be paid out of the estate but reserved the liberty to apply if necessary. The court also dismissed the bankrupt's application for the costs involved in the attendance on subpoena of Mrs Foster's solicitor as trivial.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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