Defence Force Retirement and Death Benefit Authority v Britt

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350

Administrative law -

Appeal from Administrative Appeals

Tribunal - Defence Force Retirement and

Death Benefits -

Authority "may" treat contributing member as

if retired

on ground

of invalidity

- Whether "may" permissive or

mandatory - Whether discretion vested

in Chiefs of Staff

or Authority

Words and Phrases - "may"

e Force Retirement and

Death Benef its Act 1973

(Cth) 8n.23, 24, 25, 26, 28, 29, 37, 38,

43A

SA G.15 of 1984

Fox, Woodward and Davies

JJ

30 October 1984

Canberra

.

COURT OF AUS-

)

)

No. SA G.15 of 1984

D I S m RFGISTRY)

)

-

)

B :

CE FORCE RETI-

T

I

-

AUTHORITY

Appellant

m

8

-

Respondent

O R D E R

-

I

I 30 October 1984

Fox, Woodward and Davies JJ

EwaLHwE

I

Canberra

I The decision of the

Administrative

Appeals Tribunal is set aside and the matter is renitted to the Tribunal to be reheard.

'SHE

COURT OF

)

SOUTH AII-IAN

DISTRICT

REGISTRY)

No. SA G.15 of 1984

)

DIVISIN

3

ON "

TRIBUNAL

IT AUTHORITY

Appellant

-

8

Respondent

: FOX, Woodward and Dnvles JJ

30 October 1984

!Chls

I s an appeal from a declslon of

the Administrative

Appeal8 Tribunal.

The short issue In the

appeal I s whether the word "may" in

0.37 of the w e

Force R

s

t

i

f

-

e

Art 1973

(Cth) ("the Act") con€ers

a wide discretion upon the Defence

Force Retirement and Death Benefits Authority ("the Authority") or whether it merely confers a power which the Authority is under

2. J

a duty to exercise if the other elements of the section be satisfied. It was in that latter aense that the Administrative Appeals Tribunal read the section, which provides I

"37. Where a contributing member has been retired otherwise than on the ground of invalidity or of physical or mental incapacity to perform his duties but, after his retirement, the Chief of Naval Staff, the Chief of the General Staff or the Chief of the Air Staff or a person authorized in writing by the Chief of Naval Staff, the Chief of the General Staff or the Chief of the Air Staff, as the case requires, informs the Authority that, at the time the member was retired, grounds existed on which he could have been retired on the

ground of invalidity or of physical or mental incapacity to perform hia duties, he may, for the purposes of this Act, be treated as if he had been

retired on that ground."

The principles to be applied were stated

in

v W i l l i w

(1955) 92 CLR 496 by Dixon CJ, Webb,

Fullagar, Kitto and Taylor

JJ at p.505-6 a6 follows :

"In considering the correctness of this interpretation it is necessary to bear steadily in mind that it is the real intention of the legislature that must be ascertained and that in ascertaining it you begin with the prima facie presumption that permissive or…

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Details
Case
[1984] FCA 350
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Defence Force Retirement and Death Benefit Authority v Britt is an appeal from a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. The central issue in the appeal is the interpretation of the word "may" in section 37 of the Defence Force Retirement and Death Benefits Act 1973 (Cth). Specifically, the question is whether this word confers a broad discretion on the Defence Force Retirement and Death Benefits Authority (the Authority) or merely a power that the Authority is obligated to exercise if certain conditions are met. The Administrative Appeals Tribunal had interpreted the word "may" as imposing a duty on the Authority to exercise the power if the conditions of section 37 were satisfied.

The Court considered the principles for interpreting statutory language, particularly focusing on whether the word "may" in section 37 should be read as permissive or mandatory. The Court examined the context of the Act and noted that other sections of the Act confer specific benefits based on particular conditions, without granting the Authority any discretion. Section 37, however, explicitly confers a discretion on the Authority to treat a member as if they had been retired on the ground of invalidity, even if they were not actually so retired. The Court found that the word "may" in this context confers a discretion rather than an obligation, as it would not be possible to read it in any other sense, given the context of the Act and the specific benefits outlined in other sections.

The Court further reasoned that the discretion conferred by section 37 is intended to be exercised by the Authority, not the Chiefs of Staff, despite the latter's role in determining whether grounds existed for the member to have been retired on the ground of invalidity. The Court concluded that the interpretation of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal was incorrect and set aside their decision, remitting the matter to the Tribunal for reconsideration in light of the Court's findings.

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