Dekker and Australian Postal Corporation (Compensation) [2018] AATA 682 (28 March 2018)
Division:GENERAL DIVISION
File Number(s): 2015/4873 & 2016/2949
Re:Rodney Dekker
APPLICANT
AndAustralian Postal Corporation
RESPONDENT
DECISION
Tribunal:Senior Member A Poljak
Date:28 March 2018
Place:Sydney
2015/4873
The decision under review is affirmed.
2016/2949
The decision under review is affirmed.
....................[sgd]................................................
Senior Member A Poljak
CATCHWORDS
COMPENSATION – workers compensation – section 14 claim – physical injuries – aggravation of an ailment – whether employment contributed to a significant degree – changes degenerative in nature – decision affirmed
LEGISLATION
Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) s 14
CASES
Re Blasco and Australian Postal Corporation [2017] AATA 1222
REASONS FOR DECISION
Senior Member A Poljak
28 March 2018
Mr Dekker, the applicant, is employed by Australia Post, the respondent, as a full-time postal delivery officer at Wollongong Delivery Facility and has been employed since 16 October 1990. The applicant’s role involved postal deliveries on a motorbike and sorting mail in preparation for delivery. As of early 2015, the applicant has been on restricted duties.
On 28 April 2015, the applicant lodged a claim for worker’s compensation in respect of ‘neck left shoulder and arm/hand’ injuries under section 14 of the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act1988 (Cth) (“the Act”). No specific incident is recorded in the claim form (“first claim”).
The respondent denied liability in a decision dated 18 May 2015, on the basis that the applicant’s claimed condition had not arisen out of, or in the course of his employment. The decision of the respondent was affirmed by a reconsideration officer on 30 June 2015. This is the first decision under review in these proceedings (“2015/4873”).
On 16 September 2015, the applicant lodged a second claim for worker’s compensation in respect of ‘soft tissue right shoulder/neck strain’ under section 14 of the Act, with an injury date of 16 September 2015 (“second claim”). The respondent denied liability in a decision dated 25 November 2015. The decision of the respondent was affirmed by a reconsideration officer on 4 April 2016. This is the second decision under review in these proceedings (“2016/2949”).
ISSUES
The issue in each application is whether the respondent is liable to pay compensation to the applicant pursuant to s 14 of the Act in respect of each alleged injury.
KEY FACTS
The following facts are not in dispute.
First Claim
On 31 August 2009, an incident form was completed which recorded that the applicant suffered an injury ‘reaching down to letterbox to push mail into box strain on left shoulder’.
On 29 October 2009, the applicant submitted a claim for rehabilitation and compensation for a ‘left shoulder muscular’ injury with an injury date of 31 August 2009. On 12 November 2009, the respondent issued a determination accepting liability for ‘left shoulder and neck muscle strain’.
On 28 April 2015, an incident form was completed which recorded that…
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- Dekker and Australian Postal Corporation (Compensation) [2018] AATA 682
- Case
- [2018] AATA 682
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues before the Tribunal were whether the applicant's claimed conditions arose out of, or in the course of, his employment with the Australian Postal Corporation, and whether his employment contributed to a significant degree to any aggravation of a pre-existing condition. This involved considering the nature of the applicant's work tasks, the medical evidence regarding the cause and aggravation of his symptoms, and the applicant's own account of events in light of his extensive prior medical history.
The Tribunal considered expert medical evidence from Dr Pillemer and Associate Professor McGill. Associate Professor McGill opined that the applicant's degenerative changes in his cervical spine were likely constitutional and that his symptoms were a reflection of these changes, not caused by his work. Dr Pillemer, however, suggested that the nature and conditions of the applicant's work would be regarded as aggravations of underlying conditions and substantial contributing factors to his ongoing symptoms. The Tribunal noted that the applicant's oral evidence was inconsistent with contemporaneous clinical history regarding prior injuries and non-work-related complaints, leading it to prefer the clinical records. Applying the principles from *Commonwealth of Australia v Beattie* and *Tippett v Australian Postal Corporation*, the Tribunal found that while pain experienced at work may constitute an aggravation, there must be a causal connection to employment, and the mere fact of feeling pain at work was insufficient.
The Tribunal affirmed the respondent's decisions to deny liability. It found that the applicant had not established that his employment with the Australian Postal Corporation had caused or significantly contributed to an aggravation of any underlying condition. The Tribunal was not satisfied that the applicant had suffered a compensable injury within the meaning of the Act.
