Dent v The King

Case [2024] SASCA 12

SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Court of Appeal: Criminal)

DENT v THE KING

[2024] SASCA 12

Judgment of the Court of Appeal  

(The Honourable President Livesey, the Honourable Justice Lovell and the Honourable Justice Nicholson)

22 February 2024

CRIMINAL LAW - APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - VERDICT UNREASONABLE OR INSUPPORTABLE HAVING REGARD TO EVIDENCE - APPEAL DISMISSED

CRIMINAL LAW - PARTICULAR OFFENCES - OFFENCES AGAINST THE PERSON - HOMICIDE - MURDER - EVIDENCE

CRIMINAL LAW - PARTICULAR OFFENCES - OFFENCES AGAINST THE PERSON - HOMICIDE - MURDER - EVIDENCE - MOTIVE

CRIMINAL LAW - PARTICULAR OFFENCES - OFFENCES AGAINST THE PERSON - HOMICIDE - MURDER - INTENTION TO KILL OR CAUSE SERIOUS NON-FATAL INJURY

CRIMINAL LAW - PROCEDURE - TRIAL HAD BEFORE JUDGE WITHOUT JURY

The appellant was found guilty by judge alone of murdering the deceased through administering an assortment of drugs, including opioids and prescription medication.

The appellant appeals her conviction on the grounds that the primary Judge erred in her factual findings, and that it was not reasonably open for her to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt, when having regard to all of the evidence, that the appellant administered the combination of drugs that caused the death of the deceased with the requisite intent.

Held, per Livesey P, Lovell JA and Nicholson AJA, dismissing the appeal:

1.There was no error in the factual findings the primary Judge made.

2.It was open to the primary Judge to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant was guilty of murder.

3.The assessment of the evidence does not cause a reasonable doubt about the guilt of the appellant.

Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (NSW) s 6(1); Criminal Procedure Act 1921 (SA) ss 158(1)(a); 158(1)(b); 158(c), referred to.
Bristow v The Queen (2020) 137 SASR 449; Chamberlain v The Queen (No 2) (1984) 153 CLR 521; Dansie v The Queen (2022) 274 CLR 651; De Gruchy v The Queen (2002) 211 CLR 85; Filippou v The Queen [2013] NSWCCA 92; Filippou v The Queen (2015) 256 CLR 47; Jones v Harris [1946] SASR 98; Lang v The Queen (2023) 97 ALJR 758; Lukaj v The King (2022) 142 SASR 98; M v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 487; Martin v Osborne (1936) 55 CLR 367; MFA v The Queen (2002) 213 CLR 606; R v Ball [1911] AC 47; R v Georgiev (2001) 119 A Crim R 363; Shepherd v The Queen (1990) 170 CLR 573; SKA v The Queen (2011) 243 CLR 400, considered.

DENT v THE KING
[2024] SASCA 12

Court of Appeal – Criminal: Livesey P, Lovell JA and Nicholson AJA

  1. LIVESEY P AND LOVELL JA: Mr David Lawrence (“the deceased”) was found dead in his bed on the morning of 3 December 2015. An autopsy determined that the cause of death was the toxic effect of opiates, namely, morphine and tramadol. Ms Wendie-Sue Dent (“the appellant”), who was in a relationship with the deceased…

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Dent v The King [2024] SASCA 12
Case
[2024] SASCA 12
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appellant, Dent, appealed to the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia against a conviction for murder. The appeal concerned the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict, particularly in relation to the cause of death, motive, and the appellant's intent. The trial was conducted before a judge without a jury.

The central legal issues before the Full Court were whether the verdict of guilty was unreasonable or unsupported by the evidence. This involved determining if the trial judge had erred in finding that the prosecution had established beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant administered a combination of drugs causing the deceased's death, that a sufficient motive existed for the appellant to intend to kill the deceased, and that the appellant possessed the requisite specific intent to kill or cause serious injury, considering the evidence of her own intoxication.

The Court reiterated the principles governing circumstantial evidence, emphasising that for guilt to be established beyond reasonable doubt, it must be the only rational inference permitted by the circumstances. While individual pieces of circumstantial evidence need not be proved beyond reasonable doubt, their cumulative weight must lead to this standard. The Court stressed that all evidence must be considered holistically, and inferences favouring the prosecution must be weighed against explanations and submissions put forward by the accused. The Court noted that while a circumstantial case should not be considered piecemeal, it is important to consider the accused's explanations for individual items of evidence.

The appeal was dismissed. The Court found that the trial judge had not erred in her findings of fact regarding the cause of death, motive, or intent, and that the verdict was not unreasonable or unsupported by the evidence.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

