DEMAR and COMMISSIONER OF POLICE
[2006] WASAT 198
•21 JULY 2006
DEMAR and COMMISSIONER OF POLICE [2006] WASAT 198
| STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL | Citation No: | [2006] WASAT 198 | |
| EQUAL OPPORTUNITY ACT 1984 (WA) | |||
| Case No: | EOT:57/2004 | 19 & 20 DECEMBER 2005 9 JANUARY 2006 | |
| Coram: | MS J TOOHEY (SENIOR MEMBER) MR K BRADLEY (SENIOR SESSIONAL MEMBER) MS K LANG (SESSIONAL MEMBER) | 21/07/06 | |
| 16 | Judgment Part: | 1 of 1 | |
| Result: | Application dismissed | ||
| B | |||
| PDF Version |
| Parties: | VICTORIA IRENE DEMAR COMMISSIONER OF POLICE |
Catchwords: | Police officer – Family responsibility – Child care arrangements – Officer only able to work weekday day shift – Application for transfer refused – Applicant claimed refusal constituted discrimination on ground of family responsibilities – Respondent claimed was for operational reasons – Tribunal finding that refusal did not constitute unlawful discrimination |
Legislation: | Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (WA), s 4, s 8, s 35A, s 35A(1), s 35A(2)(b), s 35B, s 67, s 93(1)(b) State Administration Tribunal (Conferral of Jurisdiction) Amendment and Repeal Act 2004 (WA) |
Case References: | Dare v Hurley [2005] FMCA 844 Mooney v Commissioner of Police, New South Wales Police Service (2003) EOC 93-281 Nil |
JURISDICTION : STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL STREAM : HUMAN RIGHTS ACT : EQUAL OPPORTUNITY ACT 1984 (WA) CITATION : DEMAR and COMMISSIONER OF POLICE [2006] WASAT 198 MEMBER : MS J TOOHEY (SENIOR MEMBER)
- MR K BRADLEY (SENIOR SESSIONAL MEMBER)
MS K LANG (SESSIONAL MEMBER)
- 9 JANUARY 2006
- Applicant
AND
COMMISSIONER OF POLICE
Respondent
Catchwords:
Police officer – Family responsibility – Child care arrangements – Officer only able to work weekday day shift – Application for transfer refused – Applicant claimed refusal constituted discrimination on ground of family responsibilities – Respondent claimed was for operational reasons – Tribunal finding that refusal did not constitute unlawful discrimination
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Legislation:
Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (WA), s 4, s 8, s 35A, s 35A(1), s 35A(2)(b), s 35B, s 67, s 93(1)(b)
State Administration Tribunal (Conferral of Jurisdiction) Amendment and Repeal Act 2004 (WA)
Result:
Application dismissed
Category: B
Representation:
Counsel:
Applicant : Ms Carol Adams
Respondent : Mr T Russell
Solicitors:
Applicant : N/A
Respondent : State Solicitor's Office
Case(s) referred to in decision(s):
Dare v Hurley [2005] FMCA 844
Mooney v Commissioner of Police, New South Wales Police Service (2003) EOC 93-281
Case(s) also cited:
Nil
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Summary of Tribunal's decision
1 The applicant complained that her employer unlawfully discriminated against her on the ground of family responsibility when it refused her application for a position at Joondalup Police Station.
2 The applicant had three small children at the relevant time. She claimed she had an agreement with her employer, dating from when she joined the service in 1989, that she not be required to work afternoon, evening or weekend shifts because of her child care responsibilities. The respondent denied any such formal agreement existed.
3 In mid-2003, the applicant applied for a transfer to a position at Joondalup Police Station. Although she was the only applicant, her application was refused when the officer-in-charge learned that she could not work afternoon shift. In his view, the station could not operate effectively with another officer working day shift only.
4 It was not in dispute that it was the applicant's inability to work other than weekday day shifts that meant her application was unsuccessful. What was in dispute was whether, in refusing her application, the respondent unlawfully discriminated against her on the ground of family responsibility.
5 The applicant claimed she was treated less favourably than another officer who, she maintained, was in the same, or not materially different, circumstances. However, the Tribunal was not satisfied that their circumstances were in fact comparable. It found the refusal of her application was for operational reasons and did not amount to unlawful discrimination within the meaning of the Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (WA).
