De Tocqueville Private Equity Pty Ltd v Linden & Conway Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

De Tocqueville Private Equity Pty Ltd v Linden & Conway Limited, in the matter of Linden & Conway Limited [2006] FCA 1309

CORPORATIONS – oppressive or unfair conduct – what constitutes - whether action to delist company amounts to unfair conduct – continuation of conduct at time of proceeding not necessary – appropriate relief

Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 232, 233

Fexuto Pty Ltd v Bosnjak Holdings Pty Ltd (No 2) (1998) 28 ACSR 688 cited
M Dalley & Co Pty Ltd v Sims (1968) 120 CLR 603 considered
Martin v Australian Squash Club Pty Ltd (1996) 14 ACLC 452, 475 cited
Re G Jeffrey (Mens Store) Pty Ltd and G Jeffrey Pty Ltd (1984) 9 ACLR 193 considered
Re Spargos MiningNL (1990) 3 WAR 166 followed
Shelton v National Roads & Motorists Association Ltd (2004) 51 ACSR 278 considered
Thomas v HW Thomas Ltd [1984] 1 NZLR 686 discussed
Turnbull v National Roads & Motorists Association Ltd (2004) 186 FLR 360 considered

In the matter of Linden & Conway Limited (ACN 009 661 769)

DE TOCQUEVILLE PRIVATE EQUITY PTY LTD (ACN 117 201 519) AND LEOPARD ASSET MANAGEMENT PTY LTD (ACN 105 479 463) v LINDEN & CONWAY LIMITED (ACN 009 661 769) AND ALLAN TREGITHEW FRANK ROWE
VID 810 OF 2006

MIDDLETON J
22 AUGUST 2006
MELBOURNE


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

VID 810 OF 2006

IN THE MATTER OF LINDEN & CONWAY LIMITED (ACN 009 661 769)

BETWEEN:

DE TOCQUEVILLE PRIVATE EQUITY PTY LTD (ACN 117 201 519)
First Plaintiff

LEOPARD ASSET MANAGEMENT PTY LTD (ACN 105 479 463)
Second Plaintiff

AND:

LINDEN & CONWAY LIMITED (ACN 009 661 769)
First Defendant

ALLAN TREGITHEW FRANK ROWE
Second Defendant

JUDGE:

MIDDLETON J

DATE OF ORDER:

22 AUGUST 2006

WHERE MADE:

MELBOURNE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application be dismissed.

2.Plaintiffs to pay the defendants’ costs.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

VID 810 OF 2006

IN THE MATTER OF LINDEN & CONWAY LIMITED (ACN 009 661 769)

BETWEEN:

DE TOCQUEVILLE PRIVATE EQUITY PTY LTD (ACN 117 201 519)
First Plaintiff

LEOPARD ASSET MANAGEMENT PTY LTD (ACN 105 479 463)
Second Plaintiff

AND:

LINDEN & CONWAY LIMITED (ACN 009 661 769)
First Defendant

ALLAN TREGITHEW FRANK ROWE
Second Defendant

JUDGE:

MIDDLETON J

DATE:

22 AUGUST 2006

PLACE:

MELBOURNE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction

  1. This is an application made pursuant to s 232 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (‘the Act’) seeking relief under s 233. Sections 232 and 233(1) of the Act provide as follows:

    232   The Court may make an order under section 233 if:
            (a)   the conduct of a company’s affairs; or

    (b)an actual or proposed act or omission by or on behalf of a company; or

    (c)a resolution, or a proposed resolution, of members or a class of members of a company;

    is either:

    (d)     contrary…

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Details
Case
[2006] FCA 1309
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

De Tocqueville Private Equity Pty Ltd and Leopard Asset Management Pty Ltd, the plaintiffs, sought relief against Linden & Conway Limited and Allan Rowe, the defendants, under sections 232(d) and (e) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). The plaintiffs sought orders for the appointment of independent officers, a return of capital, or the purchase of their shares, and costs. The primary dispute arose from the plaintiffs' dissatisfaction with the management of Linden & Conway Limited, culminating in their request for changes to the company's leadership and capital structure.

The court had to determine whether the defendants' actions constituted oppressive or unfairly prejudicial conduct under sections 232(d) and (e) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). The plaintiffs argued that the defendants unfairly restricted their ability to sell shares and failed to respond to their concerns. The court needed to assess the cumulative effect of the defendants' actions and whether they amounted to oppressive conduct warranting court intervention.

The court examined the defendants' actions, including their decision to delist the company and their failure to respond to the plaintiffs' correspondence. The court found that while the plaintiffs had legitimate concerns, the defendants' conduct did not reach the threshold of oppressive or unfairly prejudicial conduct as defined by the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). The court noted that the plaintiffs would have faced difficulties selling their shares regardless of the company's listing status. The failure to respond to correspondence and the timing of notifications were not sufficient to establish oppressive conduct. Therefore, the court concluded that the plaintiffs' application should be dismissed.

The court dismissed the application and ordered the plaintiffs to pay the defendants' costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application be dismissed.