During the record of interview on 17 February 2017, previously referred to, the appellant denied the offence. The appellant did admit that she had given the deceased some Valium.Circumstantial evidence As some of the appellant’s submissions involved the analysis of circumstantial evidence, it is necessary to set out the well-known and basic principles. Circumstantial evidence is evidence which, if accepted, tends to prove a fact from which the existence of a fact in issue may be inferred. The force of circumstantial evidence lies in the combined strength of items of evidence pointing in the same direction. That is, whilst none of the many pieces of evidence by themselves may be determinative of an issue, their convergence becomes increasingly persuasive. To put that another way, the strength of circumstantial evidence lies in its ability to show that “according to the common course of human affairs, the degree of probability that the occurrence of the facts proved would be accompanied by the occurrence of the fact to be proved is so high that the contrary cannot reasonably be supposed”.[3][3] Martin v Osborne (1936) 55 CLR 367, 375 (Dixon J, Latham CJ agreeing). Often the circumstances constituting circumstantial evidence can be supplemented by direct evidence but that is not necessary.[4] The facts that go to make up a circumstantial case, unless they are an indispensable intermediate step in the reasoning process towards an inference of guilt, are not required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. It is the elements of the offence that must be established beyond a reasonable doubt.[4] Lukaj v The King (2022) 142 SASR 98 at [59]; Jones v Harris [1946] SASR 98, 104-105; see also Cross on Evidence (9th edition, 2013) [1105]. As Dawson J observed in Shepherd v The Queen:[5]… the prosecution bears the burden of proving all the elements of the crime beyond reasonable doubt. That means that the essential ingredients of each element must be so proved. It does not mean that every fact - every piece of evidence - relied upon to prove an element by inference must itself be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Intent, for example, is, save for statutory exceptions, an element of every crime. It is something which, apart from admissions, must be proved by inference. But the jury may quite properly draw the necessary inference having regard to the whole of the evidence, whether or not each individual piece of evidence relied upon is proved beyond reasonable doubt, provided they reach their conclusion upon the criminal standard of proof. Indeed, the probative force of a mass of evidence may be cumulative, making it pointless to consider the degree of probability of each item of evidence separately.[5] (1990) 170 CLR 573, 579-580 (Toohey and Gaudron JJ agreeing). In a case relying on circumstantial evidence, to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of an accused, it is necessary not only that guilt should be a rational inference, but that it should be the only rational inference that the circumstances permit.

Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In a case relying on circumstantial evidence, to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of an accused, it is necessary not only that guilt should be a rational inference, but that it should be the only rational inference that the circumstances permit. However, to be reasonable, an inference must rest upon something more than mere conjecture. It is necessary to weigh and consider the totality of the evidence and, in doing so, the finder of fact ought not stretch credulity or engage in tortuous reasoning in order to explain away each and every individual circumstance as being consistent with innocence. A circumstantial case is not to be considered piecemeal. Often in a circumstantial case there will be evidence of matters which, looked at in isolation from other evidence, would yield an inference compatible with the innocence of the accused. However, it is of critical importance to remember that in considering a circumstantial case, all of the circumstances established by the evidence are to be considered and weighed in deciding whether there is an inference consistent with innocence reasonably open on the evidence. As Gibbs CJ and Mason J stated in Chamberlain v The Queen (No 2):[6] At the end of the trial the jury must consider all the evidence, and in doing so they may find that one piece of evidence resolves their doubts as to another. For example, the jury, considering the evidence of one witness by itself, may doubt whether it is truthful, but other evidence may provide corroboration, and when the jury considers the evidence as a whole they may decide that the witness should be believed. Again, the quality of evidence of identification may be poor, but other evidence may support its correctness; in such a case the jury should not be told to look at the evidence of each witness “separately in, so to speak, a hermetically sealed compartment”; they should consider the accumulation of the evidence.Similarly, in a case depending on circumstantial evidence, the jury should not reject one circumstance because, considered alone, no inference of guilt can be drawn from it. It is well established that the jury must consider “the weight which is to be given to the united force of all the circumstances put together”.(citations omitted)[6] (1984) 153 CLR 521, 535. While a circumstantial case is not to be considered piecemeal, it is important to bear in mind, both at trial and on appeal, any inferences, explanations, and submissions put forward by an accused in relation to individual items of circumstantial evidence. To put that another way, resolution of the case depends upon assessment of all the evidence and that includes, of course, not just inferences in favour of the prosecution but inferences, explanations, and submissions put forward on behalf of the accused.Grounds of appeal The appellant appeals on the following grounds:1. The verdict should be set aside on the grounds that it is unreasonable or cannot be supported having regard to the evidence.Particulars1.1 It was not reasonably open for the Learned Trial Judge (‘LTJ’) to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of guilt having regard to the inadequacy/insufficiency of evidence to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the [appellant] administered the combination of drugs causing the death of the deceased.1.1.1The LTJ has erroneously made findings of fact attributing the cause of death to the actions of the [appellant] when, on all of the evidence, it could not be excluded as a reasonable possibility that alternative hypotheses exist, namely, accident or self-administration.1.1.2 The LTJ has excluded as a reasonable possibility that the deceased intentionally administered drugs himself for pain relief, or that the [appellant] separately administered the drugs for pain relief. In doing so, the LTJ has had insufficient regard to the evidence supporting that the deceased was experiencing back pain in the days prior to his death and was seeking medical attention and drugs to alleviate that pain.1.2 The LTJ erred in finding that the prosecution established a sufficient motive to enable an inference to be drawn that the [appellant] formed an intention to kill the deceased.1.2.1 The lack of evidence of disharmony in the relationship between the [appellant] and the deceased prior to the death was not acknowledged.1.2.2 Post-death behaviours of the [appellant] in the midst of a dispute over the deceased's estate cannot in the circumstances constitute motive.1.3 The LTJ has erred in excluding the possibility of an altruistic intent for the administration of the drugs, as demonstrated in the evidence of the [appellant's] ready innocent provision of large quantities of her potentially fatal medication to other persons previous to the death of the deceased.2. The LTJ has erred by failing to bring to bear, direct herself, or otherwise to consider at all the effect of the [appellant’s] intoxication upon her capacity to form the requisite specific intent to kill (or otherwise to have regard to the [appellant’s] intoxication when considering any competing hypothesis consistent with innocence).Particulars2.1 The LTJ has failed to have regard to the evidence of Professor White and other eyewitnesses as to the effect on the [appellant] of the drugs prescribed to the [appellant] when considering whether it was proven that the [appellant’s] administration of the fatal dose of drugs to the deceased was accompanied by the requisite specific intent to kill or do grievous bodily harm.