Background
6 The applicant, Victoria Irene Demar, joined the police service in 1989. She and her husband have three young children who, at the relevant time, were aged eight, seven and four years. Her husband worked part-time as a police officer and was frequently overseas working for another employer. As a result, she could only work day shifts during the week when her children were at school or day care; she could not work afternoon, evening or weekend shifts.
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7 In mid-2003, Ms Demar applied for a part-time position as a Patrol and Inquiry Officer at Joondalup Police Station. Her application was refused by the officer-in-charge because she was not able to work afternoon, evening or weekend shifts.
8 On 28 November 2003, Ms Demar complained to the Commissioner for Equal Opportunity that she had been discriminated against by her employer on the ground of family responsibility, and victimised, contrary to s 35B and s 67 of the Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (WA) (the Act).
9 On 8 December 2004, after attempts to conciliate the complaint had been unsuccessful, the Commissioner for Equal Opportunity referred it to the Equal Opportunity Tribunal pursuant to s 93(1)(b) of the Act.
10 On 1 January 2005 the functions of the Equal Opportunity Tribunal were assumed by the State Administrative Tribunal by virtue of the State Administrative Tribunal (Conferral of Jurisdiction) Amendment and Repeal Act 2004 (WA) and the complaint was transferred to this tribunal.
11 In the course of preliminary proceedings before this tribunal, Ms Demar abandoned the claim of victimisation and some aspects her discrimination complaint. As well, although a Statement of Issues, Facts and Contentions filed in the proceedings alleged indirect discrimination by the respondent, Ms Demar confirmed at the start of the hearing that the complaint of indirect discrimination was not maintained and that her complaint was of direct discrimination only.
12 As a result, these proceedings now concern one act of alleged unlawful direct discrimination, being a decision by Senior Sergeant Greg Savage, the officer-in-charge of Joondalup Police Station, to refuse Ms Demar's application for a transfer to that station.
13 The Tribunal held a hearing on 19 and 20 December 2005. Parties made additional written submissions following the hearing.
14 Much of the evidence and submissions, both before and at the hearing, went to the complaint of victimisation and to allegations of discrimination which had been abandoned by the applicant. Except where relevant, either directly or by way of background, to the complaint presently being inquired into, those matters are not repeated here.
Ms Demar's substantive position at the office of North West Crime Prevention
15 On joining the police service, Ms Demar worked at the Nollamara Police Station where she was required to work weekday day shifts only.
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- When the Nollamara station closed in January 1999, she was transferred to the Mirrabooka station and the agreement followed her.
16 In January 2002, a part-time position became available at the office of North West Crime Prevention (NWCP). Ms Demar was the successful applicant. She subsequently signed an employment agreement which stated she was to work on Monday, Thursday and Friday one week, and Thursday and Friday the following week. The agreement specified the days, but not the particular hours or shifts, she was to work.
17 Ms Demar claims that, before applying for the position at NWCP, and later when signing the employment agreement, she advised the officer-in-charge, Sergeant Pat Bernard, that she could only work weekday day shifts on account of her family commitments. She says that, on both occasions, Sergent Bernard told her there was no problem; she could continue to work the same hours she had at Nollamara and Mirrabooka. Ms Demar maintains she would have not have accepted the position other than on those terms.
18 Sergeant Bernard refutes Ms Demar's account of their conversations. He maintains that he told her there would be occasional afternoon shift and weekend work and she was agreeable to this. Sergeant Bernard says he would not have accepted Ms Demar for the position on condition that she work weekday day shifts only.
19 In any event, as it happens, NWCP was essentially a Monday to Friday day shift office, with only very occasional afternoon or weekend shifts, and Ms Demar worked only day shifts during the time she was there. On the few occasions when there was mention of her working afternoon or evening shifts, or weekends, she cited her "agreement" with Sergeant Bernard and the matter was not pressed.
Ms Demar's temporary transfer to Joondalup Police Station
20 In mid-May 2003, Ms Demar was seconded to a temporary part-time position at Joondalup Police Station. At the time, Senior Sergeant (now Inspector) Greg Savage, the officer-in-charge, was on leave and Sergeant (now Senior Sergeant) Matt Ray was acting in his place.
