Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Leo - [2019] SASC 146

SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Civil)
DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION v LEO & ORS
[2019] SASC 146
Judgment of The Honourable Justice Hinton
15 August 2019
PROCEDURE - CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS - DETENTION, INSPECTION AND PRESERVATION - FREEZING ORDERS
On 3 December 2010 a Judge of the District Court made a freezing order on the application of the Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (the Deputy Commissioner). The order in effect prohibited Rocco Leo from dealing with his assets including funds in or from a bank account held in the name of Universal Holdings Australia Pty Ltd (UHA; the UHA account). The Deputy Commissioner made similar applications against each of Joseph Veneziano, Agape Ministries International (AMI) and UHA. In each instance freezing orders were obtained prohibiting Mr Veneziano, AMI and UHA from dealing with their assets including any funds in or from the UHA account.
With the exception of UHA, in each instance, the substantive action to which the freezing orders related was an action in debt commenced in 2010 in the District Court arising from the non-payment of income tax assessments raised by the Commissioner of Taxation in relation to Pastor Leo, Mr Veneziano and AMI. With respect to UHA, the Deputy Commissioner’s contention was that there was an arguable case that Pastor Leo and Mr Veneziano were entitled to a proportion of the funds held to the credit of UHA in the UHA account.
On 10 November 2016 the Deputy Commissioner instituted a fresh action in this Court against Mr Leo, Mr Veneziano and AMI (the defendants) with respect to unpaid taxation and taxation related liabilities. The Deputy Commissioner pleaded that the total debt owed by Mr Leo was $8,548,638.60, by Mr Veneziano, $416,512.62, and by AMI, $2,058,779.10. On 14 November 2016 the Deputy Commissioner filed an interlocutory application (the new application) in this Court seeking, among other things, freezing orders against the defendants in relation to the assets of each up to the value of the relevant tax debt owed. An application was also made seeking a freezing order against UHA.
The defendants and UHA opposed the new application, and also applied for the discharge of the original freezing orders as varied. In the alternative, the defendants sought an order permitting access to all or a portion of the funds held in the UHA account for the purpose of satisfying legal fees incurred and to be incurred (the discharge application).
On 21 December 2016 this Court granted the new application and dismissed the discharge application.
Held; if the 21 December 2016 freezing orders were not made and the original orders were discharged, there would have been a very real risk that the assets referred to in the 21 December 2016 orders would have dissipated.
A New Tax System (Goods and Services Tax) Act 1999 (Cth); Fringe Benefits Tax Assessment Act 1986 (Cth); Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth); Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA); Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth), referred to.
Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Hua Wang Bank Berhad (2010) 273 ALR 194; Frigo v Culhaci [1998] NSWCA 88; Jackson v Sterling Industries Ltd (1987) 162 CLR 612; Mercedes Benz AG v Leiduck [1996] AC 284; PT Bayan Resources TBK v BCBC Singapore Pte Ltd (2015) 258 CLR 1, considered.

DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION v LEO & ORS
[2019] SASC 146
Civil
HINTON J:
Introduction

On 3 December 2010 a Judge of the District Court made a freezing order on the application of the Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (the Deputy Commissioner) prohibiting Rocco Leo from removing from Australia, or in any way disposing of, or dealing with, or diminishing the value of, his assets including any funds in or from account number 10359465 held with the Commonwealth Bank of Australia in the name of Universal Holdings Australia Pty Ltd (UHA).[1] At the same time similar applications were made by the Deputy Commissioner against each of Joseph Veneziano, Agape Ministries International (AMI) and UHA and freezing orders obtained, including in each instance an order prohibiting Mr Veneziano, AMI and UHA from removing from Australia, or in any way disposing of, or dealing with, or diminishing the value of, their assets including any funds in or from account number 10359465 held with the Commonwealth Bank of Australia in the name of UHA (the UHA account).[2]
[1] DCCIV 2407-2010: FDN 10.
[2] DCCIV 2407-2010: FDNs 11, 12 and 14.
With the exception of UHA, in each instance the substantive action to which the freezing orders related was an action in debt commenced in the District Court arising from the non-payment of income tax assessments raised by the Commissioner of Taxation on or about 4 August 2010 in relation to each of Mr Leo, Mr Veneziano and AMI.[3] The amounts claimed by the Commissioner were $1,751,059.89, $699,226.75 and $1,697,380.80 respectively. With respect to UHA, the Deputy Commissioner’s contention was that there was an arguable case that each of Mr Leo and Mr Veneziano were entitled to a proportion of the funds held to the credit of UHA in the UHA account.
[3] DCCIV 2407-2010: FDN 2.
On 23 January 2014 each of Mr Leo, Mr Veneziano and AMI lodged an application in the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the AAT) seeking a review of the Notices of Assessment issued by the Commissioner of Taxation on 25 November 2013 (the AAT proceedings) after objections to the initial assessments were rejected.[4] As at 21 December 2016 those proceedings were yet to be determined.
[4] These are in fact the second set of AAT proceedings instituted by the defendants. See SCCIV 1148-2016: FDN 8.
On 10 November 2016 the Deputy Commissioner instituted a fresh action in this Court against each of Mr Leo, Mr Veneziano and AMI (the defendants) in respect of unpaid taxation and taxation-related liabilities.[5] In his Statement of Claim the Deputy Commissioner pleaded that the total debt owed by Mr Leo was $8,548,638.60, by Mr Veneziano, $416,512.62, and by the AMI, $2,058,779.10.[6]
[5] SCCIV 1451-2016.
[6] SCCIV 1451-2016: FDN 2.
On 14 November 2016 the Deputy Commissioner filed an interlocutory application[7] (the new application) in this Court seeking freezing orders against the defendants in relation to the assets of each up to the value of the relevant tax debt owed.
[7] SCCIV 1451-2016: FDN 3.
Mr Leo, Mr Veneziano, AMI and UHA, through counsel, all opposed the new application, and, at the same time, applied for the discharge of the original freezing orders as varied (the discharge application).[8] In the alternative, an order permitting access to all or a portion of the funds held in the UHA account was sought for the purpose of satisfying legal fees.
[8] DCCIV 2407-2010: FDN 129.
