FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
DB Marketing Solutions Pty Ltd (formerly known as Auto Xtreme Electronics Pty Ltd) v Cause [2014] FCA 1153
Citation: DB Marketing Solutions Pty Ltd (formerly known as Auto Xtreme Electronics Pty Ltd) v Cause [2014] FCA 1153 Appeal from: Application for leave to appeal: DB Marketing Solutions Pty Ltd (formerly known as Auto Xtreme Electronics Pty Ltd) v Cause [2014] FCA 1026 Parties: DB MARKETING SOLUTIONS PTY LTD (FORMERLY KNOWN AS AUTO XTREME ELECTRONICS PTY LTD) ACN 105 423 014 and WORLDMARK GROUP HOLDINGS PTY LTD (FORMERLY KNOWN AS ACN 144 505 199 PTY LTD) v TRENT DAVID CAUSE, ASHLEY GRANT CAUSE and ON HIGHWAY ELECTRONICS (A PARTNERSHIP) ABN 67 918 445 405 File number: QUD 548 of 2014 Judge: RANGIAH J Date of judgment: 28 October 2014 Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for leave to appeal – whether primary judge erred in not granting interlocutory injunctions against second and third respondents – no substantial injustice – application for leave to appeal dismissed Legislation: Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 182(1) and 183(1)
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 24(1A) and 27
Partnership Act1891 (Qld) ss 8 and 9Cases cited: Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O’Neill (2006) 227 CLR 57 cited
Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397 cited
Guus v Johnstone [2000] FCA 1455 cited
Johnson Tiles Pty Ltd v Esso Australia Pty Ltd (2000) 104 FCR 564 cited
Minogue v Williams [2000] FCA 125 cited
Samsung Electronics Co Ltd v Apple Inc (2011) 217 FCR 238 citedDate of hearing: 27 October 2014 Place: Brisbane Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 34 Counsel for the Applicants: Mr NM Cooke Solicitor for the Applicants: Hunt and Hunt Lawyers Solicitor for the Respondents: Mr R Watson-Jones of Snowton Saje
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
QUD 548 of 2014
BETWEEN: DB MARKETING SOLUTIONS PTY LTD (FORMERLY KNOWN AS AUTO XTREME ELECTRONICS PTY LTD) ACN 105 423 014
First ApplicantWORLDMARK GROUP HOLDINGS PTY LTD (FORMERLY KNOWN AS ACN 144 505 199 PTY LTD)
Second ApplicantAND: TRENT DAVID CAUSE
First RespondentASHLEY GRANT CAUSE
Second RespondentON HIGHWAY ELECTRONICS (A PARTNERSHIP) ABN 67 918 445 405
Third Respondent
JUDGE:
RANGIAH J
DATE OF ORDER:
28 OCTOBER 2014
WHERE MADE:
BRISBANE
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.
2.The applicants pay the respondents’ costs of the application.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
QUD 548 of 2014
BETWEEN: DB MARKETING SOLUTIONS PTY LTD (FORMERLY KNOWN AS AUTO XTREME ELECTRONICS PTY LTD) ACN 105 423 014
First ApplicantWORLDMARK GROUP HOLDINGS PTY LTD (FORMERLY KNOWN AS ACN 144 505 199 PTY LTD)
Second ApplicantAND: TRENT DAVID CAUSE
First RespondentASHLEY GRANT CAUSE
Second RespondentON HIGHWAY ELECTRONICS (A PARTNERSHIP) ABN 67 918 445 405
Third…
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- Case
- [2014] FCA 1153
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered whether the applicants had established a serious question to be tried against Ashley Cause and On Highway Electronics. The applicants argued that Ashley Cause was employed by one of the applicants and was therefore bound by a contract which restrained him from competing with Auto Xtreme. However, the court found that the applicants had not established a serious question to be tried against Ashley Cause as there was no evidence before the primary judge that he was an employee of one of the applicants. The applicants also proposed to adduce further evidence of an annexure to a contract between Ashley Cause and Playing to Win Pty Ltd, which they asserted would have shown that Ashley Cause was bound by a restraint agreement. However, the court found that the applicants had not sought leave to adduce this evidence and had not explained why it was not placed before the primary judge. The court also found that there was at least the possibility of making another application for an injunction based on the applicants' recent discovery of the annexure.
The court dismissed the application for leave to appeal. The applicants were ordered to pay the respondents' costs of the application. The court found that the applicants had not demonstrated that they would suffer substantial injustice if leave were refused.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.
2. The applicants pay the respondents’ costs of the application.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The proposed grounds of appeal are general in nature and do not themselves specify the errors that the applicants assert the primary judge committed. It is necessary to consider the submissions made in order to identify what errors are asserted.Consideration The applicants initially argued that her Honour erred in failing to find that Ashley Cause was employed by DBMS or WorldMark. They eventually accepted that her Honour’s finding that he was employed by Motor One Group Pty Ltd, a company which is not an applicant in the proceeding, was correct. Accordingly, the applicants cannot succeed in any appeal on the basis that Ashley Cause breached a contract of employment with one of the applicants or that he breached ss 182(1) or 183(1) of the Corporations Act. The applicants argue that her Honour erred in failing to find that DBMS is entitled to enforce the confidentiality and restraint agreement annexed to and forming part of the contract under which Ashley Cause agreed to provide services to Playing to Win Pty Ltd. The applicants point to an agreement for the sale of the business by Playing to Win Pty Ltd to DBMS, under its former name. The agreement provides for the assignment to DBMS of the vendor’s rights and interests in its “Business Contracts”, a term that appears to be defined widely enough to include the contract with Ashley Cause. In the application before the primary judge, the applicants placed into evidence the written contract between Playing to Win Pty Ltd and Ashley Cause, but not the annexure containing the confidentiality and restraint agreement. As there was no evidence as to the terms of any restrictions on Ashley Cause, it was impossible for her Honour to find that there was a serious question to be tried as to whether Ashley Cause had breached the agreement, irrespective of the ability of DBMS to enforce the agreement. The applicants propose to adduce evidence in their appeal of what they assert is the annexure containing the confidentiality and restraint agreement. That agreement requires that Ashley Cause not disclose “Confidential Information” to any person, which includes all information which is by its nature likely to be confidential and which relates to customers or the business. The agreement also prevents Ashley Cause from soliciting customers of Playing to Win Pty Ltd for up to one year from the termination of the contract. The applicants assert that DBMS is entitled to the benefit of the agreement and is entitled to enforce it. It would be necessary for the applicants to obtain the leave of the Full Court to adduce this further evidence pursuant to s 27 of the Federal Court of Australia Act. The applicants would ordinarily have to explain why this evidence was not placed before the primary judge and satisfy the Full Court that the further evidence would have produced a different result if it had been available at the trial: Guus v Johnstone [2000] FCA 1455 at [33], [45]. The applicants have not sought to raise any such explanation in this application. In the absence of such an explanation, I consider that their prospects of being permitted to adduce this further evidence on appeal are poor. Their prospects of succeeding in the appeal on this ground are insufficient to justify a grant of leave. In addition, there is at least the possibility of making another application for an injunction based on what may be the applicants’ recent discovery of the annexure, so I am not satisfied that the applicants would suffer substantial injustice if leave were refused.