2. Plaintiffs to pay the defendants’ costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

By amended application, the plaintiffs seek various relief in reliance upon ss 232(d) and (e) of the Act as follows: 1.Orders pursuant to section 233 of the [Act] that the first defendant:(a) appoint an independent chief executive officer nominated by the plaintiffs;(b) appoint 2 independent non-executive directors nominated by the plaintiffs.2.In the alternative, an order pursuant to section 233 of the [Act] that the first defendant declare a return of capital of all of the company’s liquid assets except cash sufficient to cover operating costs for a period of 12 months.3.In the further alternative, an order pursuant to section 233 of the [Act] that the shares of the plaintiffs in the first defendant be purchased by the second defendant or his nominee/s for fair value.4.Such further or other orders or directions necessary for the plaintiffs to obtain the relief set out in paragraphs 1 and 2 above.5.An order that the defendants pay the plaintiffs’ costs of this proceeding.Factual Background The primary facts as to the background circumstances giving rise to this application are not in contention. On 11 August 1933 the first defendant, Linden & Conway Limited (‘LND’), was registered pursuant to the laws of Queensland. On 15 July 1968 the second defendant, Mr Allan Rowe, became a director of LND. In the same year he became the Chief Executive Officer of LND. On 10 July 2003 the second plaintiff, Leopard Asset Management Pty Ltd (‘LAM’), was incorporated pursuant to the Act. Mr Michael de Tocqueville is the sole director and shareholder of LAM. In the period from June 2005 to October 2005 LAM acquired parcels of shares in, and became a member of, LND. The LND directors' report showed that, as at 12 August 2005, Mr Rowe was the major shareholder in LND and held interests in, amongst others, the following voting shares in LND: 180,009 (i.e. 85.36 per cent) of the 210,872 fully-paid ordinary shares in LND, and 2,230 (i.e. 73.38 per cent) of the 3,043 fully-paid 9 per cent fixed cumulative preference shares in LND. On 18 November 2005 the first plaintiff, De Tocqueville Private Equity Pty Ltd (‘DPE’), was incorporated pursuant to the Act. Mr de Tocqueville is a director and shareholder of DPE. On 3 March 2006, DPE acquired all of LAM’s shares in, and became a member of, LND. On 20 March 2006 DPE wrote to Mr Rowe and LND and expressed concerns about the management of LND. DPE sought responses to each of those concerns. On 8 May 2006, LND wrote to its shareholders and reported, amongst other things, that LND had received a letter dated 28 April 2006 from Australian Stock Exchange Limited (‘ASX’), requiring it to comply with listing rules 12.3 and 12.4. ASX wrote: Thank you for your letter dated 25 November 2005.As you are aware, Australian Stock Exchange Limited (“ASX”) has been corresponding with the Company since 8 March 2005 in relation to the requirements of listing rules 12.3 and 12.4, and has previously highlighted that ASX may impose a suspension of trading on an entity’s securities where compliance with these rules is at issue.During this time, ASX has endeavoured to provide the Company with a reasonable period of time within which to take steps necessary to demonstrate compliance with these rules – in other words, to undertake the investment of sufficient of its cash, to ensure that rule 12.3 no longer applied to it, and to enable the Company to take steps to increase the number of holders of its main class of securities with marketable parcels to approximately 250 to 300 holders, to meet ASX’s requirements under rule 12.4. To date, the Company has stated that it is not in a position to take action necessary to comply with the requirements of these rules.ASX has considered this matter further and has made the following determination.1.The Company will be afforded a period of six months from the date of this letter to demonstrate to ASX that it complies with listing rule 12.3. If the Company has not demonstrated compliance with the rule to ASX’s satisfaction by 31 October 2006, ASX will suspend the Company’s securities from official quotation prior to the commencement of trading on 1 November 2006.2.The Company will be afforded a period of 12 months from the date of this letter to demonstrate compliance with listing rule 12.4, to ASX’s satisfaction. If the Company is unable to demonstrate a level of spread acceptable to ASX by 30 April 2007, ASX will suspend the Company’s securities from official quotation on 1 May 2007.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

MIDDLETON J

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: MIDDLETON J

Finally, it is not necessary that the conduct of which the plaintiffs complain be continuing at the time of the application or at the time when the court comes to consider the matter. However, that question may well be relevant as to whether relief is granted at all or what is the appropriate relief: Re Spargos MiningNL (1990) 3 WAR 166.Consideration One must look to all the circumstances, including the timing of the actions of the defendants, to ascertain whether particular conduct is within the terms of ss 232(d) or (e). One event or one act in itself may not constitute an act which will provide the basis for the court to conclude that the conduct is within these provisions. However a number of events or acts, when viewed cumulatively, may well provide such a basis. The main complaint in this case is that the defendants unfairly took action to put a restriction upon the plaintiffs’ ability to sell their shares through the taking of a positive action to delist LND. The restriction was not so much one which realistically imposed any greater restraint upon the volume of shares that could be sold, but it was said that it did impact upon the price that could be achieved. The evidence seems clear that, whether listed or not, the plaintiffs would have difficulty in selling their shares, even if they were so minded to sell. There was evidence of a recent sale of some 680 of DPE’s shares for the price of $46 each which seemed to be above the ‘fair value’ attributed by the directors of LND. In addition to this positive action to delist, the plaintiffs call in aid a number of other factors which indicate the unfair dealing, such as the failure to respond to requests addressing their concerns and other correspondence, compelling the institution of these proceedings and failing to notify in a timely matter various matters affecting LND. It seems strange that no response was made to the correspondence from the plaintiffs, particularly the letter setting out the concerns of the plaintiffs, dated 20 March 2006, although it seems clear that all the concerns were considered by the Board of LND at the meeting on 22 June 2006. Clearly, the Board took the view that the plaintiffs were seeking to interfere with the administration and investment strategy of LND, which the directors were not prepared to accept. Whilst a response may have been prudent, I do not view the failure to respond to this letter or the other correspondence, in the circumstances, as constituting a basis to support the plaintiffs’ case, either in isolation or combined with the other factors relied on by the plaintiffs. Equally, I do not put much store upon the allegations of the untimely manner of informing the plaintiffs in relation to certain of LND’s affairs, particularly in relation to the communications and negotiations with ASX. It seems to me that these are matters which could be discussed by the directors prior to any notification necessarily being given to the other shareholders, including the plaintiffs.