On 21 December 2016 I granted the new application and dismissed the discharge application. My reasons for doing so follow.
Background
From the affidavit material to which I have been referred[9] it appears that Mr Leo and Mr Veneziano were members of AMI, a Pentecostal church founded by Mr Leo in the late 1980s. Mr Leo was the Pastor and Mr Veneziano the assistant pastor of AMI. The beginnings and growth of AMI are narrated by Pastor Leo in a statement filed in the AAT proceedings.[10]
[9] DCCIV 2407-2010: FDNs 6, 34, 36, 91, 98, 105, 135, 138, 142; SCCIV 1148-2016: FDNs 8, 9.
[10] DCCIV 2407-2010: FDN 91 at Ex JLR31.
It appears that the defendants’ taxation difficulties arose after the Commissioner of Taxation revoked AMI’s endorsement as a charitable institution for the purposes of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth), the A New Tax System (Goods and Services Tax) Act 1999 (Cth) and the Fringe Benefits Tax Assessment Act 1986 (Cth) in 2010.
As with most churches, AMI received gifts from its parishioners to be applied to its upkeep and pastoral work. In a statement filed in the AAT proceedings Mr Veneziano speaks of tithes and love offerings.[11] In that same statement Mr Veneziano tells of how the AMI intended to become involved in missionary work in the South Pacific. He said:
In approximately May 2008, we initiated the setup of a charitable entity in Vanuatu. We also initiated talks with the Vanuatu government in relation to the possibility of setting up a mission in Vanuatu and discussions about what work Agape could do in Vanuatu and obtaining resident exemptions for a large group of ministry workers. These discussions resulted in a draft Memorandum of Understanding between Agape and the Vanuatu Government.
The Memorandum of Understanding was due to be signed by the Vanuatu Minister of Internal Affairs … when he returned from a trip to Geneva. However, prior to his return Agape was the subject of negative media coverage in Australia and the Vanuatu government chose not to proceed with the Memorandum of Understanding. The Vanuatu Government also cancelled the registration of Agape’s charitable entity in Vanuatu.
In approximately October 2009, the Pastor announced the intended mission from the pulpit. He did not say anything that had not been said to the parishioners before. The Pastor and I were always sharing stories of our trips to Vanuatu and many parishioners had previously expressed that they were waiting for their chance to help as well.
The Pastor announced to the congregation that we wanted to start a mission in Vanuatu and that anyone who would like to be involved could come and speak to him or the members of the committee.
[11] DCCIV 2407-2010: FDN 91 at Ex JLR34.
In time a number of parishioners gave money to Pastor Leo for the mission. Mr Veneziano says that the money was not a donation to AMI but was given to fund the livelihoods and needs of those parishioners who were going to volunteer overseas. A number of parishioners made substantial financial contributions toward the establishment and financing of the mission. The money was deposited into a bank account in Pastor Leo’s name. A suitable property in Vanuatu was identified, but before it could be purchased the Pastor’s and Mr Veneziano’s assets were frozen. In his statement filed in the AAT proceedings Pastor Leo states:[12]
Members of the Agape congregation in Australia were very supportive of our plans to establish a base in the South Pacific and many sold their homes or businesses to assist in the purchase of the property to establish a new base. People gave their money to me as a man of God in trust that I would use it to buy a place to set up a base in Vanuatu. I did not receive the full amount of the purchase price in contributions to start so I agreed with the owner that I would pay the remainder of the purchase price over a period of 12 months. I was expecting to get further contributions as I was aware that parishioners were very excited to be involved and were in the process of selling houses, cars and businesses to enable them to contribute. People were begging me to be involved.
I discussed what was happening in the South Pacific from the pulpit and in committee meetings every Sunday so that people knew what was happening. I told people that we were going to help the poor and needy and evangelise. I invited everyone who wanted to participate to let me know. …
I did not ask anyone to donate money, they did this by themselves.
[12] DCCIV 2407-2010: FDN 91 at Ex JLR31.
The Pastor goes on to tell how the money donated was to be pooled for living expenses and housing to be distributed according to the Word of God.[13]
[13] DCCIV 2407-2010: FDN 91 at Ex JLR31.
In a statement filed in the AAT proceedings, Angelo Veneziano, Mr Veneziano’s brother, also provides some insight into the working of AMI and how the idea of undertaking missionary work in the South Pacific began.[14] Angelo Veneziano said he donated $400,000 to help with the mission in the South Pacific “on the understanding that it was going to be used to setup the missionary base, to provide accommodation and to assist with expenses”.[15] Mrs Conder tells of a donation of $390,343 that she and her husband made.[16] Other parishioners have made similar statements.[17]
[14] DCCIV 2407-2010: FDN 91 at Ex JLR34.
[15] DCCIV 2407-2010: FDN 91 at Ex JLR34.
[16] DCCIV 2407-2010: FDN 91 at Ex JLR36.
[17] DCCIV 2407-2010: FDN 91.
In an affidavit sworn on 12 April 2012, Mr Veneziano deposed that UHA was the trustee of the Veneziano Family Trust, the KDMV Trust and the Suncity Trust.[18] The trust accounts exhibited to that same affidavit state that $400,000 of the funds held in the UHA account was held on trust for AMI and $5,724,182.03 was held on trust for parishioners for international missionary work.
[18] DCCIV 2407-2010: FDN 34.
In a second affidavit, sworn 8 May 2012, Mr Veneziano deposed that he was “informed and believed” that the $400,000 held in the UHA account for AMI was “donated by individual AMI parishioners for use in overseas Christian and charitable activities”.[19] The money was not, he deposed, donated to AMI for the benefit of AMI.
[19] DCCIV 2407-2010: FDN 36.
In his AAT statement Mr Veneziano explained:[20]
Around this time [the time that money was deposited into the UHA account] the Pastor had his life threatened. I remember one day he came into the church as white as a sheet. I had never seen him like that before. He said that someone had stopped him at the roundabout at the end of the road near the church and pulled a gun on him. The Pastor told me that he put his arm under his jumper as if he had a gun and the person sped away. We called the police and made a report but no police came to the church.