Orders
Orders of the court
Full text does not contain this section.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The applicant’s prior history was put to the doctors at hearing. Dr Pillemer conceded that it was not the history given to him by the applicant and he stated that based on the information, he would not attribute the applicant’s injury to the 2004 incident. Dr Pillemer also agreed at hearing with A/Prof McGill that SLAP tears were incredibly common and that the shoulder pathology was not significantly contributing to the applicant’s symptoms. CONSIDERATION At hearing, the applicant provided details about his duties with Australia Post and provided details about a major accident he had in June 2004, an incident in August 2009 and the event that occurred on 16 September 2015. In cross-examination the applicant denied a range of matters, arising from the clinical history which is outlined above in this decision. For example, the applicant denied injuring himself while playing golf, playing sport and riding a skateboard. This is despite the clinical notes from his long-term treating practitioners recording such matters contemporaneously. The applicant appeared to accept matters in his history which included references to his employment but could not recall his neck and shoulder complaints when those complaints arose in a non-work-related context. This raises doubt as to the accuracy of the applicant’s evidence. In saying that, I do accept that over the passage of time, the applicant’s recollection of events may have faded. To the extent to which the applicant’s oral evidence is inconsistent with the contemporaneous clinical history, I prefer the latter evidence. Medical practitioners are obliged to record accurate clinical notes which include, among other things, a patient’s reason for consultation. It is plain from the applicant’s evidence that he describes a noticeable onset of symptoms while doing his work in 2015. This does not necessarily mean that the applicant suffered an aggravation. The law in relation to claims involving an alleged aggravation was recently summarised by the Tribunal in the decision of Re Blasco and Australian Postal Corporation [2017] AATA 1222 (7 August 2017) at [125]-[132], where it relevantly was observed as follows:[125] Pain brought on by work activity may constitute an aggravation of a pre-existing injury, even though no pathological change takes place: Commonwealth of Australia v Beattie (1981) 35 ALR 369 at 378. It is not necessary that any pre-existing condition itself be an injury (or a disease) within the meaning of the Act. The question is whether any pre-existing condition was aggravated and, if so, whether the employment contributed to a significant degree to that aggravation. …[127] It is not enough that an employee feel pain while at work. In Beattie (above), Evatt and Sheppard JJ said (at 378):It does not follow in every case that a worker with a pre-existing injury, who carries out work and as a result suffers pain, will have suffered an aggravation of his injury.[128] Nor does it follow, merely because an employee feels pain on return to work after a period away during which symptoms abate, that she has suffered an injury within the meaning of the Act. In Tippett v Australian Postal Corporation (1998) 27 AAR 40, Finkelstein J said:What Beattie also makes clear is that the symptom of an injury, that is the experience of the injury, is a part of the injury in respect of which compensation is payable...Pain is the most common symptom of an injury. If the pain arising from an underlying condition is aggravated, that is increased or intensified, as a result of an employee’s employment then the employee will have suffered a compensable injury: Commonwealth Banking Corporation v Percival (1988) 20 FCR 176 at 179-180; 209-210. The same is true if the pain caused by an underlying condition has dissipated but returns as a consequence of the activities that are undertaken during the course of an employee’s employment (emphasis added).…[130] For Ms Blasco it is submitted that the experience of pain itself constitutes an injury. Pain brought on by work may constitute an aggravation: Commonwealth of Australia v Beattie (1981) 235 ALR 369 at 378. That is so, but there must still be a causal connection to employment…[131] In Comcare v Reardon [2015] FCA 1166, Mortimer J agreed with the observations of Finkelstein J in Tippett v Australian Postal Corporation (1998) 27 AAR 40, where he observed of Beattie:This passage draws a very important and perhaps obvious distinction between the case of a worker who has a pre-existing injury that causes the worker to suffer pain whether or not the worker is at work and the case of a worker who has a pre-existing injury and it is the activities at work that cause the worker to suffer pain or to suffer pain more intensely. It is only in the latter case that it can be said that the worker has suffered an aggravation of his or her pre-existing injury.[132] The mere fact that Ms Blasco felt pain when she returned to work is insufficient to find there was a causal connection with her employment. For the reasons we have given, we are not satisfied that a connection existed.