Derma Pen LLC v Biosoft (Australia) Pty Ltd (Security for Costs)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Derma Pen LLC v Biosoft (Australia) Pty Ltd (Security for Costs) [2022] FCA 885  

File number: NSD 130 of 2022
Judgment of: PERRAM J
Date of judgment: 29 July 2022
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for security for costs – where Applicants are incorporated in Delaware – where neither Applicant has assets in or conducts business in Australia –  where First Applicant has judgment debt against the Third Respondent out of jurisdiction – where Second Applicant has assets in form of US word mark – whether security for costs ought be granted – whether security ought to be limited to costs of enforcement in a foreign jurisdiction
Legislation:

Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 140(1)

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 56

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 19.01

Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act, Utah Code Ann §78B-5-450 (2020)

Cases cited:

Austin, Nicols & Co Inc v Lodestar Anstalt [2009] FCA 1228

Berry v Inovia Security Pty Ltd [2014] FCA 357

CME Blasting & Mining Equipment Ltd v Rock Tool Refurbishment Solutions Pty Ltd [2021] FCA 160

Commissioner of Taxation v Vasiliades [2016] FCAFC 170; 344 ALR 558

Concrete Mining Structures Pty Ltd v Cellcrete Australia Pty Ltd (No 2) [2016] FCA 360

Cornelius v Global Medical Solutions Australia Pty Ltd [2014] NSWCA 65; 98 ACSR 301

Energy Drilling Inc v Petroz NL (1989) ATPR 40-954

FarmitaliaCarlo Ebra SrL v Delta West Pty Ltd (1994) 28 IPR 336

Fina Research SA v Halliburton Energy Services Inc [2002] FCA 1331

Madgwick v Kelly [2013] FCAFC 61; 212 FCR 1

Maxim’s Caterers Limited v Magnona Pty Ltd (No 1) [2010] FCA 450

Neilson v Overseas Projects Corporation of Victoria Ltd [2005] HCA 54; 223 CLR 331

PS Chellaram & Co Ltd v China Ocean Shipping Co (1991) 102 ALR 321

Division: General Division
Registry: New South Wales
National Practice Area: Intellectual Property
Sub-area: Trade Marks
Number of paragraphs: 40
Date of last submissions: 18 July 2022
Date of hearing: 27 June 2022 and 1 and 18 July 2022
Counsel for the Applicants: Ms F St John with Ms N Gollan
Solicitor for the Applicants: Mills Oakley
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr M Baroni
Solicitor for the First Respondent: McEvoy Legal
Counsel for the Third Respondent: Mr A Bailey
Solicitor for the Third Respondent: St. Clair & Associates
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice save as to costs

ORDERS

NSD 130 of 2022

BETWEEN:

DERMA PEN LLC

First Applicant

DERMA PEN IP HOLDINGS LLC

Second Applicant

AND:

BIOSOFT (AUSTRALIA) PTY LTD (ACN 608 514 021)

First Respondent

BIOSOFT (AUST) PTY LTD (IN LIQ)

Second Respondent

STENE MARSHALL

Third Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

PERRAM J

DATE OF ORDER:

29 JULY 2022

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The parties bring in a short minute of order to give effect to these reasons within 7 days. 

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32…

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Details
Case
[2022] FCA 885
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Derma Pen LLC v Biosoft (Australia) Pty Ltd, the Federal Court was asked to determine the appropriate amount of security for costs that should be granted to the applicants, Derma Pen LLC and Derma Pen Holdings, against the respondents, Biosoft (Australia) Pty Ltd and Mr. Marshall. Derma Pen LLC and Derma Pen Holdings are corporations incorporated in Delaware, USA, and neither have assets in Australia nor conduct business here. The primary legal issue before the court was whether the applicants were entitled to security for costs, and if so, whether the amount should be limited to the costs of enforcing a judgment in a foreign jurisdiction. The court also had to consider whether there were any countervailing circumstances that would warrant the refusal of the application for security for costs.

The court found that there were no countervailing circumstances to refuse the grant of security in relation to Derma Pen LLC against the first and third respondents. However, it determined that the amount of security should be limited to the costs of enforcing a judgment of this Court in a foreign place (Utah). In relation to Derma Pen Holdings, the court found that there were sufficient countervailing circumstances to support the refusal of a grant of security in relation to the third respondent, but not the first respondent. The court concluded that the amount of security should be limited to the costs of enforcement in Utah for both Derma Pen LLC and Derma Pen Holdings against the third respondent.