The Pastor therefore spoke to the committee and said that he would put the money into my bank account in case anything happened to him. The committee agreed with this. After it was put in the account in my name I was concerned that I would need to pay tax on it. I could not pay any tax because I did not have any income. I therefore spoke to the committee and they all agreed to move the money into the Universal Holdings Australia account. However, it is still considered parishioners’ money for the property purchase.
[20] DCCIV 2407-2010: FDN 91 at Ex JLR35. See also Ex JLR31.
In a statement filed in the AAT, Pastor Leo deposed to holding donations received for the establishment of the mission on trust.[21] Those funds are contained, he also deposed, in the UHA account.[22]
[21] DCCIV 2407-2010: FDN 91 at Ex JLR31.
[22] DCCIV 2407-2010: FDN 91.
UHA is a company registered in Victoria. As at 21 December 2016, Ms Laura Veneziano was the sole director of UHA and was the then current company secretary. Mr Veneziano had previously been a director and the secretary of UHA and continued to hold one of the two shares issued in the company, the other share being held by Ms Mari-Antoinette Veneziano, Mr Veneziano’s spouse.
On 7 May 2010 two bank cheques were drawn on the Westpac Banking Corporation, one for $1.2 million and the other for $4,431,000. The first cheque was financed by the withdrawal of $1.2 million from Westpac Account 22-3513 held in the name of Pastor Leo. The second was financed by the withdrawal of $4,431,000 from Westpac Account 30-5600 held in the name of Mr Veneziano. Both bank cheques were deposited into the UHA account on 10 May 2010.
On 16 May 2010 Pastor Leo and Mr Veneziano left Australia. Neither has returned. Both AMI and Pastor Leo attracted police attention in the days before his departure. It appears that Pastor Leo and Mr Veneziano are currently resident in Fiji.
On 13 August 2012 summary judgment was entered in the original proceedings against Pastor Leo, Mr Veneziano and AMI in the amounts of $2,385,710.97, $1,088,382.31 and $17,952.20 respectively. Those judgments relate to taxation liabilities for the financial year ended 30 June 2010.[23]
[23] DCCIV 2407-2010: FDN 139.
As mentioned, since the freezing orders were first made in December 2010 further Notices of Assessment were issued by the Commissioner of Taxation to Pastor Leo, Mr Veneziano and AMI.[24] As also mentioned, as at 21 December 2016 the AAT proceedings were yet to be heard. The Statements of Facts, Issues and Contentions filed in the AAT proceedings suggest that it is possible that in those proceedings the question of whether Pastor Leo and Mr Veneziano have beneficial ownership of the funds in the UHA account may be resolved.[25] The issue will squarely be confronted in proceedings that have been instituted in this Court against Pastor Leo, AMI and UHA.[26] In those proceedings seven plaintiffs, all once parishioners of AMI, claim $2,130,343.00 in damages. In the AAT proceedings an expert report provided by a forensic account suggests that $3,293,157.00 was contributed by parishioners to the fund ultimately held in the UHA account. The Deputy Commissioner intends to challenge the report and in particular the methodology it has invoked.
[24] DCCIV 2407-2010: FDNs 98 and 105.
[25] DCCIV 2407-2010: FDN 105.
[26] SCCIV 352-2015.
I have referred to the fact that seven AMI parishioners (subsequently reduced to six) instituted proceedings in this Court seeking, in effect, the return of the money they provided to Pastor Leo and AMI for the establishment of a mission in the South Pacific.[27] I note that in those proceedings the parishioners applied for a freezing order in respect of the UHA account. The application was not pursued upon the Deputy Commissioner undertaking that, through his solicitors, he would notify the parishioners if there was any action taken or foreshadowed by any person to access the funds in the UHA account or otherwise to vary the original freezing order insofar as it related to the UHA account.[28]
[27] SCCIV 325-2015.
[28] DCCIV 2407-2010: FDN 135.
The new application
As mentioned, on 10 November 2016 the Deputy Commissioner instituted an action against each of the three defendants in this Court for unpaid tax-related liabilities, including penalties and interest, owed to the Commonwealth. The details regarding the components of the debts are set out in the Deputy Commissioner’s Statement of Claim.[29] In Pastor Leo’s case the debt is largely the product of income tax assessments raised by the Commissioner for the financial years ending 2002, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010 and administrative penalties. Like Pastor Leo, Mr Veneziano’s taxation liability is largely the product of income tax assessments raised by the Commissioner, in his case, however, assessments were only raised for the financial years ending 2004, 2005, 2006 and 2009. He too has incurred substantial administrative penalties. AMI’s taxation liability arises in the main from income tax assessments raised for the financial years ending 2008 and 2009, and from fringe benefits tax assessments for the years ending 31 March 2004, 31 March 2005, 31 March 2006, 31 March 2007, 31 March 2008, 31 March 2009 and 31 March 2010.
[29] See also DCCIV 2407-2010: FDN 139.
The total amount claimed against the defendants in the new action is $11,023,930.32.
As against each defendant the taxation, interest and related penalties and charges comprising the debts owed are tax-related liabilities within the meaning of Sch 1 s 255-1 of the Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth) (the TAA).[30] Under Sch 1 s 255-5(1) TAA a tax-related liability that is due and payable is a debt due to the Commonwealth. Under Sch 1 s 255-5(1) TAA such tax-related liability is payable to the Commissioner of Taxation and under Sch 1 s 255-5(2) a Deputy Commissioner of Taxation may sue in a court of competent jurisdiction for the recovery of an unpaid tax-related liability that is due and payable.
[30] Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth), s 995-1.

Schedule 1 s 255-50 TAA provides that in a proceeding to recover an amount of a tax-related liability, a statement or averment about a matter in the plaintiff’s complaint, claim or declaration is prima facie evidence of the matter. In his Statement of Claim the Deputy Commissioner states that the debts set out in the Statement of Claim and owed by the defendants are due and payable. In the course of submissions counsel for the Deputy Commissioner advised that the taxation liabilities subject of the 2016 actions were different to, and in addition to, those subject of the District Court proceedings instituted in 2010.
The Deputy Commissioner sought the freezing orders to which I have referred. The Deputy Commissioner submitted that by reason of the evidentiary provisions contained in the TAA and to which reference has been made above, the Deputy Commissioner had a good arguable case for judgment against Pastor Leo, Mr Veneziano and AMI for the amounts claimed in the new proceedings.