21 Ms Demar claims that, before she took up the position, she discussed her family circumstances with Sergeant Ray who was agreeable to her working weekday day shifts. Senior Sergeant Ray concedes there was some discussion about Ms Demar's hours but denies he gave her any
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- undertaking; that would be a matter for Senior Sergeant Savage on his return.
22 Whether or not Ms Demar was given any undertaking as to when she would be required to work, she continued to work the hours she had previously. As well as being temporary, her position at Joondalup was "over strength" meaning she was additional to the normal complement of staff station and the hours she worked did not affect its usual operations.
Ms Demar's application for permanent transfer to Joondalup Police Station
23 In early June 2003, Ms Demar learned from Sergeant Ray that a permanent part-time position at the station would shortly become available because a full-time officer, Constable Darren MacCondruin, had applied to work part-time following the birth of his baby; as a result the other half of his position would require filling.
24 Ms Demar claims that she told Sergeant Ray she was interested in the position, that they discussed the hours she was available to work and the reasons, and that, very shortly afterwards, he congratulated her and told her the position was hers. At this point the position had not been formally advertised.
25 The evidence at this point becomes frequently conflicting and confusing, particularly as to the sequence of events. The confusion is compounded by administrative practices that are difficult to make sense of, by inconsistent practices relating to transfers, and by a number of documents relating to the position which bear clearly incorrect dates.
26 There is a good deal of conflicting evidence about whether Sergeant Ray gave Ms Demar any sort of undertaking about the permanent position and any hours she would be required to work. There is also some difference in the evidence as to whether he had the authority to give such an undertaking in any event.
27 In any event, there is evidence before the Tribunal suggesting that at least some others besides Ms Demar understood, or expected, that she would fill the position. That evidence includes emails and memoranda apparently confirming her "transfer" to Joondalup Police Station, and that she would share Constable MacCondruin's position.
28 In the last week of June 2003, Senior Sergeant Savage returned from leave and resumed his position as officer-in-charge. According to Ms Demar, when he learned of her interest in the position, he spoke to her
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- and asked if she could work afternoon shifts; when she said she could not, he told her the station could not accommodate another officer who could work day shift only. At this point the position still had not been formally advertised.
29 Senior Sergeant Savage gave evidence that he did not recall this particular conversation. Given the confusion as to dates and the sequence of events, it is possible that it did not in fact happen at this time. Nothing turns in this, however, as Senior Sergeant Savage does not dispute that a conversation along these lines happened in early August.
30 On 30 June 2003, Ms Demar returned to her substantive position at NWCP at the request of the officer-in-charge there who needed her back because others were going on leave.
31 The part-time position was advertised in late June; applications closed on 28 July. Ms Demar submitted her application on 25 July.
32 A copy of the notice calling for expressions of interest in the position is before the Tribunal. The relevant parts state:
"This position has been nominated as being suitable for flexible working arrangements. Please contact the [person below] for more information."
- and:
"Joondalup Police Station operates 24 hours per day and has 3 x 8 hour shifts."
34 There was some dispute as to whether, and in how much detail, Ms Demar's child care arrangements were discussed at this time but
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- nothing turns on this. There is no dispute that it was on account of the hours she was able to work that her application for the position was refused.
35 The evidence which confuses matters includes an email dated 9 July 2003, headed "Transfer notice", which advises Ms Demar that she has been transferred (permanently) from NWCP to the position at Joondalup. As this was before applications for the position had even closed, and before Ms Demar had submitted hers, it makes little sense. When it came to his attention on 10 June, Senior Sergeant Savage had it cancelled immediately but neither he nor anyone else could explain why it had been issued other than to say it was clearly issued in error.
36 Some of the documents before the Tribunal were clearly issued in error; others, such as the email dated 9 July, are more difficult to explain. The Tribunal is satisfied that, for the most part, they reflect poor administrative practices more than anything else but it does not discount the possibility that Sergeant Ray did in fact give Ms Demar to believe that the position would be hers. Even if this is so, however, nothing turns on it as it is the actions of Senior Sergeant Savage that are the subject of Ms Demar's complaint and this inquiry, not anything that preceded his refusal of her application, or the conduct of anyone else involved.
