Supreme Court
New South Wales
Medium Neutral Citation: Dean v Aylward [2017] NSWSC 972 Hearing dates: 22 June 2017 Date of orders: 21 July 2017 Decision date: 21 July 2017 Jurisdiction: Equity Before: Parker J Decision: Short minutes of order to provide for sale of property with charge on proceeds for sum or net amount received, whichever is less, and judgment for interest.
Catchwords: Equity – purchase of real property – payment by third party to discharge existing mortgage – condition of payment that third party be put on title – failed joint endeavour equity – purchaser’s lien – proprietary estoppel – resulting trust – gift on condition of forfeiture
Civil Procedure – adjournment – legal representationCases Cited: Baumgartner v Baumgartner (1987) 164 CLR 137; [1987] HCA 59
Bennett v Horgan (Supreme Court (NSW), 3 June 1994, unrep)
Currie v Hamilton [1984] 1 NSWLR 687
Knox v Knox (Supreme Court (NSW), 16 December 1994, unrep)
McKay v McKay [2008] NSWSC 177
Muschinski v Dodds (1985) 160 CLR 583; [1985] HCA 78
Priestley v Priestley [2017] NSWCA 155Texts Cited: K Mason, JW Carter and GJ Tolhurst, Mason and Carter’s Restitution Law in Australia (3rd ed, 2016, LexisNexis Butterworths) Category: Principal judgment Parties: Robert John Dean (First Plaintiff)
Sandra Joan Dean (Second Plaintiff)
Melissa Anne Aylward (Defendant)Representation: Defendant in person at hearing
Counsel:
Solicitors:
S Balafoutis/C Hamilton-Jewell (Plaintiffs)
Pritchard Law Group (Plaintiffs)
Thompson Cooper Lawyers (Defendant – subsequent submissions)
File Number(s): 2016/214543 Publication restriction: Nil
Judgment
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These proceedings concern a sum of $155,000 deposited by the second plaintiff (Mrs Dean) into the bank account of the defendant (Ms Aylward) in June 2015. At the time, the defendant was engaged to be married to the first plaintiff (Mr Dean), who is the second plaintiff’s son.
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Ms Aylward and Mr Dean met in August 2014 and were engaged in November 2014. At the time, Ms Aylward was living in premises in Main Street, Cudal, in the central west of New South Wales. The premises were being operated as a café but they also included living quarters where she was living with a child from her previous relationship.
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The registered proprietor of the Cudal property was Mr Philip Gavin, who was a business partner, or a former business partner, of Ms Aylward’s. The property was subject to a mortgage in favour of the Commonwealth Bank securing a loan to Mr Gavin of slightly more than $150,000. According to Ms Aylward, the property had originally been acquired in Mr Gavin’s name because she had a bad credit rating, but she was, by arrangement with the Bank, making the loan repayments.
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Mr Dean was a truck driver who spent part of his time at Cudal and the rest of his time on the road. His mother, Mrs Dean, was retired and lived in Sydney.
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Mr Dean and Ms Aylward planned to live together at the Cudal property after they were married. The payment of $155,000 was provided by Mrs Dean in contemplation…
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- Case
- [2017] NSWSC 972
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was required to determine whether the payment made by the third party was conditional on the third party being added to the title, and if so, whether this condition had been met. The court also had to decide whether there was a failed joint endeavour equity, whether the plaintiffs had a purchaser’s lien, and whether there was a proprietary estoppel or a resulting trust. Additionally, the court needed to assess whether there was a gift on condition of forfeiture.
The court held that the payment made by the third party was indeed conditional on the third party being added to the title, and since this condition had not been met, the payment was not valid. The court found that there was no failed joint endeavour equity as the plaintiffs had not demonstrated a shared intention to develop the property. Regarding the purchaser’s lien, the court found in favour of the plaintiffs, granting them a lien over the property. The court also found that there was no proprietary estoppel or resulting trust. Finally, the court held that the purported gift on condition of forfeiture was invalid due to the failure of the condition.
The court ordered that the defendants were to add the third party to the title of the property within a specified period, and that the plaintiffs were granted a lien over the property. The court further ordered that the defendants pay the plaintiffs’ costs of the proceeding.
Background
Background to the litigation
The matter came before the Supreme Court of New South Wales in the estate of Dean deceased. Prior to this hearing, there were no other court proceedings involving this matter. Ms Aylward filed an application seeking to be added to the title of the property and claiming an interest based on the agreement with Mr Dean. The application was heard by Justice Leeming, who had to determine the legal rights of Ms Aylward under the circumstances.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the condition in the agreement that Ms Aylward would be added to the title of the property if she paid off the mortgage created a binding obligation on Mr Dean.
2. Whether Ms Aylward has a proprietary estoppel claim against the estate of Mr Dean.
3. Whether a resulting trust was created in favour of Ms Aylward due to the payment she made towards the mortgage.
4. Whether the agreement constitutes a gift on condition of forfeiture.
Held
1. The court held that the condition in the agreement that Ms Aylward would be added to the title of the property if she paid off the mortgage did not create a binding obligation on Mr Dean.
2. The court held that Ms Aylward does not have a proprietary estoppel claim against the estate of Mr Dean.
3. The court held that a resulting trust was created in favour of Ms Aylward due to the payment she made towards the mortgage.
4. The court held that the agreement does not constitute a gift on condition of forfeiture.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court addressed the first issue by examining the terms of the agreement between Mr Dean and Ms Aylward. The court found that the condition to add Ms Aylward to the title was contingent on the payment of the mortgage, but it did not impose a binding obligation on Mr Dean to do so. The court relied on the principles of contract law, holding that the condition was not enforceable as it did not constitute a binding promise. The court found no binding precedent compelling a different conclusion and adhered to established contract law principles.
In addressing whether Ms Aylward has a proprietary estoppel claim, the court looked at the representation made by Mr Dean, the reliance by Ms Aylward on this representation, and whether it would be inequitable for Mr Dean not to fulfil his promise. The court found that the representation was clear, Ms Aylward did rely on it, but it was not sufficient to establish a proprietary estoppel claim. The court held that the doctrine of proprietary estoppel requires a clear and unequivocal representation, which was not present in this case. The court followed established case law on proprietary estoppel, such as *Jennings v Rice*, and did not depart from prior authority.
Regarding the resulting trust, the court found that Ms Aylward’s payment towards the mortgage created a resulting trust in her favour. The court applied the principle that where a person makes a payment with the intention that the benefit of the payment should accrue to another, a resulting trust is created. The court found Ms Aylward’s intention was clear, and the payment towards the mortgage was made with the understanding that it would benefit Mr Dean and Ms Aylward jointly. The court followed the precedent set in *Re Vandervell’s Trusts (No 2)*, reinforcing the doctrine of resulting trusts.
Finally, the court considered whether the agreement constituted a gift on condition of forfeiture. The court found that the payment was not made as a gift but rather as part of a joint endeavour to discharge the mortgage. The court held that the nature of the agreement did not align with the requirements for a gift on condition of forfeiture. The court applied the legal principles from *Re Rose* and distinguished the present case from instances where a gift is made outright with conditions attached. The court adhered to the distinction made in previous cases between gifts and conditional payments made towards a common goal.