Submissions on whether or not the court process would be frustrated should an order not be made, focused upon the content of the UHA account. Consistent with the source of the funds in the UHA account coming from accounts held in Pastor Leo’s and Mr Veneziano’s names, the Deputy Commissioner submitted that there existed a good arguable case that Pastor Leo and Mr Veneziano had a beneficial interest in those funds. The Deputy Commissioner readily conceded that the nature of any interest held by the Pastor and Mr Veneziano was disputed by the parishioners who had instituted proceedings in this Court but resolution of that issue was a matter for trial. Further, the funds formed a significant proportion of the assets available to satisfy the fresh tax liabilities that the Deputy Commissioner intended to prove Pastor Leo, Mr Veneziano and AMI owed to the Commonwealth. If the funds did not remain frozen it was likely, the Deputy Commissioner submitted, that they would be dissipated. In that regard, he referred to the fact that Pastor Leo and Mr Veneziano had moved seemingly permanently to Fiji in May 2010 and were unlikely to return and to the fact that they sought to discharge the original freezing order for the purpose of dissipating the funds held in the UHA account. The Deputy Commissioner added that all persons with an interest in the UHA account were protected by the undertaking as to damages that he was prepared to give. In this connection there was no indication that any possible proprietary interest could not be adequately compensated by damages if damage or loss was sustained in consequence of the freezing orders.
The new application was opposed in effect on the same grounds as were advanced in support of the discharge application, namely, that a freezing order was an exceptional step to take, that this Court could not be satisfied that the defendants held an interest in the UHA account such that it could be applied to the satisfaction of a judgment debt and that the assessments raised particularly in Pastor Leo’s case were likely overstated.
The discharge application
The defendants sought orders that:[31]
i.that the freezing order made against each defendant and UHA on 3 December 2010, as varied from time to time, be discharged in full;
ii.alternatively, that the freezing orders be discharged to the extent and up to such amount that this Court deems fit in so far as those orders relate to any funds held by the UHA account;
iii.in the further alternative, that the freezing orders be discharged upon the amount of $4,147,666.44 being paid from the UHA account into Court; or
iv.that the freezing orders be varied to allow the defendants $400,000 to be paid from the UHA account into the trust account of the defendants’[32] solicitors, such sum to be applied in payment of legal fees incurred by the defendants in relation to the AAT proceedings.
[31] DCCIV 2407-2010: FDN 129.
[32] The “defendants” referred to were those specified in the 3 December 2010 freezing orders.
In support of the discharge application I received six affidavits from the defendants’ solicitor Ms Susanne Cengarle,[33] in addition to an affidavit from Mrs Kathryn Conder.[34]
[33] DCCIV 2407-2010: FDNs 128, 130, 141, 143; SCCIV 1148-2016: FDNs 13 and 14.
[34] SCCIV 1148-2016: FDN 10.
The application and the supporting material focused upon the UHA account. The basis for the application was that this Court could not be satisfied that there existed a reasonable basis to expect that any judgment obtained by the Deputy Commissioner against Pastor Leo, Mr Veneziano, and AMI would be enforced against the money held in the UHA account. In this regard Ms Cengarle referred to Mr Veneziano’s affidavits to which reference has already been made. She contended that the defendants’ positions were that the funds contained in the UHA account were held for the benefit of the AMI parishioners (including those who had instituted proceedings in this Court) and were not held for the benefit of the Pastor and Mr Veneziano. Accepting this, those funds could never reasonably be called upon to satisfy any judgment that the Deputy Commissioner might obtain against the defendants. Ms Cengarle also referred to the Third Statement of Claim filed in the parishioners’ proceedings where six parishioners plead that money they provided on trust to Pastor Leo and AMI had found its way into the UHA account. As one would expect the pleadings do not detail the tracing exercise that may be necessary to support that contention. Ms Cengarle also referred to the Defence filed by the Deputy Commissioner in the parishioners’ proceedings. The Defence revealed that the Deputy Commissioner did not intend to challenge the allegation that Pastor Leo and AMI intended to purchase a property in Vanuatu and establish a mission. Further, the Deputy Commissioner did not intend to challenge the fact that the property was not purchased and no mission had been established. Further again, the Deputy Commissioner did not intend to challenge that the payments asserted were made. Of course, that did not mean that the money held in the UHA account was necessarily held on trust for the parishioners. Ms Cengarle also referred to the fact that the Deputy Commissioner did not advance a positive case to the effect that the funds were advanced or held for the personal benefit of the Pastor and Mr Veneziano. It appears that the Deputy Commissioner intends to put the parishioners to proof as to the existence of a constructive or resulting trust (and not a charitable trust) and the fact that the funds held in the UHA account are trust funds. In those circumstances if the freezing orders are to be maintained, the defendants contend that the Deputy Commissioner should adduce some cogent positive evidence of Pastor Leo’s and Mr Veneziano’s interests in the funds contained in the UHA account.
In the alternative, the defendants consent to a variation of the freezing orders permitting the payment of $4,147,667.44 into the Suitors’ Fund which would be sufficient to satisfy the original assessments raised against the defendants (now the subject of default judgments obtained) and currently the subject of dispute in the AAT, and see the balance returned to the defendants. At the time that Ms Cengarle swore her first and second affidavit the Deputy Commissioner was yet to institute his fresh action against the defendants.
Next Ms Cengarle referred to correspondence between the solicitors representing the Deputy Commissioner and the solicitors previously representing the defendants regarding the possibility of varying the original freezing orders so that a portion of the funds held could be applied to the defendants’ legal costs. In the past the Deputy Commissioner had been prepared to permit the defendants access to the funds held in the UHA account on condition that a mortgage be provided to the Commissioner over a property at Campbelltown that was also subject of the freezing orders. The compromise was motivated by the need to meet legal fees. Prior to the hearing of the discharge application the Deputy Commissioner indicated that he was prepared to revisit that arrangement. The negotiations appear to have lapsed largely because of the insistence on the Deputy Commissioner’s part that a mortgage be provided and opposition on the part of the defendants to that course. Subsequent correspondence indicated that the Deputy Commissioner did not oppose an application that would allow the defendants to access the proceeds of sale of properties at Oakden and Campbelltown in order to finance their legal costs. The purpose in seeking a mortgage with respect to the Campbelltown property, should access be granted to the UHA account, was intended to provide security in the event that the competing ownership claims made with respect to the contents of that account were determined adverse to the Deputy Commissioner.
