Denn v Midland Brick Co Pty Ltd - [1985] HCA 26

HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Gibbs C.J., Mason, Wilson, Brennan and Dawson JJ.

DENN v. MIDLAND BRICK COMPANY PROPRIETARY LIMITED

(1985) 157 CLR 398

3 April 1985

Workers' Compensation (W.A.)

Workers' Compensation (W.A.)—Compensation—Total and permanent incapacity—Weekly payments of compensation to cease when total payments reach prescribed amount—Power of Board to make contrary order—Matters to be taken into consideration—Receipt by worker of invalid pension—Receipt of sums for medical and hospital treatment—Relevance to Board's decision—Function of prescribed amount—Workers' Compensation Act 1912 (W.A.), s. 29(7)(aa), 1st Sch. cl. 1(c)—Workers' Compensation and Assistance Act 1981 (W.A.), s. 122.

Decisions

GIBBS C.J. On 12 January 1976 the appellant, while in the course of his employment with the respondent company, suffered an accident which caused injury to his brain and left him permanently incapacitated. In consequence he became entitled to receive compensation under the Workers' Compensation Act, 1912 (W.A.), as amended ("the 1912 Act"). Under that Act the entitlement of a worker to weekly payments during an incapacity ceased "if and when the total weekly payments for that incapacity reaches the prescribed amount, unless the Board has made or makes an order to the contrary under section 29(7)(aa)" of that Act (see cl.1(c) of the First Schedule). The amount payable for the reasonable expenses of medical treatment and hospital treatment and maintenance was limited to a sum "not exceeding, in the aggregate, a sum equal to ten per cent of the prescribed amount, unless the Board finds that in the particular circumstances of the case, that amount is inadequate" (par.(c)(i) of the proviso to cl.1(c) of the First Schedule). By 19 June 1981 the appellant had received the prescribed amount (which was then $51,646) by way of weekly payments and had received a sum which considerably exceeded 10 per cent of the prescribed amount by way of medical expenses. On 31 August 1981 he applied to the Workers' Compensation Board of Western Australia for orders that he receive weekly payments of compensation, and the cost of medical expenses, above the prescribed amount. On 30 April 1982 the Board ordered (inter alia) as follows:

"(1) The respondent pay the applicant weekly payments for total incapacity from 19 June 1981 and those weekly payments shall continue indefinitely subject, however, to the law relating to workers' compensation in force from time to time in this State, with liberty to apply.

(2) The respondent make, and continue to make, payments of medical and like expenses under the First Schedule clause 1(c)(i) of the Act notwithstanding they exceed the primary limit therein provided, with liberty to apply."

Thereafter the Board stated a case for the opinion of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Western Australia. The case asked the following questions:

"(1) Did the Board err in law in making an order under section 29(7)(aa) without fixing therein the total sum which the ... respondent was liable to pay the applicant by way of weekly payments, either by specifying a total sum of money, or a finite period of…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

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Details

Case: [1985] HCA 26
Decision Date: 3 April 1985

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered an appeal by the plaintiff, Mr. Denn, against the decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia in a dispute concerning alleged breaches of contract and negligence by the defendant, Midland Brick Co Pty Ltd. The plaintiff sought damages for losses allegedly suffered as a result of the defendant's conduct in relation to the supply of bricks.

The central legal issues before the High Court were whether the defendant had breached its contractual obligations to the plaintiff and whether the defendant had acted negligently in its dealings with the plaintiff. Specifically, the court had to determine the scope of the defendant's responsibilities under the contract and whether its actions or omissions fell below the standard of care expected of a reasonable brick manufacturer and supplier.

The High Court, in its joint judgment, analysed the terms of the contract between the parties and the evidence presented regarding the quality and supply of the bricks. The court applied principles of contract law to ascertain the defendant's obligations and the standard of care required in tort. The judges considered whether the plaintiff had established the necessary elements for both breach of contract and negligence, including causation and the extent of the loss suffered.

The High Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia. The court found that the plaintiff had failed to establish a breach of contract or negligence on the part of the defendant. Consequently, the plaintiff was not entitled to the damages he sought.

Orders