Operational requirements at Joondalup Police Station
37 The Tribunal heard evidence that, whereas NWCP was involved in crime prevention and community policing and was essentially a Monday to Friday day shift office, Joondalup Police Station was a 24-hour, seven days a week, "front line operational" police station with staff rostered to cover three eight-hour shifts: day, afternoon and evening shifts. In addition, from 3 am until early morning, it provided cover to the Wanneroo, Clarkson and Hillarys areas which did not have operating police stations during those hours.
38 The Tribunal heard that it was difficult to attract officers to a 24-hour station like Joondalup because the smaller stations that worked only day and afternoon shifts were considered more attractive.
39 It was Senior Sergeant Savage's responsibility, as officer-in-charge, to manage rostering of staff to cover the various shifts. He gave evidence that rostering at Joondalup was "an ongoing issue" and required tight management. When he started work at the station in August 2002, of the approximately 60 staff at the station, a number of officers were on maternity or paternity leave or leave without pay; two officers undergoing
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- rehabilitation were confined to the office; and there was a large number of part-time officers and non-operational officers. In effect, the station was several positions short of its normal quota.
40 The Tribunal heard that a "flexi-roster" was developed to accommodate the circumstances of the various officers. Three-weekly rosters were made up based on officers from each shift nominating the days they wanted off each week. The shift supervisor would aim to ensure a balance of officers working, especially on busy shifts, of which the afternoon shift was the busiest. It appears there was considerable flexibility allowed in the arrangements that existing officers had at the time.
41 According to Senior Sergeant Savage, he supported flexible arrangements but the station had reached "saturation point" and could not accommodate any more officers working day shift only; it was not possible to operate the station if everyone wanted to work day shift only, and the number of such arrangements already was affecting operations. Although some officers, including Constable MacCondruin, were allowed to work day shift only on account of their personal circumstances, there was an understanding that they would eventually be required to work all three shifts. There does not seem to have been any firm arrangement as to when a particular officer would be required to resume working across all shifts but the Tribunal accepts that was the general understanding.
42 Superintendent Dominic Staltari, who was at the time District Superintendent at the North West Metropolitan police district, supported Senior Sergeant Savage's account of the particular operational strain that Joondalup Police Station was under at the time. He agreed that accommodating another officer who wanted to work day shift only would mean the station would not able to meet operational demands. For this reason, when Ms Demar subsequently asked him to intervene and overturn Senior Sergeant Savage's decision, he declined.
43 Senior Sergeant Savage gave evidence that the statement in the advertisement that Joondalup Police Station "operates 24 hours per day and has 3 x 8 hour shifts" was to make applicants fully aware that they would be required to work day, afternoon and night shifts; the reference to "flexible working arrangements" meant there was some flexibility between an officer and their supervisor as to the actual starting and finishing times of each shift.
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44 Sergeant Ray had a slightly different understanding of the meaning of "suitable for flexible working arrangements". He took the statement to mean that an officer could negotiate with his or her officer-in-charge an arrangement that suited both; this might include working day shift only. However, he supported Senior Sergeant Savage's evidence that the station could not accommodate another such arrangement at that time.
45 A number of incidents occurred after Ms Demar returned to NWCP, some of which led to her complaint of victimisation and aspects of her original complaint of discrimination. As none goes to the complaint before the Tribunal, they are not repeated here.
46 In November 2003, Ms Demar was successful in obtaining a position at the City Police Station in Perth where, although it was also a 24-hour station like Joondalup, she was able to work hours that suited her.
Constable MacCondruin's arrangements
47 Ms Demar maintains that, before applying for the position, she talked with Constable MacCondruin who told her the Joondalup Police Station had been very accommodating of the fact he could only work day shift because of his family responsibilities. It is not in dispute that Constable MacCondruin was allowed, at least for the time being, to work hours that suited his family responsibilities.
48 The Tribunal did not hear evidence from Constable MacCondruin but it has before it a copy of his part-time employment agreement which purports to commence on 13 June 2003. It is (incorrectly) dated 4 June 2004 and there is some confusion about the period it covered. But there is no real dispute that it represents Constable MacCondruin's hours at the relevant time.