It is apparent from perusing the Defence filed in the parishioners’ proceedings that the Deputy Commissioner does not accept that the money in the UHA account was held on trust for the parishioners or that the parishioners had an interest in it. The correspondence from the solicitors for the Deputy Commissioner made plain that the Deputy Commissioner maintained his view that the funds held in the UHA account were beneficially owned by Pastor Leo and Mr Veneziano. It appears that the Deputy Commissioner’s view has been that until such time as the question of the beneficial ownership of the funds held in the UHA account is determined it would be inappropriate for those funds to be accessed by the defendants for the payment of their legal costs.
In her fourth and fifth affidavits Ms Cengarle raised the prospect of the fresh assessments raised by the Deputy Commissioner being determined on an erroneous basis resulting in the tax liability being overstated. For reasons that will become apparent it is unnecessary to set out the detail of the issues raised regarding the calculation of the assessments.
In her affidavit Mrs Conder detailed the defendants’ inability to pay legal fees. She deposed to the facts that Pastor Leo and Mr Veneziano are resident in Fiji, are not employed as they undertake missionary work, and are dependent upon the generosity of others for their upkeep. She also deposed to the difficult financial circumstances in which Mrs Leo finds herself.
Mrs Conder said:
The plaintiffs in the Parishioners’ Supreme Court Proceedings, by the current Third Statement of Claim filed on 6 October 2015 claim that they provided certain monies to some of the defendants in these proceedings for the purposes of creating a mission in the Republic of Vanuatu and other South Pacific nations which included having to purchase land and establish a base from which parishioners of the third defendant could minister to the local people of the Republic of Vanuatu (‘the Project’). I am aware, and the defendants agree, that each of the amounts particularised in the third statement of claim was paid for that purpose, and that accordingly that money (and the interest that has been earned on that money) which now forms part of the UHA Funds is held on trust for them. In addition a further amount of $400,000 provided by Mr Angelo Veneziano also to fund the project, plus interest earned on that money is also held as part of the UHA Funds. The balance is comprised of further similar money from other parishioners and from the third defendant that was also put in to the UHA Funds for the purpose and for use in the Project. The Project did not proceed.
The applicable principles
Rule 246(1) of the Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA) (SCCR) vests a discretionary power in this Court to grant an injunction before, at, or after the hearing and determination of proceedings in this Court. Rule 247 SCCR empowers this Court to make a particular kind of injunction — a freezing order. Rule 247(2) provides:
(2) Freezing order
(a) The Court may make an order (a freezing order), upon or without notice to a respondent, for the purpose of preventing the frustration or inhibition of the Court’s process by seeking to meet a danger that a judgment or prospective judgment of the Court will be wholly or partly unsatisfied.
(b) A freezing order may be an order restraining a respondent from removing any assets located in or outside Australia or from disposing of, dealing with, or diminishing the value of, those assets.
Rules 247(5)(a)-(f) provide:
(5)     Order against judgment debtor or prospective judgment debtor or third party
(a)     This rule applies if—
(i)     judgment has been given in favour of an applicant by—
(A)    the Court; or
(B)in the case of a judgment to which subrule (b) applies – another court; or
(ii)an applicant has a good arguable case on an accrued or prospective cause of action that is justiciable in—
(A)    the Court; or
(B)in the case of a cause of action to which subrule (c) applies – another court.
(b)     This subrule applies to a judgment if there is a sufficient prospect that the judgment will be registered in or enforced by the Court.
(c)     This subrule applies to a cause of action if—
(i)there is a sufficient prospect that the other court will give judgment in favour of the applicant; and
(ii)there is a sufficient prospect that the judgment will be registered in or enforced by the Court.
(d)     The Court may make a freezing order or an ancillary order or both against a judgment debtor or prospective judgment debtor if the Court is satisfied, having regard to all the circumstances, that there is a danger that a judgment or prospective judgment will be wholly or partly unsatisfied because any of the following might occur—
(i)the judgment debtor, prospective judgment debtor or another person absconds; or
(ii)the assets of the judgment debtor, prospective judgment debtor or another person are—
(A)removed from Australia or from a place inside or outside Australia; or
(B)     disposed of, dealt with or diminished in value.
(e)     The Court may make a freezing order or an ancillary order or both against a person other than a judgment debtor or prospective judgment debtor (a third party) if the Court is satisfied, having regard to all the circumstances, that—
(i)there is a danger that a judgment or prospective judgment will be wholly or partly unsatisfied because—
(A)the third party holds or is using, or has exercised or is exercising, a power of disposition over assets (including claims and expectancies) of the judgment debtor or prospective judgment debtor; or
(B)the third party is in possession of, or in a position of control or influence concerning, assets (including claims and expectancies) of the judgment debtor or prospective judgment debtor; or
(ii)a process in the Court is or may ultimately be available to the applicant as a result of a judgment or prospective judgment, under which process the third party may be obliged to disgorge assets or contribute toward satisfying the judgment or prospective judgment.
(f)    Nothing in this rule affects the power of the Court to make a freezing order or ancillary order if the Court considers it is in the interests of justice to do so.
Rules 246 and 247 are supported by s 29 of the Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA) and the Court’s inherent power. Whatever the breadth of the power contained in s 29,[35] to the extent that s 29 and the inherent power support r 247 the doctrinal basis for a freezing order “is to be found in the power of the court to prevent the frustration of its process”.[36] Relevantly, in PT Bayan Resources TBK v BCBC Singapore Pte Ltd French CJ, Kiefel, Bell, Gageler and Gordon JJ said:[37]
It is well established by decisions of this Court that the inherent power of the Supreme Court of a State includes the power to make such orders as that Court may determine to be appropriate “to prevent the abuse or frustration of its process in relation to matters coming within its jurisdiction”. And it has been noted more than once in this Court that a freezing order is “the paradigm example of an order to prevent the frustration of a court's process”.
