Austin, Nichols & Co Inc v Lodestar Anstalt

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Austin, Nichols & Co Inc v Lodestar Anstalt [2009] FCA 1228

COSTS - security for costs - applicants overseas residents - whether they had “assets in Australia” against which a costs order in favour of respondent might be enforced - trade marks registered in Australia - distribution agreement under which money flowed from Australian company - applicants had no bank account in Australia.
Held: those assets did not constitute readily realisable assets.  Order for security made.

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 56
Federal Court Rules O 28 r 3

Bell Wholesale Co. Ltd v Gates Export Corporation (1984) 2 FCR 1 cited
Energy Drilling Inc. v Petroz N.L. [1989] ATPR 40-954 cited
Fina Research SA v Halliburton Energy Services Inc [2002] FCA 1331
Jesse James v Nolmont Pty Ltd (subject to a Deed of Company Arrangement) (ACN 010 874 834) [2007] FCA 1604 cited
NV Sumatra Tobacco Trading Company v British American Tobacco Australia Services Ltd (ACN 004 069 649) (2008) 79 IPR 286 followed
P S Chellaram & Co Ltd v China Ocean Shipping Co (1991) 102 ALR 321 followed

AUSTIN, NICHOLS & CO INC and RARE BREED DISTILLING LLC v LODESTAR ANSTALT

NSD 518 of 2009

LINDGREN J
23 OCTOBER 2009
SYDNEY


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 518 of 2009

ON APPEAL FROM THE REGISTRAR OF TRADE MARKS

BETWEEN:

AUSTIN, NICHOLS & CO INC
First Applicant

RARE BREED DISTILLING LLC
Second Applicant

AND:

LODESTAR ANSTALT
Respondent

JUDGE:

LINDGREN J

DATE OF ORDER:

23 OCTOBER 2009

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The proceeding be listed on Wednesday 28 October 2009 for the making of orders.

2.The parties confer with a view to agreeing on the amount of security and the form in which it is to be provided.

3.The parties submit to the Associate to Lindgren J by 27 October 2009 an agreed form of the orders to be made, or, if the parties have failed to reach agreement, the forms of orders for which they will respectively contend.

Note:Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


The text of entered orders can be located using eSearch on the Court’s website.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 518 of 2009

ON APPEAL FROM THE REGISTRAR OF TRADE MARKS

BETWEEN:

AUSTIN, NICHOLS & CO INC
First Applicant

RARE BREED DISTILLING LLC
Second Applicant

AND:

LODESTAR ANSTALT
Respondent

JUDGE:

LINDGREN J

DATE:

23 OCTOBER 2009

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION

  1. By notice of motion filed on 27 August 2009 the respondent seeks an order that the applicants give security for costs in a sum of $111,630.00.

    BACKGROUND

  2. This proceeding arises out of the use of the expressions “WILD GEESE” and “WILD TURKEY” as trade marks or parts of trade marks.

  3. The mark “WILD GEESE” was registered in the Australian Register of Trade Marks No 839740 in the name…

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Details
Case
[2009] FCA 1228
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Austin, Nichols & Co Inc v Lodestar Anstalt involves a dispute over the use of the trade marks “WILD GEESE” and “WILD TURKEY”. Lodestar Anstalt, the respondent, is the owner of the “WILD GEESE” trade mark registered in respect of various goods, including alcoholic beverages. Austin, Nichols & Co Inc, along with Rare Breed Distilling LLC, sought the removal of the trade mark in relation to certain goods. The matter was escalated to the Federal Court of Australia where the respondent applied for an order that the applicants provide security for costs amounting to $111,630.00.

The central legal issue before the court was whether the applicants should be required to provide security for costs, given their status as foreign corporations with no readily realisable assets in Australia. The court considered the purpose of ordering security for costs against applicants ordinarily resident outside the jurisdiction, which is to ensure that a successful respondent has a fund within the jurisdiction to enforce the judgment for costs. The court also weighed the applicants' size, wealth, and revenue derived from the Australian market against the need to protect the respondent from the risk of uncertain enforcement in a foreign country.

The court concluded that it was appropriate to order security for costs despite the applicants' financial strength, as the primary purpose of the order was to protect the respondent from the risk of uncertain enforcement in a foreign country. The court found that the applicants, being foreign corporations, did not have readily realisable assets in Australia, and thus the order for security was necessary to safeguard the respondent’s interests. The court further determined the quantum of security based on various factors including the estimated length of the hearing, the necessity of a transcript, and the requirement for professional expert witnesses. The court accepted Lodestar's evidence and submissions on most points of disagreement regarding the quantum of security.