49 The agreement requires Constable MacCondruin to work 40 hours per fortnight comprising five eight-hour day shifts. He apparently worked Friday and Saturday one week, and Friday, Saturday and Sunday the following week. On Fridays and Sundays his hours were 7 am to 3 pm; on Saturdays they were 10 am to 6 pm. It is evident that his hours were different from Ms Demar's in that he worked weekends.
50 The Tribunal heard evidence which it accepts that, although Constable MacCondruin had been allowed to return to work on day shift only, the understanding was that he would be required, after a period, to be available for all three shifts. Just when that would happen was not
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- quite clear. It appears, from the evidence, that he was allowed to maintain this arrangement for at least 12 months after returning to work.
Damages claimed
51 Ms Demar seeks compensation by way of an apology and general damages for stress, hurt, humiliation, anxiety, distress, emotional upset, injury to feeling and emotional upheaval. She seeks additional compensation for child care fees incurred between November 2003 when she obtained a position at the Perth Police Station and April 2005 when she obtained a position at the Joondalup Police Academy, closer to home and child care arrangements.
52 Because, for the reasons set out below, we are not satisfied that the claim of unlawful discrimination is made out, we do not deal here with the issue of quantum of damages or compensation.
Relevant legislation
53 The Act defines "family responsibility or family status", to mean:
"(a) having responsibility for the care of another person, whether or not that person is a dependant, other than in the course of paid employment;
(b) the status of being a particular relative; or
(c) the status of being a relative of a particular person." (s 4)
54 Section 35A(1) of the Act provides that a person (the "discriminator") discriminates against another person (the "aggrieved person") on the ground of family responsibility or family status if, on the ground of –
"(a) the family responsibility or family status of the aggrieved person;
(b) a characteristic that appertains generally to persons having the same family responsibility or family status as the aggrieved person; or
(c) a characteristic that is generally imputed to persons having the same family responsibility or family status as the aggrieved person,
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- the discriminator treats the aggrieved person less favourably than, in circumstances that are the same or are not materially different, the discriminator treats or would treat a person who does not have such a family responsibility or family status."
55 Section 35B provides that it is unlawful for an employer to discriminate against a person on the ground of the person's family responsibility or family status:
"(a) in the arrangements made for the purpose of determining who should be offered employment;
(b) in determining who should be offered employment; or
(c) in the terms or conditions on which employment is offered."
56 Further, it is unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an employee on the ground of the employee's family responsibility or family status:
"(a) in the terms or conditions of employment that the employer affords the employee;
(b) by denying the employee access, or limiting the access of the employee, to opportunities for promotion, transfer or training or to any other benefits associated with employment;
(c) by dismissing the employee; or
(d) by subjecting the employee to any other detriment."
Reasons for decision
57 To make out a claim of unlawful direct discrimination on the ground of family responsibility, Ms Demar must establish, firstly, that she was treated less favourably than, in circumstances that are the same or are not materially different, her employer treated, or would have treated, another person who did not have family responsibilities. Secondly, she must establish that the reason for the less favourable treatment was her family responsibility.
58 Ms Demar has made a number of submissions that go to a claim of indirect discrimination, the tests for which are quite different from one of
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- direct discrimination. Because it was clearly abandoned before the commencement of the hearing, whether or not a claim of indirect discrimination might be made out on the evidence is not a matter we deal with here.
59 Ms Demar asks the Tribunal to accept her account of the undertakings she says she was given by both Sergeant Bernard and Sergeant Ray that she could work hours that suited her family responsibilities. We think it quite possible that, although formal undertakings were not given, she was given to believe, in one way or another, that she could continue working the hours that suited her. In any event, that is what happened. However, nothing turns on this. Whether or not Ms Demar was given an undertaking, the issue for determination here is whether, in refusing her application for the permanent position, Senior Sergeant Savage's conduct amounted to unlawful discrimination. No prior undertakings or agreements conferred on Ms Demar any entitlement that’s she could apply as of right to any new position she applied for.
60 "Less favourable treatment" necessarily involves another person by comparison with whom Ms Demar can say her treatment was less favourable. That person must be in "circumstances" which are "the same" or "not materially different": s 8 of the Act.