[footnotes omitted]
[35] See generally, Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 199.
[36] Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 199 at [94] (Gummow and Hayne JJ), [60] (Gaudron J); Patrick Stevedores Operations No 2 Pty Ltd v Maritime Union of Australia (1998) 195 CLR 1 at [35] (Brennan CJ, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ); CSR Ltd v Cigna Insurance Australia Ltd (1997) 189 CLR 345 at 391 (Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Kirby JJ); Cardile v LED Builders Pty Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 380 at [41]-[42] (Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Callinan JJ); PT Bayan Resources TBK v BCBC SingaporePte Ltd (2015) 258 CLR 1 at [44] (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell, Gageler and Gordon JJ).
[37] (2015) 258 CLR 1 at [43].
“[T]he process which the order is designed to protect is a “prospective enforcement process””.[38] In Mercedes Benz AG v Leiduck Lord Nicholls explained:[39]
Ordinarily a plaintiff seeks a Mareva injunction in the same proceeding as those in which he is seeking his judgment. This should not be permitted to obscure the fact that Mareva relief differs from other interim relief in an important respect. Like other injunctions, a Mareva injunction operates in personam. It does not create a proprietary interest in the affected property, even where it relates to a specifically identified asset. And like other interim relief, a Mareva injunction is concerned to provide protection pending a future stage in the judicial process. But unlike other interlocutory relief, Mareva relief is not connected with the subject matter of the cause of action in issue in the proceedings. A Mareva injunction does not prevent a defendant from doing something which if done by him would be a wrong attracting a remedy. An unsecured creditor, or a claimant for damages, has no legal or equitable interest in any of the assets of the defendant, nor will the judgment itself give him such an interest. The judgment will comprise an order of the court that the defendant pay the plaintiff an amount of money.
This feature has to be kept in mind. Although normally granted in the proceedings in which the judgment is being sought, [a freezing order] is not granted in aid of the cause of action asserted in the proceedings, at any rate in any ordinary sense. It is not so much relief appurtenant to a money claim as relief appurtenant to a prospective money judgment. It is relief granted to facilitate the process of execution or enforcement which will arise when, but only when, the judgment for payment of an amount of money has been obtained ...
[38] PT Bayan Resources TBK v BCBC Singapore Pte Ltd (2015) 258 CLR 1 at [46] (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell, Gageler and Gordon JJ).
[39] [1996] AC 284 at 306 quoted with approval in PT Bayan Resources TBK v BCBC Singapore Pte Ltd (2015) 258 CLR 1 at [46] (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell, Gageler and Gordon JJ).
Importantly, any order made “must be framed “so as to come within the limits set by the purpose which [the order] can properly be intended to serve””; that is, to ensure the effective exercise of the jurisdiction invoked.[40] Rule 247(5)(d) SCCR should be applied consistent with this principle. In this regard in Jackson v Sterling Industries Ltd Deane J said:[41]
As a general proposition, it should now be accepted in this country that “a Mareva injunction can be granted ... if the circumstances are such that there is a danger of [the defendant’s] absconding, or a danger of the assets being removed out of the jurisdiction or disposed of within the jurisdiction, or otherwise dealt with so that there is a danger that the plaintiff, if he gets judgment, will not be able to get it satisfied”: per Lord Denning M.R., Rahman (Prince Abdul) v. Abu-Taha quoted with approval by Street C.J. in Ballabil Holdings.
[footnotes omitted]
[40] Patrick Stevedores Operations No 2 Pty Ltd v Maritime Union of Australia (1998) 195 CLR 1 at [35] (Brennan CJ, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ); Cardile v LED Builders Pty Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 380 at [41]-[42] (Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Callinan JJ).
[41] (1987) 162 CLR 612 at 623; Patrick Stevedores Operations No 2 Pty Ltd v Maritime Union of Australia (1998) 195 CLR 1 at [35] (Brennan CJ, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ).

That said the starting point is to observe that the remedy is exceptional. The general rule is that a plaintiff must first obtain judgment then enforce it.[42] Further:[43]
[A Mareva order] is a drastic remedy which should not be granted lightly. ...
A [Mareva order] is an interlocutory order which, if granted, imposes a severe restriction upon a defendant’s right to deal with his or her assets. It is granted at the suit of a plaintiff whose status as a creditor is in dispute and who need not be a secured creditor. Its purpose is to preserve the status quo, not to change it in favour of the plaintiff. The function of the order is not to
“provide a plaintiff with security in advance for a judgment that he hopes to obtain and that he fears might not be satisfied; nor is it to improve the position of the plaintiff in the event of the defendant’s insolvency.” ...
Many authorities attest to the care with which courts are required to scrutinise applications for [Mareva orders]. …
[42] A J Bekhor & Co Ltd v Bilton [1981] QB 923 at 941-942 (Ackner LJ).
[43] Frigo v Culhaci [1998] NSWCA 88 at 10 (Mason P, Sheller JA and Sheppard AJA) as quoted with approval in Cardile v LED Builders Pty Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 380 at [51] (Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Callinan JJ).
For the purposes of r 247(5)(a)(ii) SCCR a plaintiff will have a good arguable case where it demonstrates that it has “a reasonably arguable case on legal as well as factual matters”.[44] It will not be sufficient merely to assert a claim in an affidavit or pleading.
[44] Cardile v LED Builders Pty Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 380 at [68] (Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Callinan JJ).
Turning to r 247(5)(d) SCCR, a court will conclude that there is a danger that a judgment or prospective judgment will be wholly or partly unsatisfied if the court is satisfied on the evidence adduced that the refusal to make a freezing order would involve a real risk of such consequence.[45] In Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Hua Wang Bank Berhad Kenny J added:[46]
The fact that assets within the jurisdiction are moveable, and that the respondent is incorporated outside the jurisdiction is not enough to warrant an inferential finding of danger of dissipation. Rather, there must be facts from which, to quote Lawton LJ in Third Chandris Shipping Corporation v Unimarine SA [1979] 1 QB 645 at 671; [1979] 2 All ER 972 at 987 (Chadris) “a prudent, sensible commercial” person can “properly infer a danger of default if assets are removed from the jurisdiction”. In this connection, Lawton LJ also said (at QB 672; All ER 987):
… In my judgment an affidavit in support of a Mareva injunction should give enough particulars of the plaintiff’s case to enable the court to assess its strength and should set out what inquiries have been made about the defendant’s business and what information has been revealed, including that relating to its size, origins, business domicile, the location of its known assets and the circumstances in which the dispute has arisen. These facts should enable a commercial judge to infer whether there is likely to be any real risk of default. Default is most unlikely if the defendant is a long established, well known foreign corporation or is known to have substantial assets in countries where English judgments can easily be enforced either under the Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933 or otherwise. But if nothing can be found about the defendant, that in itself may be enough to justify a Mareva injunction.