The final orders made by the court were that the proceeding be listed for the making of orders on 28 October 2009, and that the parties confer to agree on the amount and form of security to be provided. If the parties could not reach an agreement, they were to submit their respective forms of orders to the Associate by 27 October 2009.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The proceeding be listed on Wednesday 28 October 2009 for the making of orders.

2. The parties confer with a view to agreeing on the amount of security and the form in which it is to be provided.

3. The parties submit to the Associate to Lindgren J by 27 October 2009 an agreed form of the orders to be made, or, if the parties have failed to reach agreement, the forms of orders for which they will respectively contend.

Note:

Background

Background to the litigation

By notice of motion filed on 27 August 2009 the respondent seeks an order that the applicants give security for costs in a sum of $111,630.00.BACKGROUND This proceeding arises out of the use of the expressions “WILD GEESE” and “WILD TURKEY” as trade marks or parts of trade marks. The mark “WILD GEESE” was registered in the Australian Register of Trade Marks No 839740 in the name of the respondent, Lodestar Anstalt (Lodestar), in respect of the following goods:Class 32 - Beers, mineral and aerated waters and other non-alcoholic drinks, fruit drinks and fruit juices, syrups and other preparations for making beverages.Class 33 - Alcoholic beverages (except beers). Wild Geese Wines Pty Limited, which is a locally owned Australian company, filed an application for removal from the Register of the WILD GEESE trade mark in respect of “alcoholic beverages (except beers)”, that is to say, the goods described in class 33. The first applicant, Austin, Nichols & Co Inc (Austin Nichols), filed a separate application for removal of the same trade mark in respect of all goods covered by the registration. As part of a wider agreement between them, on or about 1 June 2007 Wild Geese Wines Pty Limited assigned application No 106646 for the registration of “WILD GEESE WINES” and application No 106650 for the registration of “WILD GEESE” to Austin Nichols. Austin Nichols remained the only party moving for the removal of “WILD GEESE”. Austin Nichols is a subsidiary of the French company, Pernod Ricard S.A., and part of the international Pernod Ricard Group. On or about 7 April 2009, Pernod-Ricard S. A. with two of its subsidiaries, Austin Nichols & Co., Inc. and Pernod Ricard USA, LLC entered into an agreement with an Italian company, Davide Campari-Milano S.p.A. (Campari or DCM) and an associated entity, Redfire, which provided for certain assets and agreements of Pernod Ricard S.A. or its subsidiaries to be acquired by a Campari affiliate (Asset Purchase Agreement). That affiliate was the second applicant, Rare Breed Distilling LLC (Rare Breed). Rare Breed was incorporated in Delaware, and its business address is in the United States of America. On 13 May 2009, the Registrar of Trade Marks’ delegate (Delegate) refused the application for removal. However, the Delegate directed a removal of the trade mark in so far as it related to “wine, fortified wine and wine based spirits, namely brandy, grappa and cognac” in class 33 (apparently Lodestar had offered to submit to such a partial removal). On 29 May 2009, closing took place in relation to the Asset Purchase Agreement. Pursuant to s 104 of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) (TM Act), on 3 June 2009 Austin Nichols filed the notice of appeal from the Delegate’s decision which commenced this proceeding. Pursuant to an order made by consent on 26 August 2009, Rare Breed was added as second applicant. Accordingly, Austin Nichols’ role has become, in a sense, only “nominal”, even though it applied for the removal before the Delegate and was originally the sole appellant in this Court. In substance, the moving party in the appeal is Rare Breed, a United States subsidiary of DCM.