61 The identification of what is commonly called a "comparator" is an essential element of the statutory formula of direct discrimination. There will not always be an actual person in comparison with whom a complainant is less favourably treated. It may be that the comparator is necessarily hypothetical: see, for example, Dare v Hurley [2005] FMCA 844; Mooney v Commissioner of Police, New South Wales Police Service (2003) EOC 93-281. It is not necessary that they be in identical circumstances but there must be a sufficient degree of similarity in the circumstances of the complainant and the actual or hypothetical comparator to form the basis of an appropriate comparison.
62 In this case, Ms Demar cites Constable MacCondruin as the person compared with whom she was treated less favourably. However, we are not satisfied that their circumstances were, in any relevant sense, the same or not materially different or that he is even an appropriate comparator.
63 Insofar as Constable MacCondruin worked part-time and had family responsibilities, and insofar as he had requested an arrangement that suited his family responsibilities, he and Ms Demar were similar.
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- However, it is clear that his arrangement was different from hers. He was a permanent member of staff returning from paternity leave; Ms Demar was an applicant for a vacant position. Whereas she was available to work only weekday day shifts, he worked weekend day shifts as well. Further, although it was not clear just when Constable MacCondruin would be required to start working all three shifts, the Tribunal accepts that this was the understanding with him. His arrangement was therefore not permanent whereas Ms Demar's unavailability was, in effect, a permanent circumstance at least for the foreseeable future. Particularly in circumstances where weekday day shifts were the most popular, and other shifts more difficult to cover, Constable MacCondruin's availability to work regular weekends put him in materially different circumstances from Ms Demar.
64 It is arguable that Constable MacCondruin is not an appropriate comparator in any event because he also had family responsibilities. All we know about his circumstances is that he wanted to return to work part-time following the birth of his baby and was allowed to. If he is to be a comparator at all, it would seem that it is sex which differentiates him from Ms Demar. However, even if Ms Demar's treatment is compared with others in the office who were allowed to work shifts that suited them for reasons other than family responsibility, we are not satisfied that family responsibility was in fact the reason for the treatment she complains of.
65 A claim that "operational requirements" preclude treating an employee in a certain way can operate to mask what may in fact be an act of unlawful discrimination. When an employer treats one employee in a manner apparently different from how others are treated, some careful examination of the circumstances is required.
66 It is not relevant to a claim of direct discrimination, as it is to a claim of indirect discrimination, to inquire whether a requirement or condition imposed upon an employee is "reasonable having regard to the circumstances of the case" (see for example s 35A(2)(b) in relation to indirect discrimination on the ground of family responsibility). The Tribunal's task is to determine what in fact were the reasons for the conduct complained of and whether it amounted to direct discrimination within the meaning of the Act.
67 We accept that, at the relevant time, Joondalup Police Station was under considerable pressure to cover all the necessary shifts and that this was partly because of the arrangements allowed to others, including
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- Constable MacCondruin, to accommodate their personal circumstances. We are satisfied, in light of the various arrangements allowed to accommodate others, that Senior Sergeant Savage was willing to allow flexible arrangements to the extent that operational requirements would permit but that it had become untenable to accommodate any more officers wanting to work day shift only. We are satisfied that Senior Sergeant Savage would, at the time, have refused an application by anyone who could not work afternoon shift. We are satisfied that, had operational requirements been able to accommodate her circumstances, he would have accepted Ms Demar for the position.
68 We find that it was the intention of the advertisement for the position Ms Demar applied for to make clear to applicants that they could be required to work all three shifts. Although there appeared to be some different understandings of what "flexible working arrangements" might mean, it cannot reasonably be understood to mean that an officer was entitled to the position on such terms as to shifts as he or she nominated.
69 We accept that it was Ms Demar's family responsibilities that restricted the hours she could work. However, we are not satisfied that the refusal of her application for transfer amounted to unlawful discrimination on the ground of her family responsibility within the meaning of the Act.
70 It is understandable that Ms Demar, applying to work at Joondalup at a time when so many others had the benefit of flexible arrangements that no more could be accommodated, should feel aggrieved. However, that does not mean that the refusal to accommodate her circumstances amounted to discrimination within the meaning of the Act.
Order
71 The application is dismissed.
I certify that this and the preceding [71] paragraphs comprise the reasons for decision of the State Administrative Tribunal.
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MS J TOOHEY, SENIOR MEMBER
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