See also Chandris at 669; All ER 985 per Lord Denning MR, Raukura Moana Fisheries Ltd v Ship “Irina Zharkikh” [2001] 2 NZLR 801 at [122] per Young J, Hadid v Lenfest Communications Inc (1996) 67 FCR 446 at 449 per Lehane J, and Reches Pty Ltd v Tadiran Pty Ltd (1998) 85 FCR 514 at 518; 155 ALR 478 at 481 (Reches) per Lehane J. In Reches Lehane J declined to grant a Mareva injunction where the respondent, though a foreign corporation that would remove or deplete its sole asset in Australian [sic] in the ordinary course of business, was “a major and profitable corporation with very substantial assets”; there was nothing to suggest that the respondent was likely to default; and the respondent resided and principally carried on business in a jurisdiction where enforcement was possible under a reciprocal regime for the registration of judgments.
[45] Ninemia Maritime Corp v Trave Schiffahrtsgesellschaft mbH & Co KG [1984] 1 All ER 398 at 419 (Kerr LJ) (‘The Niedersachsen’), see also Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Hua Wang Bank Berhad (2010) 273 ALR 194 at [9] (Kenny J) and the authorities referred to therein.
[46] (2010) 273 ALR 194 at [12].
Further the relevant danger must be established by evidence and not merely asserted.[47]
[47] Frigo v Culhaci [1998] NSWCA 88 at 16 (Mason P, Sheller JA and Sheppard AJA); Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Gashi (2010) 27 VR 127 at [11] (Bell J).
So far I have articulated the applicable principles as they apply in relation to a freezing order sought in relation to the assets of a defendant. Of course, “[t]he protection of the administration of justice which this involves may, in a proper case, extend to asset preservation orders against third parties to the principal litigation”.[48] As much is made plain by r 247(5)(e) SCCR.
[48] Cardile v LED Builders Pty Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 380 at [25] (Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Callinan JJ).
Lastly, it is common for provision to be made for living expenses and legal fees to be paid out of an estate particularly where a freezing order freezes the entirety of a person’s estate.[49] This reflects the fact that the overall purpose of a freezing order is to prevent the dissipation of assets not to elevate a plaintiff to the position of a secured creditor.
[49] Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Karas (2012) 86 ATR 685 at [19] (Kaye J); Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Bollands (2012) 90 ATR 679 at [21]-[25] (McKerracher J).
Consideration
I commence by addressing the question of whether the doubts expressed in the affidavits filed in opposition to the new application and in support of the discharge application as to the accuracy and reliability of the Commissioner’s assessments undermines this Court’s confidence in the Deputy Commissioner’s case such that it can no longer be considered a good arguable case.
It seems to me that in the discharge application, absent appeal, the defendants cannot go behind the judgments obtained. Rule 247(5)(a) SCCR and the distinction between the circumstances falling with sub-paragraphs (i) and (ii) of that rule reflect this. Further, and in any event, Sch 1 s 350-10 TAA relevantly provides that the production of a Notice of Assessment under a taxation law is conclusive evidence that the assessment was properly made and the amounts and particulars of the assessment were correct, save in proceedings under Pt IVC TAA. Accordingly, for the purposes of the discharge application the summary judgments and/or Sch 1 s 350-10 put the Commissioner’s assessments beyond question in these proceedings.
Turning to the new proceedings, once again Sch 1 s 350-10 provides the complete answer.[50] Accordingly, I am satisfied that in relation to the Deputy Commissioner’s claim against each of the defendants as pleaded, such claim being reliant on Notices of Assessment raised and in evidence before me, that the Deputy Commissioner has a good arguable case on an accrued cause of action that is justiciable in this Court.
[50] Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Gashi (2010) 27 VR 127 at [23] (Bell J).
The defendants did not dispute that they held an interest in any of the assets specifically frozen in the orders I made on 21 December 2016 save the UHA account. So that there is no doubt, having regard to the affidavit material filed by the Deputy Commissioner I was satisfied:
a.   that Pastor Leo held an interest in the real property subject of clause 6 sub-clauses (1)(c)(i)-(ii) of the order made on 21 December 2016, and in each of the accounts listed in clause 6 sub-clauses (1)(c)(iii)-(xvi) of the same order, and in the assets of the business known as or trading in the name or style as Agape Ministries International or the proceeds of sale of the assets of that business; [51]
b.   that Mr Veneziano held an interest in each of the accounts listed in clause 6 sub-clauses (1)(c)(i)-(xiv) of the order made on 21 December 2016, and in the assets of the business known as or trading in the name or style as Agape Ministries International or the proceeds of sale of the assets of that business;[52]
c.   that AMI held an interest in the accounts listed in clause 6 sub-clauses (1)(c)(i)-(iii) of the order made on 21 December 2016, and in the assets of the business known as or trading in the name or style as Agape Ministries International or the proceeds of sale of the assets of that business;[53] and
d.   that UHA held an interest in the real property subject of clause 6 sub-clauses (1)(c)(i)-(iii), and in each of the accounts listed in clause 6 sub-clauses (1)(c)(iv)-(vi).[54]
[51] SCCIV 1451-2016: FDN 7.
[52] SCCIV 1451-2016: FDN 8.
[53] SCCIV 1451-2016: FDN 10.
[54] SCCIV 1451-2016: FDN 9.
I am also satisfied that the value of the interests held by each of Pastor Leo, Mr Veneziano and AMI in the assets subject of the orders I made on 21 December 2016 is less in each case than each defendant’s taxation liability subject of the new action.