The court's decision was based on the fact that Derma Pen LLC had obtained a judgment debt against the third respondent out of jurisdiction, and this debt was considered an asset in a security for costs analysis. The court also took into account that Derma Pen LLC and Derma Pen Holdings did not conduct business in Australia and had no assets here. The court found that the judgment debt against the third respondent was a significant factor in determining the appropriate amount of security for costs, but it did not consider the potential difficulty of enforcing the judgment in Australia as a countervailing circumstance.

The final orders of the court were that Derma Pen LLC and Derma Pen Holdings were to bring in a short minute of order to give effect to these reasons within 7 days. The entry of orders was dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The parties bring in a short minute of order to give effect to these reasons within 7 days.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In the present case, it is neither contested that the Applicants do not conduct business in Australia nor that they have no assets here. Although there was some dispute between the parties as to where the Applicants were domiciled, for the reasons I give below, I do not consider this dispute to be material. The critical question, therefore, is whether there are countervailing circumstances supporting the refusal of the application. For the reasons which follow, I conclude that: ·In relation to the First Respondent, there are no sufficient countervailing circumstances to refuse a grant of security against LLC or Holdings. However, there are circumstances which warrant the amount of security being limited to the costs of enforcing a judgment of this Court in a foreign place (Utah); and ·In relation to the Third Respondent, there are sufficient countervailing circumstances to support the refusal of a grant of security in relation to LLC, but not Holdings. In relation to Holdings, there are circumstances which warrant the amount of security being limited to the costs of enforcement in Utah. CONSIDERATION The Assets of LLC Exhibit 1 is a copy of a judgment of the United States District Court in and for the District of Utah, Central Division (‘District Court’). It shows that on 9 May 2017:(1)LLC obtained a default judgment against Mr Marshall in the sum of USD11,907,320.00;(2)LLC obtained a judgment for his attorneys’ fees and costs against Mr Marshall in the sum of USD3,668,007.53; and(3)LLC obtained default judgments for the same amounts against 4EverYoung Limited, Biosoft (Aust) Pty Ltd, and Equipmed International Pty Ltd. Biosoft (Aust) Pty Ltd is the Second Respondent in the present proceeding and is in liquidation. It has filed a submitting notice save as to costs. Neither Biosoft nor Mr Marshall suggested that these judgments have been affected by any appeal (indeed, it appears that Mr Marshall unsuccessfully appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit). I therefore accept that LLC owns a judgment debt in the sum of USD15,575,327.53 against Mr Marshall and the other entities mentioned in (c). Making the assumption that the judgment debt against the Second Respondent which is in liquidation is worthless, no submission was made by Biosoft or Mr Marshall that the judgment debts against the other entities or Mr Marshall were worthless. Mr Marshall did submit that he had had financial difficulties in dealing with the Utah proceeding. However, that does not erase the judgment debt and I do not see how it can provide an avenue by which I may ignore it in an assessment of LLC’s assets. He also submitted that at the time the judgment was obtained, LLC was not the owner of the DERMAPEN mark. The proceeding in Utah concerned, inter alia, the alleged infringement of that mark by the defendants including Mr Marshall. Accepting that to be so, I do not see that it permits me to treat the judgment debt as if it did not exist. It might provide a basis for Mr Marshall to seek to set aside the default judgment and it might ultimately afford Mr Marshall a defence to LLC’s present claim against him based on the Utah judgment debt. However, it provides no basis for pretending that the judgment debt against Mr Marshall is not presently an asset in a security for costs analysis. If Mr Marshall had led evidence that he was presently seeking to set aside the judgment debt in Utah on this basis, it might have been appropriate to consider the likely outcome of that application in terms of assessing the issue of security. However, the short of the matter is that debt is not impugned by Mr Marshall and whilst that remains the case, I do not consider myself at liberty to disregard it on the basis that he might one day impugn it. In that regard, whilst it is conceptually possible that he might successfully resist the enforcement of the judgment debt in this country, this would not have the consequence that it ceased to exist as an asset in Utah.