Decision

Reasons for decision

LINDGREN J
I do not think that it is appropriate to regard Lodestar as being in part the moving party. Accordingly, I do not think it appropriate to reduce the amount of any security to be ordered against the applicants on that account.CONCLUSION ON THE QUESTION OF WHETHER AN ORDER OF SECURITY FOR COSTS SHOULD BE MADE I am not persuaded by the considerations referred to by the applicants to think that the “great weight” to which McHugh J referred in Chellaram should not be attached to the circumstance that both applicants are foreign corporations who have no readily realisable assets in Australia against which an order for costs could be enforced without difficulty or delay. Ultimately, the applicants’ submission is that in view of the size and wealth of Rare Breed and the Campari Group, the considerable revenue that Rare Breed derives from the Australian market, and its apparent commitment to expand its operations in that market, it is simply unthinkable that it would not satisfy an adverse costs order. According to this approach, the presence or absence of assets in Australia is irrelevant. In my respectful opinion, this is the wrong approach. Lodestar is entitled to have its present application for security determined on the basis that it will have to enforce the costs order hypothetically made in its favour. It is not appropriate to determine the application on the assumption that the applicants will respond to an order that they pay costs with immediate compliance. At that time they may hold a certain view of the course that the proceeding has taken and determine not to satisfy the costs order unless forced to do so. There should be an order for security.QUANTUM Unfortunately, notwithstanding the considerable experience and expertise of the solicitors for the respective parties (Maurice Gonsalves of Mallesons for the applicants and Kenneth Philp of Bennett & Philp Lawyers for Lodestar), there was disagreement over many aspects of the quantum of security sought by Lodestar. Generally speaking, on the various points of disagreement I accept Lodestar’s evidence and submissions. In my estimation, the hearing is likely to occupy two full days, not one as contended for by the applicants, and not three as contended for by Lodestar. This is not simply a matter of “splitting the difference” but represents my best estimate at this stage of the likely length of the hearing. I take into account that apparently there will be five substantive witnesses: three for the applicants and two for Lodestar. It is difficult to be sure how long the witnesses will take in the witness box. It should remain open to Lodestar, as preparation for the trial proceeds, to apply for further security if it does become clear that the hearing is likely to go into a third day. Against that possibility, I will recommend to the trial Judge that a third day be held in reserve. I can state my conclusions briefly in relation to the other issues (using the paragraph lettering that was used in para 54 of Mr Philp’s affidavit of 27 August 2009 and para 23 of Mr Gonsalves’s affidavit of 16 September 2009):(c)A transcript will be necessary.(d)There will be a need for accommodation in Sydney but the amount will be reduced on account of the reduction in the estimated length of the hearing as estimated.(e)A charge for photocopying should be included.(f)There should be an allowance for two professional expert witnesses on the basis that I am not in a position to prefer the evidence of Mr Philp or that of Mr Gonsalves as to whether or not expert witnesses are needed and must accept Mr Philp’s bona fide estimate of what is proposed for his client’s case.(g)The 15% loading for care and consideration is allowable but is to be applied only to solicitors’ fees and not to disbursements.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: LINDGREN J

For the purpose of informing the market of its acquisition from the Pernod Ricard Group, the Campari Group issued an “Information Memorandum”. As will appear below, the applicants have relied on the contents of this document to show that Rare Breed and the Campari Group of which it forms part are corporations of substance.CONSIDERATION Lodestar relies on s 56 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (FCA Act) and O 28 r 3 of the Federal Court Rules. Section 56 provides that the Court or a Judge may order an applicant in a proceeding in the Court or an appellant in an appeal to the Court to give security for the payment of costs that may be awarded against him or her. Order 28 r 3 provides that when considering an application by a respondent for an order for security under s 56, the Court may take into account the matters listed in that rule, including the fact “that an applicant is ordinarily resident outside Australia”. Clearly, this does not limit the matters that the Court may take into account when exercising its jurisdiction under s 56: see to this effect Bell Wholesale Co. Ltd v Gates Export Corporation (1984) 2 FCR 1 at 2-3. Lodestar does not rely on s 1335 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). Section 1335(1) provides that where a corporation is plaintiff in any action or other legal proceeding, the court having jurisdiction in the matter may, “if it appears by credible testimony that there is reason to believe that the corporation will be unable to pay the costs of the defendant if successful in his, her or its defence”, require sufficient security to be given for those costs and stay all proceedings until the security is given. There is no express condition of this kind in s 56 of the FCA Act. While the prospect of an applicant’s inability to satisfy an adverse costs order is obviously a relevant consideration, it is not a condition of the availability of the power conferred by s 56. Indeed, the present case is one in which I am satisfied that the applicants would be able to satisfy an adverse costs order, yet will order them to provide security. In Energy Drilling Inc. v Petroz N.L. [1989] ATPR 40-954 (Energy Drilling), Gummow J said (at p 50,422):The purpose of ordering security for costs against an applicant ordinarily resident outside the jurisdiction is to ensure that a successful respondent will have a fund available within the jurisdiction of this Court against which it can enforce the judgment for costs, so that the respondent does not bear the risk as to the certainty of enforcement in the foreign country and as to the time and complexity of the action there which might be necessary to effect enforcement: Kent Heating Ltd. V. Cook-on-Gas Products Pty. Ltd. & Anor (1984) 59 A.L.R. 277 at p. 279. On the other hand, the mere circumstance that an applicant is resident outside the jurisdiction does not necessarily invite an exercise of discretion in favour of ordering security, the question being how justice will best be served in the particular case: Barton v. Minister for Foreign Affairs (1984) 2 F.C.R. 463; CBS Records Australia Ltd. & Ors v. Telmak Teleproducts (Aust.) Pty. Ltd. (1987) ATPR ¶40-783 at pp. 48,554-48,555, (1987) 72 A.L.R. 270 at pp. 284-285. [My emphasis]