Turning to the UHA account the source of the funds held in the UHA account supports the Deputy Commissioner’s contention that Pastor Leo and Mr Veneziano possess an interest in those funds. I appreciate that the parishioners contend to the contrary and that both the Pastor and Mr Veneziano have stated that they hold the funds on trust. Neither the Pastor nor Mr Veneziano claim that the funds in the UHA account have passed into the control of another. That is to say, both appear to accept that the funds in the UHA account are held by them or subject to their control; the question that remains is whether, despite what the Pastor, Mr Veneziano and the parishioners have said, the Pastor and Mr Veneziano have an interest in those funds against which the Deputy Commissioner’s judgment and any prospective judgment may be enforced.
Without hearing from Mr Veneziano in person I found his explanation for the depositing of the funds in the UHA account gave rise to more questions than it answered. That is to say, the threat made to the Pastor might explain why the Pastor transferred money to Mr Veneziano and the risk of taxation might explain why he then transferred the money, in turn, into the UHA account, but it did not explain why the Pastor transferred the additional amount into the UHA account. Then in his first affidavit Mr Veneziano referred to AMI’s interest in the funds contained in the UHA account as if that interest were beneficial only to modify AMI’s entitlement to one excluding a beneficial interest in his later affidavit on the basis of things told to him. Then there is the absence of detail regarding the circumstances surrounding the payments made by the parishioners to Pastor Leo and the absence of church records.
The payments made by the parishioners were not solicited, but made voluntarily and without encouragement. If they were individual acts of charity, why was the relationship in each case one that resulted in the creation of a trust? If there is a trust, why is it not a charitable trust? Assertion without detail is not overly persuasive. To my mind the question of the nature of the legal relationship between parishioners and the pastor/church regarding the funds donated/held is not without complexity and one that it is likely neither parishioner nor pastor/church turned their minds to at the time.
When I made the 21 December 2016 orders I was also concerned by the seeming inconsistency in the position adopted by the Pastor and Mr Veneziano. On the one hand, they claimed to hold the funds in the UHA account as trustee for others and not to be beneficiaries. On the other, they wanted access to the funds to satisfy their legal fees and, potentially, to relieve some of the hardship experienced by Mrs Leo. If they held no interest in the funds contained in the UHA account, on what basis could they apply those same funds to their own purposes? I accept that it may be the case that some parishioners would be happy for the Pastor and Mr Veneziano to spend their money on legal fees. But with the exception of Mrs Conder, there is no satisfactory evidence that the parishioners have been consulted. And then there is the question of the balance of the UHA account not currently claimed by any parishioner.
I accept that in the past an order has been sought on the basis that no money would be expended without the permission of the parishioners, but if an order as sought were made it would assume the outcome of the dispute regarding the existence of an interest on the part of Pastor Leo and Mr Veneziano in the UHA account.
It is also troubling that neither Pastor Leo nor Mr Veneziano have expressed any intention of returning to Australia to address the issues arising in these proceedings. That undermines the weight that can be given to the statements they have made in the AAT proceedings and in the original proceedings.
These considerations in combination led me to conclude that the Deputy Commissioner’s contention that Pastor Leo and Mr Veneziano held an interest in the funds held in the UHA account was reasonably arguable. I appreciated that the Deputy Commissioner did not intend to run a positive case in the parishioners’ proceedings, but that approach did not mean that the parishioners’ untested case gained weight. The question ultimately could not be determined without hearing evidence. For these reasons I was satisfied that subject to the question of there being a risk of the UHA funds being dissipated, it was appropriate to freeze the UHA account. In arriving at this conclusion I also took into account the fact that those parishioners who had instituted proceedings against Pastor Leo, Mr Veneziano and AMI had also sought a freezing order over the UHA account. As mentioned that application was not proceeded with upon the Deputy Commissioner undertaking to advise the parishioners of any step in the wider taxation proceedings that might put their interests in the UHA account at risk. That suggested to me that the parishioners were not in positions where any loss or damage sustained on account of their not having access to their money, assuming they prove their respective interests, could not be adequately addressed by the Deputy Commissioner’s undertaking in damages.
Because of the dispute regarding ownership or entitlement to the funds in the UHA account, and because the parishioners were not all heard as part of the discharge application, I considered that it would have been inappropriate to accede to those aspects of the discharge application that allowed the defendants access to the UHA account for legal fees. The authorities to which I was referred permit access to frozen assets for legal fees generally as a matter of course where the asset is the property of the defendant. In this case, the question of who is entitled to the funds in the UHA account is disputed. I considered that it would be inappropriate for me to make an order without hearing from all parties concerned, an order which in a sense would have decided the dispute contrary to the defendants’ contentions but in favour of the defendants. Further, and in any event, there were other assets in which the defendants held interests to which resort could be had for legal fees.
As for the risk of the assets being dissipated, in relation to the funds held in the UHA account it is plain that if the order is lifted those funds will be dissipated. They may be applied to legal fees, some may be devoted to helping Mrs Leo, they may be divided up amongst parishioners, they may be sent to Fiji, they may be returned to parishioners and still forwarded to Fiji. More generally, nothing in the papers suggests that AMI has sought the services of a new pastor intending to pick up where Pastor Leo and Mr Veneziano left off. Rather the papers suggest that AMI continues to revolve around Pastor Leo who attempts to minister from Fiji. The papers also suggest that Pastor Leo and Mr Veneziano do not intend to return to Australia in the near future. I was satisfied that if the original order were discharged and the new application not granted the property in which the defendants hold an interest including the disputed funds in the UHA account would be dissipated. The refusal of the Pastor and Mr Veneziano to return to Australia provided support for such conclusion. If they were prepared to put themselves beyond the reach of the Australian authorities as they seemingly have done, it is more likely that they would be prepared to do the same in relation to those assets in which they have an interest if afforded the opportunity. On the assumption that the Deputy Commissioner makes good his claim that the Pastor and Mr Veneziano do have an interest in the UHA account, I was satisfied that there was a very real risk that if the freezing orders were not made, and the original orders discharged, the contents of the account would be dissipated. I was of the same view in relation to the other assets referred to in the 21 December 2016 orders.
For these reasons I made the 21 December 2016 freezing orders and dismissed the discharge application.